EP1923658B1 - Procédé de vérification de la capacité d'interaction entre un aéronef et un corps volant non habité armé pouvant être couplé avec celui-ci - Google Patents

Procédé de vérification de la capacité d'interaction entre un aéronef et un corps volant non habité armé pouvant être couplé avec celui-ci Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1923658B1
EP1923658B1 EP07022253A EP07022253A EP1923658B1 EP 1923658 B1 EP1923658 B1 EP 1923658B1 EP 07022253 A EP07022253 A EP 07022253A EP 07022253 A EP07022253 A EP 07022253A EP 1923658 B1 EP1923658 B1 EP 1923658B1
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Prior art keywords
armed
aircraft
airborne vehicle
check
test
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Expired - Fee Related
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EP07022253A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP1923658A3 (fr
EP1923658A2 (fr
EP1923658B2 (fr
Inventor
Michael Grabmeier
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MBDA Deutschland GmbH
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LFK Lenkflugkoerpersysteme GmbH
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    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42B—EXPLOSIVE CHARGES, e.g. FOR BLASTING, FIREWORKS, AMMUNITION
    • F42B35/00—Testing or checking of ammunition
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41—WEAPONS
    • F41F—APPARATUS FOR LAUNCHING PROJECTILES OR MISSILES FROM BARRELS, e.g. CANNONS; LAUNCHERS FOR ROCKETS OR TORPEDOES; HARPOON GUNS
    • F41F3/00—Rocket or torpedo launchers
    • F41F3/04—Rocket or torpedo launchers for rockets
    • F41F3/055—Umbilical connecting means

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method for checking the ability to interact between an aircraft and an armed, unmanned missile which can be coupled thereto, in accordance with the preamble of patent claim 1.
  • Such armed missiles and their interfaces to the aircraft as well as the weapon control functions in the aircraft are becoming increasingly complex and "intelligent". This increases the likelihood of malfunction in any one of the functional elements of the unit from an aircraft and an armed missile coupled to it, thus resulting in the need to operate the system of aircraft, armed missile, prior to launching an armed missile-launched aircraft and to reliably detect this connecting interface. As a result, the loss of the armed missile can be avoided by emergency shedding, a non-fulfillment of the mission to be flown and also collateral damage by an armed or missile that does not function or does not fully function.
  • the US 5,721,680 A discloses a method for testing the operational readiness of a rocket. It states that it is customary to test the rocket's functionality during the manufacturing process, after removal from a depot and when mounting it on the launcher, the latter statement leaving open whether this test is prior to attachment to the launcher or before the launcher actual launch takes place when the rocket is already connected to the launcher. A systematic review of both the rocket and the launcher both separately prior to mounting the rocket on the launcher and a subsequent joint test after mounting the rocket on the launcher is not known from this citation.
  • the object of the present invention is therefore to specify a generic method which can increase the functional reliability of an aircraft unit and armed, unmanned missile which can be coupled thereto and thereby minimize functional failures and collateral damage.
  • This solution according to the invention provides a method in which the armed missile, the aircraft and the interaction between the aircraft and the armed missile, ie the interface between the two, are checked systematically and in a coherent sequence.
  • This systemic approach to carrying out a review makes it possible to verify the overall system of aircraft, armed missile and interface immediately before the aircraft is launched. This makes it possible to make a much more reliable statement about the functionality of the overall system intended for use. It is not only important that a review of the aircraft, armed missile and interface itself takes place, but that in concrete terms an intended for use unit of aircraft, armed missile and interface of the inventive review is subjected. This check should be made as soon as possible before take-off of the aircraft. The order of steps a) and b) can also be reversed.
  • a simple identification means can be formed, for example, from a short-circuit plug, which is connected to the missile.
  • the duration of individual technical processes in the armed missile is measured and stored in a memory in the missile and output after completion of the entire review via the maintenance interface.
  • This recording of the duration of individual technical processes allows a state analysis even if no fatal error has occurred. Based on the data collected and stored, a decision can be taken after the verification has been carried out to determine whether the overall system of aircraft and armed missile is still operational.
  • the interlock conduit of the weapon station of the aircraft is a discrete conduit, which is returned from the aircraft to the missile and which is split when the missile is separated from the aircraft. This allows the aircraft to detect whether the missile has been decoupled properly from the aircraft, ie, a "release" of the missile took place, or whether the missile has not been disconnected or not completely disconnected, so that there is a so-called "hangfire”.
  • the interlock cables are part of the relevant standard MIL-STD-1760 and are classified as safety-critical.
  • the error circumstances causing the error are output via the armed missile maintenance interface.
  • the operating personnel are provided with data that allows fast troubleshooting.
  • the sporadic, non-fatal errors detected during the communication analysis test are stored in the armed missile according to type and number and are output as a report after completion of the check via the armed missile maintenance interface, then this can also be used for reliable fault analysis and contribute to faster repair of the affected component advantageous.
  • This report allows to check the aircraft navigation for plausibility and the correct supply of the armed missile with navigation data.
  • the missile software has various modes of operation, namely, operational operation for use of the missile, a special test operation during missile manufacture, and a special test operation during missile utilization.
  • the communication analysis test is a variant of the special test operation during use. It is selected by means of an identification means designed, for example, as a short-circuit plug.
  • Fig. 1 schematically shows the test setup for the test of an armed missile 1 by means of an external weapons test device.
  • the missile 1 has a fuselage 10, wings 11, rudder flaps 12, 13, at least one engine, of which in the Fig. 1 only the right air inflow channel 14 is shown, and at its front end an infrared homing head 15 on.
  • a test unit TLP
  • the missile is provided inside the fuselage with one or more warheads (for example Vorhohlladung or Penetrator).
  • warheads for example Vorhohlladung or Penetrator
  • Another interface 18 is provided at the top of the missile 1, via which the missile is in use connected to the aircraft carrying it (umbilical interface) and which is used in the present method for data exchange with the weapon test apparatus 100.
  • the missile 1 is connected via an antenna line 60 to an external satellite navigation antenna 6, which supplies the missile-own on-board computer with satellite navigation data.
  • the weapon test apparatus 100 is connected to the maintenance interface 16 'of the missile 1 via a second connection cable 104, the so-called "maintenance cable”.
  • the weapon test apparatus 100 is connected to an external power supply device 108 via a power supply cable 106.
  • This power supply device can supply the weapon test apparatus 100 with the usual 3x115V 400 Hz power supply in suitable carrier aircraft.
  • Fig. 1 As shown in the experimental setup, the functioning of the armed missile 1 is performed by means of the weapon test apparatus 100 in the manner described below.
  • Fig. 2 shows a schematic test setup for the test of a weapon station of an aircraft.
  • a weapon station device 20 is provided on the underside 21 of the aircraft 2 either on the fuselage or on one of the wings of the aircraft 2.
  • a left weapon station 20 'and a right weapon station 20 are shown schematically, which are mounted below the fuselage of the aircraft 2.
  • Each of the weapon stations 20 ', 20 " is connected to a weapon station tester 200 or 210 via a respectively assigned umbilical cable 202 or 212.
  • the respective umbilical cable 202, 212 is for this purpose to a corresponding (not shown) interface of the associated weapon station 20 ', 20 "connected and electrically connected to this.
  • the two weapon station test devices 200, 210 are each supplied from the aircraft 2 via a power supply cable 204, 214 with an on-board voltage; this on-board voltage is for example 28 V. Furthermore, the two weapon station test equipment 200, 210 via a respective data cable 206, 216 connected to an external computer 220, such as a notebook, for data exchange.
  • the computer 220 may be electrically connected by a power supply cable 222 to a conventional power grid.
  • the test setup shown verifies the weapon station 20, 20 'of the aircraft 2 by means of the weapon station test device 200, 210.
  • the implementation of this test will be described in more detail below.
  • Fig. 3 shows a schematic test setup for the communication analysis test between the missile 1 and the aircraft 2.
  • the missile 1 is suspended by means of the suspension devices 17, 17 'at the weapon station 20' of the aircraft 2, as in Fig. 3 is shown schematically.
  • the umbilical interface 18 of the missile 1 is connected via an aircraft-internal Umbilical cable 22 with the (not shown) on-board electronics of the aircraft 2, which has a weapon control computer.
  • the missile 1 is provided with an identification means, which is formed for example by a suitable short-circuit plug, which is inserted into a corresponding electrical socket and together with this forms a plug connection, in which by plugging the plug into the socket at least one Connection between two contacts of the socket is made.
  • the short-circuit plug forming the identification means can be situated, for example, in the area of the maintenance interface 16 'and thus also accessible by opening the hull which covers it.
  • a visualization means 300 is connected to the maintenance interface 16 'of the missile 1 by means of a maintenance cable 302.
  • the Visualization means may be formed for example by a monitor or a computer.
  • FIG. 3 schematically test construction is the implementation of a communication analysis test between the aircraft 2 and the missile 1 possible, wherein the implementation of the test will be discussed in detail below.
  • Fig. 4 shows a flowchart for schematically illustrating the method sequence according to the invention.
  • step 400 the test of the armed missile in the figures also designated as a weapon 1.
  • the functioning of the armed missile 1 is checked by means of the weapons test apparatus 100, as for example in the not previously published German patent application DE 10 2006 041 140.4 is described.
  • test of the missile can be done in several steps. For example, initially for a first component of the missile a power-on test, in which the component tests its basic functions independently, followed by a triggered self-test of the component follows in a next step, which is commanded by the on-board computer of the missile and in which activates the complete test spectrum of the isolated component becomes.
  • a continuous test of the corresponding component carried out under a simulation of an existing carrier aircraft and a mission software loaded into the computer of the missile then takes place, in particular the Functionality of possibly present in the component sensors, detectors or actuators is checked.
  • tests of component groups and function chains are carried out.
  • the result of the tests is output via the weapon test apparatus 100.
  • This complete error image essentially contains a complete log of the individual tests carried out with their respective results and the error cause of the component reported as defective, including all relevant information from a possibly defective component as well as from the environment of this defective component. This "NOGO" check can also be carried out continuously in all three steps.
  • sporadic, non-fatal errors that have been recorded during the test are output to the weapon test apparatus 100 during the test, so that a person evaluating the test result can obtain an image of the condition of the missile from this sporadic, non-fatal error data 1, even though these mistakes did not contribute to the "NOGO" decision.
  • the evaluating person can then draw conclusions about the condition of the missile, so that on the basis of this data certain maintenance or repair work on the missile can be made.
  • technical times of individual processes taking place in the missile 1 or in its control computer are measured, logged and output to the external weapon test device 100. Even from these technical times, a person analyzing the test result can draw conclusions about the condition of the missile and thus arrange maintenance work in good time.
  • step 402 If, after this test of the armed missile, it has been determined in step 402 whether the test was successful, the test of the weapon station of the aircraft is subsequently carried out in step 404.
  • a first operator occupying the space of the weapon system officer in the cockpit executes the appropriate commands required to launch and discharge the armed missile 1 from the aircraft 2.
  • a second operator on the ground observes on the screen of the computer 220 the corresponding signals at the associated weapon stations 20 ', 20 "which are caused in response to the operations performed by the first operator, and the first person in the cockpit observes the corresponding ones Cockpit displays and verifies that these ads work in the correct manner for the operating case.
  • step 408 the missile 1 is attached to the associated weapon station 20 ', 20 "of the aircraft 2 and mechanically and electrically connected to the aircraft 2.
  • step 410 an operational run-up of the armed missile 1 takes place at the weapon station 20 'or 20 "of the aircraft 2.
  • the individual components of the armed missile 1 are activated by the aircraft 2 and certain automatic checks are performed.
  • Fig. 5 shows a development of the above in connection with the Fig. 4 described method, wherein the steps 500 to 508 correspond to the corresponding lower by the value 100 steps 400 to 408.
  • the armed missile 1 is then deployed in step 510 by placing the identification means in the armed missile 1 Configured communication analysis test with the aircraft.
  • step 512 a communication analysis test is performed between the armed missile 1 and the aircraft 2.
  • this communication analysis test it is checked whether the information channels used in the operational deployment of the unit of aircraft 2 and armed missile 1 are functional and whether the communication that takes place via these channels runs correctly.
  • step 514 If an error is detected in this communication analysis test, it is decided in step 514 to branch to step 515 in which an error image and a report of the error analysis are output via the visualization means 300.
  • step 516 the armed missile 1 is configured for operational operation by removing the identification means from the armed missile 1 again.
  • steps 518 and 520 steps 410 and 412 of the example are performed Fig. 4 the operational launch of the armed missile at the weapon station of the aircraft and the appropriate decision as to whether or not errors occurred during that run-up.
  • Fig. 6 shows a flowchart of a further modification of the method according to Fig. 4 , wherein the method steps 600 to 612 the reduced by the value of 200 method steps 400 to 412 of the example Fig. 4 correspond.
  • step 612 If it is determined in decision step 612 that an error has occurred during the operational start-up of the armed missile 1 at the weapon station 20 ', 20 "of the aircraft 2, then the test does not take place - as in the example of FIG Fig. 4 - concluded with a "NOGO" decision, but it is configured in step 613, the armed missile 1 for a communication analysis test by the identification means is introduced into the armed missile 1. It then follows in step 615 a communication analysis test between the armed missile 1 and the aircraft 2 that complies with the communication analysis test 512 of the method example Fig. 5 equivalent.
  • step 617 If it is decided in the subsequent decision step 617 that the communication analysis test has been carried out without error in step 615, a report about the communication analysis performed in step 615 is output via the visualization means 300 in step 618.
  • step 617 if it is decided in step 617 that an error has occurred in the communication analysis test of step 615, the communication analysis report is output via the visualization means 300 in step 619 together with an error image of the occurred error.

Claims (15)

  1. Procédé de contrôle systématique de l'aptitude à l'interaction entre un aéronef et un engin volant armé non habité qui peut être accouplé à celui-ci dans une séquence cohérente, l'aéronef étant muni d'une station d'armement qui présente des moyens d'accouplement mécaniques et électriques, lesquels peuvent être reliés avec des moyens d'accouplement mécaniques et électriques correspondants de l'engin volant,
    caractérisé par les étapes suivantes :
    a) contrôle de l'aptitude fonctionnelle de l'engin volant armé au moyen d'un dispositif de test d'arme ;
    b) contrôle de la station d'armement de l'aéronef avec un dispositif de test de station d'armement avant ou après l'étape a) ;
    c) installation de l'engin volant armé sur la station d'armement de l'aéronef par accouplement mécanique et électrique de l'engin volant avec l'aéronef ;
    d) activation de l'engin volant armé par l'aéronef jusqu'à atteindre un état de disponibilité de l'engin volant armé et
    e) contrôle des actions d'activation individuelles de l'étape d) ;
    un signal d'erreur étant délivré quand au moins l'un des contrôles a échoué.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce
    que les étapes suivantes sont exécutées en plus après avoir exécuté l'étape c) du procédé :
    c1) configuration de l'engin volant armé pour un test d'analyse de communication avec l'aéronef par introduction d'un moyen d'identification dans l'engin volant armé ;
    c2) exécution d'un test d'analyse de communication entre l'engin volant armé et l'aéronef ;
    c3) configuration de l'engin volant armé pour le mode intervention en retirant de nouveau le moyen d'identification de l'engin volant armé.
  3. Procédé selon la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce
    que dans le cas où un signal d'erreur est généré à l'étape d) du procédé, les étapes supplémentaires suivantes sont exécutées après avoir exécuté l'étape d) du procédé :
    d1) configuration de l'engin volant armé pour un test d'analyse de communication avec l'aéronef par introduction d'un moyen d'identification dans l'engin volant armé ;
    d2) exécution d'un test d'analyse de communication entre l'engin volant armé et l'aéronef.
  4. Procédé selon la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce
    qu'au moins les contrôles fonctionnels suivants de l'engin volant armé sont exécutés dans l'étape a) du procédé :
    a1) contrôle du bon fonctionnement de l'interface d'aéronef de l'engin volant armé ;
    a2) contrôle de l'absence de défaut sur les sous-ensembles électroniques de l'engin volant armé ;
    a3) contrôle de la mobilité des actionneurs prévus dans l'engin volant armé ;
    a4) contrôle du bon fonctionnement des capteurs de l'engin volant armé et de leurs fonctions.
  5. Procédé selon la revendication 4,
    caractérisé en ce
    que pendant le contrôle de l'engin volant armé aux étapes a1) à a4), les défauts sporadiques non fatals qui se produisent sont enregistrés en fonction de leur nature et de leur nombre dans une mémoire de l'engin volant armé et, après avoir terminé l'intégralité du contrôle, sont délivrés par le biais d'une interface de maintenance de l'engin volant armé.
  6. Procédé selon la revendication 4 ou 5,
    caractérisé en ce
    que pendant le contrôle de l'engin volant aux étapes a1) à a4), la durée dans le temps de chacune des opérations techniques dans l'engin volant armé est mesurée et enregistrée dans une mémoire dans l'engin volant puis délivrée par le biais de l'interface de maintenance après avoir terminé l'intégralité du contrôle.
  7. Procédé selon la revendication 4, 5 ou 6
    caractérisé en ce
    que dans le cas d'un message d'erreur lors du contrôle de l'engin volant armé, l'image du défaut complète associée à chaque sous-ensemble qui a provoqué le message d'erreur est délivrée par le biais de l'interface de maintenance.
  8. Procédé selon la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce
    qu'au moins les contrôles suivants sont exécutés à l'étape b) du procédé :
    b1) contrôle du codage correct des lignes d'adresse du bus de données ;
    b2) test des lignes avec lesquelles l'aéronef alimente l'engin volant armé en énergie pour vérifier au moins si la tension, la fréquence et la phase sont correctes ;
    b3) test de l'état correct des lignes de mise à feu avec lesquelles l'aéronef déclenche des fonctions irréversibles de l'engin volant armé ;
    b4) test de l'état correct de la ligne de verrouillage mutuel de la station d'armement de l'aéronef ;
    b5) test du bus de données de la station d'armement et de la commande d'armement de l'aéronef pour vérifier si la transmission de communication est correcte et si le contenu des communications est correct en raccordant le testeur de station d'armement à la station d'armement de l'aéronef et en simulant l'engin volant armé.
  9. Procédé selon la revendication 2,
    caractérisé en ce
    qu'à l'étape c2) du procédé, pendant le test d'analyse de communication entre l'engin volant armé et l'aéronef, l'engin volant armé exécute au moins les contrôles suivants :
    - contrôle de la transmission avec des cycles corrects des messages du bus de données ;
    - contrôle de la séquence correcte des messages du bus de données ;
    - contrôle de la transmission correcte d'informations par les messages du bus de données ;
    - contrôle de la plausibilité du contenu des messages du bus de données ;
    - contrôle de l'identité correcte de l'aéronef dans les messages du bus de données ;
    - contrôle de l'état désactivé de la ligne de commande de mise à feu ;
    - contrôle de l'état désactivé de la ligne d'énergie de mise à feu.
  10. Procédé selon la revendication 3,
    caractérisé en ce
    qu'à l'étape d2) du procédé, pendant le test d'analyse de communication entre l'engin volant armé et l'aéronef, l'engin volant armé exécute au moins les contrôles suivants :
    - contrôle de la transmission avec des cycles corrects des messages du bus de données ;
    - contrôle de la séquence correcte des messages du bus de données ;
    - contrôle de la transmission correcte d'informations par les messages du bus de données ;
    - contrôle de la plausibilité du contenu des messages du bus de données ;
    - contrôle de l'identité correcte de l'aéronef dans les messages du bus de données ;
    - contrôle de l'état désactivé de la ligne de commande de mise à feu ;
    - contrôle de l'état désactivé de la ligne d'énergie de mise à feu.
  11. Procédé selon la revendication 9 ou 10,
    caractérisé en ce
    que dans le cas d'un défaut lors du test d'analyse de communication, les faits erratiques qui ont provoqué le défaut sont délivrés par le biais de l'interface de maintenance de l'engin volant armé.
  12. Procédé selon la revendication 9 ou 10,
    caractérisé en ce
    que les défauts sporadiques non fatals détectés pendant le test d'analyse de communication sont enregistrés dans l'engin volant armé en fonction de leur nature et de leur nombre et sont délivrés sous la forme d'un rapport au moyen de l'interface de maintenance de l'engin volant armé après avoir terminé le contrôle.
  13. Procédé selon la revendication 9 ou 10,
    caractérisé en ce
    qu'au moins les informations d'analyse de bus de données suivantes sont délivrées sous la forme d'un rapport par le biais de l'interface de maintenance de l'engin volant armé après avoir terminé le test d'analyse de communication :
    - fréquence absolue de chaque message du bus de données ;
    - nombre de messages reconnus erronés par type de message de bus de données ;
    - cycle réel calculé de chaque message de bus de données, chaque cycle réel étant confronté à un cycle de consigne spécifié.
  14. Procédé selon la revendication 9 ou 10,
    caractérisé en ce
    qu'au moins les données de navigation de l'aéronef suivantes sont délivrées sous la forme d'un rapport au moyen de l'interface de maintenance de l'engin volant armé après avoir terminé le test d'analyse de communication :
    - état actuel du système de navigation de l'aéronef ;
    - position, vitesse et angle d'Euler actuels de l'aéronef ;
    - indice de précision pour les données de navigation de l'aéronef.
  15. Procédé selon la revendication 9 ou 10,
    caractérisé en ce
    que le test d'analyse de communication est un mode de fonctionnement du logiciel opérationnel de l'engin volant armé qui peut être sélectionné à l'aide d'un moyen d'identification.
EP07022253.4A 2006-11-17 2007-11-16 Procédé de vérification de la capacité d'interaction entre un aéronef et un corps volant non habité armé pouvant être couplé avec celui-ci Expired - Fee Related EP1923658B2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE200610054340 DE102006054340A1 (de) 2006-11-17 2006-11-17 Verfahren zur Überprüfung der Interaktionsfähigkeit zwischen einem Luftfahrzeug und einem mit diesem koppelbaren bewaffneten, unbemannten Flugkörper

Publications (4)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1923658A2 EP1923658A2 (fr) 2008-05-21
EP1923658A3 EP1923658A3 (fr) 2010-10-13
EP1923658B1 true EP1923658B1 (fr) 2012-01-25
EP1923658B2 EP1923658B2 (fr) 2016-06-15

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EP (1) EP1923658B2 (fr)
DE (1) DE102006054340A1 (fr)

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
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DE102008034618B4 (de) * 2008-07-25 2015-05-13 Mbda Deutschland Gmbh Verfahren zum Abkoppeln eines unbemannten Flugkörpers von einem Trägerluftfahrzeug
DE102008054264B4 (de) * 2008-10-31 2012-09-13 Lfk-Lenkflugkörpersysteme Gmbh Multifunktionale Service- und Testeinrichtung für unbemannte Flugkörper
DE102009022007B4 (de) * 2009-05-19 2011-09-22 Lfk-Lenkflugkörpersysteme Gmbh Unbemannter Flugkörper
DE102009040304B4 (de) 2009-09-05 2012-10-04 Lfk-Lenkflugkörpersysteme Gmbh Vorrichtung zur Steuerung von Funktionstests und/oder Serviceprozeduren für von Luftfahrzeugen absetzbare unbemannte Flugkörper
DE102010018186B4 (de) * 2010-04-26 2013-11-14 Mbda Deutschland Gmbh Verfahren zur Fehlererfassung eines im Tragflug an einem Trägerflugzeug angekoppelten, unbemannten Flugkörpers sowie unbemannter Flugkörper
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EP1923658A3 (fr) 2010-10-13
DE102006054340A1 (de) 2008-05-21
EP1923658A2 (fr) 2008-05-21
EP1923658B2 (fr) 2016-06-15

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