DE102006054340A1 - A method for verifying the ability to interact between an aircraft and an armed unmanned missile coupled thereto - Google Patents

Abstract

A method for verifying the ability to interact between an aircraft and an armed, unmanned missile coupled thereto, the aircraft being provided with a weapon station having mechanical and electrical coupling means connectable to corresponding mechanical and electrical coupling means of the missile, is characterized by the steps a) Checking the functioning of the armed missile by means of a weapons test device; b) checking the weapon station of the aircraft with a weapon station testing device; c) attaching the armed missile to the weapon station of the aircraft with mechanical and electrical coupling of the missile to the aircraft; d) Activation of the armed missile by the aircraft until a standby status of the armed missile is reached; and e) Verification of the individual activation actions of step d); wherein if at least one of the checks has failed, an error signal is output.

Description

TECHNICAL AREA

The The present invention relates to a method for checking the Interactivity between an aircraft and an armed, coupled with it, Unmanned missile according to the preamble of claim 1

such armed missiles as well as their interfaces to the aircraft and the weapons control functions in the aircraft are becoming more complex and "intelligent". This increases the probability a malfunction in one of the functional elements of the unit an aircraft and an armed aircraft attached to it Missiles from which the requirement arises, before the start of one with a armed missile provided the functioning of the system the aircraft, the armed missile and the interface connecting them reliable determine. Thereby can the loss of the armed missile by emergency shedding, a non-fulfillment the mission to be executed and also collateral damage by one or not not completely functioning armed missiles are avoided.

STATE OF THE ART

In the DE 10 2004 042 990 and the not pre-published German patent application 10 2006 041 140.4 Methods and devices are described which allow the inspection of armed missiles during production prior to delivery to a customer or prior to operational deployment.

The not previously published DE 10 2005 058 546 and DE 10 2006 041 140 , the US-A 5,614,896 and the EP 0 309 133 disclose apparatus and methods for testing a weapon station of an aircraft.

These However, known methods and devices only provide each isolated applications which is either a review of the armed missile or a review of Weapon station of this missile carrying aircraft. But even if these known Test method be performed on the aircraft or the missile and discover no malfunction, it can interact with Aircraft and armed missile to unwanted Malfunction come.

PRESENTATION OF THE INVENTION

task The present invention is therefore a generic method specify the functional reliability of a unit Aircraft and at this dockable armed, unmanned missile increase and thus functional failures and collateral damage can minimize.

These The object is achieved by the Method of claim 1 solved.

• a) Überprüfen der Funktionsfähigkeit des bewaffneten Flugkörpers mittels einer Waffen-Testvorrichtung;
• b) Überprüfen der Waffenstation des Luftfahrzeugs mit einer Waffenstations-Testvorrichtung;
• c) Anbringen des bewaffneten Flugkörpers an der Waffenstation des Luftfahrzeugs unter mechanischer und elektrischer Kopplung des Flugkörpers mit dem Luftfahrzeug;
• d) Aktivierung des bewaffneten Flugkörpers durch das Luftfahrzeug bis zum Erreichen eines Bereitschaftsstatus' des bewaffneten Flugkörpers und
• e) Überprüfen der einzelnen Aktivierungsaktionen des Schritts d); wobei dann, wenn zumindest eine der Überprüfungen nicht erfolgreich verlaufen ist, ein Fehlersignal ausgegeben wird.

The method for verifying the ability to interact between an aircraft and an armed, unmanned missile coupled thereto, wherein the aircraft is provided with a weapon station having mechanical and electrical coupling means, which are connectable to corresponding mechanical and electrical coupling means of the missile following Steps:

• a) Checking the functioning of the armed missile by means of a weapons test device;
• b) checking the weapon station of the aircraft with a weapon station testing device;
• c) attaching the armed missile to the weapon station of the aircraft with mechanical and electrical coupling of the missile to the aircraft;
• (d) Activation of the armed missile by the aircraft until it reaches a readiness status of the armed missile and
• e) checking the individual activation actions of step d); wherein if at least one of the checks has failed, an error signal is output.

These inventive solution provides a method in which the armed missile, the aircraft and the interaction between the aircraft and the armed Missiles So the interface between these two, systematically and in a coherent way Sequence to be checked. This systemic approach allows the conduct of a review it, just before the launch of the aircraft, the overall system from aircraft, armed missile and interface. hereby can be a much more reliable Statement about the functionality of for the deployment envisaged overall system. It is It's not only important that a review of Aircraft, armed missile and interface itself, but that one specific for one Insert intended unit of aircraft, armed missile and Interface subjected to the inventive review becomes. This review should preferably take place shortly before the start of the aircraft. The chronological order Steps a) and b) can also be reversed.

• c1) Konfiguration des bewaffneten Flugkörpers für einen Kommunikations-Analyse-Test mit dem Luftfahrzeug durch Einbringen eines Identifikationsmittels in den bewaffneten Flugkörper;
• c2) Durchführen eines Kommunikations-Analyse-Tests zwischen dem bewaffneten Flugkörper und dem Luftfahrzeug;
• c3) Konfiguration des bewaffneten Flugkörpers für den Einsatzbetrieb, indem das Identifikationsmittel aus dem bewaffneten Flugkörper wieder entfernt wird.

It is particularly advantageous if, after carrying out process step c), the following steps are additionally carried out:

• c1) configuring the armed missile for a communication analysis test with the aircraft by introducing an identification means into the armed missile;
• c2) performing a communication analysis test between the armed missile and the aircraft;
• c3) configuration of the armed missile for use by removing the identification means from the armed missile.

through the identification means, the status of individual operating mode lines can be changed, causing the missile the desired Can sense operating mode. A simple means of identification may be formed, for example, from a short-circuit plug, the at the missile is connected.

• d1) Konfiguration des bewaffneten Flugkörpers für einen Kommunikations-Analyse-Test mit dem Luftfahrzeug durch Einbringen eines Identifikations-Mittels in den bewaffneten Flugkörper;
• d2) Durchführen eines Kommunikations-Analyse-Tests zwischen dem bewaffneten Flugkörper und dem Luftfahrzeug.

In the event that an error signal is generated in method step d), the following additional steps are preferably carried out after carrying out method step d):

• d1) configuring the armed missile for a communication analysis test with the aircraft by introducing an identification means into the armed missile;
• d2) Perform a communication analysis test between the armed missile and the aircraft.

• a1) Überprüfung der Luftfahrzeugschnittstelle des bewaffneten Flugkörpers auf korrekte Funktionsweise;
• a2) Überprüfung der elektronischen Baugruppen des bewaffneten Flugkörpers auf Fehlerfreiheit;
• a3) Überprüfung der im bewaffneten Flugkörper vorgesehenen Aktuatoren auf Bewegungsfähigkeit;
• a4) Überprüfung der Sensoren des bewaffneten Flugkörpers sowie deren Funktionen auf korrekte Funktionsweise.

It is particularly preferred if in process step a) at least the following functional tests of the armed missile are carried out:

• a1) checking the aircraft interface of the armed missile for correct operation;
• a2) checking the electronic assemblies of the armed missile for accuracy;
• a3) checking the mobility of the actuators in the armed missile;
• a4) Checking the armed missile sensors and their functions for correct functioning.

there It is particularly advantageous if during inspection of the armed missile in the steps a1) to a4) occurring sporadic, non-fatal Errors according to type and number stored in a memory of the armed missile and after completing the entire review of one Maintenance interface of the armed missile are issued.

These Error storage of non-fatal errors allows fast and accurate Error analysis and thus faster troubleshooting after the review.

Preferably will also be during the review of the missile in steps a1) to a4) the duration of individual technical Events in the armed missile measured and stored in a memory in the missile and after completion the entire review of the Maintenance interface output.

This Recording the duration of individual technical processes allows a State analysis even if no fatal error occurred is. Due to this determined and stored data can after execution the review decided whether the overall system of aircraft and armed missile is still operational.

Farther It is advantageous if in the case of an error message in the review of armed missile that the assembly that caused the error message, associated complete error image over the Maintenance interface is issued.

The information obtained thereby enables that assembly, which has caused the error message to identify as soon as possible and to repair.

• b1) Überprüfung der Adressleitungen des Datenbusses auf korrekte Codierung;
• b2) Test der Leitungen, mit denen das Luftfahrzeug den bewaffneten Flugkörper mit Energie versorgt, auf zumindest korrekte Spannung, Frequenz und Phase;
• b3) Test der Zündleitungen, mit denen das Luftfahrzeug irreversible Funktionen des bewaffneten Flugkörpers auslöst, auf korrekten Status;
• b4) Test der Interlock-Leitung der Waffenstation des Luftfahrzeugs auf korrekten Status;
• b5) Test des Datenbusses der Waffenstation und der Waffensteuerung des Luftfahrzeugs auf korrekte Kommunikations-Übertragung und auf korrekte Kommunikations-Inhalte, indem das Waffenstations-Testgerät an die Waffenstation des Luftfahrzeugs angeschlossen ist und den bewaffneten Flugkörper simuliert.

Preferably, in process step b) at least the following tests are carried out:

• b1) checking the address lines of the data bus for correct coding;
• b2) test the lines used by the aircraft to power the armed missile to at least the correct voltage, frequency and phase;
• b3) checking the ignition cables with which the aircraft triggers irreversible functions of the armed missile to the correct status;
• b4) test the interlock management of the aircraft's weapon station for correct status;
• b5) Test the Weapon Station's data bus and weapon control for proper communication transmission and communication content by connecting the Weapons Station Tester to the weapon station of the aircraft and simulating the armed missile.

The interlock line of the weapon station of the aircraft is a discrete line, which is led from the aircraft into the missile and back and which is separated when the missile from the air vehicle is separated. This allows the aircraft to detect whether the missile has been decoupled properly from the aircraft, ie, a "release" of the missile took place, or whether the missile has not been disconnected or not completely disconnected, so that there is a so-called "hangfire". The interlock cables are part of the relevant standard MIL-STD-1760 and are classified as safety-critical.

• – Überprüfung der Datenbus-Botschaften auf Übertragung mit korrekten Zyklen;
• – Überprüfung der Datenbus-Botschaften auf korrekte Reihenfolge;
• – Überprüfung der Datenbus-Botschaften auf korrekte Informations-Übertragung;
• – Überprüfung der Datenbus-Botschaften auf plausiblen Inhalt;
• – Überprüfung der Datenbus-Botschaften auf korrekte Identität des Luftfahrzeugs;
• – Überprüfung der Zündsteuer-Leitung auf deaktivierten Zustand;
• – Überprüfung der Zündenergie-Leitung auf deaktivierten Zustand.

A particularly preferred performance of a communication analysis test between the armed missile and the aircraft is characterized in that in step c2) or in step d2) the armed missile during the communication analysis test between the armed missile and the aircraft at least the following tests performs:

• - checking the data bus messages for transmission with correct cycles;
• - checking the data bus messages for correct order;
• - checking the data bus messages for correct information transmission;
• - checking the data bus messages for plausible content;
• - checking the data bus messages for correct identity of the aircraft;
• - Check the ignition control line to deactivated state;
• - Checking the ignition energy line to deactivated state.

Preferably in the event of a failure of the communication analysis test, they become the error causing errors via the maintenance interface of the issued armed missile. As a result, the operating personnel are given data to hand, the enable fast troubleshooting.

If the while of the communication analysis tests detected, sporadic, non-fatal Errors according to type and number stored in the armed missile and after completion Review by the maintenance interface of the armed missile is reported as a report, then this too can be reliable Error analysis and faster repair of the affected component contribute favorably.

• – absolute Häufigkeit jeder Datenbus-Botschaft;
• – Anzahl der als fehlerhaft erkannten Botschaften je Datenbus-Rotschafts-Typ,
• – errechneter Ist-Zyklus jeder Datenbus-Botschaft, wobei jeder Ist-Zyklus einem spezifizierten Soll-Zyklus gegenübergestellt wird.

It is also advantageous if, at the end of the communication analysis test, at least the following data bus analysis information is output as a report via the maintenance interface of the armed missile:

• Absolute frequency of each data bus message;
• Number of messages detected as faulty per data bus rotation type,
• - Calculated actual cycle of each data bus message, each actual cycle being compared to a specified target cycle.

• – aktueller Status des Navigations-Systems des Luftfahrzeugs;
• – aktuelle Position, Geschwindigkeit und Eulerwinkel des Luftfahrzeugs;
• – Genauigkeits-Maß für die Navigations-Daten des Luftfahrzeugs.

It is also advantageous if, at the end of the communication analysis test, at least the following aircraft navigation data are output as a report by means of the maintenance interface of the armed missile:

• - current status of the navigation system of the aircraft;
• - current position, speed and Euler angle of the aircraft;
• Accuracy measure for the navigation data of the aircraft.

This Report allows the aircraft navigation for plausibility and the correct supply of the armed missile with navigation data to check.

Especially It is also advantageous if the communication analysis test uses a of an identification means operational operational mode Software of the armed missile is. This will make the communication analysis test in the armed missile integrated and is therefore always available without additional testing facilities.

The Software of the missile knows different operating modes, namely the operational operation for the Use of the missile, a special test operation during the manufacture of the missile and a special test operation during the use of the missile. Of the Communication analysis test is a variant of the special test operation during the Use. He is using a example as a short-circuit plug trained identification means selected.

preferred embodiments the invention with additional Design details and other advantages are below Reference to the attached Drawings closer described and explained.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

It shows:

1 a schematic test setup for the test of the armed missile according to step a);

2 a schematic test setup for the test of the weapon station of the aircraft according to step b);

3 a schematic test setup for the communication analysis test;

4 a flowchart for schematically illustrating the process sequence according to the invention;

5 a detailed schematic representation of the process flow in an advantageous embodiment; and

6 an example of a procedure with an error message.

PRESENTATION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

1 schematically shows the test setup for the test of an armed missile 1 by means of an external weapon test device.

The missile 1 has a hull 10 , Wings 11 , Rudder valves 12 . 13 , at least one engine of which in the 1 only the right air inlet channel 14 is shown, and at its front end an infrared homing head 15 on. In the front trunk area 16 Inside the fuselage, a test unit (TIP) is provided, which has a maintenance interface behind a fuselage flap 16 ' with the outside of the missile 1 provided weapons test device 100 is connectable. The missile is provided inside the fuselage with one or more warheads (for example Vorhohlladung or Penetrator). At the top of the hull are two hangers 17 . 17 ' attached to those of the missiles 1 on a carrier aircraft, for example, on the local bomb pylon, can be attached. Another interface 18 is at the top of the missile 1 provided over which the missile is in use connected to the aircraft carrying it (umbilical interface) and in the present method for data exchange with the weapons test device 100 is being used. Finally, the missile 1 via an antenna cable 60 with an external satellite navigation antenna 6 connected, which supplies the missile own on-board computer with satellite navigation data.

The weapon test device 100 is via a first connection cable 102 , the so-called "umbilical cable", with the umbilical interface 18 of the missile 1 connected. Over this connection, the weapon test device then with the missile 1 in the same way (for example via Milbus or MIL-STD 1760 discrete lines) as communicating and interacting with a carrier aircraft.

Furthermore, the weapons test device 100 via a second connection cable 104 , the so-called "maintenance cable" with the maintenance interface 16 ' of the missile 1 connected.

The power supply is the weapons test device 100 via a power cable 106 with an external power supply device 108 connected. This power supply device can be the weapons test device 100 supply with the usual in suitable carrier aircraft power supply of 3 × 115V 400Hz.

With this in 1 shown experimental setup is the functioning of the armed missile 1 by means of the weapon test device 100 carried out in the manner described below.

2 shows a schematic test setup for the test of a weapon station of an aircraft 2 ,

A weapon station facility 20 is at the bottom 21 of the aircraft 2 either on the fuselage or on one of the wings of the aircraft 2 intended. In the example shown is a left weapon station 20 ' and a right weapon station 20 '' shown schematically below the fuselage of the aircraft 2 are attached.

Each of the weapon stations 20 ' . 20 '' is with a weapons station testing device 200 respectively 210 via a respectively assigned umbilical cable 202 respectively 212 connected. The respective umbilical cable 202 . 212 For this purpose, it is connected to a corresponding interface (not shown) of the assigned weapon station 20 ' . 20 '' connected and electrically connected to this.

The two weapon station testers 200 . 210 are each from the aircraft 2 via a power cable 204 . 214 supplied with an on-board voltage; this on-board voltage is, for example, 28 V. Furthermore, the two weapons station test equipment 200 . 210 via one data cable each 206 . 216 with an external computer 220 , For example, a notebook, connected for data exchange. The computer 220 can by means of a power supply cable 222 be electrically connected to a conventional power grid.

With the in 2 Test setup shown is the review of the weapons station 20 . 20 ' of the aircraft 2 by means of the weapon station test device 200 . 210 , The implementation of this test will be described in detail below.

3 shows a schematic test setup for the communication analysis test between the missile 1 and the aircraft 2 ,

The missile 1 is by means of hangers 17 . 17 ' at the weapon station 20 ' of the aircraft 2 hung like in the 3 is shown schematically. The umbilical interface 18 of the missile 1 is via an aircraft-internal umbilical cable 22 with the (not shown) on-board electronics of the aircraft 2 connected, which has a weapon control computer.

The missile 1 is provided with an identification means which is formed for example by a suitable short-circuit plug, which is inserted into a corresponding electrical socket and together with this forms a plug connection, in which by plugging the plug into the socket at least one connection between two Contacts of the socket is made. The short-circuit plug forming the identification means can be used, for example, in the area of the maintenance interface 16 ' be located and therefore also be accessible by opening this hiding the hull flap.

Furthermore, it is a visualization tool 300 by means of a maintenance cable 302 to the maintenance interface 16 ' of the missile 1 connected. The visualization means may be formed, for example, by a monitor or a computer.

By means of in 3 schematically shown test setup is the implementation of a communication analysis test between the aircraft 2 and the missile 1 possible, with details of how to carry out the test below.

4 shows a flowchart for schematically illustrating the method sequence according to the invention.

First, with the in 1 shown test setup in step 400 the test of in the figures also referred to as a weapon armed missile 1 , Here is the operability of the armed missile 1 by means of the weapon test device 100 reviewed, as for example in the non-prepublished German patent application DE 10 2006 041 140.4 is described.

If a so-called fatal error occurs in this test, that is, a fault that makes the use of the missile impossible or at least so impaired that a mission success must be questioned, the test is failed as a failure and it will be a " NOGO "signal via the weapons test device 100 output. The test of the missile can be done in several steps. For example, initially for a first component of the missile a power-on test, in which the component tests its basic functions independently, followed by a triggered self-test of the component follows in a next step, which is commanded by the on-board computer of the missile and in which activates the complete test spectrum of the isolated component becomes. In a third step, a continuous test of the corresponding component carried out under a simulation of an existing carrier aircraft and a mission software loaded into the computer of the missile is then carried out, wherein in particular the functionality of any sensors, detectors or actuators present in the component is checked. At the same time, tests of component groups and function chains are carried out.

At the end of these three tests, a decision is made as to whether a fatal error has occurred in one of the tests, that is, an error that renders the missile unusable. If this is the case, then a "NOGO" signal is transmitted together with a complete error image of this component just tested, which has led to the "NOGO". The result of the tests is about the weapons test device 100 output. This complete error image essentially contains a complete log of the individual tests carried out with their respective results and the error cause of the component reported as defective, including all relevant information from a possibly defective component as well as from the environment of this defective component. This "NOGO" check can also be carried out continuously in all three steps.

Furthermore, to the weapons test device 100 sporadic, non-fatal errors that have been recorded during the test are output, so that a person evaluating the test result can obtain an image of the state of the missile based on this sporadic, non-fatal error data 1 even if these mistakes did not contribute to the "NOGO" decision. The evaluating person can then draw conclusions about the condition of the missile, so that on the basis of this data certain maintenance or repair work on the missile can be made. Furthermore, during the test run technical times of individual in the missile 1 or measured in the control computer processes running, logged and sent to the external weapons test device 100 output. Even from these technical times, a person analyzing the test result can draw conclusions about the condition of the missile and thus arrange maintenance work in good time.

Is in step after this test of the armed missile 402 been determined whether the Test has been successful, it is done in the following step 404 the test of the weapon station of the aircraft.

In this test, the first operator in the cockpit takes the place of the weapons system officer, the appropriate commands are issued to trigger and discard the armed missile 1 from the aircraft 2 required are. A second operator on the ground is watching on the screen of the computer 220 the corresponding signals at the assigned weapon stations 20 ' . 20 '' which are caused in response to the operations performed by the first operator. The first person in the cockpit, in turn, observes the corresponding cockpit displays and verifies that these displays are working in the correct manner for the operational case.

If a fatal error occurs during this test of the weapon station of the aircraft, this also leads to a "NOGO" decision. Will in this decision step 406 However, found that no error has occurred, so in step 408 the missile 1 to the assigned weapon station 20 ' . 20 '' of the aircraft 2 grown and mechanically and electrically with the aircraft 2 connected.

Subsequently, in the step 410 an operational run-up of the armed missile 1 at the weapon station 20 ' respectively 20 '' of the aircraft 2 ,

This will be the individual components of the armed missile 1 from the aircraft 2 off and certain automatic checks are performed.

During this run-up of the armed missile 1 on the aircraft 2 which lasts until the armed missile reaches a standby status, the individual activation actions are performed by means of the visualization means 300 observed for the occurrence of fatal errors. Occurs in this observation and test step 412 a fatal error is revealed, this leads to a "NOGO" decision. If the test is, however, problem-free and error-free, then in the step 412 made a "GO" decision with which the unit of armed missile 1 and aircraft 2 released for use.

5 shows a development of the above in connection with the 4 described method, wherein the steps 500 to 508 the corresponding to the value 100 lower steps 400 to 408 correspond.

After in step 508 carried out cultivation of the armed missile 1 to the aircraft 2 and establishing the mechanical and electrical connections between the aircraft 2 and the armed missile 1 is in the step 510 by introducing the identification means into the armed missile 1 the armed missile 1 configured for a communication analysis test with the aircraft.

Subsequently, in step 512 a communication analysis test between the armed missile 1 and the aircraft 2 carried out. This communication analysis test verifies that the operational deployment of the unit from aircraft 2 and armed missile 1 used information channels and whether the communication that takes place via these channels is correct.

If an error is detected in this communication analysis test, then in step 514 decided to step 515 to branch in which an error image and a report of the error analysis via the visualization means 300 be issued.

Will in step 514 however, found that in the communication analysis test of the step 512 no error has occurred, so in step 516 the armed missile 1 configured for operational operation by the identification means of the armed missile 1 is removed again. Then follow in the steps 518 and 520 taking the steps 410 and 412 of the example 4 the operational launch of the armed missile at the weapon station of the aircraft and the appropriate decision as to whether or not errors occurred during that run-up.

6 shows a flowchart of a further modification of the method according to 4 , wherein the method steps 600 to 612 the value 200 reduced process steps 400 to 412 of the example 4 correspond.

Will in the decision step 612 found that during the operational ramp-up of the armed missile 1 at the weapon station 20 ' . 20 '' of the aircraft 2 an error has occurred, then the test will not - as in the example of 4 - concluded with a "NOGO" decision, but it gets in step 613 the armed missile 1 configured for a communication analysis test by placing the identification means in the armed missile 1 is introduced. It then follows in step 615 a communication analysis test between the armed missile 1 and the aircraft 2 who is the communication Ana analysis test 512 of the method example 5 equivalent.

Will in the subsequent decision step 617 decided that the communication analysis test in step 615 has been carried out without errors, so in step 618 a hand over in step 615 conducted communication analysis via the visualization means 300 output.

Will, however, in the step 617 decided that in the communication analysis test of the step 615 an error has occurred, so in step 619 the report on the communication analysis together with an error image of the error that has occurred via the visualization means 300 output.

reference numeral in the claims, The description and the drawings are only for the better understanding of the invention and are not intended to limit the scope.

1

missile

2

aircraft

6

Satellite navigation antenna

10

hull

11

wings

12

rudders

13

rudders

14

right air inflow

15

Infrared homing head

16

front hull area

16 '

Service Interface

17

suspension

17 '

suspension

18

Umbilical Interface

20

Weapons station equipment

20 '

left weapon station

20 ''

right weapon station

21

bottom of the aircraft

22

Umbilical cable

60

aerial cable

100

Weapon test device

102

connection cable

104

connection cable

106

Power cable

108

Power supply means

200

Weapon station tester

202

Umbilical cable

204

Power cable

206

data cable

210

Weapon station tester

212

Umbilical cable

214

Power cable

216

data cable

220

external computer

222

Power cable

300

visualization means

302

maintenance cable

Claims (15)

Procedure for checking the ability to interact between an aircraft and an armed, coupled with it, unmanned missile, wherein the aircraft is provided with a weapon station which having mechanical and electrical coupling means, which with corresponding mechanical and electrical coupling means of missile are connectable, characterized by the steps a) Check the operability of the armed missile by means of a weapon test device; b) Check the weapon station of the aircraft with a weapons station testing device; c) attaching the armed missile at the weapon station of the aircraft under mechanical and electrical Coupling of the missile with the aircraft; d) activation of the armed missile by the Aircraft until reaching a standby status' of the armed missile and e) Check the individual activation actions of step d); if then at least one of the reviews not has been successful, an error signal is output. Method according to claim 1, characterized, that after execution of process step c), the following steps are additionally carried out: c1) Configuration of the armed missile for a communication analysis test with the aircraft by introducing an identification means in the armed missile; c2) Carry out a communication analysis test between the armed missile and the aircraft; c3) configuration of the armed missile for the mission, by turning the identification means off the armed missile again Will get removed. Method according to Claim 1, characterized in that, in the event that an error signal is generated in method step d), the following additional steps are carried out after carrying out method step d): d1) configuration of the armed missile for a communication analysis test with the aviation by introducing an identification means into the armed missile; d2) Perform a communication analysis test between the armed missile and the aircraft. Method according to claim 1, characterized, that in method step a) at least the following functional tests of armed missiles are carried out: a1) Review of Aircraft interface of the armed missile to correct operation; a2) Review of electronic assemblies of the armed missile for accuracy; a3) Review of in the armed missile provided actuators on mobility; a4) Review of Sensors of the armed missile as well as their functions for correct functioning. Method according to claim 4, characterized, - that during the review of the armed missile in the steps a1) to a4) occurring sporadic, non-fatal Errors according to type and number stored in a memory of the armed missile and after completing the entire review of one Maintenance interface of the armed missile are issued. Method according to claim 4 or 5, characterized, - that during the review of the missile in steps a1) to a4) the duration of individual technical operations in the armed missile measured and stored in a memory in the missile and after completion the entire review of the Maintenance interface are issued. Method according to claim 4, 5 or 6, thereby in - that in the case of an error message when checking the armed missile the that assembly that caused the error message has the complete error image about the Maintenance interface is issued. Method according to claim 1, characterized, that in process step b) at least the following tests are carried out: b1) Review of Address lines of the data bus for correct coding; b2) Test the lines with which the aircraft carries the armed missile with Energy supplied, at least correct voltage, frequency and Phase; b3) test of the ignition cables, with which the aircraft irreversible functions of the armed missile triggers, on correct status; b4) Test the interlock line of the weapon station the aircraft to correct status; b5) Test of the data bus the weapon station and the weapon control of the aircraft correct communication transmission and correct communication content by passing the Weapons Station Tester to the Weapon station of the aircraft is connected and the armed missile simulated. Method according to claim 2, characterized, that the armed missile in process step c2) during of the communication analysis test between the armed missile and at least carry out the following checks on the aircraft: - Review of the Data bus messages on transmission with correct cycles; - Review of the Data bus messages on correct order; - Review of the Data bus messages for correct information transmission; - Review of the Data bus messages on plausible content; - Review of the Data bus messages for correct identity of the aircraft; - Review of the Ignition line on deactivated state; - Checking the ignition power line to disabled Status. Method according to claim 3, characterized, that in step d2) the armed missile during the communication analysis test between the armed missile and carrying out at least the following checks on the aircraft: - Review of the Data bus messages on transmission with correct cycles; - Review of the Data bus messages on correct order; - Review of the Data bus messages for correct information transmission; - Review of the Data bus messages on plausible content; - Review of the Data bus messages for correct identity of the aircraft; - Review of the Ignition line on deactivated state; - Checking the ignition power line to disabled Status. Method according to claim 9 or 10, characterized that in case of a failure of the communication analysis test the error-causing issues via the maintenance interface of the armed missile become. Method according to claim 9 or 10, characterized that during the The communication analysis tests detected sporadic, non-fatal ones Errors according to type and number stored in the armed missile and after completion Review by the maintenance interface of the armed missile are issued as a report. Method according to claim 9 or 10, thereby in that after completing the communication analysis test on the Maintenance interface of the armed missile at least the following data bus analysis information is output as a report: - absolute frequency each data bus message; - Number the messages recognized as erroneous per data bus message type, - calculated Actual cycle of each data bus message, each actual cycle being specified Target cycle compared becomes. Method according to claim 9 or 10, thereby in that after completing the communication analysis test by means of the maintenance interface of the armed missile at least the following aircraft navigation data are output as a report: - current Status of the navigation system of the aircraft; - current Position, speed and Euler angle of the aircraft; - Accuracy measure for the navigation data of the aircraft. Method according to claim 9 or 10, characterized in that the communication analysis test selects one that can be selected by means of an identification means Operating mode of the operational software of the armed missile is.