EP1597709A2 - Procede de production de marques de securite - Google Patents

Procede de production de marques de securite

Info

Publication number
EP1597709A2
EP1597709A2 EP04708320A EP04708320A EP1597709A2 EP 1597709 A2 EP1597709 A2 EP 1597709A2 EP 04708320 A EP04708320 A EP 04708320A EP 04708320 A EP04708320 A EP 04708320A EP 1597709 A2 EP1597709 A2 EP 1597709A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
security
random
fingerprint
printing
particles
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP04708320A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Nils Biermann
Hilmar Rauhe
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Informium AG
Original Assignee
Informium AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Informium AG filed Critical Informium AG
Publication of EP1597709A2 publication Critical patent/EP1597709A2/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/08—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means
    • G06K19/083—Constructional details
    • G06K19/086—Constructional details with markings consisting of randomly placed or oriented elements, the randomness of the elements being useable for generating a unique identifying signature of the record carrier, e.g. randomly placed magnetic fibers or magnetic particles in the body of a credit card
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
    • G07D7/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
    • G07D7/20—Testing patterns thereon
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/06009—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking
    • G06K19/06046—Constructional details
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
    • G06K7/10—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation
    • G06K7/14—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation using light without selection of wavelength, e.g. sensing reflected white light
    • G06K7/1404—Methods for optical code recognition
    • G06K7/1439—Methods for optical code recognition including a method step for retrieval of the optical code
    • G06K7/1447—Methods for optical code recognition including a method step for retrieval of the optical code extracting optical codes from image or text carrying said optical code

Definitions

  • a random sample is applied to the product or label. It is essential that a very large number of distinguishable patterns can be generated and that the economic effort to produce such a pattern is low, while the effort to produce a very specific pattern in a targeted manner is much greater (e.g. random distribution of effect pigments).
  • a fingerprint is extracted from the random pattern read in the form of a data record which contains the individual features of the pattern.
  • This fingerprint is saved individually for each security identifier. During authentication, the fingerprint is extracted again and the correspondence with the stored fingerprint is checked.
  • the security label can generally be used as a counterfeit protection, e.g. for means of payment, documents, tokens, license plates and much more be used.
  • Overt systems are e.g. Labels, holograms, engravings etc.
  • Covert systems are typically molecular markers that are inserted or attached directly in or on the product to be labeled.
  • Overt labeling systems used for product labeling should meet the following requirements:
  • a problem that has not yet been solved is the copy protection of security markings. This makes it easy to copy simple optical features, barcodes, labels, etc. More complicated security labels such as holograms cannot be copied directly, they can be reproduced. In order to make copying more difficult, it has so far typically been avoided to hide the security indicators (e.g. features only visible in the UV or IR range), or to encrypt information and then apply it in encrypted form to the respective product (e.g. matrix code, its Contains data in an encrypted manner).
  • both strategies are relatively easy to circumvent for counterfeiters. In the first case, you perform a "scan" of different wavelengths and thereby find the wavelength in which the security label is openly visible. This can then simply be photographed and imitated or copied.
  • the application US 4,218,674 describes a document security system in which magnetic fibers are incorporated into the document and are randomly distributed in the document. The magnetic fibers are detected with a magnetic head. An identification code (“fingerprint”) can be calculated from the randomly distributed magnetic fibers by swiping a magnetic reading head over the marked document and logically (AND) linking the received signals with a time signal so that the signals (ordinate) versus time (abscissa)
  • the application US4,568,936 describes a system based on the detection of random patterns of microscopic paper fragments with different light transmission
  • the application US4,820,912 describes a system for securing banknotes and credit cards based on randomly distributed conductive fibers can be detected with microwaves.
  • the application US5,354,097 describes a labeling system based on the use of spatially randomly distributed microfibers, which are characterized by an optical system.
  • the registration is the basis of the 3DAS technology advertised by Unicate BV (Netherlands).
  • Target object may have come (e.g. due to scratches on the surface or the like) and that the respective detection devices themselves are never completely identical and cannot be positioned identically.
  • optical recording devices e.g. Precautions against slipping or twisting the comparative image compared to the
  • Original recording can be considered.
  • the application US5, 354,097 indicates that the reading system recognizes polygons that arise from the superimposition of the microfibers in the room. How this detection works, however, and how, in particular, recognition is ensured, is not disclosed.
  • the present invention is therefore based on the object of providing a method for product identification which meets the above-mentioned requirements and overcomes the disadvantages of the prior art.
  • the object is achieved to provide an inexpensive security identifier that cannot be copied or imitated, or can only be copied or imitated with uneconomically high expenditure.
  • This object is achieved according to the invention by a method for producing security labels, which is characterized in that Applies a unique, unordered random pattern to the object to be labeled (eg product or label), or uses a random pattern already on the object to be labeled for the further steps described.
  • the random pattern is not tied to any particular material or medium, the only decisive factor is that it contains disordered information, that it can be detected with a device, that a very large number of distinguishable patterns can be generated randomly and as evenly as possible, and that the economic outlay is any Creating such a pattern is low, while the effort to create a specific pattern is much larger, or it is completely impossible.
  • Random patterns are preferably obtained with the aid of detail or signal amplification.
  • the printing of letters by printing machines appears to the normal eye regularly. However, when the detail is magnified by a microscope, random deviations and irregularities become apparent.
  • suitable readers in different resolutions.
  • electromagnetic signals Such a pattern obtained by signal amplification can be detected by a suitable reading device, but the more difficult it is to imitate the higher the signal amplification and the more sensitive the detection device.
  • the random pattern is so complex that it cannot be reproduced at all. If resolution or signal amplification can be scaled up, the copying effort can also be increased later and adapted to the respective security requirements.
  • step III The fingerprint extracted in step III is stored in a data processing device or a machine data storage device.
  • the fingerprint extracted in step III is stored directly in or on the object to be identified, preferably in machine-readable form, e.g. as a barcode, matrix code or as a transponder.
  • the extracted information is preferably encrypted beforehand.
  • the fingerprint extracted in step III, together with the unique identification number, is stored as a pair in a data structure (database).
  • Variant A consisting of process steps I, II, III, V, VIII, in which a fingerprint is extracted from the random pattern and this is stored in a data structure (database) that contains the valid fingerprints.
  • database data structure
  • other features such as batch number, article number, year of birth, etc. can be used as the key to the database.
  • Variant B Consisting of process steps I, II, III, IV, VII, VIII in which, in addition to variant A, an identification number is applied to the object to be identified (e.g. as a barcode or matrix code), which is stored together with the fingerprint in a data structure (database) becomes. This simplifies and speeds up access to the respective fingerprints for the comparisons required for checking.
  • an identification number e.g. as a barcode or matrix code
  • Variant C consisting of process steps I, II, III, VI, VIII in which the extracted fingerprint is saved directly in or on the object to be identified, e.g. in machine-readable form as barcode or matrix code.
  • a reader with recognition software can subsequently extract the fingerprint for authentication and compare it directly with the fingerprint attached to or on the object.
  • a great advantage of this method is that the authentication is also offline, i.e. works without any connection to a database.
  • An asymmetric encryption method e.g. RSA
  • One key is used for encryption and one for decrypting information.
  • Variant D consisting of variant A, B or C with additional use of the random pattern for storing pre-coded, i.e. non-random, information, eg for differentiating batches.
  • pre-coded i.e. non-random
  • the quantitative ratio of these particle types to one another can be used to store information. This information can be determined by appropriately mixing the particles before the production of the random samples.
  • An example of realizing random patterns is the production of mixtures of distinguishable microparticles.
  • Such a mixture can e.g. made of clear lacquer
  • Microscope at approx. 400-1000 times magnification an image of the random pattern that shows a characteristic dot pattern of the reflecting metal particles. This image is sent to a computer in electronic form.
  • Random pattern a fake can be made more difficult by one
  • Random pattern multiple images can be taken under irradiation of light from different sides. A counterfeiter is also forced to do the exact thing
  • particles e.g. colored particles, pigments, effect pigments, sand, dust, crystals (e.g. salt crystals of different colors), ferromagnetic, magnetizable, permanently magnetic, fluorescent, phosphorescent, iridescent, opalescent or radioactive particles
  • Electromagnetic random resonance frequencies (transponders)
  • Random patterns can be read or detected using the following devices, for example:
  • microscopes electron microscopes, atomic force microscopes, transmission electron microscopes (TEM), magneto-optical eddy current microscopes etc.
  • optical patterns such as holograms and pictorial information that are only visible in a certain wavelength spectrum, barcodes, magnetic patterns on magnetic strips, etc.
  • the information actually to be recognized is therefore not “pre-coded” and applied to an object in the method according to the invention, but “post-coded”: an unordered random pattern is read (“scanned”) and information is extracted therefrom , The extracted information is then used as a fingerprint that uniquely identifies the respective object.
  • Such Random patterns can typically be obtained by using a reader with a high resolution range.
  • the image area will generally not be expanded accordingly (from 1 megabyte to 1 terabyte in the example above), but you can now select a section from a larger image area that is not known to a third party. You can take advantage of this fact and use it for steganographic encryption. In the example, only the encryptor knows where the relevant 1 megabyte image section is located in the 1 terabyte image space. For decryption, it is therefore necessary to find the "right place" again. The information required for this is a secret key, which can be passed on to third parties as required and enables them to decrypt.
  • the encryption strength can be increased even further more degrees of freedom can be used
  • Another degree of freedom is, for example, the z-axis (third spatial dimension)
  • Another degree of freedom is, for example, the number of different particles used to extract features be used.
  • particle mixtures can be used to generate chaotic patterns, in which k (ke IN, k> 1) of n (ne IN, 0 ⁇ k ⁇ n) distinguishable particle species are used for feature extraction (the decoding information would accordingly include which Particles are relevant).
  • the encryption strength therefore increases in proportion to the size of the data volume, for which we have determined an exponential growth for the number of degrees of freedom above.
  • An exemplary method for extracting a fingerprint for the above-mentioned mixture of clear lacquer and metal microparticles uses common methods of digital image processing.
  • the reflective metal particles create a pattern of dots (features).
  • the dots are separated from the background by a thresholding. All pixels whose brightness lies above a threshold value are assigned to a point and colored black. The other pixels remain white.
  • a black and white image is created from the original image ( Figure 1 and Figure 2).
  • the color information can also be used to support segmentation and also to differentiate between different particle types.
  • the image is searched line by line. Whenever a black pixel is found, the associated point is filled with a filling algorithm (e.g. flood fill as in Foley, V. Dam, Feiner, Hughes, Computer Graphics Principles and Practice, 2nd Ed., Addison Wesley).
  • a filling algorithm e.g. flood fill as in Foley, V. Dam, Feiner, Hughes, Computer Graphics Principles and Practice, 2nd Ed., Addison Wesley.
  • a further average position is weighted according to the size of the points. This position is used as the origin of the coordinate system, according to which the coordinates of the points together with their sizes as
  • This table represents a data structure that can be further coded for data storage (e.g. in a database), e.g. as arrays of floating point numbers.
  • This table, or the coded form of the table represents the actual fingerprint. It should be noted that the method shown is only one way of extracting fingerprints. In principle, any feature extraction methods and any data structures can be used for this.
  • the fingerprint of a random layer thickness distribution can be saved as an array of x, y, and z coordinates.
  • a random pattern of scratches can be saved as a line graph, a random pattern of frequency oscillations can be saved as a series of floating point numbers, etc.
  • a scanned image can be differently illuminated, tilted, shifted or rotated in several recordings.
  • the random pattern used as a characteristic must be as robust as possible against external influences. It is sufficient to use materials that are designed for this anyway. For example, Many surface coatings have already been optimized for abrasion resistance, UV resistance, etc.
  • the method described below for comparing two fingerprints shows an example of a solution to this problem for the particle and dot patterns described above by way of example.
  • a pair of corresponding points are two points from two fingerprints, which are probably due to the same metal microparticle of the same random pattern.
  • a comparison of their characteristic properties determines whether two points count as such a pair. If, for example, the match of the size of the points, the distances and directions to their closest neighbors and their sizes exceeds a threshold value, the two points are considered to be a corresponding pair. Another criterion is the distance between the two points, which must not be too large. If not enough corresponding points are found, the fingerprints are not considered identical.
  • the positions of the points of one of the two fingerprints are shifted and rotated so that the sum of the distances between the points of the corresponding pairs is then minimal.
  • the random sample can be produced easily, cheaply and in high throughput. A simple, low-quality printing device without self-intelligence is sufficient for this, which can print random distributions of mixtures of particles.
  • no random pattern has to be applied at all, but there is already a usable pattern on the object.
  • Random samples and test code (variant C) can be applied separately from each other, so that e.g. B. a packaging manufacturer applies random samples in high throughput while a second instance determines and applies the test codes.
  • the security label can be produced in high throughput as a "token", each containing a random sample and test code (variant C) and can be applied to any object at any time.
  • the security of the security label is scalable. The security can thereby be increased continuously That encoders and test devices are made more sensitive. For the determination of the fingerprint / test code ever higher resolutions of the random pattern can be used, whereby the counterfeiting effort increases more and more.
  • the validity can only be checked on the object with the test device The connection to a database is not required for variant C.
  • the validation of the security identifier is very simple, for example, a security identifier can be devalued a) by destruction b) by blocking or deleting the corresponding database entry.
  • Pappu's method is based on so-called "physical one-way functions", the extraction of 2400-bit identifiers ("digital fingerprint”) from the radiation of an unordered, transparent, light-scattering medium (randomly distributed Glass beads in epoxy resin) with laser light and the digital compression (Gabor hash) of the speckle patterns ("speckle pattems") obtained by this radiation to 2400-bit identifiers.
  • SR Pappu deserves to have shown on the basis of his method variant that this Principle "physical authentication” follows cryptographic principles and thus security features based on the principle of secrecy ("security by obscurity”) are far superior, since it has the advantage of higher security and mathematically quantifiable security.
  • the method described according to the invention does not require a micrometer-precise positioning mechanism and therefore no complex, error-prone and, moreover, expensive hardware;
  • the method described according to the invention can achieve at least a similarly high level of security as that of the SR Pappu method, but with extremely reduced hardware and time expenditure.
  • this is due to the fact that an amplifier, preferably optical magnification (lens system), is used.
  • the number of distinguishable patterns increases quadratically with the magnification factor.
  • a particular advantage of the method according to the invention is that the deviations can be several orders of magnitude higher, which saves considerable positioning effort choose different optical magnifications from commercially available devices, for example, deviations of 600 ⁇ m and 6 mm can also be achieved, if desired.
  • a further advantage of the method according to the invention is that the magnification factor is described with most according to the invention level probes can be parameterized (scalability); the method described according to the invention does not require any identification for certain objects. For example, euro notes can be authenticated without any additional labeling and thus without any change to the previous printing process (see Figure 17 and comment). Process variants A and B described according to the invention are particularly suitable, process variant B being particularly preferred. At the same time, the “retrofitting” with the method according to the invention would result in a considerably higher level of security against counterfeiting than is the case today
  • particles for example the use of platelet-shaped interference pigments with a thickness of, for example, 1-3 ⁇ m, allows the doping of printing inks. By adding or dispersing the marker, these become security printing inks.
  • the interference pigments described according to the invention are not only for particularly thin ones Layers are suitable, but also have the advantage of generating 3-dimensional random patterns by randomly tilted particles after application of a doped printing ink in the room planes, which result in different patterns when the radiation source or probe is translated or rotated (see Figure 9 and Figure for comparison 10).
  • the method described according to the invention is therefore particularly suitable for coating objects by means of common printing methods, in particular screen, gravure and offset printing, and is therefore particularly suitable for bulk articles, packaging and containers;
  • - Method variant B has the particular advantage of requiring only one (instead of n) comparisons in a database with n stored fingerprints, since only a comparison with the fingerprint stored in the database under the identification number is necessary, which is extremely time-consuming and time-consuming for authentication saves;
  • the method described according to the invention is particularly suitable for the labeling of bulk articles, the advantages being in particular the combination of high (cryptographic) security and comparatively little effort and thus low costs.
  • Counterfeit-proof means of payment can be produced as follows: a) The means of payment are provided with a random sample at a precisely defined point. This random pattern can be optical (eg random distribution of pigments), magnetic (random distribution of magnetic particles) or electromagnetic (random distribution of frequency resonators). This random pattern serves as a certificate of authenticity and copy protection. b) The certificates are "scanned" with the detection device corresponding to the marking (microscope, eddy current probe, frequency scanner) and stored in a database.
  • marking microscope, eddy current probe, frequency scanner
  • the means of payment equipped with a random sample are copy-protected because the certificates are described in a way as described above d)
  • the means of payment protected in this way can be deactivated and tracked by simply locking the data records in question in the database or transmitting the last reading locations using suitable readers Test devices that check the authenticity of the means of payment only need access to the database.
  • machine-readable serial numbers e.g. barcodes
  • means of payment which are saved together with the certificate.
  • the source of random patterns is the effect field formed from interference pigments (see Figure 17 a), which shows a random distribution of reflecting particles under the microscope.
  • the effect field is recorded with a video microscope used as a probe at a defined magnification (for example, but not exclusively, magnifications such as 20, 50 or 100 times magnification are suitable) at an optional, but defined, position and, as described according to the invention, processed into a fingerprint ,
  • a defined magnification for example, but not exclusively, magnifications such as 20, 50 or 100 times magnification are suitable
  • process variant B at least one random pattern is extracted from the effect field and the serial number of the bill is used as the identification number under which the fingerprint extracted from the effect field is stored in this database (see Figure 17 and comment on this).
  • the banknote has an additional security feature with considerably higher (cryptographic) security than the previous features b) for this additional security feature, the actual printing process of the banknotes does not have to be changed, which makes the security feature considerably less expensive than other security features and c) if desired, banknotes can be traced and, if desired (e.g. by locking the data record), can be deactivated without these banknotes to move in.
  • Another application example is individual labeling for painted objects (e.g. machines and vehicles). It is sufficient to spray an object to be marked in at least one predetermined location with an uneven layer of lacquer (for example, simply by applying “any” random layer with a spray gun). Such a layer will have irregularities in the layer thickness If so, the sequence of measured layer thicknesses results in a sequence of floating point numbers, which can be saved as a unique identifier and subsequently identified again.
  • a deposit redemption system can be implemented on the basis of the method described here.
  • the deposit return system is designed to ensure that objects remain in a defined economic and recovery cycle and are not removed from it. In order to ensure that objects are returned to the economic and recovery cycle even when they are temporarily removed, a deposit is levied on the objects before removal, which is only repaid when they are returned to the cycle.
  • the requirements for the deposit system include: a) No false objects should be placed in the deposit system, b) The deposit system must be as simple as possible for everyone involved, c) The deposit system should be as inexpensive as possible.
  • a marking is applied / applied to the objects, which is tamper-proof (copy-protected) and can be easily validated.
  • the identification consists of a random pattern (eg a random distribution of color particles) and a corresponding test code, which is preferably machine-readable (eg as a bar code) (variant C).
  • the marking can be designed, for example, as printing (screen printing, gravure printing, digital printing, wax printing, etc.) or as a label.
  • the marking functions as an authentication feature, the validity of which can be checked by a test device by comparing the random pattern and the test code.
  • the random pattern acts as a copy protection, which cannot be cracked or only cracked at an uneconomically high cost.
  • the check code in turn is obtained from the random pattern by extracting features from the random pattern as described above and encoding it as a data record (fingerprint).
  • the marking can be applied / applied at any time after the production of the object to be marked.
  • the verification of labels is carried out using test devices which have a detector for the random pattern and software which extracts features from the random pattern, calculates a fingerprint and compares this with the test code.
  • Objects without or without complete identification or without random patterns and test code matching are invalidated. The devaluation can be carried out in several ways, for example tearing off (in the case of a label), scraping, brief heating (in the case of a wax print), etc.
  • Figure 22 and Figure 23 show the barcode of the container, from which, as described according to the invention, a unique fingerprint was obtained, on the basis of which the individual container can be recognized.
  • the illustrations in Figure 29 and Figure 30 show the identification of the container and the recognition of the fingerprint which is achieved by comparing the original fingerprint with a subsequently recorded fingerprint.
  • the example illustrates how the method described according to the invention can also be used to individually identify unmarked bulk items, which is used, for example, to detect counterfeits or is useful, for example, within a deposit return system.
  • the functionality of the deposit return system is based on the fact that the containers to be pledged are read into the database of the return system.
  • the containers When returning empty containers, the containers are then identified by a reading device according to the method described in accordance with the invention and deleted or blocked in the database so that they cannot be returned several times or illegal copies of containers can be produced and returned.
  • the method according to the invention has the advantage over deposit return systems that are based on the individualization of containers by producing random numbers that are applied to containers as barcodes or matrix codes, that neither random numbers have to be generated, nor that containers with barcode / matrix code have to be printed or labeled , which entails not inconsiderable and costly changes in the manufacturing process of the containers (in the Federal Republic there are about 15 billion disposable packaging annually).
  • a method for producing security labels characterized in that the security label contains a random pattern.
  • the .security mark is formed by the reflecting surface of the object to be marked in each case.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the safety mark of particles, for. B. colored particles, pigments, effect pigments, sand, dust, crystals (e.g. salt crystals of different colors), ferromagnetic, magnetizable, permanent magnetic, fluorescent, phosphorescent, iridescent, opalescent or radioactive particles.
  • particles for. B. colored particles, pigments, effect pigments, sand, dust, crystals (e.g. salt crystals of different colors), ferromagnetic, magnetizable, permanent magnetic, fluorescent, phosphorescent, iridescent, opalescent or radioactive particles.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the security identifier is formed by fluorescent, phosphorizing, iridescent, opalescent or reflective particles.
  • fluorescent, phosphorizing, iridescent, opalescent or reflective particles for example, organic and inorganic, particularly inorganic fluorescent particles such as those offered by the company Leuchtstoffwerk Breitungen GmbH (98597 Breitungen, www.leuchtstoffwerk.com) are suitable.
  • Crystals, platelet-shaped crystals, liquid crystals, reflective pigments from at least two layers with different refractory indexes, effect pigments (interference pigments, pearlescent and metallic luster pigments) are also very suitable.
  • Effect pigments are available, for example, under the trade names Iriodin ⁇ / Afflair® and Colourstream® from Merck KGaA, Darmstadt, under the trade name Helicone® from Wacker Chemie, Burghausen.
  • a particular advantage of reflecting particles is the fact that a) unlike fluorescent particles, they are subject to almost no wear from light, and b) different random patterns arise depending on the viewing and lighting angle. Such changes arise when looking at the effect pigments, for example, in that each individual pigment acts like a microscopic mirror for light of a certain wavelength, which reflects this light in its random spatial orientation, which creates 3-dimensional random patterns.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the particles used have a diameter between 0.1 ⁇ m and 1 ⁇ m, between 1 ⁇ m and 10 ⁇ m, between 10 ⁇ m and 80 ⁇ m, between 80 ⁇ m and 150 ⁇ m and between 150 ⁇ m and 2000 ⁇ m, and a thickness of up to 50 ⁇ m, preferably to 10 ⁇ m, particularly preferably up to 3 ⁇ m.
  • fluorescent particles Use of fluorescent particles, crystals, platelet-shaped crystals, liquid crystals, reflective pigments from at least two layers with different refractory index, effect pigments (interference pigments, pearlescent and metallic luster pigments) for the identification of objects according to the principle of individual random patterns.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the particles are introduced into a matrix (carrier) and the mixture formed in this way is used for coating objects.
  • Suitable as a matrix are paints and lacquers, preferably water, solvent, powder, UV lacquers, epoxy resins, plastics (e.g. polyethylene), ethyl acetate and comparable materials, paraffins, waxes and wax-like coatings (e.g. Flexane).
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the particles are introduced into printing inks.
  • Printing inks for screen, gravure, flexo and offset printing are preferred.
  • Printing ink obtainable by a process according to the invention.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that at least two distinguishable particle types are used for coding additional information;
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the marker is applied by spraying, galvanizing or printing, preferably by ink-jet, wax, screen, gravure, letterpress or offset printing;
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the concentration in percent by weight of the particles in the matrix is between 0.01% and 30%, preferably between 0.01% and 1%, between 1% and 10% and between 10% and 30% , is particularly preferably between 0.01% and 1% and between 10% and 15%;
  • Reading or scanning of individual, chaotic or random features of an object preferably with the help of optical and electromagnetic detection devices (microscope, interferometer, NMR, AFM etc.).
  • Reading or scanning of individual, chaotic or random features of an object preferably with the aid of optical and electromagnetic detection devices (microscope, interferometer, NMR, AFM etc.), characterized in that the random pattern used for identification can be obtained by a method according to the invention.
  • optical and electromagnetic detection devices microscope, interferometer, NMR, AFM etc.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that at least one radiation source is used to induce a random pattern detectable by the probe and at least one probe is used to detect this random pattern, each of which contains a signal amplifier (e.g. optical or electronic lenses) in front of the actual detector.
  • a signal amplifier e.g. optical or electronic lenses
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that at least one radiation source is used to induce a random pattern detectable by the probe and at least one probe, which preferably contains a signal amplifier (e.g. optical or electronic lenses) in front of the actual detector, is used to detect this random pattern.
  • a signal amplifier e.g. optical or electronic lenses
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the object or a localized partial area (target area) of the object is recorded in incident light.
  • at least one radiation source and one probe focus in the same target area on the object.
  • the radiation source and probe are preferably located at a defined distance and defined solid angles from the target area of the object.
  • the position of the radiation source (s) and probe (s) in relation to the object is preferred for first scanning of the object is stored and preferably kept secret, so that precise knowledge of the positioning data in the steganographic sense represents a secret key which, if desired, increases the security of the identification.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that no coherent radiation or coherent light (laser) is required for the identification of the random pattern, or the radiation source does not have to emit coherent radiation or coherent light.
  • Suitable sources of radiation are, for example, but not exclusively, diodes, halogen lamps, UV lamps, IR lamps.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the radiation source and probe work in the spectral range of X-rays, UV, visible light, infrared, microwaves, particularly preferably in the spectral range of UV, visible light or infrared.
  • the reading device contains a CMOS or CCD with a digital output and at least 640x480 pixels, preferably 1024x768 pixels resolution.
  • the probe contains, as an amplifier in front of the detector, a lens or a lens system for focusing electromagnetic waves. It is preferably an enlarging optical lens system with a transmittance for wavelengths between 100nm and 950nm, particularly preferably a lens system with a transmittance for wavelengths between 300nm and 850nm.
  • the optical magnification of the signal amplifier is at least 2x the original image, preferably between 10x and 200x, 200x and 400x, 400x and 750x and 750x and 1000x, particularly preferably between 25x and 50x, 70x and 100x, 120x and 150x, 170x and 21 Ox, 220x and 250x, 280x and 325x, 350x and 400x, 500x and 600x, 650x and 750x, 800x and 850x, 900x and 1000x.
  • a method according to the invention for the purpose of identifying or authenticating objects.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the security identifier is different for each object.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the security identifier is different for each object and is unique in each case (individual identifier).
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that packaging and containers are identified individually.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that barcodes and matrix codes are individually identified by random patterns.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that there is a second identifier on the object to be identified, which is preferably machine-readable (e.g. as a barcode or matrix code).
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that there is a second identifier on the object to be identified, which is preferably machine-readable (for example as a barcode or matrix code), characterized in that the fingerprint extracted by this object is stored in a database and all accesses run on this extracted fingerprint via the corresponding second identifier.
  • a second identifier on the object to be identified which is preferably machine-readable (for example as a barcode or matrix code)
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that there is a second identifier on the object to be identified, which is preferably machine-readable (for example as a barcode or matrix code), characterized in that the second identifier is obtained by extracting a fingerprint from this object is encrypted, is preferably applied using asymmetrical encryption methods and is again applied to the same object as a second identifier, preferably in machine-readable form (for example as a barcode or matrix code).
  • method variant D for the additional storage of (precoded) data on an object, e.g. of manufacturer and product data.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the security identifier is machine-readable.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the fingerprint can be read electronically.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the fingerprint cannot be copied or reproduced using optical methods.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the fingerprint cannot be copied or imitated efficiently, i.e. that counterfeiting the labeled product is too expensive for counterfeiting to be economically worthwhile.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the label has an identifier in addition to the security identifier (e.g. serial number), machine-readable identifiers (e.g. barcodes, labels, transponders) are preferred.
  • the security identifier e.g. serial number
  • machine-readable identifiers e.g. barcodes, labels, transponders
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that probes are used to identify electrical and magnetic fields in order to identify the security indicators.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that the reading device recognizes electrical or magnetic fields or field lines.
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that, for identification of the safety indicators, probes and devices from material testing, particularly preferably Hall detectors, magneto-resistive detectors, detectors using the eddy current method, capacitive, inductive detectors, X-ray fluorescence devices, Interferometer and laser interferometer, electron microscope and
  • a method according to the invention characterized in that high-resolution detection devices are used, i.e. Devices that can read structures in the ⁇ m and nm range.
  • Manufacture of the security label by a method according to the invention by printing (color printing, screen printing, gravure printing, digital printing, flexographic printing, etc.).
  • the security identifier contains a random pattern obtainable by a method according to the invention as copy protection and the fingerprint extracted from the random pattern as a certificate.
  • Device for producing security signs comprising device for producing random patterns.
  • Device for producing security labels, comprising o detection probe o computer o Software for recording random patterns, extracting features, encoding features as a fingerprint and, if necessary, encrypting fingerprints o Device for applying the (encrypted) fingerprints to objects.
  • Particle mixtures obtainable by a method according to the invention for the production of random patterns.
  • Figure 5 Resulting dot pattern. The point marked with a marks the
  • Figure 6 Example of data obtained from a feature extraction from a random pattern.
  • This data table is the actual fingerprint.
  • the data table can now be encoded into a data representation by mapping (e.g. as Arrav or String) which is particularly well suited for storage (e.g. in databases).
  • mapping e.g. as Arrav or String
  • Figure 7 Data pipeline, part 1. Excitation of a target area S t on the object S with a radiation source Q. The excitation of S t is carried out by Q with a defined one
  • the emission induced by Q (preferably reflection or reflection, but also transmission, refraction or diffraction) of radiation from S t is amplified by E and D is detected (digitized).
  • Figure 10 (see Figure 9)
  • Figure 11 Reading device consisting of video microscope and computer with software.
  • Figure 12 Reading device consisting of video microscope and computer with software.
  • Figure 13 Random sample obtained by printing Helicone® HC XL effect pigments from Wacker Chemie (Jade XL / Scarabeus on RAL 9005 jet black). The XL pigments have a particle size of approx. 500 ⁇ m, which is why the random patterns can be seen with the naked eye.
  • Figure 14 Random sample obtained by printing Helicone® HC effect pigments from Wacker Chemie (Maple on RAL 9005 jet black). The apparently uniform distribution actually shows distinctive random patterns that become visible when magnified with a microscope (see also Figure 1).
  • Figure 15 Security label according to process variant B. a: Effect field with random pattern (Merck Colourstream®, Merck KGaA, Darmstadt), b: Barcode; According to method variant B, a fingerprint of the effect field is stored in a database under a unique identification code (b) as described, so that the fingerprint can be checked in constant runtime (O (1)) by database access to the identification code.
  • Figure 16 Design of a security label according to process variant C.
  • a contains a random pattern that is encrypted and saved as a check code b, a and b can subsequently be checked for correspondence without database access.
  • Figure 17 The individual fingerprint is taken from the effects field (a) and used for authentication according to one of the process variants.
  • the fingerprint is stored together with the serial number (b) in a database.
  • the example shows a 50 euro note. After reading the fingerprint and serial number into a database, a single bill is subsequently tested for identity by checking the correspondence between features a and b.
  • FIG. 18 Fingerprinting vs. Chip: a) Conventional authentication strategy using a magnetic stripe / chip, (b) “fingerprint card. In the case of b), the card is authenticated according to one of the method variants described according to the invention.
  • a particular advantage of the variant described according to the invention over other fingerprint methods is that the method described according to the invention a) also works in incident light, b) none coherent light (laser) required) c) works for standard printing inks and printing processes.
  • Figure 19 3DAS marking on plastic card. (Image from: R.L. van Renesse, Optical
  • Figure 20 3DAS marking: detailed view of Figure 19. You can see the
  • Figure 25 Image after threshold operation.
  • Figure 26 Image after erosion and dilation.
  • Figure 28 Resulting data table (fingerprint) of the coordinates and sizes of the points.
  • Figure 29 Comparison of two dot patterns that were read from the same barcode.

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé de production de marques de sécurité. Les marques de sécurité actuelles (codes-barres, hologrammes, etc.) sont souvent faciles à falsifier, coûteuses à produire, accessibles à des contrefacteurs ou non lisibles par machine. Ce nouveau procédé doit pallier à ces inconvénients. Selon ledit procédé, un motif aléatoire est appliqué sur le produit ou l'étiquette ; un très grand nombre de motifs différents peut être produit et le coût de production de n'importe quel motif est très faible, tandis que la difficulté de production d'un motif défini est bien plus grande (p. ex. répartition aléatoire de pigments à effet). Une empreinte digitale sous la forme d'un enregistrement de données est extraite à partir du motif aléatoire lu, laquelle empreinte contient les caractéristiques individuelles du motif. Cette empreinte digitale est mémorisée de façon individuelle pour chaque marque de sécurité. Lors de l'authentification, l'empreinte digitale est à nouveau extraite et la concordance avec l'empreinte digitale mémorisée est vérifiée. Cette marque de sécurité peut généralement servir de protection contre les contrefaçons p. ex. pour des moyens de paiement, documents, bons, numéros d'immatriculation de véhicules automobiles, etc.
EP04708320A 2003-02-05 2004-02-05 Procede de production de marques de securite Withdrawn EP1597709A2 (fr)

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DE10304805 2003-02-05
DE10304805A DE10304805A1 (de) 2003-02-05 2003-02-05 Verfahren zur Herstellung von Sicherheitskennzeichen
PCT/EP2004/001087 WO2004070667A2 (fr) 2003-02-05 2004-02-05 Procede de production de marques de securite

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