EP1082722B1 - Key distribution via a memory device - Google Patents

Key distribution via a memory device Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1082722B1
EP1082722B1 EP00922542A EP00922542A EP1082722B1 EP 1082722 B1 EP1082722 B1 EP 1082722B1 EP 00922542 A EP00922542 A EP 00922542A EP 00922542 A EP00922542 A EP 00922542A EP 1082722 B1 EP1082722 B1 EP 1082722B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
key
recording medium
encrypted content
content material
recording
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP00922542A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP1082722A1 (en
Inventor
Michael A. Epstein
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Koninklijke Philips NV
Original Assignee
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV filed Critical Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV
Publication of EP1082722A1 publication Critical patent/EP1082722A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1082722B1 publication Critical patent/EP1082722B1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/78—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data
    • G06F21/80—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data in storage media based on magnetic or optical technology, e.g. disks with sectors
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G11B20/00217—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source
    • G11B20/00253—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source wherein the key is stored on the record carrier
    • G11B20/00282—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source wherein the key is stored on the record carrier the key being stored in the content area, e.g. program area, data area or user area
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2211/00—Indexing scheme relating to details of data-processing equipment not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00
    • G06F2211/007—Encryption, En-/decode, En-/decipher, En-/decypher, Scramble, (De-)compress
    • G06F2211/008—Public Key, Asymmetric Key, Asymmetric Encryption

Definitions

  • This invention relates to the field of electronic security, and in particular to the encryption and decryption of copy-protected content material.
  • Digital recording techniques are commonly used to record copy-protected content material, such as audio and video recordings. Subsequent digital copies of such digital recordings are virtually indistinguishable from the original, and offer the same quality as the original.
  • a variety of encryption and decryption techniques have been developed, and continue to be developed, to limit the number of times that a copy of copy-protected content material can be made, or to limit the number of times that a copy may be played-back, or to place an expiration time on a copy.
  • encryption and decryption techniques have been developed that limit the type of actions than can be applied to the copy. For example, a copy may have a limit to the number of times that it can be copied, independent of the number of times that it can be played-back.
  • a "copy-once, play-always" authorization would allow for an infinite number of play-backs, but only one copy; a “copy-never, play-10" authorization would allow for ten play-backs, and no copies of this copy.
  • the term “rendering” is used herein to identify either a recording function or a playback function.
  • a recorder renders the material to a recording medium
  • a CD-player renders the material to an audio system
  • a DVD-player renders the material to an audio-visual system, and so on.
  • the device that provides the limited-use copy may also limit the number of limited-use copies of the copy-protected material that are simultaneously available at any given time.
  • the compliant recorder will not provide an eleventh copy until at least one of the first ten copies is "checked-in", and marked as being expired, if not already so marked.
  • the copy contains a counter or ticket that stores, in a secure manner, an indication of the authorized rights, and a compliant playback device updates the counter with each rendering or each passage of time, as appropriate for the particular authorized right.
  • the device that provides the limited-use copy and the device that renders the material share a cryptographic key or set of keys that are used to prevent the rendering of the material on an illicit device, and to prevent a modification to the authorization parameters.
  • the content material is encrypted using a symmetric key, and this key is communicated to the rendering device in an encrypted form, using an asymmetric public key that corresponds to a private key that is associated with the rendering device. In this manner, only the intended rendering device is able to decrypt the encrypted content material. This asymmetric public key is also used to encrypt the authorization rights associated with the encrypted content material.
  • time-based system based on real time (clock time)
  • clock time is not often effective for copy protection, because many illicit copies could be made in a relatively short amount of time, and, conversely, most purchasers would be dissatisfied with a time limit that was not related to whether the material was being rendered during that time.
  • time-based systems are based on a duration of time that the material is actually rendered, rather than real (clock) time.
  • time-limited or usage-limited copies of copy- protected material is for the legitimate vendors of the copy-protected material to sell time- limited or usage-limited copies directly, potentially at a lower cost than the above referenced copies that allow for unlimited reproductions.
  • a limited-use copy may be provided via a download from the Internet, or via a broadcast from a provider, such as a cable or satellite television program provider, with an option to purchase an unlimited-use copy.
  • limited-use copies can be provided as rental items, such as a single-use rental of a video recording that does not require the return of the recording within a limited time period.
  • a bit-for-bit copy is made of the limited-use copy while it contains its full allocation of authorized usage or time, and stored in an archive.
  • this copy cannot typically be used in a non-compliant rendering device, because the material is stored in a secured form, this copy can be used, or replayed, on a compliant device by re-recording the bit-by-bit copy of the maximum allocated copy back onto the recording medium.
  • European patent application EP 0 809 244 discloses a software copying system for copying software from a master storage medium to a target storage medium.
  • a contents identifier reading means reads out an identifier from the master storage medium
  • a storage medium identifier reading means reads out a storage medium identifier from a target storage medium.
  • the two identifiers are then used to generate a first signature at a signature generating means, and a second storage at a signature generating/comparing means.
  • the signature generating/comparing means also compares the first signature with the second signature. If the two signatures match, the data copying means retrieves the subject software product and writes the same onto the target storage medium.
  • the identifier stored in the master storage medium includes an identifier that is unique to each of the commercial software products available from the master storage medium.
  • the storage medium identifier is unique to the target storage medium, and is written at the factory before shipment. Thus, both of the identifiers are set values used to indicate either the software product contained in the master storage medium or the target storage medium itself.
  • EP 0 672 991 discloses a method and apparatus for controlling the dissemination of digital information. More specifically, EP '991 discloses that sealed controlled information includes a header and a body.
  • the header preferably includes a total number of legal accesses allowed and a total number of legal accesses left.
  • a counter keeps track of the number of accesses already granted such that when the number of legal access left equals zero, access to the controlled information is denied.
  • Also included in the header of the controlled information is a plurality of encryption/decryption keys.
  • an encryption system having a secure item that is substantially unique for each recording of a copy of copy- protected content material.
  • a memory element is provided in the recording medium that is readable but not writeable by external devices, and whose content changes each time material is recorded onto the medium.
  • the content of this memory element is used to form a unique encryption key that is used to encrypt the encryption key that is used to encrypt the content material.
  • This unique encryption of the content encryption key is further encrypted using a public key that corresponds to a private key of the intended rendering device.
  • the unique encryption key is determinable by reading and processing the content of the externally read-only memory element, the decryption of the content encryption key requires both the unique encryption key and the private key of the intended rendering device. Because the unique encryption key is based on a content value of the read-only memory element that is unique to each recording to the recording medium, a subsequent illicit re-recording of the original encrypted content material onto the recording medium (a replay attack) will not provide the same unique encryption key as the unique encryption key used to originally encrypt the content encryption key. Because the unique encryption key of the replay attack differs from the original unique encryption key used to encrypt the content encryption key, the rendering device will be unable to decrypt the content encryption key, and thereby will be unable to decrypt the content material, and the replay attack will fail.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates an example block diagram of an encryption system 100 that provides a copy of copy-protected material on a recording medium 300 that precludes replay attacks in accordance with this invention.
  • the encryption system 100 includes a content provider 200, a recording medium 300, and a rendering device 400.
  • the content provider 200 records encrypted content material and associated information to the recording medium 300, for rendering by the rendering device 400. Any of a variety of conventional recording techniques can be employed, depending upon the form and structure of the medium 300. For ease of understanding, the components utilized to write to and read from the medium 300 are not illustrated in the example block diagram of the content provider 200 and rendering device 400 in FIG. 1 .
  • the recording medium 300 includes a recording indicator 310 that contains a unique number U.
  • a new number U is created each time encrypted content material 221 is stored to the memory area 320 of the medium 300.
  • Any number of techniques may be used to facilitate the production of this unique number U.
  • the recording indicator 310 includes a counter that is incremented by a modifier 315 with each write access 299 to the memory 320.
  • the modifier 315 includes a random number generator that provides a new random number to the recording indicator 310 with each write access 299 to the memory 320.
  • Other techniques are also viable, such as the use of a data-time stamp, and others.
  • the recording indicator 310 is embodied in the "disk sector tag" commonly associated with sectors of memory in a computer memory device.
  • Corresponding tags can be written to optical or magnetic disks via a secure disk drive analogously to the case of computer memory. That is, as the encrypted content material 221 is written to each sector of the memory area 320, the modifier 315 changes the disk sector tag of each sector that is written to. One or more of these changed disk sector tags thereby form the unique number U.
  • writes to other sectors within the medium 300 will not affect the tags associated with the sectors used to form the memory block 320 for storing the encrypted content material 320. In this manner, memory write operations are distinguishable, even if the medium 300 is not physically segregated into discrete memory blocks 310, 320, 340, 350 as illustrated in FIG. 1 .
  • the number U can be the collection of all tags in the entire memory thus creating a single key KU for the entire contents of the media.
  • the number U and corresponding key KU can be for a single "disk sector" so that each section of the media can be separately rewritten without affecting the other sections of the media.
  • the recording indicator 310 is configured to be externally readable, but not externally controllable. That is, at each occurrence of a write access to the memory 320, the content recording indicator 310 changes in a manner that is not externally controllable. In this manner, if the legitimate contents in the medium 300 are copied to an archive, and then subsequently re-recorded on the medium 300 from the archive, the recording indicator 310 will, via the modifier 315, contain a different value U' (not illustrated) in the recording indicator 310 than the value U that had been in the recording indicator 310 when the legitimate contents were stored in the medium 300.
  • this value U' in the recording indicator 310 will be different than the original value U, regardless of whether a total bit-by-bit copy of medium 300 is archived, including a copy of the original value U. That is, because the recording indicator 310 is not externally controllable, the original value U cannot be rewritten into the recording indicator 310. In this manner, because a copy of the original contents of the medium 300 can be distinguished from the original contents, by comparing the original value U with the copy-produced new value U', a replay attack can be prevented.
  • the original value U must be reliably and securely communicated to the rendering device 400 that enforces this defense.
  • Any number of techniques may be employed to securely communicate the original value U.
  • the original value U could be "digitally signed" by content provider 200, and this digitally signed information stored in the medium 300.
  • a compliant rendering device 400 will verify that the digitally signed information is authentic, and then compare the digitally signed original value U to the current value of the value U in the recording indicator 310. If the current value U matches the digitally signed value U, the rendering device 400 is assured that the encrypted content material 321 from the memory 320 is the encrypted content material 221 that was originally stored in the memory 320. If the current value U does not match the digitally signed value U, the rendering device 400 recognizes the attempted replay attack, and precludes a rendering of the content material.
  • the value U 311 is used by the content provider 200 to encrypt an item when the encrypted content material 221 is originally recorded, and the value U 312 is subsequently used by the rendering device 400 to decrypt the item. If the value U 311 changes between the time the encrypted content material 221 is originally recorded and the time the rendering device reads the current value U 312, the rendering device 400 will be unable to properly decrypt the item that was encrypted based on the original value U 311. If, on the other hand, the value U 311 that is used by the content provider 200 is the same as the value U 312 that is used by the rendering device 400, the rendering device 400 will properly decrypt the item that was encrypted based on the value U 312. In the example of FIG. 1 , the aforementioned item that is encrypted based on the value 311 is a content key 202 that is used to encrypt, and subsequently decrypt the encrypted content material 221.
  • an encrypter 220 is illustrated for providing the encrypted content material E KC (CM) 221 based on the content key KC.
  • a key generator 210 creates a key KU 212 from the value U 311, typically via a hashing function.
  • the key generator 210 creates the key KU 212 by iteratively hashing the unique value in each disk sector tag corresponding to the encrypted content material memory 320, and optionally, as discussed below, the unique value in each disk sector tag corresponding to the rendering rights memory 350.
  • An encrypter 230 uses the key KU 212 to encrypt the content key KC 202 to provide an encrypted content key E KU (KC) 231.
  • this encrypted content key E KU (KC) is shown as reference item 431.
  • a key generator 410 similar to key generator 210, is used to generate a key KU 412, based on the value U 312 in the recording indicator 310 at the time that the medium 300 is read by the rendering device 400.
  • a decrypter 430 decrypts the encrypted content key E KU (KC) 431 using this key KU 412.
  • the decrypter 430 will provide a content key KC 402 that matches the content key KC 202.
  • a decrypter 420 uses the decrypted content key KC 402 to decrypt the encrypted content material E KC (CM) 321 from the memory 320 of the medium 300. If the value U 312 does not correspond to the original value U 311, the rendering device key KU 412 will not match the original key KU 212, the decrypted content key KC 402 will not match the original content key 202, and therefore the decrypted content material CM 401 will not match the original content material 201, and will be substantially unrenderable.
  • the content provider 200 includes an optional encrypter 240 that further encrypts the encrypted content key E KU (KC) 231 using a public key KP 204 that is associated with the rendering device 400.
  • the encrypted content key E KU (KC) 231 cannot be decrypted by a device other than the intended receiving device 400, thereby preventing a rendering of the content material 201 by other devices.
  • This doubly encrypted key E KP (E KU (KC)) 241 is in a memory 340 of the medium 300.
  • the corresponding rendering device 400 contains a decrypter 440 that decrypts the doubly encrypted key E KP (E KU (KC)) 341 from the memory 340 using a private key Kp 404 corresponding to the public key KP 204 of a public-private key pair.
  • This decrypter 440 provides the aforementioned encrypted content key E KU (KC) 431.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates an authorization module 450 in the rendering device 400 that enforces the limited rendering rights discussed in the Background of the Invention, above.
  • Copending U.S. patent application "Usage Dependent Ticket to Protect Copy-protected Material", U.S. serial number______ , filed _ for Michael Epstein, Attorney Docket PHA ____ (Disclosure 700657), presents a method and system for allocating and enforcing limited rights to each copy of encrypted content material that is stored on a recording medium, and is incorporated by reference herein.
  • the content provider 200 includes a rights allocator 250 that stores allocated rights 251 on the recording medium 300.
  • the allocated rights 251 are based on a usage parameter 352 of the medium 300 at the time that the encrypted content material 221 is recorded to the medium 300.
  • the rights 251 may be encoded, for example, as a ticket that is "punched" by a modifier 355 each time the medium is accessed 499 by a rendering device 400, or as a counter that is decremented, and so on.
  • the recording indicator 310 may be configured to change its stored value U whenever the memory area 350 that contains the rights are written to from an external source, such as the content provider 200, or by an illicit attempt to modify the rights stored by the content provider 200.
  • the decrypted content material 401 will not match the original content material 201, and will be virtually unrenderable. If the rights in the memory 350 and the encrypted content material in the memory 320 have not been externally changed, the decrypted content material 401 will match the original content material 201 and will be renderable.
  • An authorization module 450 prevents the rendering 401', however, if the usage 353 of the medium 300 has exceeded the rights 351 allocated to the medium 300, via the gate 490.
  • the rendering module 480 represents the components that render the decrypted content material 401, such as an audio system, an audio-video system, a computer system, and the like.
  • the gate 490 represents any of a variety of means commonly available for inhibiting the production of the rendered material 401' from the content material 401 by the authorization module 450.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Signal Processing For Digital Recording And Reproducing (AREA)
EP00922542A 1999-03-25 2000-03-22 Key distribution via a memory device Expired - Lifetime EP1082722B1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US454349 1989-12-21
US12616999P 1999-03-25 1999-03-25
US126169P 1999-03-25
US09/454,349 US7162452B1 (en) 1999-03-25 1999-12-03 Key distribution via a memory device
PCT/EP2000/002597 WO2000062290A1 (en) 1999-03-25 2000-03-22 Key distribution via a memory device

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1082722A1 EP1082722A1 (en) 2001-03-14
EP1082722B1 true EP1082722B1 (en) 2009-05-27

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EP00922542A Expired - Lifetime EP1082722B1 (en) 1999-03-25 2000-03-22 Key distribution via a memory device

Country Status (8)

Country Link
US (1) US7162452B1 (ja)
EP (1) EP1082722B1 (ja)
JP (2) JP4753473B2 (ja)
KR (1) KR100714213B1 (ja)
CN (1) CN1175413C (ja)
BR (1) BR0005458A (ja)
DE (1) DE60042256D1 (ja)
WO (1) WO2000062290A1 (ja)

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WO2022267808A1 (en) * 2021-06-24 2022-12-29 International Business Machines Corporation Encrypted data processing design including local buffers
US11868275B2 (en) 2021-06-24 2024-01-09 International Business Machines Corporation Encrypted data processing design including local buffers
US12008150B2 (en) 2021-06-24 2024-06-11 International Business Machines Corporation Encrypted data processing design including cleartext register files

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JP2002541754A (ja) 2002-12-03
CN1306663A (zh) 2001-08-01
EP1082722A1 (en) 2001-03-14
JP5362675B2 (ja) 2013-12-11
DE60042256D1 (de) 2009-07-09
JP2011091800A (ja) 2011-05-06
WO2000062290A1 (en) 2000-10-19
US7162452B1 (en) 2007-01-09
CN1175413C (zh) 2004-11-10
KR100714213B1 (ko) 2007-05-02
KR20010043747A (ko) 2001-05-25
JP4753473B2 (ja) 2011-08-24
BR0005458A (pt) 2001-01-30

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