WO2018109795A1 - Ascenseur, dispositif de commande d'ascenseur, et programme - Google Patents

Ascenseur, dispositif de commande d'ascenseur, et programme Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018109795A1
WO2018109795A1 PCT/JP2016/086861 JP2016086861W WO2018109795A1 WO 2018109795 A1 WO2018109795 A1 WO 2018109795A1 JP 2016086861 W JP2016086861 W JP 2016086861W WO 2018109795 A1 WO2018109795 A1 WO 2018109795A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
car
fire fighting
operation switch
fighting operation
switch
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Application number
PCT/JP2016/086861
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English (en)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
幸一 山下
洋平 杉山
孝道 星野
Original Assignee
株式会社日立製作所
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 株式会社日立製作所 filed Critical 株式会社日立製作所
Priority to JP2018556029A priority Critical patent/JP6823080B2/ja
Priority to PCT/JP2016/086861 priority patent/WO2018109795A1/fr
Priority to CN201680090450.1A priority patent/CN109890739B/zh
Publication of WO2018109795A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018109795A1/fr

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B66—HOISTING; LIFTING; HAULING
    • B66B—ELEVATORS; ESCALATORS OR MOVING WALKWAYS
    • B66B13/00—Doors, gates, or other apparatus controlling access to, or exit from, cages or lift well landings
    • B66B13/02—Door or gate operation
    • B66B13/14—Control systems or devices
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B66—HOISTING; LIFTING; HAULING
    • B66B—ELEVATORS; ESCALATORS OR MOVING WALKWAYS
    • B66B5/00—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators
    • B66B5/02—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators responsive to abnormal operating conditions

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an elevator equipped with a door-opening travel protection device, an elevator control device, and a program, and more particularly to a fire-fighting driving technique capable of operating even when the door is open.
  • the safety device has a function of shifting the car to a safe state, for example, detecting an abnormality of the car by the detection device and making an emergency stop.
  • the detection device includes a final limit switch, governor, and car that detect that the car is operating within the specified speed and within the specified range of the hoistway.
  • the door-opening travel protection device is a safety device that automatically stops the car when the drive device or controller fails and the car goes up and down before all doors of the car and hoistway are closed. It is.
  • the electronic safety controller can also function as a door-open travel protection device. .
  • Patent Document 1 discloses a technique for detecting a floor reference position, a speed of a car, and a movement amount in an elevator system including a safety controller, and setting a car speed abnormality determination threshold value for the car position. Has been. As a result, door opening traveling can be detected at an earlier point in time than what is determined to be door opening traveling abnormality only by the car position, and safety can be further improved, and erroneous detection can be eliminated to prevent a decrease in operation efficiency. .
  • Emergency elevators are used by the fire brigade for fire fighting and rescue operations in the event of a fire.
  • the emergency elevator can be used as a normal elevator during normal times, but is designed based on a specification different from that of a normal elevator. For example, in an emergency elevator, when the primary fire fighting operation switch is turned on in an emergency, the primary fire fighting operation is switched to the operating state, and when the primary fire fighting operation is impossible due to a door failure, etc., the secondary fire fighting operation switch There is a secondary fire-fighting function that shifts to the driving state when is turned on.
  • Patent Document 1 With the technique described in Patent Document 1, it is possible to prevent the door from running with a safety system. However, in the secondary fire-fighting operation of the emergency elevator, even if the door or the door switch breaks down and the door cannot be closed, the function that enables the operation of the elevator cannot be satisfied.
  • the purpose is to realize secondary fire-fighting operation in an elevator that performs door-open running abnormality determination using an electronic safety controller.
  • the elevator includes a signal generator that generates a signal in conjunction with a car in the hoistway, and a detection member that is provided on the car and that is installed corresponding to the floor in the hoistway.
  • a car position sensor that detects the open / closed state of the landing door, a car door switch that detects the open / closed state of the car door, and a primary fire-fighting operation installed in the car
  • the primary fire fighting operation switch, the secondary fire fighting operation switch for performing the secondary fire fighting operation when the primary fire fighting operation switch is not shifted to after the operation, the output signal of the signal generator, the car Electricity having a door-opening travel protection function that determines door-opening abnormality and stops the operation of the car from the position sensor output signal, the landing door switch signal, and the car door switch signal.
  • Comprising a safety controller in the case where the electronic safety controller has determined that the running with door open abnormality, the operation controller for stopping the operation of the car, the.
  • the electronic safety controller takes in the signals of the primary fire fighting operation switch and the secondary fire fighting operation switch, and determines that the primary fire fighting operation switch and the secondary fire fighting operation switch are turned on, the electronic safety controller determines the door opening running abnormality. Disable it.
  • the signals of the primary fire-fighting operation switch and the secondary fire-fighting operation switch are taken into the electronic safety controller, and the door-open running abnormality determination is invalidated.
  • the door-open running abnormality determination is invalidated.
  • FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an overall configuration of an elevator to which an electronic safety system is applied according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the structure of the elevator 1 shown in FIG. 1 is general, the elevator to which the present invention is applied is not limited to this example.
  • the structure of the elevator 1 will be briefly described.
  • a car 10 and a counterweight 12 are connected by a main rope 11, and the car 10 moves up and down in conjunction with rotation of a sheave 13 that is driven to rotate by a motor 14.
  • the sheave 13 is fixed by a brake (not shown) (for example, a doubled structure).
  • the brake is also used for emergency stop of the car 10 when the elevator is abnormal.
  • the elevator 1 includes a control panel 20 (an example of an elevator control device) that controls the operation of the elevator 1 above a hoistway (building) in which the car 10 moves.
  • the car 10 is controlled by an operation controller 21 installed in the control panel 20 to detect registration of a destination floor button in the landing and registration of a destination floor button in the car 10 and travel to the destination floor.
  • the control board 20 is installed above the hoistway, it is not limited to this example.
  • an electronic safety controller 22 mounted with a microcontroller (hereinafter referred to as “microcomputer”) having a safety device function is installed in the control panel 20.
  • the electronic safety controller 22 determines the normal / abnormal state of the elevator 1 and performs processing for shifting the car 10 to a safe state when it is determined as abnormal.
  • the electronic safety controller 22 cuts off the main power supply (for example, the motor drive circuit 15 (see FIG. 3)) that supplies power to the motor 14 and simultaneously activates the brake to perform emergency stop of the car 10.
  • the electronic safety controller 22 has a configuration independent of the operation control controller 21 that performs basic control of the elevator 1.
  • the elevator 1 is provided with a governor device 30 and an encoder 33 (an example of a signal generator) as one of the sensors for detecting an abnormality of the elevator 1.
  • a rotary encoder is used as the encoder 33.
  • the encoder 33 is attached to a governor pulley 31 around which a speed adjusting rope 32 is wound.
  • the governing rope 32 is connected to the car 10, and the governor pulley 31 rotates as the governing rope 32 moves in conjunction with the traveling of the car 10.
  • the encoder 33 provided in the governor pulley 31 rotates in conjunction with the car 10 and generates a pulse corresponding to the rotation.
  • the signal of the encoder 33 is input to the electronic safety controller 22, and the speed and movement amount of the car 10 are calculated by counting the number of pulses per predetermined time.
  • the encoder 33 is attached to the governor pulley 31 in FIG. 1, it is not limited to this example.
  • the encoder 33 may be attached to the sheave 13 or the motor 14.
  • Car speed and amount of movement can be detected by reading code information magnetically recorded by sticking a magnetic tape vertically (in the up-and-down direction) in the hoistway (eg rail) or optically (eg barcode) It may be a signal generator.
  • the electronic safety controller 22 also includes a car provided on the upper portion of the car 10 that detects detection plates 40a and 40b (an example of detection members) for detecting floors installed corresponding to the floors of the hoistway.
  • An output signal of the position sensor 41 (an example of a detection device) is captured.
  • the position of the car 10 in the hoistway (the floor reference position of each floor and the floor position information (for example, the first floor, the second floor, etc.) of each floor) is detected by a car position sensor 41 (for example, the floor 10). This is performed using a reflective photoelectric sensor) and detection plates 40a and 40b attached to the landing thresholds on each floor.
  • detection plate 40 when the detection plates 40a and 40b are not distinguished, they are referred to as “detection plate 40”.
  • the reflected light of the sensor is detected from the detection plate 40.
  • the edge of the detection plate may be detected by a step-like change in the sensor signal.
  • a landing reference position (landing level) for the car 2 to land is calculated.
  • other detection members such as a bar code provided in the hoistway may be detected optically or by other methods.
  • the electronic safety controller 22 determines whether or not the car 10 is in a door opening permission zone in which opening of each door is permitted based on the output signal of the encoder 33 and the output signal of the car position sensor 41. .
  • the landing door switches 50a and 50B provided at the landings on each floor are provided with landing door switches 51a and 51b for detecting the open / closed state of the landing doors 50A and 50B.
  • the car 10 is provided with a car door switch 61 for detecting the open / closed state of the car door 60. Signals from the landing door switches 51a and 51b and the car door switch 61 on each floor are input to both the operation control controller 21 and the electronic safety controller 22, respectively.
  • the landing doors 50A and 50B are not distinguished from each other, they are referred to as “landing doors 50”, and when the landing door switches 51a and 51b are not distinguished from each other, they are referred to as “landing door switches 51”.
  • the car 10 is provided with an operation panel 70 equipped with a destination floor button and the like.
  • the operation panel 70 is provided with a primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and a secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 necessary for fire fighting operation in the event of a fire. Signals from the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 are input to both the operation control controller 21 and the electronic safety controller 22, respectively.
  • the secondary safety operation is realized by the cooperation of the electronic safety controller 22 and the operation control controller 21.
  • the electronic safety controller 22 detects the position of the car 10 (hereinafter referred to as “car position”) based on signals output from the encoder 33 and the car position sensor 41. In addition, the electronic safety controller 22 performs a door opening / running abnormality determination process by detecting the open / closed state of the car door from the signals output from the landing door switches 51a and 51b and the car door switch 61.
  • FIG. 3 shows the invalidation process of the door opening running abnormality determination and the process of short-circuiting the signals of the door switches.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the hardware configuration of the electronic safety controller 22 and the operation control controller 21.
  • the hardware configuration of the computer 80 included in each of the electronic safety controller 22 and the operation control controller 21 will be described. It should be noted that each part of the computer 80 is selected according to the function and purpose of use of each controller.
  • the computer 80 includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 81, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 82, and a RAM (Random Access Memory) 83 respectively connected to the bus 84. Further, the computer 80 includes a display unit 85, an operation unit 86, a nonvolatile storage 87, and a network interface 88.
  • CPU Central Processing Unit
  • ROM Read Only Memory
  • RAM Random Access Memory
  • CPU81 reads the program code of the software which implement
  • RAM 83 variables, parameters and the like generated during the arithmetic processing are temporarily written.
  • the computer 80 included in each of the electronic safety controller 22 and the operation control controller 21 includes a CPU, a microcomputer, an arithmetic processing device including a DSP, an electronic processing device that can implement processing logic by programming an FPGA (logic circuit), and the like. Consists of.
  • the display unit 85 is, for example, a liquid crystal display monitor, and displays a result of processing performed by the computer 80 and the like.
  • a keyboard, a mouse, a touch panel, or the like is used for the operation unit 86, and a user can perform predetermined operation inputs and instructions.
  • Nonvolatile storage 87 includes, for example, HDD (Hard Disk Drive), SSD (Solid State Drive), flexible disk, optical disk, magneto-optical disk, CD-ROM, CD-R, magnetic tape, nonvolatile memory card, and the like. Used.
  • the nonvolatile storage 87 may store a program for causing the computer 80 to function in addition to the OS (Operating System) and various parameters.
  • a network interface 88 for example, a NIC (Network Interface Card) or the like is used, and various types of data can be transmitted and received between devices via a network N such as a LAN.
  • the operation controller 21 and the electronic safety controller 22 may be connected by a dedicated line or other lines.
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing functional configurations of the electronic safety controller 22 and the operation control controller 21 provided in the control panel 20.
  • the function of each part of the electronic safety controller 22 and the operation control controller 21 is realized by the CPU 81 of each controller executing a program recorded in the ROM 82 or the like.
  • the electronic safety controller 22 determines door opening running abnormality and outputs the determination result to the operation controller 21.
  • the operation controller 21 controls the driving of the car 10, that is, the operation of the elevator 1 by controlling the motor drive circuit 15 that drives the motor 14.
  • the operation control controller 21 receives the determination result of the door opening travel abnormality from the electronic safety controller 22, the operation control controller 21 immediately controls to stop the traveling of the car 10.
  • the input signals of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 installed in the car 10 are double input to the electronic safety controller 22 and the operation control controller 21 in consideration of reliability.
  • the electronic safety controller 22 includes input interfaces 221a to 221d, RAMs 222a to 222d (first primary memory) as primary memories, and RAMs 223a to 223d (first secondary memories) as secondary memories. Further, the electronic safety controller 22 includes a UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224, a door-open travel protection device 225 (“UCMP” in the figure), a switch 225a, a mutual check unit 226, and a safety circuit cutoff signal generation unit 227.
  • UCMP door-open travel protection device
  • the input interfaces 221a to 221d are interfaces to which signals of external physical switches (hereinafter also referred to as “hardware switches”) are input.
  • the assigned primary fire fighting operation switch 71 or secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 signal is input to each of the four input interfaces 221a to 221d.
  • the input interfaces 221a to 221d convert the received signals of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 into signals representing the states of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72, respectively.
  • the input interfaces 221a to 221d when a signal from the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 or the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 is input, the input interfaces 221a to 221d generate 32-bit data with all bits being “1” as being in the on state. To do.
  • the input interfaces 221a to 221d when the signal from the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 or the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 is not input, the input interfaces 221a to 221d generate 32-bit data in which all bits are “0” as being in the off state. To do.
  • the electronic safety controller 22 has an input interface that captures each signal input to the electronic safety controller 22, but illustration thereof is omitted.
  • RAMs 222a to 222d are provided in one-to-one correspondence with the input interfaces 221a to 221d, respectively, and hold data input from the input interfaces 221a to 221d.
  • RAMs 222a to 222d are referred to as RAM1 to RAM4.
  • the RAM1 to RAM4 hold data (for example, 32 bits) output from the input interfaces 221a to 221d.
  • the example shown in FIG. 3 is an example when the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 are operated (ON state), and RAM1 to RAM4 are “FFFFFFFF” expressed in hexadecimal numbers. Holds data.
  • the RAMs 223a to 223d are provided in one-to-one correspondence with the RAMs 222a to 222d (RAM1 to RAM4), respectively, and hold the data output from the RAM1 to RAM4.
  • RAMs 223a to 223d are described as RAM1 'to RAM4'.
  • the RAM 1 ′ to RAM 4 ′ hold the bit expanded data of the RAM 1 to RAM 4.
  • the data “FFFFFFFF” in the RAM 1 to RAM 4 is converted into “A5A55A5A” as an example by the CPU 81 included in the electronic safety controller 22 and held in the RAM 1 ′ to RAM 4 ′.
  • This is for measures against data corruption (also referred to as RAM corruption) described later.
  • the bit expansion is not limited to this example.
  • the door-opening travel protection device 225 determines the door-opening travel abnormality from the output signal of the encoder 33, the output signal of the car position sensor 41, the signal of the landing door switch 51, and the signal of the car door switch 61. It is a microcomputer having a door-opening travel protection function for stopping the car 10. The door-open travel protection device 225 outputs the determination result of the door-open travel abnormality to the car control unit 215 of the operation control controller 21.
  • the door-opening travel protection device 225 counts the number of pulses per predetermined time included in the encoder signal of the encoder 33 and detects the speed and position (movement amount) of the car 10. Further, the door-opening travel protection device 225 detects the floor reference position of each floor based on the detection result of the detection plate 40 for floor detection output from the car position sensor 41. In the present embodiment, the floor reference position is detected based on the detection results of the detection plates 40a and 40b by the car position sensor 41. However, the structure for detecting the floor reference position is not limited to this example.
  • the UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224 (door open travel abnormality determination invalid signal generation unit) stores data (a signal indicating the state of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72) held in each of the RAM 1 'to RAM 4'. ), The state of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 is determined.
  • the UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224 determines that the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 are turned on, the UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224 generates a door opening travel abnormality determination invalid signal and determines the door opening travel abnormality. Disable.
  • a switch 225 a provided between the UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224 and the car control unit 215 is set by a door opening traveling abnormality determination invalid signal. Open. Thereby, the signal (door-opening abnormality determination result) output from the door-opening travel protection device 225 to the car control unit 215 is blocked.
  • the present invention is not limited to this example. For example, a method of invalidating the function of determining the door opening travel abnormality of the door opening travel protection device 225, a method of temporarily stopping the operation of the door opening travel protection device 225, and the like are also conceivable.
  • the UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224 compares four signals (on signals) that are bit-developed from the on / off signals and held in the RAM 1 ′ to RAM 4 ′ as a countermeasure against data corruption, and when the four signals match. Only it is desirable to invalidate the door open running abnormality determination. As a result, data corruption (also referred to as “RAM corruption”) of the signal data captured by the input interfaces 221a to 221d can be prevented.
  • RAM corruption also referred to as “RAM corruption”
  • the mutual check unit 226 continuously performs a process of reading and comparing the signals of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 that are double-captured in the electronic safety controller 22 from the RAM 1 ′ and the RAM 2 ′. In addition, the mutual check unit 226 continuously performs processing of reading out and comparing the signals of the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 that are double-captured into the electronic safety controller 22 from the RAM 3 ′ and the RAM 4 ′. When the contents of the signals of the two primary fire fighting operation switches 71 or the signals of the two secondary fire fighting operation switches 72 do not match (in an abnormal state), the mutual check unit 226 generates a safety circuit cutoff signal. A check result indicating abnormality is output to the generation unit 227.
  • the safety circuit cutoff signal generation unit 227 receives the check result of the mutual check unit 226, generates a safety circuit cutoff signal, and outputs the safety circuit cutoff signal to the car control unit 215 of the operation controller 21. Then, the car control unit 215 that has received the safety circuit cutoff signal performs control to stop the elevator 1, that is, stop the operation of the car 10.
  • the safety circuit is a circuit provided in the car control unit 215, and is a circuit that controls the motor drive circuit 15 including a power conversion circuit and the like.
  • the car control unit 215 receives the safety circuit cutoff signal, the car control unit 215 performs control to stop the operation of the elevator 1.
  • the control signal output from the safety circuit (the car control unit 215) is cut off, or the main power supplied to the motor drive circuit 15 is cut off.
  • a drive signal power supply
  • the operation controller 21 includes input interfaces 211a to 211d, RAMs 212e to 212h (secondary primary memory) as primary memories, and RAMs 213e to 213h (secondary secondary memories) as secondary memories.
  • the operation control controller 21 includes a door switch short-circuit signal generation unit 214, a car control unit 215, a mutual check unit 216, and a safety circuit cutoff signal generation unit 217.
  • RAMs 212e to 212h are described as RAM5 to RAM8, and RAMs 213e to 213h are described as RAM5 ′ to RAM8 ′.
  • the input interfaces 211a to 211d, the RAMs 212a to 212d, and the RAMs 213a to 213d correspond to the input interfaces 221a to 221d, the RAMs 222a to 222d, and the RAMs 223a to 223d, respectively, and have the same functions.
  • the door switch short-circuit signal generation unit 214 uses the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the data stored in each of the RAMs 5 ′ to 8 ′ (signals indicating the states of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72). The state of the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 is determined. When the door switch short circuit signal generation unit 214 determines that the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 are turned on, the door switch short circuit signal generation unit 214 generates a landing door switch short circuit signal and a car door switch short circuit signal. The door switch short circuit signal and the car door switch short circuit signal are output to the car control unit 215.
  • the door switch short-circuit signal generation unit 214 also compares four signals (on signal) that are bit-developed from the on / off signal and held in the RAM 1 ′ to RAM 4 ′ to prevent data corruption, and the four signals match. Only when is it desirable to generate a landing door switch short circuit signal and a car door switch short circuit signal. As a result, it is possible to prevent garbled data of the signals captured by the input interfaces 211e to 211h.
  • the car control unit 215 performs processing for controlling the traveling of the car.
  • the car control unit 215 receives the landing door switch short-circuit signal and the car door switch short-circuit signal, the car control unit 215 performs control to stop the elevator 1, that is, stop the operation of the car 10.
  • the mutual check unit 216 takes in signals representing the states of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 from the RAM 1 to RAM 4 of the electronic safety controller 22. Further, the mutual check unit 216 takes in signals representing the states of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 from the RAMs 5 to 8. The mutual check unit 216 receives each signal indicating the state of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 received from the electronic safety controller 22 and the primary fire fighting captured from the RAM 5 to RAM 8 of the operation control controller 21. The signals representing the states of the operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 are compared, and if the contents of the signals do not match, control for stopping the operation of the car 10 is performed.
  • the mutual check unit 216 continuously performs a process of reading and comparing the signals of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 that are double-captured into the operation controller 21 from the RAM 5 ′ and the RAM 6 ′. In addition, the mutual check unit 216 continuously performs a process of reading and comparing the signals of the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 that are double-captured into the operation controller 21 from the RAM 7 ′ and the RAM 8 ′.
  • the mutual check unit 216 outputs a safety circuit cutoff signal. A check result indicating abnormality is output to the generation unit 217.
  • the safety circuit cutoff signal generation unit 217 receives the check result of the mutual check unit 216, generates a safety circuit cutoff signal, and outputs the safety circuit cutoff signal to the car control unit 215. Then, the car control unit 215 that has received the safety circuit cutoff signal performs control to stop the elevator 1, that is, stop the operation of the car 10.
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing an operation example of the electronic safety controller 22 (UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224).
  • the CPU 81 included in the electronic safety controller 22 executes the program recorded in the ROM 82 or the like, whereby the processing shown in FIG. 4 is executed.
  • the UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224 of the electronic safety controller 22 determines whether or not the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 is in an ON state based on the data held in the RAM 1 ′ and the RAM 2 ′ (S1).
  • the UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224 determines the secondary fire fighting operation switch based on the data held in the RAM 3 ′ and the RAM 4 ′. It is determined whether 72 is in an ON state (S2).
  • the UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224 determines whether or not the data of all signals in the RAM 1 ′ to RAM 4 ′ match. (S3).
  • the UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224 invalidates the door opening traveling abnormality determination of the door opening traveling protection device 225. Processing is performed (S4).
  • the mutual check unit 226 compares the data of RAM1 ′ and RAM2 ′, and RAM3 ′ and RAM4 ′, and the data does not match. Is output to the safety circuit cutoff signal generator 227. Receiving the abnormality result, the safety circuit cutoff signal generation unit 227 outputs a safety circuit cutoff signal to the car control unit 215 of the operation control controller 21. Then, the car control unit 215 performs control to stop the operation of the elevator 1.
  • FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing an operation example (1) of the operation control controller 21 (door switch short-circuit signal generation unit 214). This flowchart shows a door switch short-circuit signal generation process.
  • the CPU 81 included in the operation control controller 21 executes the program recorded in the ROM 82 or the like, whereby the process shown in FIG. 5 is executed.
  • the operation controller 21 detects that the emergency call back operation button 55 is turned on (S11).
  • the operator can get into the called car 10 and operate the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72.
  • the process of step S11 is similarly performed. Note that the process of step S11 can be omitted.
  • the door switch short circuit signal generation unit 214 of the operation controller 21 determines whether or not the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 is on based on the data held in the RAM 5 ′ and RAM 6 ′ (S12). ). When the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 is not in the ON state (NO in S12), the door switch short circuit signal generation unit 214 continues the determination process of the state of the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72.
  • the door switch short circuit signal generator 214 determines whether or not the primary fire fighting operation is impossible (S13). When the primary fire fighting operation is not possible (YES in S13), the door switch short circuit signal generation unit 214 indicates that the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 is on based on the data held in the RAM 7 ′ and RAM 8 ′. It is determined whether or not (S14). When the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 is in the off state (NO in S14), the door switch short circuit signal generation unit 214 continues the state determination process of the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72.
  • the door switch short-circuit signal generation unit 214 determines whether or not the data of all signals in the RAM 5 ′ to RAM 8 ′ match. (S15).
  • the UCMP invalid signal generation unit 224 causes the short circuit signal of the landing door switch 51 and the short circuit signal of the car door switch 61. Is generated (S16). Then, the door switch short circuit signal generation unit 214 outputs a short circuit signal of each door switch to the car control unit 215 (S17).
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing an operation example (2) of the operation controller 21 (mutual check unit 216, safety circuit cutoff signal generation unit 217). This flowchart shows a process for generating a safety circuit cutoff signal.
  • the mutual check unit 216 receives the signal of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the signal of the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 from the electronic safety controller 22 (S21).
  • the mutual check unit 216 receives the data of the signals of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 received from the electronic safety controller 22, and the primary fire fighting operation switches 71 and secondary captured directly from the hard switch.
  • the data of the signal of the fire fighting operation switch 72 is compared (S22).
  • the mutual check unit 216 determines whether the contents of these four signals match (S23). If the contents of the four signals match (YES in S23), the mutual check unit 216 ends the process of this flowchart.
  • the door switch short circuit signal generation unit 214 when the contents of the four signals do not match (NO in S23), the door switch short circuit signal generation unit 214 generates a safety circuit cutoff signal (S24), and sends the safety circuit cutoff signal to the car control unit 215. Output (S25). Then, the car control unit 215 performs control to stop the operation of the elevator 1 by cutting off the power supplied to the motor drive circuit 15 or the like.
  • the operation controller 21 ends the process of this flowchart after the process of step S25 ends.
  • the mutual check unit 216 compares the data of the RAM 5 ′ and RAM 6 ′, and the RAM 7 ′ and RAM 8 ′, and the data does not match.
  • the abnormal result is output to the safety circuit cutoff signal generator 217.
  • the safety circuit cutoff signal generation unit 217 Upon receipt of the abnormality result, the safety circuit cutoff signal generation unit 217 outputs a safety circuit cutoff signal to the car control unit 215 of the operation control controller 21.
  • FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing an operation example of the operation controller 21 (the car control unit 215) during the secondary fire fighting operation according to the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the CPU 81 included in the operation control controller 21 executes the program recorded in the ROM 82 or the like, whereby the processing shown in FIG. 6 is executed.
  • the car control unit 215 of the operation control controller 21 determines whether or not the door opening travel abnormality determination of the electronic safety controller 22 is invalid, that is, whether or not the door opening traveling abnormality signal is received from the electronic safety controller 22. (S31).
  • the car control unit 215 sends a short circuit signal for the landing door switch 51 and a short circuit signal for the car door switch 61 from the door switch short circuit signal generation unit 214. Is determined (S32).
  • the car control unit 215 permits the operation of the elevator 1 (S33). Then, the car control unit 215 controls the drive signal supplied from the motor drive circuit 15 to the motor 14 according to the instructions of the operator, and performs the secondary fire fighting operation.
  • the car control unit 215 does not invalidate the door opening running abnormality determination (NO in S31), does not receive the short circuit signal of the landing door switch 51 and the car door switch 61 (NO in S32), or step S33.
  • the process of this flowchart is finished.
  • the signals of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 are taken into the electronic safety controller 22 composed of a computer, and each fire fighting operation switch is turned on. It is determined whether or not.
  • the door-opening travel protection device 225 invalidates the door-opening travel abnormality determination and permits the operation, thereby allowing the secondary fire-fighting operation. Realize driving.
  • An electronic safety system that can be operated can be constructed.
  • the secondary fire-fighting operation can be controlled by software using the electronic safety controller 22, it is possible to save space rather than assembling a control circuit related to the secondary fire-fighting operation by hardware. It is possible.
  • the signals of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 are taken into the operation controller 21 and the landing door switch 51 and the car door switch 61 are short-circuited in software.
  • the operation is permitted when the door open travel abnormality determination of the door open travel protection device 225 is invalid and the landing door switch 51 and the car door switch 61 are short-circuited. Therefore, the secondary fire-fighting operation with higher reliability can be realized.
  • the door opening travel abnormality determination of the door opening travel protection device 225 is invalid and the landing door switch 51 and the car door switch 61 are short-circuited.
  • the present invention is not limited to this example. If at least the door-opening travel abnormality determination of the door-open travel protection device 225 is invalid, the secondary fire-fighting operation of the elevator 1 may be permitted. By doing in this way, even if the landing door 50 and the car door 60 are open (the signals of the landing door switch 51 and the car door switch 61 are not in the ON state), it is possible to deal with an elevator that operates. Is possible.
  • the operation controller 21 takes in the signals of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 and generates a short circuit signal indicating that the landing door switch 51 and the car door switch 61 are turned on. The traveling of the car 10 is stopped based on the short circuit signal. Thereby, even if each door does not close due to a failure of the door of the car 10, or the landing door switch 51 or the car door switch 61, it can be considered that each door is closed and the operation can be performed.
  • the operation controller 21 receives each signal indicating the state of the primary fire fighting operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 received from the electronic safety controller 22, and the primary fire fighting directly taken into its own controller. The signals representing the states of the operation switch 71 and the secondary fire fighting operation switch 72 are compared. Then, the operation controller 21 performs control to stop the traveling of the car when the contents of the signals do not match. Thereby, the safety
  • the above-described exemplary embodiments are detailed and specific descriptions of the configuration of the apparatus and the system in order to explain the present invention in an easy-to-understand manner, and are not necessarily limited to those having all the configurations described above. . Further, it is possible to replace a part of the configuration of one embodiment with the configuration of another embodiment. In addition, the configuration of another embodiment can be added to the configuration of a certain embodiment. Moreover, it is also possible to add, delete, and replace other configurations for a part of the configuration of each exemplary embodiment.
  • each of the above-described configurations, functions, processing units, processing means, and the like may be realized by hardware by designing a part of them, for example, by an integrated circuit.
  • control lines and information lines indicate what is considered necessary for the explanation, and not all the control lines and information lines on the product are necessarily shown. Actually, it may be considered that almost all the components are connected to each other.
  • time-series processing are not limited to processing performed in time series according to the described order, but are not necessarily performed in time series, either in parallel or individually.
  • the processing for example, parallel processing or object processing is also included.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Maintenance And Inspection Apparatuses For Elevators (AREA)

Abstract

Un ascenseur selon un mode de réalisation de la présente invention est équipé d'un moyen de commande électronique de sécurité doté d'une fonction de prévention de déplacement porte ouverte servant à déterminer une anomalie de déplacement porte ouverte et à arrêter la cabine d'ascenseur, et un moyen de commande de régulation du fonctionnement servant à arrêter le fonctionnement de la cabine d'ascenseur lorsque le moyen de commande électronique de sécurité détermine la présence d'une anomalie de déplacement porte ouverte. Le moyen de commande électronique de sécurité reçoit des signaux d'un commutateur primaire d'opération de lutte contre l'incendie et d'un commutateur secondaire d'opération de lutte contre l'incendie, et invalide l'anomalie de déplacement porte ouverte lorsqu'il est déterminé que le commutateur primaire d'opération de lutte contre l'incendie et le commutateur secondaire d'opération de lutte contre l'incendie ont été activés.
PCT/JP2016/086861 2016-12-12 2016-12-12 Ascenseur, dispositif de commande d'ascenseur, et programme WO2018109795A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2018556029A JP6823080B2 (ja) 2016-12-12 2016-12-12 エレベーター及びエレベーター制御装置
PCT/JP2016/086861 WO2018109795A1 (fr) 2016-12-12 2016-12-12 Ascenseur, dispositif de commande d'ascenseur, et programme
CN201680090450.1A CN109890739B (zh) 2016-12-12 2016-12-12 电梯、电梯控制装置及电梯控制方法

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PCT/JP2016/086861 WO2018109795A1 (fr) 2016-12-12 2016-12-12 Ascenseur, dispositif de commande d'ascenseur, et programme

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WO2018109795A1 true WO2018109795A1 (fr) 2018-06-21

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WO2023175859A1 (fr) * 2022-03-17 2023-09-21 株式会社日立製作所 Dispositif d'ascenseur

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CN110316641A (zh) * 2019-07-16 2019-10-11 浙江省建设机械集团有限公司 一种施工升降机层门联动控制系统

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JP2009062127A (ja) * 2007-09-05 2009-03-26 Toshiba Elevator Co Ltd 非常用エレベータ制御システム
JP2013216411A (ja) * 2012-04-06 2013-10-24 Hitachi Ltd 運転切替システム付きエレベータ

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CN102317192B (zh) * 2009-03-04 2013-09-04 三菱电机株式会社 电梯装置及其检查方法
JP2011162333A (ja) * 2010-02-12 2011-08-25 Toshiba Elevator Co Ltd 戸開走行時のエレベータ係合部材衝突回避システムおよび方法
JP2011001196A (ja) * 2010-09-01 2011-01-06 Toshiba Elevator Co Ltd 非常用エレベータ制御システム
JP6263552B2 (ja) * 2013-11-28 2018-01-17 株式会社日立製作所 エレベータの安全システム

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JP2009062127A (ja) * 2007-09-05 2009-03-26 Toshiba Elevator Co Ltd 非常用エレベータ制御システム
JP2013216411A (ja) * 2012-04-06 2013-10-24 Hitachi Ltd 運転切替システム付きエレベータ

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2023175859A1 (fr) * 2022-03-17 2023-09-21 株式会社日立製作所 Dispositif d'ascenseur

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CN109890739A (zh) 2019-06-14
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CN109890739B (zh) 2020-11-03

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