WO2012004098A1 - Steuernetzwerk für ein schienenfahrzeug - Google Patents
Steuernetzwerk für ein schienenfahrzeug Download PDFInfo
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- WO2012004098A1 WO2012004098A1 PCT/EP2011/059933 EP2011059933W WO2012004098A1 WO 2012004098 A1 WO2012004098 A1 WO 2012004098A1 EP 2011059933 W EP2011059933 W EP 2011059933W WO 2012004098 A1 WO2012004098 A1 WO 2012004098A1
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- Prior art keywords
- data
- control
- rail vehicle
- network
- network according
- Prior art date
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- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 52
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 41
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 21
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 9
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000004913 activation Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000012806 monitoring device Methods 0.000 claims 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 9
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000004378 air conditioning Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000008878 coupling Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000010168 coupling process Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000005859 coupling reaction Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000003213 activating effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002457 bidirectional effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 210000003608 fece Anatomy 0.000 description 1
- 238000001914 filtration Methods 0.000 description 1
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- 239000013307 optical fiber Substances 0.000 description 1
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- 108090000623 proteins and genes Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 238000012552 review Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010079 rubber tapping Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011076 safety test Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000000007 visual effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61C—LOCOMOTIVES; MOTOR RAILCARS
- B61C17/00—Arrangement or disposition of parts; Details or accessories not otherwise provided for; Use of control gear and control systems
- B61C17/12—Control gear; Arrangements for controlling locomotives from remote points in the train or when operating in multiple units
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
- B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
- B61L15/0036—Conductor-based, e.g. using CAN-Bus, train-line or optical fibres
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L12/403—Bus networks with centralised control, e.g. polling
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/42—Loop networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
- H04L2012/40293—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a train
Definitions
- the invention relates to a control network for a rail vehicle and to a method for tamper-proof data transmission between control devices of a rail vehicle, in particular a train.
- Rail vehicles have a variety of HEADUNITS ⁇ th for controlling devices, such as braking systems, drive devices, lighting equipment, Tuversch widerungs strengtheneden and air conditioning.
- the control units can control passenger information units or seat reservation facilities for passengers. Passenger information devices inform, for example, the passengers about transfer options to other trains by means of acoustic announcements or visual displays.
- control units can receive data from video surveillance devices, which are transmitted to the train driver, for example. Control devices from a rail vehicle tau ⁇ rule with each payload. This payload may include passenger information data or device control data.
- Rail vehicle control units are increasingly interconnected using standardized protocols such as Ethernet or IP over data networks.
- the control units are often housed in a physically hard to reach area for third parties within a wagon or a towing vehicle of the rail vehicle.
- the kommu ⁇ nikationsnetztechnik via which the control devices transmit user data to other controllers, runs however, points to non or only consuming physical protectable From ⁇ sections of the rail vehicle.
- These data communication networks are also particularly in the passenger area of the
- Rail vehicle laid and thus relatively easily accessible to third parties. Therefore, for third parties it is possible in principle to connect a data line of the data communications network. tapping plants to make manipulations, for example, to infiltrate data packets over the data communication network or to listen to a data transmission. It is therefore an object of the present invention to provide a control network and a method for rail vehicles, which allow to detect tampering with the wiring of the data communication network of the rail vehicle.
- the invention provides a control network for a rail vehicle, in which control devices of the rail vehicle are connected to one another in an annular manner via at least two communication paths,
- a first control unit payload data transfers via a communica ⁇ tion path in a first direction to a second control unit, and transmits to the user data associated check data for checking the user data through another communication path in a second direction counter to the first direction to the second control unit.
- the test data are sent from the first control device at regular intervals or when changing an operating state of the rail vehicle.
- the payload data is passenger information data.
- the transmitted user data are device control data.
- the user data in data packets is transmitted via a data Transfer network with ring topology between the control units of the rail vehicle.
- this data network is an Ethernet data network, in particular a Profinet.
- the data network is an electrical data network with ring topology, which is laid in a wagon of Schienenfahrzeu ⁇ ges.
- the data network is an optical data network with ring topology, which is installed in a carriage of the slider ⁇ nenEnglishes.
- At least one monitoring unit is provided in the data network with ring topology, which monitors the closed ⁇ unit of the ring topology, wherein after interrupting the ring topology, the test data and the payload via a remaining communication path from the first control unit be transmitted to the second controller.
- the second control device causes countermeasures ⁇ increased, if the verification of the data received by the second control device user data obtained from the received by the second control device test data that the user data does not originate from the first control unit.
- the countermeasures comprise the sending of an alarm message by the second control unit to at least one further control unit.
- the countermeasures include the activation of a restricted operating mode by the second control device.
- the data network of a rail car of the rail vehicle via a superordinate data network of the rail vehicle with other data networks of other cars or a towing vehicle of the rail vehicle for Da ⁇ th transmission is connected between the control units of the rail vehicle.
- control network in the parent Since ⁇ tennetzwerk a rail vehicle data bus.
- the superordinate data network is a rail vehicle data network, which in turn has a ring topology.
- the data network of a wagon of the rail vehicle is connected via electrically conductive rails to other data networks of other wagons or a towing vehicle of the rail vehicle for data transmission between the control units of the rail vehicle.
- the data network of a carriage of the rail vehicle via wireless radio modules with further Since ⁇ tennetzwerken of another car or a train car of the railway vehicle is to transfer data between ECUs of the rail vehicle, respectively.
- control network is the data network of a wagon of the rail vehicle via power supply lines for powering the rail vehicle with other Da ⁇ tennetzwerken of other cars or a towing vehicle of the rail vehicle for data transmission between Steuergerä ⁇ th of the rail vehicle connected.
- test data provided for checking the user data comprise checksums of the user data.
- test data provided for checking the user data comprise cryptographic keys for decrypting or checking a cryptographically encrypted or cryptographically protected checksum of the user data.
- test data provided for checking the useful data comprise parameters for setting up a cryptographic key.
- test data provided for checking the user data comprise data packet management data or header data of the data packets in which the user data are transmitted.
- the test data provided for checking the user data has hash values.
- the hash values are hash values of the payload.
- the hash values are hash values of the data packet management data. In another possible embodiment, the hash values of hash values of the entire data packet, including payload data and ⁇ data packet management data.
- the invention further provides a method for tamper-proof data transmission between control units of a rail vehicle, which are annularly connected to one another via two communication paths,
- a first control device transmits user data via a communication path in a first direction to a second control device and transmits to the user data associated test data for checking the user data via another communication path in a second direction opposite to the first direction to the second control device.
- Figure 1 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary embodiment of the control network for a shift ⁇ nen poverty with a plurality of annular data networks, which are provided in different cars or cars of the railway vehicle.
- Fig. 2A, 2B are diagrams for illustrating,sbei ⁇ play the control network according to the invention for a rail vehicle;
- 3A, 3B are diagrams for explaining the operation of the control network according to the invention.
- Figure 5 is a further diagram illustrating another embodiment of the erfindungsge ⁇ MAESSEN control network.
- Fig. 6 is a diagram for illustrating another
- Embodiment of the control network according to the invention a diagram illustrating a further embodiment of the control network according to the invention.
- Fig. 1 shows an embodiment of the control network according to the invention 1.
- the control network 1 is located in egg ⁇ nem rail vehicle that moves on rails, in ⁇ example, a train.
- this train comprises a towing vehicle 2-1 and three wagons or cars 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 coupled thereto.
- the various vehicles of the rail vehicle can, as shown in Fig. 1 Darge ⁇ , be mechanically coupled together.
- Each car of the rail vehicle has control units SG, which are annularly connected to each other via a data network with ring topology. In these controllers SG, it may be z. B.
- control units of a brake system, a Antriebsanla ⁇ ge, an air conditioner, a lighting system, a door ⁇ closure system communicate with each other via a data network with ring topology or exchange data.
- the data are preferably transmitted as user data in data packets in the respective data network.
- These data packets include data packet management data as well as payload data.
- User data may include control data for controlling control devices SG, for example braking or drive devices, but also information data, for example, passenger information or seat reservation data.
- the user data may also contain sensor data from sensors which are connected to control units SG.
- the data networks with ring topology which are used in the each car 2-i of the rail vehicle are laid, it may be an electrical data network with ring topology or an optical network with ring topology.
- the control units SG which are annular with one another, can be connected to one another via one or more lines.
- the lines include, for example, electrical cables.
- the lines can also be formed by optical fibers or glass fibers.
- the ring-shaped data network is an Ethernet data network which transmits data packets in real time, for example a Profinet.
- a first control device SGI transmits user data ND via a communication path in a first direction to at least one second control device SG2 and simultaneously or with a time offset to the respective payload ND associated test data PD for checking the payload via another communication path in a second, to the first direction opposite direction, to the second control unit SG2.
- the test data PD can be transmitted both before and after the user data. In the example shown in FIG.
- a first control device SGI transmits in the last carriage 2-4 of Schienenfahrzeu ⁇ ges user data ND to a second control unit SG2 in a first direction over the respective ring and at the same time associated test data PD for checking the user data ND via another communication path in a second, opposite to the first direction direction.
- the user data ND are transmitted or transported in the clockwise direction via the ring shown from the first control device SGI to the second control device SG2 and the associated test data PD are transmitted counterclockwise to the same control device SG2.
- the transmission of the test data PD from the first control device SGI to the second control device SG2 can be performed in one possible embodiment. form at regular intervals, eg.
- the test data PD from the first control unit SGI if necessary, in particular when changing an operating state of a unit of the rail vehicle to the second control unit SG2 be sent.
- the change of state may, for example, by activating a control function at a control unit SG occur for example when a single Be ⁇ illumination unit or an air conditioning device or is turned off.
- a status change may be detected by sensors with ⁇ means of sensors.
- a control unit SGI sends a second control unit SG2 Nutzda ⁇ th ND when the rail vehicle starts or the rail ⁇ vehicle is transferred to a maintenance mode of operation.
- the payload ND and the associated test data PD can be transmitted from the first control device SGI to the second control device SG2 in real time.
- At least one monitoring unit is provided in each data network with ring topology, which monitors the closed nature of the respective ring or the ring topology.
- the test data PD and the user data sent ND from the first control unit SGI over the remaining communication path can then to the second control unit transmit ⁇ the. If, in the example shown in FIG. 1, the communication path which exists clockwise between the two control units SG in the car 2-4 fails, this is detected by the monitoring unit of the data network of the car 2-4.
- the various control units SGi of netzwer ⁇ kes are then instructed by the monitoring unit, called to be transmitted in the affected network, both the user data ND and the associated test data PD counterclockwise.
- This offers the advantage that an interruption of a data link between control units SG , for example due to a cable fire, or due to other conditions of the data link BeCdi ⁇ the affected data annular network is still functional and reliably transmits user data ND and associated test data PD between the control units SG.
- the second control unit SG2 carries out a check of the user data ND received by the second control unit SG2 on the basis of the check data PD received by the second control unit SG2. If this check reveals that the received user data ND does not originate from the first control unit SGI, the second control unit SG2 initiates corresponding countermeasures in a preferred embodiment . For example, the second control unit SG2 transmits an alarm message to min ⁇ least another control device, to report the error that occurred. Furthermore, actuators can be activated, for example, a warning lamp in the train 2-1 of the rail ⁇ vehicle. In one possible embodiment, an emergency stop of the rail vehicle is initiated.
- the second control unit SG2 is set in a restricted operating mode as a countermeasure. For example, a change in a Sea si ⁇ safe operation mode is caused in which no danger egg ⁇ nes driving operation of the rail vehicle of the relevant second control unit SG2 emanates.
- the second control unit SG2 causes a limited driving operation of the rail vehicle. Furthermore, it is possible for the affected control unit SG2 to discard individual received messages or to accept and process only individual messages.
- the test data PD used for checking the useful data ND are formed by checksums of the user data ND.
- these may be CRC checksums or CBC MAC values or HMAC values.
- the test data PD may also include hash values of the user data ND or hash values of the headers or data packet management data of the transmitted data packets. For checking, checksums of one or more transmitted user data messages or payload data packets can be used.
- test data PD are used cryptographic key to Entschlüs ⁇ Selung a cryptographically encrypted checksum of the payload ND, or for testing a cryptographically protected checksum.
- data packet management data or header data of the transmitted data packets are used as test data PD.
- These data packet management data include, for example, the MAC address of the receiving Steuergerä ⁇ tes. Furthermore, it is possible that it concerns with the use ⁇ th test data PD to an IP address of the sending and receiving control unit. Furthermore, port number or protocol IDs are suitable as test data PD.
- the test data PD provided for checking the useful data ND are parameters for setting up or updating cryptographic keys.
- data may be stored in a key agreement protocol, e.g. As IKE or IEEE 802. laf, are exchanged via a communication path, while the payload data are exchanged over the other communication path.
- a key agreement protocol e.g. As IKE or IEEE 802. laf
- the second control unit SG2 can recognize whether the received user data ND has been introduced by a third party or are being manipulated.
- the control network 1 it is possible to detect manipulations in the data transmission. This allows the data transmission cables in the train not or only slightly protected to lay, so that the cost of wiring can be reduced without losing security.
- only a portion of the wiring may be laid protected, for example in the underbody area, whereas another part of the wiring is laid in a relatively easily accessible area, eg in the passenger area.
- inventive control network it is sufficient that various control units which accommodate SG physically protected in the jeweili ⁇ gen car of the rail vehicle.
- a control network 1 In a control network 1 according to the invention, an attacker who taps or manipulates the ring-shaped data network at only one point does not have access to the corresponding check information transmitted via the other communication path. Therefore made Manipulatio ⁇ NEN for the receiving second control unit SG2 are recognizable.
- the control network 1 according to the invention it is possible to significantly increase the security of the data communication even without the use of complex cryptographic methods.
- the control network 1 according to the invention and the method according to the invention it is possible, in particular when asymmetric security mechanisms are used, to use public and corresponding private cryptographic mechanisms
- the annularly interconnected control units SG preferably each have at least two Network couponstel ⁇ len.
- the network interfaces can be assigned security functions, for example packet filters for filtering data packets, for encryption as well as checksum checking.
- the various control units SG preferably have at least one data processing unit or a processor which processes the received user data ND or forwards it to another control unit SG.
- the user data are received, ⁇ genes ND may be control data to be interpreted by the processor as the control commands.
- the pro cessor ⁇ can drive accordingly in dependence on the received control data actuators of the respective control unit SG.
- the test data PD or test information associated with the user data ND is preferably received by the receiving controller via another network interface.
- the transmitted user data can also contain configuration data of the various control units SG.
- FIG. 2A, 2B show various embodiments of the control network according to the invention 1.
- the annular data networks laid in the towing vehicle 2-1 and the wagons 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 each comprise a plurality of control devices SG, each ring being connected to further data networks of the rail vehicle via a gateway GW.
- the superordinate data network is formed by a rail vehicle data bus.
- the superordinate data network of the rail vehicle is formed by a data network which also has a ring topology.
- FIGS. 3A, 3B show diagrams for clarifying the mode of operation of the control network according to the invention. At the in
- Fig. 3A embodiment illustrated transmits a first Steuerge ⁇ advises SGI user data to a located in the same ring second control unit SG2.
- the test data PD associated with the user data ND are transmitted in the opposite direction to the same control unit SG2 and compared there with the received user data.
- a first control unit SGI which is located in a first annular data network, data to a second control unit SG2, wel ⁇ ches located in another annular second data network.
- the data transmission takes place via the gate ⁇ ways and the parent data network, which is a data bus in the illustrated embodiment.
- the associated test data in the respective rings are transmitted in the opposite direction to the second control device SG2.
- the user data ND and the test data PD are transmitted in the same direction.
- the transmission of the test data PD and the user data ND can take place via different data lines of the common data bus.
- the useful data ND and the test data PD are transmitted in a temporally offset manner over the data bus in the same direction, in particular if the data bus has only a single line.
- Fig. 4 shows another diagram illustrating the operation of the control network according to the invention 1.
- the parent data ⁇ network is also formed by a ring.
- Darge ⁇ a controller SGI transmits in a ring ers ⁇ th user data ND via the annular parent DA tennetzwerk to a second control unit SG2, which is located in another annular network.
- the two annular data networks are, for example, in ver ⁇ various carriages of a rail vehicle.
- the payload ND are transmitted from the first controller SGI in the annularly laid data networks of the various wagons in the opposite direction to the second controller SG2.
- an opposite transmission of the user data ND and the test data PD takes place in the annular data network of the rail vehicle, that is, the superordinate data network of the entire rail vehicle.
- a first control unit SGI transmits in a first carriage 2-i payload ND first to a further control unit within the same ring, which has a elekt ⁇ generic communication with a first rail Sl.
- the user data ND are transmitted via the first rail Sl to another car 2-j and arrive from one with the
- the test data PD associated with the useful data ND are transmitted by the first control unit SGI via a second rail S2 to the control unit SG2 located in the other wagon 2-j in the opposite direction.
- the rails Sl, S2 are electrically conductive and are suitable in the illustrated embodiment for data transmission.
- the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 has the advantage that the two carriages 2-i, 2-j do not have to be mechanically coupled to one another.
- the two cars 2-i, 2-j may also be carriages of different rail vehicles. In one possible embodiment, each of the two cars forms 2-i, 2-j own rail vehicle, for example, to transport passengers from an airport.
- the second control device SG2 of the carriage 2-j sends data back to the first control device SGI of the other carriage 2-i on receipt of user data ND.
- bidirectional payload data ND and associated check data PD can be exchanged between the two carriages 2-i, 2j.
- the two control units SGI, SG2 position data exchange as user data from, for example, a minimum distance rule Zvi ⁇ the two vehicle cars 2-i to ensure 2-j. If, for example, the second control unit SG2 determines on the basis of the received user data ND that a minimum distance between the two vehicle carriages 2-i, 2-j is not reached, the second controller SG2 can cause another controller in the car 2-j to to slow down or accelerate the car 2-j.
- FIG. 6 shows a further exemplary embodiment of the control network 1 according to the invention. In the case of that shown in FIG. 6
- Embodiment transmits the first controller SGI Nutz ⁇ data to a second control unit SG2 via a voltage ⁇ supply line to the power supply of the rail vehicle.
- the associated test data PD are transmitted via an alternative communication path to the second control device SG2.
- the test data PD are sent from the first control unit SGI via a rail S to the first wagon 2-2 out of the second wagon 2-3 and tapped there and forwarded to the second control unit SG2.
- the indicated there mechanical coupling between the various car 2-i of the rail vehicle is not necessarily required in order to enable data communication between different car 2-i.
- FIG. 7 shows a further exemplary embodiment of the control network 1 according to the invention.
- a control unit transmits SGI in the carriage 2-2 payload ND to a control unit SG2 in the carriage 2-3 of the rail vehicle.
- the user data ND are transmitted by means of a WLAN radio module W from the second car 2-2 to the third car 2-3 via an air interface.
- the test data PD belonging to the useful data ND is transmitted via a rail S to the second control device SG2.
- FIGS. 5, 6, 7 Various combinations of the exemplary embodiments illustrated in FIGS. 5, 6, 7 are possible.
- the test data PD not only as shown in Fig. 4 via an associated annular Da ⁇ tentagentechnik the rail vehicle in opposite directions to the Nutzda ⁇ th ND transferred to another car, but also via an air interface or a rail or a power supply line.
- the second control unit SG2 receives the test data PD on ver ⁇ different signal paths and can compare with each other.
- the user data ND can also be transmitted on a plurality of communication paths or transmission paths in possible embodiments from the first control device SGI to the second control device SG2.
- the signal paths or communication paths for the user data ND and the associated test data PD are selected such that the overlap between the two communication paths is as small as possible. Ideally, the two communication paths have no overlap.
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- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US13/808,500 US8682514B2 (en) | 2010-07-08 | 2011-06-15 | Control network for a rail vehicle |
RU2013105312/11A RU2534180C2 (ru) | 2010-07-08 | 2011-06-15 | Сеть управления для рельсового транспортного средства |
BR112013000387A BR112013000387A2 (pt) | 2010-07-08 | 2011-06-15 | rede de controle para um veículo ferroviário |
CN2011800338084A CN102971196A (zh) | 2010-07-08 | 2011-06-15 | 用于轨道车辆的控制网络 |
EP11748284A EP2555958A1 (de) | 2010-07-08 | 2011-06-15 | Steuernetzwerk für ein schienenfahrzeug |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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DE102010026433.4 | 2010-07-08 | ||
DE102010026433A DE102010026433A1 (de) | 2010-07-08 | 2010-07-08 | Steuernetzwerk für ein Schienenfahrzeug |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2012004098A1 true WO2012004098A1 (de) | 2012-01-12 |
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Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/EP2011/059933 WO2012004098A1 (de) | 2010-07-08 | 2011-06-15 | Steuernetzwerk für ein schienenfahrzeug |
Country Status (7)
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US (1) | US8682514B2 (de) |
EP (1) | EP2555958A1 (de) |
CN (1) | CN102971196A (de) |
BR (1) | BR112013000387A2 (de) |
DE (1) | DE102010026433A1 (de) |
RU (1) | RU2534180C2 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2012004098A1 (de) |
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- 2011-06-15 WO PCT/EP2011/059933 patent/WO2012004098A1/de active Application Filing
- 2011-06-15 US US13/808,500 patent/US8682514B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
RU2534180C2 (ru) | 2014-11-27 |
US20130110328A1 (en) | 2013-05-02 |
CN102971196A (zh) | 2013-03-13 |
DE102010026433A1 (de) | 2012-01-12 |
RU2013105312A (ru) | 2014-08-20 |
US8682514B2 (en) | 2014-03-25 |
BR112013000387A2 (pt) | 2017-10-31 |
EP2555958A1 (de) | 2013-02-13 |
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