WO1998010588A1 - Systeme de protection antimanipulation - Google Patents

Systeme de protection antimanipulation Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1998010588A1
WO1998010588A1 PCT/DE1997/001953 DE9701953W WO9810588A1 WO 1998010588 A1 WO1998010588 A1 WO 1998010588A1 DE 9701953 W DE9701953 W DE 9701953W WO 9810588 A1 WO9810588 A1 WO 9810588A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
protection system
manipulation
manipulation protection
signal line
bypass line
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/DE1997/001953
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Rüdiger KLEIN
Original Assignee
Klein, Patrick
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority to AU15894/97A priority Critical patent/AU1589497A/en
Application filed by Klein, Patrick filed Critical Klein, Patrick
Priority to DE19780928T priority patent/DE19780928D2/de
Publication of WO1998010588A1 publication Critical patent/WO1998010588A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04H—BROADCAST COMMUNICATION
    • H04H20/00—Arrangements for broadcast or for distribution combined with broadcast
    • H04H20/65—Arrangements characterised by transmission systems for broadcast
    • H04H20/76—Wired systems
    • H04H20/77—Wired systems using carrier waves
    • H04H20/78—CATV [Community Antenna Television] systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04H—BROADCAST COMMUNICATION
    • H04H20/00—Arrangements for broadcast or for distribution combined with broadcast
    • H04H20/10—Arrangements for replacing or switching information during the broadcast or the distribution
    • H04H20/103—Transmitter-side switching
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04H—BROADCAST COMMUNICATION
    • H04H60/00—Arrangements for broadcast applications with a direct linking to broadcast information or broadcast space-time; Broadcast-related systems
    • H04H60/09—Arrangements for device control with a direct linkage to broadcast information or to broadcast space-time; Arrangements for control of broadcast-related services
    • H04H60/14—Arrangements for conditional access to broadcast information or to broadcast-related services
    • H04H60/15—Arrangements for conditional access to broadcast information or to broadcast-related services on receiving information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/162—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/166—Passage/non-passage of the television signal, e.g. jamming, band suppression
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04H—BROADCAST COMMUNICATION
    • H04H2201/00—Aspects of broadcast communication
    • H04H2201/70—Aspects of broadcast communication characterised in that receivers can be addressed

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a manipulation protection system for program signal distribution systems, in particular for antenna signal distribution systems.
  • DE 37 04 405 Cl describes a release box for supplying authorized receivers with selected television programs.
  • a release socket is attached to a standard antenna socket of an antenna system, which is supplied from a central unit with signals for releasing television channels authorized to receive in accordance with the reception authorization of a specific receiver.
  • the release box releases certain program blocks via filters if the participant is authorized to purchase them.
  • the authorization is stored in the central unit, which controls the release via a signal in such a way that the release socket of a particular subscriber, which is known according to the location and location of the central unit, is addressed and then releases various transmission areas by removing filter groups.
  • each release box is constantly called up by the control center and its switching status is checked, the release box requesting the release by means of a signal generator via return signals from the central unit.
  • the release box in this central control system can only work in cooperation with the head office. It also receives its operating voltage from there.
  • the feedback signal is interrupted and this interruption is stored and registered in the central unit.
  • An operator working on the central unit recognizes that a defect or manipulation has occurred. If manipulation is really carried out, the end participant who has carried out the technical manipulation initially continues to receive the program group to which he actually does not have access authorization. Only after the program provider has gained access to the end connection of the subscriber in question and the manipulation has been determined is the reception of the program group blocked for the subscriber.
  • REPLACEMENT BLA ⁇ (RULE 26) It is therefore the task of creating a manipulation protection system which immediately blocks program reception for a manipulating end user with little technical effort.
  • Such a system describes, for example, US Pat. No. 4,443,815 in such a way that the effect described here is also achieved here, too, the signal for a subscriber is switched off by a relay, as a result of which the manipulator is punished by switching off the signal from a point to which he has no access
  • the US inventor relates the description of the invention to the shutdown to the subscriber port, which is only available in star distribution networks.
  • the TAP is referred to here as "pad"
  • the signal cut-off is caused by an interruption or short circuit.
  • the flowing current is measured, which is of no importance in the US invention. This enables the string to be switched off at a certain point, precisely at the point before the manipulator sits According to the US invention, only stub lines can be switched off. A deliberate interruption at a certain point in the line is not possible.
  • the system registered here is also suitable for tree networks. The possibility that the US inventor connects the "security devices" in series and thus forms a "manipulation circuit" is neither possible here , still described It is therefore not possible to use this US system in the tree.
  • the disconnection elements are in the feeder and if they were inserted into a trunk line with the formulated description, the release mechanism (here coil to ground) would block the cascaded system itself.
  • the American invention has another enormous disadvantage
  • the system fails completely if the supply voltage is interrupted. All relays drop out, reception is then impossible for everyone. '
  • the direct current flowing through the coaxial distribution network is used as a mechanism for the triggering and monitoring
  • REPLACEMENT SHEET (RULE 2 ⁇ )
  • the manipulation protection system described here has the further advantage that the monitoring of the current flow also means a functional display of the system and its sections. A current that occurs once a certain voltage is applied is system-specific and its value depends on the network size and the cable quality.
  • the manipulation protection system has a safety feed device 1 for feeding in a safety voltage, a signal line 2 and at least one manipulation protection device 3 for automatically interrupting the signal line 2 when a manipulation carried out on the output side is detected, for example in an antenna socket 4.
  • FIG. 2 shows the tamper protection device 3 shown in FIG. 1 in detail.
  • the tamper protection device is connected at its input connection 5 via the signal line 2 to the safety feed device 1.
  • An output connection 6 of the tamper protection device 3 is connected via the signal line 2, for example to an antenna socket 4 or a further tamper protection device 3.
  • the input connection 5 is connected directly to a decoupling circuit 7 for decoupling a safety voltage from the signal line 2 into a bypass line 8.
  • An electronic detection device 9 for detecting a current change on the bypass line 8 is connected to the bypass line 8.
  • the electronic detection device 9 is connected via a control line 10 to a switching device 11.
  • the switching device 1 1 can be an electronic switch or a relay. In a preferred embodiment, the switching device 11 has two switches 12, 13.
  • the switch 12 is connected to the signal line 2 and the switch 13 to the bypass line 8.
  • the switch 12 switches the switch contact 12a on the output side between the switch contacts 12b and 12c.
  • the switch 13 switches the switch contact 13a on the output side between the switch contacts 13b and 13c.
  • the switch contact 12c is connected to ground via a terminating line 14 and a terminating resistor 15.
  • the switch contact 13c is via a terminating line 16 and a terminating resistor 17 also grounded.
  • the switch contact 13b is connected to the node 18 in the signal line 2 via the bypass line 8, as a result of which the safety voltage is further fed into the signal line 2 via output 6.
  • FIG. 3 shows the manipulation protection device shown in principle in FIG. 2 in detail.
  • the same reference numerals designate the same components.
  • the decoupling circuit 7 contains a connection point 7a at which the bypass line 8 is connected to the signal line 2.
  • a DC isolation capacitor 7b, which is connected in the signal line 2, and a decoupling coil 7c, which is connected in the bypass line 8, are connected to the connection point 7a.
  • a resistor 19 is connected to the bypass line 8 in series with the outcoupling coil 7c of the outcoupling circuit 7.
  • the resistor 19 forms part of the electronic detection device 9 and serves to detect a direct current change on the bypass line 8.
  • An amplifier device 20, preferably an operational amplifier, taps the voltage drop via the measuring resistor 19 via the nodes 21 and 22.
  • a line 23 connects the tapping node 21 to a first input 24 of the operational amplifier 20.
  • the line 23 is connected to a power supply connection 26 of the operational amplifier 20.
  • the operational amplifier 20 is connected to ground via a ground line 28.
  • the second input connection 29 of the operational amplifier 20 is connected to the node 22 via a tapping line 30.
  • the amplifier 20 and the measuring resistor 19 together form the electronic detection device 9.
  • the electronic detection device 9 is connected via the control line 10 to an input connection 1 1a of the switching device 11.
  • a control circuit (not shown) for controlling the switches 12, 13 contained in the switching device 11 is connected to the input terminal 11a of the switching device 11.
  • An electrolyte capacitor 33 which is connected to ground via a ground line 34, is preferably connected to the node 21, which lies between the coupling coil 7c and the coupling circuit 7 and the measuring resistor 19 of the electronic detection device 9, via a further line 32.
  • An additional series resistor 35 is preferably connected into the bypass line 8 between the tapping point 22 and the input switching contact 13a of the switch 13 of the switching device 11.
  • a diode 36 and a choke 37a are preferably provided between the output switch contact 13b of the switch 13 and the node 18.
  • the second switching contact 12c and the second switching contact 13c are connected to ground via terminating resistors 15 and 17.
  • the terminating resistor 15 for the signal line 2 preferably has a resistance of 75 ohms.
  • the resistor 17 is to be dimensioned so that the previous current flow of the safety voltage loop in the bypass line 8 is retained.
  • FIG. 4 shows a further embodiment of the tamper protection device 3.
  • the tamper protection device 3 shown in FIG. 4 differs from the tamper protection device shown in FIG. 3 only in that it is integrated into a conventional antenna through-socket, which is designated by 39 in FIG. 4 is.
  • a conventional antenna through-socket has a tap 40 which is connected to the signal line 2.
  • the branched signal is then distributed, for example, to a radio output 42 and a television output 43 via a distributor 41.
  • the structure of the tamper protection device is otherwise identical to the structure shown in FIG. 3, only the resistors 35 and 17 might have to be slightly modified in their values due to the through connection of the individual antenna sockets in order to obtain the ideal measuring current in the safety voltage bypass loops.
  • the capacitor 37 b is connected in the signal line 2 for DC isolation
  • the safety feed device 1 has an input connection 44 and an output connection 45.
  • the safety feed device 1 is connected to the incoming signal line 2 via the input connection 44.
  • a coupling circuit 46 is connected into the signal line 2 and is connected to a DC power supply 49 via a coupling line 47 and a switch 48 or a reset button 48.
  • the coupling circuit 46 contains a capacitor 50 and a coupling coil 51.
  • a DC voltage of, for example, 24 volts can be generated by the power supply 49 of the safety feed device 1.
  • the power supply 49 can be plugged into a conventional power socket via a power cable 52, which has a plug 53 at its end.
  • each amplifier connected to the distribution network can have its own DC supply voltage from its power supply via the circuit shown in FIG. 5 be fed into its output as a safety voltage that can be switched off.
  • the safety feed device 1 receives a high-frequency program signal via the signal line 2, which is distributed to a distributor 54 with direct current passage on a plurality of signal lines 55, 56.
  • the signal lines 55, 56 connected downstream of the distributor 54 are also branched 57 with a direct current passage with manipulation protection.
  • the branch signal 57 branches the program signal onto signal lines 58, in which antenna sockets 59 are connected in a loop-through circuit, the antenna sockets 59 being designed as shown in FIG. 4.
  • any number of antenna sockets 59 with tamper protection device 3 can be connected in series in a loop-through system.
  • the antenna sockets 58a can be implemented in a conventional manner with a direct current and RF terminating resistor of 75 ohms, preferably without protection against manipulation.
  • a safety feed device 1 is connected to the signal line 2, the signal line 2 being distributed to signal lines 55 and 56 on a distributor 54 with direct current passage.
  • the signal and the safety voltage at distribution devices 60 or antenna sockets 59 are branched off at taps 57 and / or 57a with or without a tamper protection device.
  • Several common antenna sockets 61 without tamper protection can be connected in parallel to the distribution devices 60, into which a plurality of tamper protection devices are integrated.
  • loop-through system shown in FIG. 6 can be combined as desired with the star distribution system shown in FIG. 7.
  • FIG. 8 shows the distributor device shown in FIG. 7 here in detail as a 6-way branch tap 60.
  • the signal line 2 branched off, for example, at a tap 57 is the one
  • REPLACEMENT SHEET (RULE S ⁇ ) Distributor device 60 fed In a decoupling circuit 62, which corresponds to the decoupling circuit 7 shown in FIGS. 3 and 4, a safety voltage is decoupled from the signal line 2.
  • a plurality of taps 63 are connected in the part of the signal line 2 connected downstream of the decoupling circuit 62, through which the signal goes in parallel a plurality of output signal lines 64 is branched off.
  • the distributor device 60 has its own manipulation protection device 65 for each of the parallel output signal lines 64.
  • the structure of the manipulation protection device 65 essentially corresponds to the structure of the manipulation protection device 3, as shown in FIG. 3 or 4.
  • the main line 2 can be connected together with its safety voltage via the trunk output of the last tap 63 to another tap tap, which is not shown in detail here
  • a DC voltage generated in the power supply 49 is coupled to the signal line 2 via the coupling circuit 46 when the reset button 48 is closed, and this DC voltage together with the high-frequency program signal via the signal line 2 through the entire distribution network to the input connection 5 of each tamper protection device 3
  • the voltage at node 7a is decoupled through the decoupling circuit 7 of the manipulation protection device 3 onto the bypass line 8.
  • the decoupled DC voltage leads to a direct current through the measuring resistor 19 and the series resistor 35 to be provided, since in normal operation the signal line 2 and the bypass line 8 is switched to continuity, ie the switches 12, 13 of the switching device 11 are switched such that the switch contact 12a is connected to the switch contact 12b and the switch contact 13a is connected to the switch contact 13b
  • the direct current conducted through the bypass line 8 thus reaches the node 18 via the diode 36 and the choke 37a. From there it reaches, for example, another antenna socket with a tamper protection device via the output signal line 2.
  • the change in direct current caused by the manipulation in the bypass line 8 of the upstream manipulation device 3 causes the measuring resistor 1 to operate Chen the nodes 21, 22 a voltage drop change, which is detected by the differential amplifier 20 between the input terminals 24 and 29 and then amplified by the amplifier 20
  • REPLACEMENT BUTT (RULE 26) becomes.
  • the amplifier 20 outputs a control signal to the control signal terminal 11a of the control circuit 11 via the control signal line 10.
  • the amplifier device 20 holds the pulse, ie the control signal is present at the switching device 11 after the current change has been detected until it is only reset when the safety voltage is switched off.
  • the control signal present causes a control circuit contained in the switching device 11 di switches 12 and 13 of the switching device 1 1 to switch from a forward switching position to a blocking switching position. In the forward switching position, the switching contacts 12a and 12b of the switch 12 and the switching contacts 13a and 13b of the switch 13 are connected.
  • the forward switching position corresponds to an operation in which no manipulation has been detected or in which there is no safety voltage in the distribution network and thus on the signal line 2.
  • the control signal applied to the control signal line causes the switch 12 to switch to the blocking switch position in which the switch contact 12a is connected to the switch contact 12c, whereby the signal line 2 is switched to the terminating resistor 15.
  • the switch contact 13a is separated from the switch contact 13b and switched to the switch contact 13c of the switch 13. This switch-over separates the antenna socket downstream of the manipulation protection device from the reception of the high-frequency program signal. Switching the signal line 2 by means of the switch 12 to the terminating resistor 15 ensures that the previous function of this component, for example as an antenna socket with tamper protection, as shown in Fig. 4, is retained.
  • the switchover of the switch 13 causes the current flow via the diode 36 and the choke 37a to the next participant to be interrupted.
  • the direct current flowing through the bypass line 8 is derived to ground after the switch 13 has been switched over via the load discharge resistor 17.
  • a recognizable current continues to flow through the respective measuring resistor 19 for all upstream tamper protection devices in the safety voltage circuit, and there is no chain reaction due to further shutdowns.
  • This can also be prevented by the optionally provided electrolytic capacitor 32, which slows down the abrupt change in current, as a result of which the detection of preceding ones
  • Tamper protection elements is prevented.
  • An electronic holding device in the amplifier device 20 holds the pulse, which is supplied via the control line 10 to the switching device 11, until the safety supply voltage, which is coupled out via the decoupling circuit 7 and supplies the amplifier circuit with voltage via lines 23, 25, once at the reset Button 48 of the safety feed device 1 is interrupted, whereby the entire system is briefly de-energized or de-energized.
  • this one-time interruption of the safety voltage at the safety feed device 1 for example by an operator or also by remote control, there is no voltage at the amplifier 20 for a short time and thus no control signal at the control signal line 10, and the switching device 11 switches back to the open position. As a result, the downstream antenna sockets are again supplied with the program signal.
  • the switching device 11 In the de-energized delivery state, the switching device 11 is in the through switching position, i.e. contact 12a is connected to contact 12b and contact 3a is connected to contact 13b. This switch position is maintained throughout the normal operating state. If a manipulation is carried out on a downstream antenna socket by a current change in the safety circuit, switches
  • REPLACEMENT SHEET (RULE 28) the manipulation protection device 3 connected upstream of the manipulated device to the blocking switch position in order to try to compensate the current change at the measuring resistor 19, for example by feeding a DC voltage in the opposite direction to transmit the program signal, this prevents the diode 36 connected in the bypass line 8.
  • the manipulator is therefore in each In case of being forced to report to the program provider and to have the technical manipulation removed or eliminated, the program provider can then simply switch the subscriber on again remotely by simply opening and closing the switch 48 in the safety feed device 1
  • the manipulation protection system provides an excellent instrument for the network operator to protect his system and his users from third-party interventions To protect Those who unauthorized disconnected, clamped, removed, damaged or changed components, must expect due to the tamper protection system according to the invention that this intervention on the upstream component in the signal flow causes an interruption of the outgoing program signal from the upstream component, so that it lasts receives no signal until the network operator first causes the shutdown and then the restart of a safety voltage, which then all components with elek tronic signal cut-out is switched on again This can also be done remotely
  • the specific current for the safety voltage supply device 1 which is different for each system, to store it in the latter, and to compare or compare it with the current that is set after the reset button is pressed.
  • the current values are before and after the manipulation is the same size, the manipulation did not cause any change, the distribution system is ultimately intact and does not need to be further examined
  • the invention is suitable not only for preventing the number of unauthorized interventions, for example in operators' antenna distribution networks, but also for effectively preventing program theft and thus, for example, forgery of documents or enrichment of third parties at the expense of the general public

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système de protection antimanipulation pour installation de distribution de signaux de programme ou analogues, constitué d'un dispositif d'alimentation de sécurité (1), servant à l'amenée d'une tension de sécurité sur une ligne à signaux (2), et d'au moins un dispositif (3) de protection antimanipulation qui interrompt automatiquement la ligne à signaux (2) lorsqu'une variation du courant continu est détectée sur une ligne de dérivation (8) contenue dans ledit dispositif antimanipulation (3).
PCT/DE1997/001953 1996-09-05 1997-09-05 Systeme de protection antimanipulation WO1998010588A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU15894/97A AU1589497A (en) 1996-09-05 1996-10-18 System for protecting against manipulation
DE19780928T DE19780928D2 (de) 1996-09-05 1997-09-05 Manipulationsschutzsystem

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE1996136098 DE19636098A1 (de) 1996-09-05 1996-09-05 Manipulationsschutzsystem
DE19636098.6 1996-09-05

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1998010588A1 true WO1998010588A1 (fr) 1998-03-12

Family

ID=7804741

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/DE1997/001953 WO1998010588A1 (fr) 1996-09-05 1997-09-05 Systeme de protection antimanipulation

Country Status (3)

Country Link
AU (1) AU1589497A (fr)
DE (2) DE19636098A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO1998010588A1 (fr)

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US2912600A (en) * 1958-05-19 1959-11-10 Hans D Isenberg Tamper protective system and cable for use therein
US4443815A (en) * 1981-03-20 1984-04-17 Nabu Manufacturing Corporation Wired program distribution system tamper detector
US5614939A (en) * 1995-09-18 1997-03-25 Lucent Technologies Inc. Coaxial cable service interrupter

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US2996580A (en) * 1958-01-30 1961-08-15 A R & T Electronics Inc Closed-circuit communications signal distribution system
US4630313A (en) * 1985-08-08 1986-12-16 Control Data Corporation Cable sensor for sensing a DC signal from a cable headend
US4885795A (en) * 1987-11-06 1989-12-05 Bunting, Inc. Hospital digital data transfer system
US5331412A (en) * 1990-11-27 1994-07-19 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Tamper resistant apparatus for a CATV system
US5243647A (en) * 1992-06-10 1993-09-07 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Method and apparatus for broadband signal distribution

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US2912600A (en) * 1958-05-19 1959-11-10 Hans D Isenberg Tamper protective system and cable for use therein
US4443815A (en) * 1981-03-20 1984-04-17 Nabu Manufacturing Corporation Wired program distribution system tamper detector
US5614939A (en) * 1995-09-18 1997-03-25 Lucent Technologies Inc. Coaxial cable service interrupter

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
AU1589497A (en) 1998-03-26
DE19636098A1 (de) 1998-03-12
DE19780928D2 (de) 1999-09-02

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