JP2004350807A - Game machine - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To prevent illegal setting change in a game machine such as a slot machine. <P>SOLUTION: The slot machine 1 is provided with three reels 10a, 10b and 10c to which various kinds of symbols are attached, the reels 10a, 10b and 10c are rotated, and the display form of the patterns is changed. A player operates stop buttons 26, 28 and 30 to stop the rotation of the reels 10a, 10b and 10c, and when a prescribed symbol combination is achieved inside a display window 8 at the time, a winning privilege is given to the player. The probability of giving the winning privilege can be set stepwise by operating a switch inside a case body 2, and setting can not be changed unless switch signals are correctly transmitted. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2005,JPO&NCIPI

Description

【００８２】
表１中、Ｎｏ．１，２の組み合わせは正常時の信号論理値を示し、これらの場合、いずれも異常検出回路９４からの検出信号Ｄが低い電圧レベル（論理値＝Ｌ）となっている。これに対し、上述した第１〜第３の態様で不正が図られた場合、いずれも異常検出回路９４からの検出信号Ｄが高い電圧レベル（論理値＝Ｈ）となる。
【００８３】
上述した検出信号Ｄの論理値（Ｈ／Ｌ）の特性に基づいて、ＣＰＵ５２は不正行為による異常が発生したと判断することができる。すなわち、異常検出回路９４の検出信号Ｄが低い電圧レベル（論理値＝Ｌ）である場合は正常であると判断し、逆に検出信号Ｄが高い電圧レベル（論理値＝Ｈ）となった場合は異常が発生したと判断することができる（異常検出手段）。
【００８４】
第２実施例の場合、ＣＰＵ５２は電源投入時に異常が発生しているか否かを判断することで、設定変更に関して以下の判定処理を実行することができる。
図４は、ＣＰＵ５２により実行される判定処理（２）を示している。この判定処理（２）もまた、電源が投入（電源スイッチ８２がＯＮ）されたときに最初に実行されるものである。
ここでは先ず、ＣＰＵ５２は異常が検出されたか否かを判断する（ステップＳ２１）。この判断は検出信号Ｄの論理値に基づいて行うことができ、ここで特に不正による異常が生じておらず、システムそのものが正常の状態であれば、各種信号の論理値は表１中のＮｏ．２の組み合わせとなる。この場合、検出信号Ｄは依然として低い電圧レベル（論理値＝Ｌ）にあるので、ＣＰＵ５２は異常が検出されていない（Ｎｏ）と判断することができる。
【００８５】
またＣＰＵ５２は、設定キースイッチ８４がＯＮ（右へひねった状態）に操作されているか否かを判断する（ステップＳ２２）。ここでも同様に、特に異常が生じていなければ差動式レシーバ９２からの信号Ｃが低い電圧レベル（論理値＝Ｌ）にあるので、これに基づいてＣＰＵ５２は設定キースイッチ８４がＯＮに操作されている（Ｙｅｓ）と判断することができる。この場合、ＣＰＵ５２はステップＳ２３に進んで設定変更処理を実行する。
【００８６】
第２実施例においても、ステップＳ２３の設定変更処理は上述した手順と同様であり、この間、リセットスイッチ８６の操作（変更操作）がされるごとに設定値が１ずつ繰り上がっていく。
【００８７】
上記の変更操作が終了するまでＣＰＵ５２は設定変更処理を繰り返し（ステップＳ２４＝Ｎｏ）、この後、始動レバー２４の操作によって変更操作が終了したと判断すると（Ｙｅｓ）、その時点でＣＰＵ５２は変更後の設定を確定し、これをＲＡＭ５４に記録する（ステップＳ２５）。
【００８８】
次にＣＰＵ５２は、ここでも再度異常を検出したか否かを判断する（ステップＳ２６）。このとき特に異常が生じていなければ（Ｎｏ）、ＣＰＵ５２は設定キースイッチ８４が元通りＯＦＦ（左へひねった状態）に操作されたか否かを判断する（ステップＳ２７）。そして、正規の設定キーにより設定キースイッチ８４がＯＦＦに操作されると、ＣＰＵ５２はステップＳ２８に進んで設定変更モードを終了する。また、ＣＰＵ５２は設定変更モードを終了すると、ここで判定処理（２）の実行を終了し、電源投入後のメイン処理（図示されていない）に移行する。
【００８９】
一方、電源投入時に特に異常がなく（ステップＳ２１＝Ｙｅｓ）、設定キースイッチ８４がＯＦＦの状態のままであれば、各種信号の論理値は、表１中のＮｏ．１の組み合わせとなる。この場合、差動式レシーバ９２からの信号Ｃは高い電圧レベル（論理値＝Ｈ）にあるので、これに基づいてＣＰＵ５２は設定キースイッチ８４がＯＦＦの状態にある（Ｎｏ）と判断することができる。この場合、ＣＰＵ５２は判定処理（２）を終了してそのまま電源投入後の処理（図６には示されていない）を続行する。
【００９０】
以上が正規の手順を踏んだ場合の処理の内容であるが、上述した第１〜第３の不正態様によって設定キースイッチ８４やハーネス８８等に何らかの介入があった場合は以下のように処理される。
【００９１】
例えば、第１または第２の不正態様で出力線９０ａ，９０ｂをむりやりショートさせ、この状態で電源スイッチ８２が不正にＯＦＦからＯＮへ操作された場合、各種信号の論理値は表１中のＮｏ．３，４の組み合わせとなる。この場合、異常検出回路９４からの出力信号Ｄは高い電圧レベル（論理値＝Ｈ）となるので、ＣＰＵ５２はこれに基づいて異常が検出されたと判断することができる（ステップＳ２１＝Ｙｅｓ）。
【００９２】
あるいは、第３の不正態様で信号線８８ａ，８８ｂが断線された場合、各種信号の論理値は表１中のＮｏ．５，６の組み合わせとなる。この場合も同様に、異常検出回路９４からの出力信号Ｄは高い電圧レベル（論理値＝Ｈ）となるので、ＣＰＵ５２はこれに基づいて異常が検出されたと判断することができる（ステップＳ２１＝Ｙｅｓ）。
【００９３】
いずれの不正態様であっても、異常を検出するとＣＰＵ５２はステップＳ３０に進んで異常時処理を実行する。この異常時処理では、例えば主制御基板５０からホールコンピュータ７６にエラー信号を出力したり、ＲＡＭ５４の内容をクリアしたり、ＣＰＵ５２で永久ループを実行したりすることができる。あるいは、主制御基板５０から演出制御基板７０に指令信号を出力することで、例えば液晶表示器４２に「異常が発生しました」等の文字情報を表示させたり、スピーカ４４から警報メッセージを発したり、あるいは、ランプ４５，４６，４８を激しく点滅させたりして不正行為による異常が発生したことを周囲に報知することもできる。
【００９４】
また第２実施例の判定処理（２）では、設定変更後の設定を確定させた後で再度、異常が検出されたか否かを判断しているため（ステップＳ２６）、例えば不正行為によって設定値の変更および確定までの処理をかろうじて行うことができた場合であっても、最後に設定キースイッチ８４をＯＦＦの状態に戻すところで異常が検出された場合、同様に異常時処理（ステップＳ３０）が実行される。
【００９５】
いずれにしても、ＣＰＵ５２により異常が検出されたと判断されると、ＣＰＵ５２はメイン処理に戻らなくなるため、それ以上の不正行為は続行不能に陥る。
したがって、第１実施例の場合と同様に不正に高設定で遊技を行う企みが途中で失敗に終わり、遊技場において不正な出玉を獲得される被害が未然に防止される。
【００９６】
また、ステップＳ３０の異常時処理においてエラー信号がホールコンピュータ７６に送信されれば、これに気付いた警備員やホール係員等が直ちに対応にあたることで不正行為を早期に発見することができるし、不正行為が行われた現場においてその人物を特定することが容易となる。
【００９７】
上述した第２実施例の構成では、差動回路にて使用される論理値信号の組み合わせ（表１中のＮｏ．１，２）を不正行為によって完璧に再現しない限り、不正な設定変更がおこなわれることはない。このため、不正行為の手口がきわめて複雑であり、これを実現することは事実上不可能であるため、不正行為の防止対策としてより高度な完成度を有する。
【００９８】
また第２実施例の構成では、異常時処理において異常が発生したことを報知することができるため、たとえ不正による設定変更が未遂に終わったとしても、不正遊技者が何らかの不正介入を試みただけでそれが発覚してしまう。このため、このような異常を報知する機能は不正遊技者にとって大きな脅威となり、不正行為の抑止力を大きく発揮することができる。
【００９９】
第２実施例で挙げた差動回路や異常検出回路９４等の構成は、設定キースイッチ８４だけでなく、その他の各種ボタン・スイッチ類にも適用できる。例えば、メダルセレクタ６４のメダル検出信号を差動回路によって主制御基板５０に伝達する構成であれば、不正にメダルベットがされたり、クレジットが加算されたりするのを有効に防止することができる。また、主制御基板５０からの払出信号を差動回路によってホッパ装置６８に伝達する構成であれば、不正行為によってホッパ装置６８を作動させ、メダルが払い出されてしまうのを有効に防止することができる。さらに、これらの差動回路にそれぞれ異常検出回路９４を接続する構成であれば、各種の不正に対して総合的な対策を講じることが可能となり、スロットマシン１を不正行為から強力に防御することができる。
【０１００】
また第１実施例の信号伝達経路において、主制御基板５０に異常検出回路（手段）を備えていてもよい。この異常検出回路は、２本の信号線８８ａ，８８ｂを通じて伝達される操作信号Ａ，Ｂの論理値（ＯＮ／ＯＦＦ）の組み合わせに不整合が生じた場合に異常が発生したものと判断することができる。例えば、正常時に互いに異なる論理値の操作信号Ａ，Ｂが伝達されている場合、断線やショートによって一方の論理値に変化が生じると２つの操作信号Ａ，Ｂの論理値が互いに一致するので、この場合は異常が生じたと判断することができる。あるいは、正常時に同一論理値の操作信号Ａ，Ｂが伝達されている場合、断線やショートによっていずれか一方の論理値に変化が生じると、２つの操作信号Ａ，Ｂの論理値が一致しなくなるので、この場合に異常が生じたと判断することができる。また、異常が生じたと判断された場合、いずれもＣＰＵ５２により第２実施例の場合と同様な異常時処理を実行することができる。
【０１０１】
また第２実施例の場合、図５中に２点鎖線で示されるように設定キースイッチ８４の操作信号を主制御基板５０に直接入力し、差動式ドライバ９０からの信号を異常検出回路９４による異常の検出のみに用いることもできる。この場合、公的機関での試験に利便となる。
【０１０２】
上述した第１および第２実施例では、いずれもハーネス８８に２本の信号線８８ａ，８８ｂのみが含まれているが、信号線は少なくとも２本以上であればよい。したがって、２本を超える信号線を用いて電源ユニット８０と主制御基板５０との間を接続していても、上記の実施例を好適に実現することができる。
【０１０３】
また本発明は一実施形態のスロットマシン１に限られず、各種の変形を伴って実施が可能である。例えば、一実施形態では図柄表示器の一例としてリール装置６６を挙げているが、本発明の遊技機は無端ベルトやドラム、回転ディスク等の図柄表示器を有するものであってもよい。また、設定キースイッチ８４等の配置は電源ユニット８０に限らず、その他の場所であってもよい。
【０１０４】
また、一実施形態では回胴式遊技機を例に挙げて説明しているが、同様な構成（設定回路、変更許可手段、信号伝達手段）を有するものであれば、パチンコ機等の弾球遊技機としても実施可能である。
その他、図示とともに説明したスロットマシン１の構成要素はいずれも好ましい例示であり、本発明を適用するべき遊技機の実施形態に応じて各種の構成要素を適宜変更可能であることはいうまでもない。
【０１０５】
【発明の効果】
本発明の遊技機は、設定回路に対する不正介入を一切寄せ付けず、設定変更を狙った不正行為を強力に除外することができる。
【図面の簡単な説明】
【図１】一実施形態のスロットマシンの正面図である。
【図２】制御機器類を含むスロットマシンの構成を概略的に示した図である。
【図３】第１実施例で用いられる信号伝達経路の回路構成図である。
【図４】判定処理（１）のフローチャートである。
【図５】第２実施例で用いられる信号伝達経路の回路構成図である。
【図６】判定処理（２）のフローチャートである。
【符号の説明】
１ スロットマシン
４２ 液晶表示器
４４ スピーカ
４５，４６，４８ ランプ
５０ 主制御基板（設定回路、変更許可手段、異常処理手段）
７０ 演出制御基板
８０ 電源ユニット
８４ 設定キースイッチ
８６ リセットスイッチ
８８ ハーネス
９０ 差動式ドライバ
９２ 差動式レシーバ
９４ 異常検出回路（異常検出手段）[0001]
TECHNICAL FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to a gaming machine for providing a prize in accordance with a game operation, and more particularly to a gaming machine having a function of setting a probability of providing a prize and also changing the setting.
[0002]
[Prior art]
As a conventional technique related to this type of gaming machine, there is known a gaming machine capable of changing a set value corresponding to a probability of generating a state advantageous to a player in a stepwise manner (for example, see Patent Document 1). This known gaming machine is provided with setting control means for performing setting control of the probability, and the setting value can be changed by giving an instruction regarding the setting value from the instruction means to the setting control means. Further, the specific set value can be displayed by the display means, and at this time, the display means simultaneously displays whether or not the set value can be changed. Further, the setting control means is provided with a setting change mode in which a setting value can be changed and a setting confirmation mode in which only a confirmation display thereof can be performed, and the display mode of the setting value can be changed depending on each mode. it can.
[0003]
According to the known gaming machine described above, for example, when a game arcade operator or the like performs an adjustment operation on the gaming machine, the display mode of the display means determines whether or not the setting can be changed in the current mode. Since the determination can be made immediately, it is considered that the setting value can be smoothly changed by appropriately switching the mode when necessary.
[0004]
[Patent Document 1]
JP-A-2003-52887 (pages 2-3, FIGS. 3, 9, and 10)
[0005]
[Problems to be solved by the invention]
The above-mentioned setting (set value) is such that the higher the probability corresponding to the setting, the higher the payout rate of the gaming machine. Of a nature that should be managed. For this reason, the setting of a gaming machine is a very important concern for a normal player, and finding a platform with as high a setting as possible is one of the interests in performing a game. On the other hand, a player who intends to illegally obtain a ball is likely to be a good target for setting. In other words, the settings can be changed illegally so that a lot of balls can be obtained against the will of the game arcade operator. You can think enough.
[0006]
In the case of the above-mentioned known gaming machine, it is necessary to operate a switch using a dedicated setting key in order to shift the setting control means to the setting value change mode. However, since the operation signal of the setting key switch is merely a contact signal (ON signal) (see FIG. 9 of Patent Document 1), an unauthorized player inserts a metal piece or the like into a housing of a gaming machine, for example. Even if the contact of the setting key switch (or the wiring connected thereto) is simply short-circuited, the mode shifts to the set value change mode. Further, if the contact of the setting button switch is short-circuited in this state, the setting signal can be illegally changed by inputting the contact signal.
[0007]
Therefore, an object of the present invention is to provide an effective measure for preventing an illegal setting change in a gaming machine.
[0008]
[Means for Solving the Problems]
In the gaming machine according to the present invention, the probability that the prize is given is set by the setting circuit, the setting of the setting circuit is changed by the switch, and the operation signal is transmitted to the setting circuit by the signal transmission unit. The above problem is solved (solution 1). In this case, the switch operation signal for changing the setting needs to be transmitted to the setting circuit through the transmitting means, so that the setting cannot be changed simply by short-circuiting the contact of the switch.
[0009]
Further, the gaming machine of the present invention has a setting circuit capable of changing the setting of the probability when a predetermined change operation is accepted while setting the probability of giving the winning privilege, and a switch connected to the setting circuit. A change permitting unit that determines whether to accept a change operation on the setting circuit based on the operation signal of the switch; and a signal transmission unit that transmits the operation signal of the switch to the setting circuit through a plurality of signal lines. (Solution 2).
[0010]
When the switch of the change permitting means is operated, the setting circuit selects either to accept the setting change operation based on the operation signal or to decide the setting without accepting the change operation. At this time, since the operation signal of the switch is transmitted through a plurality of signal lines, the setting circuit is not recognized as an operation signal of the switch by simply shorting one signal line, for example. Therefore, even if the illegal operation due to the contact short-circuit or the like is attempted as described above, the operation of changing the setting circuit is not allowed unless all of the plurality of signal lines are short-circuited at the same time. It becomes difficult, and illegal setting changes are effectively prevented.
[0011]
The switch of the change permitting means may be connected to the setting circuit by a signal line such as a cable, or may be connected to the setting circuit via a signal line wired on the same substrate as the setting circuit. It may be an aspect. Therefore, the specific mode of the signal line of the signal transmission means is not particularly limited.
[0012]
More preferably, the above-mentioned signal transmission means transmits two operation signals having different logical values from each other through at least two signal lines (solution means 3). As described above, by using two types of logical values (true and false) for the operation signal, the setting circuit can recognize the switch operation signal as valid only when the combination is correct.
[0013]
More specifically, when the logical values of the operation signals on the two signal lines are the same, that is, when the two operation signals are all true, or when the two operation signals are all false, The switch operation signal becomes invalid. Therefore, even if an illegal operation is attempted due to a simple short-circuit of a contact or the like, the setting circuit cannot be permitted to change the setting unless a correct combination of logical values is established. Intervention becomes increasingly difficult.
[0014]
Further, the signal transmission means can invert the logical values of the two operation signals when the switch of the change permission means is operated (solution means 4). Viewing this from another angle, the change permitting means can make the output state of the operation signal different between when the change operation to the setting circuit is permitted and when the change operation is not permitted. Means 5).
[0015]
That is, when the switch of the change permitting means is operated, one operation signal is inverted from true to false, and the other operation signal is inverted from false to true. As a result, the two operation signals have logical values mutually before and after the switch operation. It will be replaced. In this case, when the procedure of the formal setting change is performed, the logical value is inverted for the first time when the switch of the change permitting means is operated to permit the change operation to the setting circuit, and the setting is changed after the change operation. When the operation of returning the switch to the final state is performed, the second inversion of the logical value (return to the state before the setting change) occurs.
[0016]
If you try to reproduce the same phenomenon by cheating, the signal line whose logical value was true at first will not be able to reverse the logical value unless it is broken incorrectly, and if it is broken once, The logical value does not return to true unless physically restored. For this reason, inversion (return) of the logical value due to wrongdoing is extremely poor, and it is almost impossible to illegally change the setting.
[0017]
In any one of the second to fifth aspects, the signal transmitting means transmits two operation signals having a predetermined combination of logical values through at least two signal lines. In this case, the gaming machine according to the present invention has two signal lines. An abnormality detecting means for determining that an abnormality has occurred when a mismatch occurs in the combination of the logical values of the two operation signals is further provided (solution means 6).
[0018]
The combination of the logical values of the two operation signals may be the same or they may be different from each other. For example, if the logical values of two operation signals have different combinations in a normal state, if one of the logical values changes due to disconnection or short-circuit of the signal line due to wrongdoing, the logical values of the two operation signals match each other. Therefore, in this case, a mismatch occurs in a combination of correct logical values. Alternatively, when the logical values of the two operation signals have the same combination with each other, if one of the logical values changes due to disconnection or short circuit of the signal line due to wrongdoing, the logical values of the two operation signals do not match. In this case as well, a mismatch occurs in a combination of correct logical values. In any case, the inconsistency of the logical values causes the abnormality detection means to determine that an abnormality has occurred.
[0019]
Further, the signal transmission means may further include a differential circuit for distributing and transmitting the contact signal of the switch to two operation signals having different logical values from each other (solution means 7). The differential circuit can be composed of, for example, a combination of a differential driver and a differential receiver, and these can be connected via two signal lines. In this case, even if the operation signal of the switch is a mere contact signal, the signal can be converted into a combination of operation signals having two logical values (true / false) by the differential driver. When received by the differential receiver, one logical value signal corresponding to a combination of two logical values can be extracted.
[0020]
Therefore, the setting circuit can determine whether or not the switch operation signal is valid based only on the logical value signal received through the differential circuit, and any illegal signal is input without passing through the differential circuit. Even so, it is not recognized as valid. In this case, if the differential circuit is short-circuited or disconnected, a correct combination of logical values is not established in any case, so that it is practically impossible to illegally change the setting.
[0021]
Further, the present invention may further include abnormality detection means connected to at least two signal lines of the signal transmission means, and judging that an abnormality has occurred when output states of operation signals passing through these signal lines match each other. Yes (solution 8).
[0022]
As described above, when a signal is transmitted using a combination of two signals having different logical values from each other, operation signals having different output states are always transmitted to two signal lines in a normal state. In this case, the output states of the two operation signals may coincide with each other by short-circuiting or breaking the signal line due to fraud. In particular, in a differential circuit, if any one of the signal lines is short-circuited, the logical values of the two signals always match, and if any one of the signal lines is disconnected, the two signals are cut off at the same time. Is OFF and coincides. By utilizing such characteristics, for example, when there is no potential difference between the two signal lines, the abnormality can be determined as abnormal by the abnormality detecting means.
[0023]
For this reason, a more practical gaming machine further includes abnormality processing means for executing a predetermined abnormality processing when the abnormality detecting means determines that an abnormality has occurred in the solving means 6 or 8 (solution means 9). ). As specific contents of the abnormal time processing, it is conceivable to notify the occurrence of an abnormality, to issue an alarm, or to stop the operation of the gaming machine. In any case, if it is determined that something is wrong due to some kind of wrongdoing, this can be detected early, so that a great threat can be given to the wrongful player. Further, when the operation of the gaming machine is stopped, it is possible to prevent the game from continuing with the illegal setting change being performed, so that it is possible to prevent the damage to the game hall from occurring.
[0024]
BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
The present invention can take a preferred embodiment as a spinning-type gaming machine that provides a slot machine game using medals or coins as a game medium, for example.
FIG. 1 shows a spinning-type gaming machine (hereinafter simply referred to as a “slot machine”) 1 as one embodiment. The slot machine 1 has a box-shaped housing 2 and is installed on an island facility or the like of a game arcade based on the housing 2. In the island facility, a plurality of slot machines 1 are arranged in rows in the width direction, and usually a medal sand (not shown) is arranged between the units. When cash is inserted into this medal sand, medals corresponding to the inserted amount are lent out, and the player can execute a game using these. The game medium is not limited to medals and coins, but may be a game ball or a token. Alternatively, the game may be executed by inserting a prepaid card into the sand between the stands and exchanging medals and the like for the remaining frequency.
[0025]
The housing 2 has a front door 4 on the front surface facing the player, and the front door 4 can be opened toward the front with one side end (left end in this example) as the center. The front door 4 has a transparent plate 6 at a middle position thereof, and a substantially rectangular display window 8 is formed at the center thereof.
[0026]
The slot machine 1 of one embodiment is equipped with three reels (a left reel, a middle reel, and a right reel) 10a, 10b, and 10c as an example of a mechanical symbol display, and these reels 10a, 10b, and 10c It is arranged behind the front door 4, that is, inside the housing 2.
[0027]
A reel band is stretched around the outer periphery of each of the reels 10a, 10b, 10c, and various symbols are attached to the surface thereof. Although not all shown in FIG. 1, the pattern is, for example, a pattern of a figure “7”, a pattern of a specific alphabet (or a character string thereof), or a lucky charm such as a bell. It includes a stylized fruit, watermelon, apple, cherry, orange, and other fruits or vegetables, or a stylized character, figure, or symbol that characterizes the model of the slot machine 1.
[0028]
The slot machine 1 can change or stop the symbol display mode by rotating or stopping these reels 10a, 10b, 10c. From the front of the slot machine 1, only a part of the reels 10a, 10b, 10c is visible through the display window 8, and at the time of stoppage, three symbols are displayed in the vertical direction for each reel 10a, 10b, 10c. It is displayed effectively.
[0029]
In the transparent plate 6, display areas 12 and 14 are formed on both sides of the display window 8, respectively, and various character information and design information are attached to the display areas 12 and 14 in a predetermined arrangement. . A lamp unit (not shown) is arranged behind the transparent plate 6, and the information in the display areas 12, 14 is lit and displayed by the transmitted light of the lamp. For example, when a player first inserts a medal through the medal insertion slot 15, the bet number is added according to the inserted number, and at this time, a bet lamp (medal line lamp) corresponding to the bet number is displayed in the left display area 12. Lights up. When the bet number reaches the maximum (for example, 3 bets), the inserted medals are stored as credits, and the credit numbers are numerically displayed on the display unit 16.
[0030]
For example, up to 50 credits can be stored, and if there is sufficient credit remaining after one game, that amount can be used for the next bet. The selection of the number of bets is performed by operating the bet buttons 18, 20, and 22, and these bet buttons 18, 20, and 22 are respectively single bet (one bet), two bets (two bets), and MAX bet (three bets). ).
[0031]
In any case, when the player operates the start lever 24 in a state where the bet lamp is lit and displayed, the reels 10a, 10b, and 10c start rotating at the same time, and the symbol fluctuates. Further, when the player operates the stop buttons 26, 28, and 30, the reels 10a, 10b, and 10c corresponding to left, middle, and right respectively stop rotating, and the symbols stop changing. At this time, when a certain combination of symbols (for example, a state in which specific symbols are arranged in a line) is displayed on the winning line activated in the display window 8, a winning privilege is given to the player. Here, examples of the winning award include payout of a predetermined number of medals, transition to a special game state (a so-called big bonus game or regular bonus game, or assist time, challenge time, or the like). The player can receive more medals by executing the special game.
[0032]
As is well known, mechanical operations by reel control intervene at the stop positions of the reels 10a, 10b, 10c. For this reason, as a result of the lottery performed each time, even if the player aims at a combination (combination of symbols) for which the flag is not turned on, the symbol aimed at at the position intended by the player may not stop. Conversely, if the flag is turned on for a specific combination, a specific symbol may be drawn at a position on the pay line by reel control without permission, and in this case, even if there is no technical intervention of the player, The patterns can be arranged. In any case, in the following description, realizing a predetermined symbol arrangement on each of the activated pay lines is referred to as “winning”.
[0033]
When a prize is won by the above-described game operation, the number of paid out medals according to the type of the symbol at that time is displayed on the display unit 32. When a big bonus game or a regular bonus game is won, the number of remaining games is displayed on the display unit 34 during the progress. The paid-out medals are stored as credits until the number of credits on the display unit 16 reaches the maximum, and medals exceeding the maximum number of credits are paid out to the receiving tray 38 through the payout port 36. Further, the player can operate the credit settlement button 40 to release the storage of the medals (credit) and request the return of the stored medals.
[0034]
The slot machine 1 of the present embodiment has a liquid crystal display 42 above the display window 8, and the liquid crystal display 42 has images for effects associated with the progress of the game and acquisition of various bonus games. The number of medals and the like are displayed. Further, a pair of speakers 44 are provided on the left and right sides of the payout opening 36, respectively, and these speakers 44 can output sound effects, BGM, sound, and the like accompanying the progress of the game. In addition, lamps 45, 46, 48 are arranged at various places on the front door 4, and these lamps 45, 46, 48 can perform an effect by light-emitting decoration in accordance with the progress of the game.
[0035]
FIG. 2 schematically illustrates the configuration of various mechanical elements, electronic devices, operation members, and the like provided in the slot machine 1. The slot machine 1 has a main control board 50 for integrally controlling the progress of the game. On the main control board 50, electronic circuits such as a CPU 52, a ROM 54, a RAM 56 and the like are mounted. The main control board 50 includes an interface 58 for exchanging information with an external device, a counter 62 for generating random numbers for lottery, and the like.
[0036]
The above-described bet buttons 18, 20, 22, the start lever 24, the stop buttons 26, 28, 30, the settlement button 40, and the like are all connected to the main control board 50. These operation buttons are formed by using sensors (not shown). The operation by the player can be detected, and the operation signal can be output to the main control board 50.
[0037]
The housing 2 of the slot machine 1 houses other devices together with the main control board 50, and various signals are input to the main control board 50 from these devices. The devices include a medal selector 64, a reel device 66, a hopper device 68, and the like. Among them, the medal selector 64 detects medals inserted from the medal insertion slot 15 one by one, and sends the detection signal to the main control board 50. Output.
[0038]
The reel device 66 is configured as a unit including the above-described reels 10a to 10c. The reel device 66 has an index sensor (not shown) for detecting a reference position for the rotation of each of the reels 10a, 10b, 10c, and a detection signal (index signal) from these index sensors is used as a main control board. 50 has been entered. The hopper device 68 also has a payout sensor (not shown) for detecting paid out medals one by one, and a detection signal for each medal is inputted to the main control board 50 from the paid out sensor. ing.
[0039]
On the other hand, a control signal is output from the main control board 50 to the reel device 66 and the hopper device 68. That is, the reel device 66 has a built-in stepping motor (not shown) for rotating each of the reels 10a, 10b, and 10c, and a driving pulse signal for controlling the start and stop of these stepping motors is mainly controlled. Output from the substrate 50. A payout signal is input from the main control board 50 to the hopper device 68 in accordance with the type of the winning symbol, and the hopper device 68 performs a medal payout operation based on the payout signal.
[0040]
The slot machine 1 includes an effect control board 70 in addition to the main control board 50. In addition to the CPU 72, the effect control board 70 includes a ROM, a RAM (not shown), an interface, a VDP (video display processor), a sound source IC, It is equipped with an audio amplifier and the like. The effect control board 70 receives various command signals from the main control board 50, controls the operation of the liquid crystal display 42, the display sections 16, 32, 34, and the speaker 44, and turns on or off the lamps 45, 46, 48. Flashing is controlled.
[0041]
Further, an external terminal board 74 is connected to the main control board 50, and the slot machine 1 is connected to a hall computer 76 of the game hall via the external terminal board 74. The external terminal board 74 relays the inserted medal signal or the paid-out medal signal transmitted from the main control board 50, the signal during the big bonus game or the regular bonus game (JAC game) to the hall computer 76, or conversely, the hall computer 76. The stop release signal and the like transmitted from 76 are relayed to the main control board 50 and the effect control board 70.
[0042]
In addition, a power supply unit 80 is housed inside the housing 2. The power supply unit 80 receives electric power from an external power supply and generates electric power required for operating the slot machine 1. The power generated here is supplied from the power supply unit 80 to each unit.
[0043]
The power supply unit 80 includes a power switch 82, a setting key switch 84, a reset switch 86, and the like. None of these switches are exposed outside the housing 2 and can be operated only by opening the front door 4. The power switch 82 is for turning on and off the power supply to the slot machine 1, and the setting key switch 84 is for changing the settings of the slot machine 1. The reset switch 86 is used to cancel an error that has occurred in the slot machine 1, and is also operated when changing settings together with the setting key switch 84.
[0044]
Next, setting and setting change of the slot machine 1 will be described. The setting itself has the same properties as those of the known setting, and the outline thereof will be described here.
In the slot machine 1 of the present embodiment, for example, six levels of settings are possible, and the probability of giving the above-mentioned prize privilege differs depending on each set value (1-6). Specifically, six table data (1 to 6) are stored in the ROM 54 of the main control board 50 for convenience, and these table data (1 to 6) correspond to all random numbers (for example, 16384 patterns). A hit value of a big bonus or a regular bonus is given in advance. Among them, the table data (1) has the smallest hit value of the big bonus and the regular bonus, whereas the table data (2), (3), and (4) have the hit value of the table data (5) in this order. The number has been increased. And among all the table data, the table data (6) has the largest hit value of the big bonus.
[0045]
The CPU 52 of the main control board 50 determines the hit by comparing the random number value obtained from the counter 62 with the hit value of the table data during the normal game, and if any one of the bonus games is hit, the flag of the corresponding symbol is determined. To ON. In this case, when the player operates the stop buttons 26, 28, and 30 near the target symbol, the symbol hits a stop position within a range (for example, within four symbols) that can be controlled by the above-described reel control. It becomes easier to win a prize with the symbol corresponding to the game.
[0046]
Here, which table data (1 to 6) is used for performing the hit determination during the normal game depends on the setting, and the setting is made such that the hit determination is performed using the table data having a larger number of hit values. The higher the probability, the higher the probability of winning a lottery, and accordingly, it can be said that the payout rate of the gaming machine is set higher. The numbers of such table data (1 to 6) are referred to as settings 1 to 6 by comparing them to the high and low stages of the payout rate.
[0047]
Specifically, if a certain gaming machine is set to perform a hit determination using the table data (1) during a normal game, it is set to 1 or the setting of the gaming machine is set to 1 It is referred to as a certain gaming machine or a gaming machine of setting 1. Similarly, if it is set to perform the hit determination using the table data (2) to (6), they are referred to as settings 2 to 6, respectively.
[0048]
As described above, the setting of the gaming machine determines the level of the probability of the prize award given to the player, and is directly linked to the payout rate of the gaming machine. The specific settings for the gaming machines are strictly managed and operated by the management decisions of the amusement arcade operator.
For this reason, in the slot machine 1 of the present embodiment, when the setting is changed, the changing operation is performed according to the following strict procedure.
[0049]
First, the front door 4 of the housing 2 is opened, the power switch 82 is operated, and the power of the slot machine 1 is turned off. In this state, a predetermined setting key (not shown) is inserted into the setting key switch 84, and is twisted rightward by about 90 degrees. Next, when the power switch 82 is operated to turn on the power of the slot machine 1 with the setting key inserted into the setting key switch 84, the CPU 52 of the main control board 50 changes the setting value (reset) in this state. The operation of the switch 86) can be accepted, and the set value (one of 1 to 6) at that time is numerically displayed on the display unit 16.
[0050]
Thereafter, each time the reset switch 86 is operated once, the setting is increased by one step, and the display unit 16 displays a numerical value obtained by adding 1 to the set value up to that time. However, if the setting has already been set to 6, the setting returns to 1 the next time the reset switch 86 is operated.
[0051]
As described above, the reset switch 86 is operated several times until the desired set value is reached while checking the display on the display unit 16, and then the start lever 24 is operated to complete the setting change operation. Then, the setting key switch 84 is turned 90 degrees to the left to return to the original position, the inserted setting key is extracted, and the change of the setting is completed.
[0052]
When the above-described setting change is performed, the power supply unit 80 is the object that the operator actually performs the change operation, but the main control board 50 (CPU 52) accepts the change operation. That is, when the power switch 82 is turned on with the setting key switch 84 turned to the right, an operation signal of the setting key switch 84 is transmitted to the main control board 50 through the harness 88. The main control board 50 determines, based on the operation signal of the setting key switch 84, whether or not to permit the setting change, that is, to accept the change operation. Further, when the reset switch 86 is operated while the acceptance of the change operation is permitted on the main control board 50 (during the setting change mode), the change operation is performed on the main control board 50 and the effect control board 70, respectively. Information indicating that the operation has been performed is transmitted. The main control board 50 accepts the change operation based on this information, and, for example, rewrites the set value stored in the RAM 56 and also records fact information that the setting change has been performed together. At this time, the effect control board 70 also records the fact of the setting change together with the changed set value.
[0053]
Thereafter, when the user turns the setting key switch 84 to the left to return it to the original position, the operation signal is transmitted to the main control board 50 through the harness 88. When recognizing this operation signal, the main control board 50 does not accept any further change operation (disallowed), and at that point, the changed settings are confirmed.
[0054]
The above is the basic configuration of the slot machine 1. In addition to this, the slot machine 1 of the present embodiment has a useful configuration and a function for preventing a gossip aiming at an illegal setting change. Therefore, a specific example will be described below.
[0055]
【Example】
(First embodiment)
FIG. 3 schematically shows a signal transmission path from the power supply unit 80 to the main control board 50. In this case, the setting key switch 84 is configured by combining two contact switches 84a and 84b. When one of the two contact switches 84a and 84b is turned on (closed), the other is always turned on. It is set to OFF (open). In the power supply unit 80, a signal voltage is applied to each of the two contact switches 84a and 84b.
[0056]
The harness 88 connecting the power supply unit 80 and the main control board 50 includes two signal lines 88a and 88b, and these signal lines 88a and 88b are wired corresponding to the contact switches 84a and 84b, respectively. . Therefore, when the setting key switch 84 is operated, an operation signal is transmitted to the signal lines 88a and 88b in conjunction therewith. In the following description, for convenience, the operation signals passing through the two signal lines 88a and 88b are denoted by reference numerals A and B, respectively. When the operation signals A and B are input to the main control board 50, they are transmitted to the CPU 52 (not shown in FIG. 3) via the interface 58.
[0057]
As shown in FIG. 3, when one contact switch 84a is closed, the corresponding operation signal A is ON, and conversely, the operation signal B is OFF. On the other hand, if the setting key switch 84 is operated (turning the setting key to the right) in a direction opposite to that of FIG. 3, the ON / OFF states of the contact switches 84a and 84b are switched, respectively. A is in an OFF state, and conversely, the operation signal B is in an ON state.
[0058]
As described above, the CPU 52 of the main control board 50 uses the property that the states of the operation signals A and B are interchanged with each other in response to the operation of the setting key switch 84 to change the operation signals A and B to logical values (true / false). ) Can be treated as a combination of two different operation signals. For example, the CPU 52 can determine that the logic value is true when the operation signals A and B are ON, and that the logic value is false when the operation signals A and B are OFF. Since these are merely expedient rules, the logical values may be determined by reversing the ON-OFF states of the operation signals A and B. In any case, the CPU 52 determines whether or not the combination of the logical values of the operation signals A and B is correct, so that the following determination processing can be executed for the setting change.
[0059]
FIG. 4 shows the determination process (1) of the setting key switch 84 executed by the CPU 52. This determination process (1) is executed first when the power is turned on (the power switch 82 is turned on).
Here, first, the CPU 52 determines whether or not the operation signal A is ON (step S11), and also determines whether or not the operation signal B is OFF (step S12). At this time, if the setting key switch 84 is operated to be ON (a state twisted to the right), the normal combination is that the operation signal A is ON and the operation signal B is OFF. Therefore, the determination is affirmative (Yes) in both step S11 and step S12. In this case, the CPU 52 proceeds to step S13 to execute a setting change process. This setting change processing is the same as the above-described procedure. During this time, the set value is incremented by one each time the reset switch 86 is operated (changed).
[0060]
The CPU 52 repeats the setting change process until the above change operation is completed (step S14 = No). After that, when it is determined that the change operation is completed by the operation of the start lever 24 (Yes), the CPU 52 performs the change operation at that time. Is set, and this is recorded in the RAM 54 (step S15).
[0061]
Next, the CPU 52 determines whether or not the operation signal A is in the OFF state (step S16), and also determines whether or not the operation signal B is in the ON state (step S17). As described above, when the setting key switch 84 is again turned OFF (twisted to the left) after the operation of the starting lever 24, the operation signal A is inverted to the OFF state, and the operation signal B is turned off. Is in the ON state, which is a legal combination. In this case, since the determination in both step S16 and step S17 is affirmative (Yes), the CPU 52 proceeds to step S18 and ends the setting change mode. As a result, acceptance of the subsequent change operation becomes unacceptable. When terminating the setting change mode, the CPU 52 terminates the execution of the determination process (1) and shifts to a main process (not shown) after power-on.
[0062]
On the other hand, if the setting key switch 84 is kept OFF when the power is turned on, the determination is negative (No) in the first step S11. In this case, the CPU 52 ends the determination process (1), and Continue processing after input.
[0063]
The procedure up to this point is the content of the processing when a formal setting change is performed under the management of the game arcade operator. However, if there is any intervention in the setting key switch 84, the harness 88, etc. due to fraud, the following will be described. Is processed as follows.
For example, in a state where the setting key switch 84 is OFF, if the unauthorized player makes the contact switch 84a make a forcible contact, and further disconnects the signal line 88b, for some time, the judgment of steps S11 and S12 is passed, and the process proceeds to step S13. It seems possible to reach the setting change processing (setting change mode). When this state is reached, the main control board 50 can be improperly accepted by the main control board 50 by a technique such as shorting the reset switch 86.
[0064]
However, even if such an unauthorized change operation can be accepted, the purpose of the injustice cannot be achieved to the end unless the main control board 50 is thereafter returned to a state in which a game can be played. For this reason, in order for the unauthorized player to end the setting change process (setting change mode), the logical values of the operation signals A and B must be restored to the original values, but the signal line 88b that has been disconnected once is restored. Since it is virtually impossible to return to, the wrongdoing at that point falls into an inability to continue. Therefore, in this case, an attempt to illegally play the game at a high setting ends in a failure on the way, so that damage to an illegal payout at the game hall is prevented.
[0065]
Alternatively, as another form of injustice, even if some kind of intervention (short circuit, disconnection, etc.) is attempted on only one of the signal lines 88a and 88b, this does not result in a combination of correct logical values. I ca n’t work,
If the signal line 88a is disconnected by mistake at first, the program can no longer proceed to step S12 and thereafter, so that it is impossible to reach even the setting change process (setting change mode).
[0066]
As described above, in the configuration of the first embodiment, it is extremely difficult to illegally change the settings, and it can greatly contribute to prevention of illegal acts.
In the above-described first embodiment, a combination in which the logical values (represented by ON or OFF) of the two operation signals A and B are different from each other is taken as an example, but they are the same combination (both ON or both). OFF). In this case, if a fraudulent player attempts to change the setting fraudulently, it is necessary to simultaneously intervene on a plurality of signal lines 88a and 88b, so that the fraudulent act becomes complicated and difficult. It can greatly contribute to preventing fraud.
[0067]
(Second embodiment)
FIG. 5 schematically shows a signal transmission path different from that of the first embodiment. In this case, the setting key switch 84 includes only one contact switch. Further, a differential driver 90 is incorporated in the power supply unit 80, and a signal line 84c of a setting key switch 84 is connected to the input section of the differential driver 90.
[0068]
Further, a differential receiver 92 is incorporated in the main control board 50. The differential driver 90 and the differential receiver 92 have two output lines 90a and 90b and an input through a harness 88 on the way. They are connected by lines 92a and 92b. The differential receiver 92 is connected to the interface 58 via an output line 92c on the main control board 50.
[0069]
On the main control board 50, an abnormality detection circuit 94 is branched and connected to two input lines 92a and 92b of a differential receiver 92. The abnormality detection circuit 94 has two LEDs 94a and 94b, and these LEDs 94a and 94b are connected in parallel with each other between input lines 92a and 92b, and positive and negative poles are connected in opposite directions. Further, the abnormality detection circuit 94 has a phototransistor 94c, and the collector line 94d of the phototransistor 94c is connected to the interface 58 by a common emitter type.
[0070]
Here, similarly, for convenience of description, signals passing through various signal lines 90a, 90b, 92c, 94d, 88a, and 88b are denoted by reference numerals A, B, C, D, E, and F, respectively. . The signals C and D are transmitted to the CPU 52 (not shown in FIG. 5) via the interface 58.
[0071]
When the power is turned on and the setting key switch 84 is in the OFF state, a signal B having a low voltage level is output from the negative gate of the differential driver 90, and a signal A having a high voltage level is output from the simple gate. Are output, the signals A and B have different combinations of logical values (represented by the level of the voltage level). When the signals A and B are input to the differential receiver 92 in this combination, a logical sum is established there, so that the differential receiver 92 outputs the signal C having a high voltage level.
[0072]
In addition, since the LED 94a emits light in the abnormality detection circuit 94 due to the potential difference between the signals A and B (E, F) at this time, a detection signal D having a low voltage level can be output from the abnormality detection circuit 94.
[0073]
Conversely, when the setting key switch 84 is turned on (turned to the right), the signals A, B, and C are all in a state where the logical values are inverted. However, also in this case, since the LED 94b emits light in the abnormality detection circuit 94, the voltage level of the detection signal D is still low, and its logical value does not change.
[0074]
Here, in the case where any illegal acts intervene in the circuit configuration of FIG. 5, for example, the following modes are assumed. In any case, it is assumed that the slot machine 1 is in operation and the setting key switch 84 is in the OFF state.
First, there is an illegal mode in which the output line 90a of the differential driver 90 is short-circuited to the ground pole of the power supply unit 80. In this case, since the voltage level of the signal A decreases (H → L), both the signals E and F input to the differential receiver 92 match at a logical value with a low voltage level. Therefore, since the logical sum is not established in the differential receiver 92, the signal C is undefined at this time.
[0075]
In this case, since the potential difference between the signals E and F disappears, none of the LEDs 94a and 94b of the abnormality detection circuit 94 emits light. As a result, the detection signal D has a high voltage level, and the logical value is opposite to that in the normal state. become.
[0076]
Secondly, there is an illegal mode in which the output line 90b of the differential driver 90 is short-circuited to the power supply line (or the signal line 84c) of the power supply unit 80. In this case, since the voltage level of the signal B becomes higher (L → H), the signals E and F input to the differential receiver 92 both match at a logical value with a higher voltage level. Therefore, since the logical sum is not established in the differential receiver 92, the signal C is undefined.
[0077]
Similarly, also in this case, since the potential difference between the signals E and F disappears, none of the LEDs 94a and 94b of the abnormality detection circuit 94 emits light. As a result, the detection signal D becomes a high voltage level and is logically different from the normal state. The values are reversed.
[0078]
The third is an illegal mode in which the signal lines 88a and 88b are disconnected. If any one of these two signal lines 88a and 88b is disconnected, the differential circuit itself does not function, and the signal C from the differential receiver 92 becomes unstable.
[0079]
Further, the disconnection of the signal lines 88a and 88b causes the signals E and F to be de-energized, so that none of the LEDs 94a and 94b of the abnormality detection circuit 94 emits light. As a result, the detection signal D becomes a high voltage level and the normal state. Has the opposite logical value.
[0080]
Table 1 below lists combinations of signal logic values in the circuit configuration of FIG. In Table 1, the level of the signal voltage level is represented by H (high) and L (low), respectively, and the notation such as “H → L” and “L → H” indicates that the signal voltage level changes. It means that there was.
[0081]
[Table 1]

[0082]
In Table 1, No. The combination of 1 and 2 indicates a normal signal logic value, and in each case, the detection signal D from the abnormality detection circuit 94 has a low voltage level (logic value = L). On the other hand, in the case where an illegal operation is performed in the first to third aspects, the detection signal D from the abnormality detection circuit 94 becomes a high voltage level (logical value = H).
[0083]
Based on the characteristic of the logical value (H / L) of the detection signal D described above, the CPU 52 can determine that an abnormality due to a fraud has occurred. That is, when the detection signal D of the abnormality detection circuit 94 is at a low voltage level (logical value = L), it is determined that the signal is normal, and when the detection signal D is at a high voltage level (logical value = H). Can be determined that an abnormality has occurred (an abnormality detecting means).
[0084]
In the case of the second embodiment, the CPU 52 determines whether or not an abnormality has occurred when the power is turned on, so that the following determination process can be performed with respect to the setting change.
FIG. 4 shows the determination process (2) executed by the CPU 52. This determination process (2) is also executed first when the power is turned on (the power switch 82 is turned on).
Here, first, the CPU 52 determines whether or not an abnormality has been detected (step S21). This determination can be made on the basis of the logical value of the detection signal D. Here, if no abnormalities have occurred due to improper operation and the system itself is in a normal state, the logical values of the various signals are No. in Table 1. . 2 combination. In this case, since the detection signal D is still at a low voltage level (logic value = L), the CPU 52 can determine that no abnormality has been detected (No).
[0085]
The CPU 52 also determines whether or not the setting key switch 84 has been operated (turned right) (step S22). Similarly, if no abnormality has occurred, the signal C from the differential receiver 92 is at a low voltage level (logical value = L), and accordingly, the CPU 52 operates the setting key switch 84 to turn it on based on this. (Yes) can be determined. In this case, the CPU 52 proceeds to step S23 to execute a setting change process.
[0086]
Also in the second embodiment, the setting change process in step S23 is the same as the above-described procedure, and during this time, the set value is incremented by one each time the reset switch 86 is operated (changed).
[0087]
The CPU 52 repeats the setting change process until the above change operation is completed (step S24 = No). After that, when it is determined that the change operation is completed by the operation of the start lever 24 (Yes), the CPU 52 performs the change after that. Is determined, and this is recorded in the RAM 54 (step S25).
[0088]
Next, the CPU 52 again determines whether or not an abnormality has been detected (step S26). At this time, if no abnormality has occurred (No), the CPU 52 determines whether or not the setting key switch 84 has been operated as before (turned to the left) (step S27). Then, when the setting key switch 84 is turned off by the regular setting key, the CPU 52 proceeds to step S28 and ends the setting change mode. When the CPU 52 ends the setting change mode, the CPU 52 ends the execution of the determination process (2), and shifts to a main process (not shown) after the power is turned on.
[0089]
On the other hand, when there is no particular abnormality at the time of turning on the power (Step S21 = Yes) and the setting key switch 84 is in the OFF state, the logical values of the various signals are No. 1 in Table 1. 1 combination. In this case, since the signal C from the differential receiver 92 is at a high voltage level (logical value = H), the CPU 52 may determine that the setting key switch 84 is in the OFF state (No) based on this. it can. In this case, the CPU 52 ends the determination processing (2) and continues the processing after power-on (not shown in FIG. 6).
[0090]
The above is the contents of the processing in the case where the regular procedure is performed. However, if there is any intervention in the setting key switch 84, the harness 88, etc. due to the first to third illegal modes described above, the processing is performed as follows. You.
[0091]
For example, if the output lines 90a and 90b are forcibly short-circuited in the first or second incorrect manner and the power switch 82 is incorrectly operated from OFF to ON in this state, the logical values of various signals are No. in Table 1. . It becomes a combination of 3 and 4. In this case, the output signal D from the abnormality detection circuit 94 is at a high voltage level (logical value = H), so that the CPU 52 can determine that an abnormality has been detected based on this (step S21 = Yes).
[0092]
Alternatively, when the signal lines 88a and 88b are disconnected in the third incorrect manner, the logical values of the various signals are set to No. 1 in Table 1. It becomes a combination of 5,6. Similarly, in this case, the output signal D from the abnormality detection circuit 94 has a high voltage level (logical value = H), so that the CPU 52 can determine that an abnormality has been detected based on this (step S21 = Yes). ).
[0093]
In any of the illegal modes, upon detecting an abnormality, the CPU 52 proceeds to step S30 to execute an abnormal time process. In the abnormal processing, for example, an error signal can be output from the main control board 50 to the hall computer 76, the contents of the RAM 54 can be cleared, and the CPU 52 can execute a permanent loop. Alternatively, by outputting a command signal from the main control board 50 to the effect control board 70, for example, character information such as “An error has occurred” is displayed on the liquid crystal display 42, or an alarm message is issued from the speaker 44. Alternatively, the lamps 45, 46, and 48 may be violently blinked to notify the surroundings of the occurrence of the abnormality due to the wrongdoing.
[0094]
Further, in the determination process (2) of the second embodiment, after the setting after the setting change is determined, it is determined again whether or not an abnormality is detected (step S26). Even if the processing up to the change and confirmation of the setting can be barely performed, if an abnormality is finally detected when the setting key switch 84 is returned to the OFF state, the abnormality processing (step S30) is similarly performed. Be executed.
[0095]
In any case, if the CPU 52 determines that the abnormality has been detected, the CPU 52 does not return to the main process, and further illegal acts cannot be continued.
Therefore, as in the case of the first embodiment, an attempt to illegally play a game at a high setting ends in a failure on the way, and damages to illegal payouts at a game hall are prevented from occurring.
[0096]
Further, if an error signal is transmitted to the hall computer 76 in the abnormal time processing in step S30, a security officer or a hall clerk who notices this can immediately detect the fraudulent behavior by taking immediate action, and It becomes easy to identify the person at the site where the action was performed.
[0097]
In the configuration of the second embodiment described above, unless the combination of logical value signals (No. 1 and No. 2 in Table 1) used in the differential circuit is completely reproduced by an illegal act, an illegal setting change is performed. Will not be. For this reason, the method of cheating is extremely complicated, and it is practically impossible to realize this, and therefore, it has a higher degree of perfection as a measure for preventing cheating.
[0098]
Further, in the configuration of the second embodiment, it is possible to notify that an abnormality has occurred in the abnormal time process. Therefore, even if the setting change due to fraud has been attempted, the fraudulent player only attempts some kind of fraudulent intervention. Then it is discovered. For this reason, the function of notifying such abnormalities poses a great threat to a fraudulent player, and can exert a great deal of deterrence against fraud.
[0099]
The configurations of the differential circuit and the abnormality detection circuit 94 and the like described in the second embodiment can be applied to not only the setting key switch 84 but also various other buttons and switches. For example, if the configuration is such that the medal detection signal of the medal selector 64 is transmitted to the main control board 50 by a differential circuit, it is possible to effectively prevent illegal medal betting and credit addition. Further, if the payout signal from the main control board 50 is transmitted to the hopper device 68 by a differential circuit, the hopper device 68 is operated by fraud to effectively prevent the payout of medals. Can be. Furthermore, if the abnormality detection circuit 94 is connected to each of these differential circuits, comprehensive measures can be taken against various types of fraud, and the slot machine 1 can be strongly protected from fraud. Can be.
[0100]
In the signal transmission path of the first embodiment, the main control board 50 may be provided with an abnormality detection circuit (means). This abnormality detection circuit determines that an abnormality has occurred when a mismatch occurs in the combination of the logical values (ON / OFF) of the operation signals A and B transmitted through the two signal lines 88a and 88b. Can be. For example, when the operation signals A and B having different logical values are transmitted in a normal state, if one of the logical values changes due to disconnection or short circuit, the logical values of the two operation signals A and B match each other. In this case, it can be determined that an abnormality has occurred. Alternatively, when the operation signals A and B having the same logical value are transmitted in a normal state, if one of the logical values changes due to disconnection or short circuit, the logical values of the two operation signals A and B do not match. Therefore, in this case, it can be determined that an abnormality has occurred. In addition, when it is determined that an abnormality has occurred, the CPU 52 can execute the same abnormal state processing as in the second embodiment.
[0101]
In the case of the second embodiment, the operation signal of the setting key switch 84 is directly input to the main control board 50 as shown by a two-dot chain line in FIG. It can also be used only for the detection of abnormalities caused by. In this case, it is convenient for testing at public institutions.
[0102]
In the first and second embodiments described above, the harness 88 includes only two signal lines 88a and 88b, but the number of signal lines may be at least two. Therefore, even if the power supply unit 80 and the main control board 50 are connected using more than two signal lines, the above-described embodiment can be suitably realized.
[0103]
The present invention is not limited to the slot machine 1 according to the embodiment, and can be implemented with various modifications. For example, in one embodiment, the reel device 66 is given as an example of the symbol display. However, the gaming machine of the present invention may have a symbol display such as an endless belt, a drum, and a rotating disk. Further, the arrangement of the setting key switch 84 and the like is not limited to the power supply unit 80, and may be located at other places.
[0104]
Also, in one embodiment, the explanation is made by taking a torso type gaming machine as an example, but if it has a similar configuration (setting circuit, change permission means, signal transmission means), it will be a ball or ball such as a pachinko machine. It can also be implemented as a gaming machine.
In addition, all the components of the slot machine 1 described with reference to the drawings are preferable examples, and it goes without saying that various components can be appropriately changed according to the embodiment of the gaming machine to which the present invention is applied. .
[0105]
【The invention's effect】
INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY The gaming machine according to the present invention can strongly exclude improper acts aimed at changing settings without bringing any unauthorized intervention into the setting circuit.
[Brief description of the drawings]
FIG. 1 is a front view of a slot machine according to one embodiment.
FIG. 2 is a diagram schematically showing a configuration of a slot machine including control devices.
FIG. 3 is a circuit configuration diagram of a signal transmission path used in the first embodiment.
FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a determination process (1).
FIG. 5 is a circuit configuration diagram of a signal transmission path used in a second embodiment.
FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a determination process (2).
[Explanation of symbols]
1 slot machine
42 liquid crystal display
44 Speaker
45, 46, 48 lamps
50 Main control board (setting circuit, change permission means, error processing means)
70 Production control board
80 Power supply unit
84 Setting key switch
86 Reset switch
88 Harness
90 differential driver
92 differential receiver
94 Error detection circuit (error detection means)

Claims (1)

In a gaming machine in which a predetermined prize is given according to a result of a game operation by a player,
A setting circuit for setting a probability of giving the winning prize,
A switch for inputting a setting change operation to the setting circuit,
And a signal transmitting means for transmitting an operation signal of the switch to a setting circuit.

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