EP3549842B1 - Système de contrôle du trafic ferroviaire et procédé de sécurisation de l'affichage d'une indication d'état d'un système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains - Google Patents
Système de contrôle du trafic ferroviaire et procédé de sécurisation de l'affichage d'une indication d'état d'un système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains Download PDFInfo
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- EP3549842B1 EP3549842B1 EP18177217.9A EP18177217A EP3549842B1 EP 3549842 B1 EP3549842 B1 EP 3549842B1 EP 18177217 A EP18177217 A EP 18177217A EP 3549842 B1 EP3549842 B1 EP 3549842B1
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- control system
- indication
- data
- safe
- operator workstation
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L19/00—Arrangements for interlocking between points and signals by means of a single interlocking device, e.g. central control
- B61L19/06—Interlocking devices having electrical operation
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L21/00—Station blocking between signal boxes in one yard
- B61L21/06—Vehicle-on-line indication; Monitoring locking and release of the route
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
- B61L25/06—Indicating or recording the setting of track apparatus, e.g. of points, of signals
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/30—Trackside multiple control systems, e.g. switch-over between different systems
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/50—Trackside diagnosis or maintenance, e.g. software upgrades
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L19/00—Arrangements for interlocking between points and signals by means of a single interlocking device, e.g. central control
- B61L19/06—Interlocking devices having electrical operation
- B61L2019/065—Interlocking devices having electrical operation with electronic means
Definitions
- the invention concerns a train traffic control system comprising a route and train control system, an operator workstation with a display, and a safe state indication component with safety level SIL>0, in particular SIL4, for indicating safety-related information concerning the state of elements of the route and train control system on the display of the operator workstation.
- the invention further concerns a method for safe displaying a state indication of a route and train control system.
- Route and train control systems are adapted to manage safely routes and movement-authorities in railway networks for running trains and to control protect and protect trains from running to fast or beyond their end of movement-authority.
- Typical route and train control systems are for example interlocking systems, radio-block-centers or similar systems.
- Traffic management systems comprise human machine interfaces for operating route and train control systems by a human operator.
- the route and train control system receives commands from the traffic management system concerning regular operation as well as concerning safety critical operations.
- Safety critical operations are carried out by using the route and train control system in special operational situations or in case of disturbances.
- safety critical operations are instructed by the operator while bypassing elements of the route and train control system (e.g. the radio block center or the interlocking system).
- safety critical operations are operator actions, e.g. safety critical route clearing, safety critical point change, etc. with which the operator can circumvent a safe setting of the system.
- a method for secure transmission of data is disclosed in [2].
- a method for verifying correct data transfer is disclosed in [3].
- Document EP 3 040 862 A1 discloses a train traffic control system comprising: route and train control system, an operator workstation with a display, wherein the operator workstation comprises at least one basic integrity indication component, with safety level SILO for indicating information with a basic integrity on the display, wherein the operator workstation is adapted to generate graphical data of information with basic integrity, safe state indication component with safety level SIL>0 configured to transform state data concerning the state of elements of the route and train control system into graphical data and thereby generating indication data indicating safety-related information concerning the state of elements of the route and train control system on the display of the operator workstation, wherein the basic integrity indication component and the safe state indication component are software components, wherein the safe state indication component is functionally separated from the basic integrity indication component, safe channel connecting the safe state indication component and the display for safe transmission of safety-related information about the state of elements of the route train control system.
- the operator workstation comprises at least one basic integrity indication component with safety level SILO for indicating information with a basic integrity on the display.
- An indication server is provided comprising a safe state indication component with safety level SIL>0, in particular SIL4, for indicating safety-related information concerning the state of elements of the route and train control system on the display of the operator workstation, wherein the safe state indication component is functionally independent of the operator workstation.
- a safe channel is provided connecting the safe state indication server and the display for safe transmission of safety-related information about the state of elements of the route train control system.
- the basic integrity indication components and the safe state indication component are software components, i.e. encapsulated building blocks of software.
- the basic integrity indication component indicates any type of information with basic integrity, such as delay of a train or the weather conditions, of a train traffic control system on a display to inform an operator about the respective conditions of the train traffic control system, the controlled route and train control system and their elements with a safety-integrity-level SILO.
- Elements of the route and train control system can be e.g. field elements (points, signals, track vacancy detection systems, level crossings, etc.), logical elements (routes, movement authorities, line block systems, etc.), train related elements (train parameters like speed or length of a train, etc.) or area related elements (zones for temporary speed restrictions, working areas of maintenance staff, responsibility areas of a specific operator etc.).
- the safe state indication component generates graphical data (indication data) in order to indicate safety related states of the train traffic control system, the controlled route and train control system and their elements with a safety-integrity-level SIL>0, in particular SIL4 to inform an operator reliably about these states. Safety related operations can be executed based on these indications.
- the basic integrity indication component is integrated in the operator workstation, whereas the safe state indication component is functionally independent of the operator workstation.
- the function for generating indication data of safety-related information concerning the state of elements of the route train control system (state data) is outsourced from the operator workstation, i.e. the safe state indication component is functionally separated from the basic integrity indication component and can (but doesn't have to) be installed in separate locations.
- the SILO basic integrity indication components on the safe state indication component can be ensured more easily.
- the operator workstation comprises only low safety components the operator workstation can be designed with basic integrity (in particular SILO), which is much cheaper compared to the high safety operator workstation known from the state of the art.
- the inventive traffic control system enables safe indication of states of elements of the route and train control system on the display of the operator workstation at low cost.
- the transmission of safety-related information about the state of elements of the route train control system between the safe state indication component and the display is realized by providing a safe channel (communication channel between the indication server and the display) that transmits graphical indication data to the display and checksum information to the safe state indication component.
- a safe channel communication channel between the indication server and the display
- the procedures to ensure safe communications via this channel are implemented according the relevant standards (e.g. EN 50159) and the required safety integrity level.
- the safe state indication component is integrated in the route and train control system, i.e. in a sub-center of the train traffic control system. No further computer is required in this case, which makes this embodiment cost effective. Yet, an additional function has to be integrated in all route and train control systems, which are to be controlled by the train traffic, control system.
- the safe state indication component can be integrated in an indication server.
- the indication server can be part of the route and train control system. This is in particular advantageous in case no overall Control Centre exists and only one (small) route and train control system has to be controlled.
- the system comprises a control center, wherein the indication server is integrated in the control center.
- This embodiment is advantageous in cases where existing route and train control system (for example from different suppliers) shall be controlled, since no further functions have to be integrated in the route and train control system.
- Control centers are known e.g. from DB "Betriebswin” or “Steuerdog” respectively and handle the tasks of controlling, securing and dispositioning of railway operations.
- the indication server is integrated in a remote computer center (remote from the display). This allows the usage of thinclients for the operator workstation (to reduce the amount of needed energy, noise and space in the control center).
- the remote computer center can be part of the control center.
- the indication server is procedure-protected, i.e. the necessary safety integrity level is achieved by a procedure that, on the one hand, integrates the human user (operator) and, on the other hand, is controlled by a component of the route and train control system.
- Common industrial computer can be used as indication server.
- the indication server can be a composite fail-safety server.
- the indication server is a multi-channel server having a 2002 or 2003 architecture.
- Safety level SIL4 can be achieved with this embodiment.
- the operator workstation is integrated in a traffic management system.
- the traffic management system may comprise further functions for managing train operation, e.g. delay detection, detection of train occupancy conflicts, (automatic) conflict resolution, management of resources such as maintenance area staff along the route, integration of telecommunications and video surveillance.
- the safe channel is routed through the operator workstation.
- no further computer is required for transmission of the safety-related information.
- state data are transmitted and processed in the workstation leading to an overall safety integrity SIL>0 for the workstation itself
- the present invention uses the workstation only as a "grey channel" which is secured by a procedure leading to no additional safety integrity needs for the workstation itself. This reduces the development costs.
- the safe state indication component is adapted to calculate a first checksum of the indication data generated by the safe state indication component and is further adapted to carry out a checksum comparison and/or a pixel comparison of pixmap data.
- the safe state indication component is preferably adapted to download a read back component from a browser of the operator workstation.
- the invention also concerns a method for safe displaying safety-related information concerning the state indication of a route and train control system at an operator workstation of a train traffic control system as described above, having the steps of claim 10.
- Safety-related information is transmitted from the route and train control system to the indication server.
- the indication server generates graphical data (indication data) from the safety-related information, which are then sent to the display of the operator workstation via the safe channel.
- Graphical data of information with basic integrity are generated within the operator workstation.
- the graphical data of information with basic integrity are then transmitted within the operator workstation to the display.
- the safe channel is routed through operator workstation.
- the safe channel is at least partially part of the operator workstation.
- the state data is transformed to pixmap indication data and the pixmap indication data are transmitted to the display by using a method for verifying correct transfer of pixmap data.
- the method for verifying correct transfer of pixmap data preferably comprises:
- the indication data generated by the safe state component is displayed in a web-browser of the operator workstation to provide the necessary flexibility.
- a preferred variant provides that the displayed indication data are read back, in particular by generating pixmap data.
- the safe state indication component generates a first checksum of the indication data
- the browser generates a second checksum of the read back data and transmits the second checksum to the safe state indication component via the safe channel
- the safe state indication component compares the first checksum and the second checksum.
- the checksum comparison is carried out remote from the operator workstation to separate the safety related comparison from the SILO operator workstation.
- the browser transmits the read back data to the safe state indication component via the safe channel and the safe state indication component compares the read back data with the indication data (pixel comparison).
- the present invention realizes a procedure based safe graphical indication of a route and train control system state in a SILO traffic management system.
- safety related route and train control systems e.g. interlockings, signaling systems can be controlled from SILO traffic management systems.
- the inventive traffic control system enables execution of safety critical operations in a safety critical system with reduced cost, in particular the execution of safety critical operations which require a safe display of the state of the route and train control system, e.g. because the route and train control system is bypassed by executing the respective safety critical operation.
- Fig. 1 shows an architecture of a traffic control system according to the state of the art.
- the traffic control system comprises a route and train control system RTCS and an operator workstation OW' with a display D.
- the operator workstation OW' comprises basic integrity indication components BIC with safety level SILO for indicating information on the display D with a basic integrity (railway traffic management data).
- the operator workstation OW' further comprises a safe state indication component SSC with safety level SIL>0 for processing state data (safety relevant information concerning states of elements of the route and train control system RTCS).
- the state data are transmitted from the route and train control system RTCS to the safe state indication component SSC of the operator workstation OW'.
- the safe state indication component SSC transforms the state data into graphical data and thus generates indication data, which is then displayed at the display D.
- Information with basic integrity is transmitted from the route and train control system RTCS to the operator workstation OW via channel C1.
- Safety relevant information (state data) however is transmitted to the safe state indication component SSC via a separate channel C2 in order to generate according graphical indication data.
- the transmission channel C2 is a secured channel, e.g. secured by means of a security gateway in order to avoid manipulation of the state data.
- the indication data is transferred from the safe state indication component SSC to the display D of the operator workstation. In order to avoid falsification of indication data due to malfunction of hardware or software, the data transfer is carried out via a safe channel C3.
- the safe state indication component SSC can either be executed by an indication server IS as shown in Fig. 2 , Fig. 3 and Fig. 5 (i.e. an additional computer is provided for executing the safe state indication component SSC) or by a secured partition of an already existing computer of the traffic control system, as shown in Fig. 4 .
- the safe state indication component SSC is integrated in a control center CC together with the operator workstation OW. Non-intrusiveness between operator workstation OW and safe state indication component SSC is ensured by providing a separate computer (indication server IS) for executing the safe state indication component SSC.
- the safe state indication component SSC in the control center CC it is also possible to integrate the safe state indication component SSC in the route and train control system RTCS, either executable by the indication server ( Fig. 3 ) or by an existing computer of the RTCS itself ( Fig. 4 ). If several route and train control systems RTCS are operated by the traffic control system, each of the route and train control systems RTCS has to be equipped with an according safe state indication component SCC.
- the indication server IS with the safe state indication component SSC is integrated in a computer center RZ, which can be located remote from the operator workstation OW.
- Fig. 6 shows the architecture of a traffic control system using a web-based operator workstation.
- the operator workstation comprises a browser B and a read back component R.
- the safe state indication component SSC is adapted to download the read back component R from the operator workstation OW.
- the displayed indication data are read back (read back data) and transmitted to the safe state indication component SSC.
- the steps below describe the realization of a highly preferred variant of the inventive method by means of the traffic control system shown in Fig. 6 .
- the according method steps are preferably executed anytime the operator uses the browser to execute safety critical commands.
- the safety critical commands might also be executed explicitly on demand through a dedicated user interaction mechanism (button, drop down button etc.).
- the preferred method steps are as follows:
- the inventive solution is based on the idea of outsourcing the SIL>0 safe state indication component SSC from the operator workstation OW and to set-up a safe channel C3 (e.g. by applying remote desktop protocols) enhanced with safety measures, in particular according to EN50159.
- This safe channel C3 is preferably routed through the operator workstation OW wherein a method for verifying correct data transfer is used.
- the invention realizes safe graphical indication of states of elements of the railway control system (e.g. interlocking, RBC,...) in an operator workstation OW, in particular within a traffic management system TMS that provides (only) a SILO environment.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Biomedical Technology (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
- Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
Claims (16)
- Système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire comprenant :un système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains (RTCS) ;un poste de travail d'opérateur (OW) qui est muni d'un affichage (D), dans lequel le poste de travail d'opérateur (OW) comprend au moins un composant d'indication d'intégrité de base (BIC) qui présente un niveau de sécurité SILO pour indiquer une information avec une intégrité de base sur l'affichage (D), dans lequel le poste de travail d'opérateur est adapté pour générer des données graphiques d'information avec intégrité de base, et dans lequel le poste de travail d'opérateur (OW) comprend seulement des composants qui présentent le niveau de sécurité SILO ou moins ; etun composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) qui présente un niveau de sécurité SIL > 0, en particulier SIL4, lequel composant est configuré pour transformer des données d'état qui concernent l'état d'éléments du système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains (RTCS) selon des données graphiques et par voie de conséquence, pour générer des données d'indication qui indiquent une information rapportée à la sécurité qui concerne l'état d'éléments du système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains (RTCS) sur l'affichage du poste de travail d'opérateur (OW) ;dans lequel le composant d'indication d'intégrité de base et le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité sont des composants logiciels ; etdans lequel le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) est fonctionnellement indépendant du poste de travail d'opérateur (OW), et le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) est fonctionnellement séparé du composant d'indication d'intégrité de base (BIC), dans lequel la fonction pour générer des données d'indication de l'information rapportée à la sécurité qui concerne l'état d'éléments du système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains est extraite en termes de ressource externalisée au niveau du poste de travail d'opérateur ; etun canal de sécurité (C3) qui connecte le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) et l'affichage (D) pour une transmission en termes de sécurité de l'information rapportée à la sécurité qui concerne l'état d'éléments du système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains (RTCS).
- Système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) est intégré à l'intérieur du système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains (RTCS).
- Système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire selon la revendication 1 ou 2, caractérisé en ce que le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) est intégré à l'intérieur d'un serveur d'indication (IS).
- Système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire selon la revendication 3, caractérisé en ce que le système comprend un centre de commande (CC), dans lequel le serveur d'indication (IS) est intégré à l'intérieur du centre de commande.
- Système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire selon la revendication 3 ou 4, caractérisé en ce que le serveur d'indication (IS) est intégré à l'intérieur d'un centre informatique à distance (RZ).
- Système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire selon l'une quelconque des revendications 3 à 5, caractérisé en ce que le serveur d'indication (IS) est protégée en termes de procédure(s).
- Système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire selon l'une quelconque des revendications 3 à 5, caractérisé en ce que le serveur d'indication (IS) est un serveur composite défaillance - sécurité.
- Système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le poste de travail d'opérateur (OW) est intégré à l'intérieur d'un système de gestion de trafic (TMS).
- Système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le canal de sécurité (C3) est routé par l'intermédiaire du poste de travail d'opérateur (OW).
- Procédé pour l'affichage en termes de sécurité d'une information rapportée à la sécurité qui concerne l'état d'un système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains (RTCS) au niveau d'un poste de travail d'opérateur (OW) d'un système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire qui comprend un système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains (RTCS), un poste de travail d'opérateur (OW) qui est muni d'un affichage (D), dans lequel le poste de travail d'opérateur (OW) comprend au moins un composant d'indication d'intégrité de base (BIC) qui présente un niveau de sécurité SILO pour indiquer une information avec une intégrité de base sur l'affichage (D), dans lequel le poste de travail d'opérateur est adapté pour générer des données graphiques d'information avec intégrité de base ; et dans lequel le poste de travail d'opérateur (OW) comprend seulement des composants qui présentent un niveau de sécurité SILO ou moins, et un composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) qui présente un niveau de sécurité SIL > 0, en particulier SIL4, pour transformer des données d'état qui concernent l'état d'éléments du système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains (RTCS) selon des données graphiques et par voie de conséquence, pour générer des données d'indication qui indiquent une information rapportée à la sécurité qui concerne l'état d'éléments du système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains (RTCS) sur l'affichage du poste de travail d'opérateur (OW), dans lequel le composant d'indication d'intégrité de base et le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité sont des composants logiciels, dans lequel le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) est fonctionnellement indépendant du poste de travail d'opérateur (OW), et le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) est fonctionnellement séparé du composant d'indication d'intégrité de base (BIC), dans lequel la fonction pour générer des données d'indication de l'information rapportée à la sécurité qui concerne l'état d'éléments du système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains est extraite en termes de ressource externalisée au niveau du poste de travail d'opérateur ; le système de contrôle de trafic ferroviaire comprenant en outre un canal de sécurité (C3) qui connecte le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) et l'affichage (D) pour une transmission en termes de sécurité de l'information rapportée à la sécurité qui concerne l'état d'éléments du système de contrôle des itinéraires et des trains (RTCS) ;
le procédé comprenant :la génération de données graphiques d'information avec intégrité de base à l'intérieur du poste de travail d'opérateur ;la transformation de données d'état qui comprennent l'information rapportée à la sécurité selon des données d'indication graphiques à l'intérieur du composant d'indication d'état de sécurité (SSC) qui présente le niveau de sécurité SIL > 0, lequel composant est fonctionnellement indépendant des composants d'indication d'intégrité de base (BIC) qui présentent le niveau de sécurité SILO du poste de travail d'opérateur (OW) ; etla transmission des données d'indication graphiques à un affichage (D) via le canal de sécurité (C3). - Procédé selon la revendication 10, caractérisé en ce que le canal de sécurité est routé par l'intermédiaire du poste de travail d'opérateur (OW).
- Procédé selon la revendication 10 ou 11, caractérisé en ce que les données d'indication sont des données de pixmap/données de table de pixels et dans lequel les données d'indication sont transmises à l'affichage (D) en utilisant un procédé pour vérifier que le transfert des données de pixmap/données de table de pixels est correct.
- Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 10 à 12, caractérisé en ce que les données d'indication sont affichées au sein d'un navigateur Web du poste de travail d'opérateur.
- Procédé selon la revendication 13, caractérisé en ce que les données d'indication affichées sont soumises à une relecture.
- Procédé selon la revendication 14, caractérisé en ce que :
le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité génère un premier total de contrôle des données d'indication ; en ce que :
le navigateur Web génère un second total de contrôle des données soumises à une relecture et transmet le second total de contrôle au composant d'indication d'état de sécurité via le canal de sécurité ; et en ce que :
le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité compare le premier total de contrôle et le second total de contrôle. - Procédé selon la revendication 14 ou 15, caractérisé en ce que :
le navigateur Web transmet les données soumises à une relecture au composant d'indication d'état de sécurité via le canal de sécurité ; et en ce que :
le composant d'indication d'état de sécurité compare les données soumises à une relecture avec les données d'indication.
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
RS20220616A RS63339B9 (sr) | 2018-04-06 | 2018-06-12 | Sistem za kontrolu železničkog saobraćaja i postupak za bezbedno prikazivanje pokazatelja stanja sistema za kontrolu rute i voza |
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HRP20220827TT HRP20220827T1 (hr) | 2018-04-06 | 2018-06-12 | Sustav za upravljanje željezničkim prometom i postupak prikazivanja indikacije sigurnog stanja sustava za upravljanje vlakovima |
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EP18166202.4A EP3549841B1 (fr) | 2018-04-06 | 2018-04-06 | Système de commande de trafic ferroviaire et procédé pour effectuer des opérations critiques de sécurité dans un système de commande de trafic ferroviaire |
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KR (1) | KR102536023B1 (fr) |
AU (1) | AU2019249938B2 (fr) |
DK (1) | DK3549842T5 (fr) |
ES (1) | ES2923182T3 (fr) |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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HUE059058T3 (hu) | 2023-01-28 |
PL3549842T3 (pl) | 2022-08-22 |
SI3549842T1 (sl) | 2022-08-31 |
AU2019249938B2 (en) | 2022-11-24 |
RS63339B1 (sr) | 2022-07-29 |
WO2019193145A1 (fr) | 2019-10-10 |
KR20200140860A (ko) | 2020-12-16 |
SA520420235B1 (ar) | 2022-11-25 |
HRP20220827T1 (hr) | 2022-10-14 |
EP3549842A1 (fr) | 2019-10-09 |
ES2923182T3 (es) | 2022-09-26 |
DK3549842T5 (da) | 2022-10-31 |
DK3549842T3 (da) | 2022-07-18 |
HUE059058T2 (hu) | 2022-10-28 |
AU2019249938A1 (en) | 2020-10-01 |
LT3549842T (lt) | 2022-07-25 |
EP3549842B9 (fr) | 2022-09-28 |
RS63339B9 (sr) | 2022-11-30 |
KR102536023B1 (ko) | 2023-05-23 |
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