EP2921369B1 - Procédé de réinitialisation d'un équipement à la voie d'un système secondaire de détection - Google Patents

Procédé de réinitialisation d'un équipement à la voie d'un système secondaire de détection Download PDF

Info

Publication number
EP2921369B1
EP2921369B1 EP15158359.8A EP15158359A EP2921369B1 EP 2921369 B1 EP2921369 B1 EP 2921369B1 EP 15158359 A EP15158359 A EP 15158359A EP 2921369 B1 EP2921369 B1 EP 2921369B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
zone
detection equipment
reset
piece
train
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
EP15158359.8A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP2921369A1 (fr
Inventor
Mathieu Bresson
Jocelyn Perrot
Jean-Louis Venencie
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
Original Assignee
Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Alstom Transport Technologies SAS filed Critical Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
Publication of EP2921369A1 publication Critical patent/EP2921369A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP2921369B1 publication Critical patent/EP2921369B1/fr
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L1/00Devices along the route controlled by interaction with the vehicle or train
    • B61L1/16Devices for counting axles; Devices for counting vehicles
    • B61L1/169Diagnosis
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/30Trackside multiple control systems, e.g. switch-over between different systems
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B61L2027/204Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using Communication-based Train Control [CBTC]

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method for resetting an equipment to the path of a secondary detection system, in an automatic train control architecture.
  • the present invention relates more particularly to an architecture for automatic control of trains running on a railway network.
  • Such an architecture is known by the acronym ATC architecture for "Automatic Train Control”.
  • an ATC architecture comprises different systems cooperating with each other to enable the safe circulation of the trains on the network.
  • a CBTC Communication-based Train Control
  • a CBTC architecture is shown schematically in the figure 1 .
  • a CBTC architecture is based on the presence of embedded computers on board trains.
  • the train calculator determines a number of operating parameters and communicates with different ground systems to enable the train to safely perform the mission assigned to it.
  • This on-board computer ensures, on the one hand, the coverage of the functional requirements of the train, that is to say for example the stations to be served, and, on the other hand, the control of security points, that is to say for example to check that the train does not have excessive speed.
  • the computer of a train is connected to an on-board radio communication unit capable of establishing a radio link with base stations of a communication infrastructure, itself connected to a communication network of the CBTC architecture.
  • the CBTC architecture includes a zone controller ZC, an acronym for "Zone Controller" in English.
  • This zone controller is notably in charge, first, to monitor the presence of trains on the rail network and, secondly, in a centralized architecture, to provide movement authorizations to trains, which are likely to guarantee their safety of movement, that is to say for example not to provide a train with a movement authorization that would lead it to go beyond the train that precedes it.
  • Such a zone controller is referenced by the number 50 on the figure 1
  • This ATC architecture is part of a global system, called Signaling System, SS on the figure 1 which is also suitable for controlling a plurality of equipment at the track.
  • Signaling System SS on the figure 1 which is also suitable for controlling a plurality of equipment at the track.
  • the signaling system includes an automatic train supervision system, also called ATS system, according to the acronym "Automatic Train Supervision".
  • ATS system is implemented in an operational central office and comprises man / machine interfaces, enabling operators to intervene on the various systems of the signaling system and, in particular, equipment on the track. For example, the operator can remotely control from the ATS the closing of a signal (switching from a fire to red).
  • the signaling system also includes an interlocking system, also known as "Interlocking" in English.
  • an interlocking system is capable of managing the equipment at the track, such as traffic lights, switching actuators, etc., these equipment to the track allowing the safe movement of the trains and to avoid movements. conflict between them.
  • the interlocking system is now computerized by adapted computers adapted to control the equipment to the track.
  • Such an interlocking calculator is referenced by the number 40 on the figure 1 .
  • the rail network is composed of sections of railroad track, each section of track being subdivided into zones. On the figure 1 three successive zones 14A, 14B and 14C are shown.
  • Occupying an area of a section of track is a fundamental piece of railway safety. The determination of this information will now be described.
  • the zone controller receives information from a primary detection system and from a secondary detection system.
  • the primary detection system allows the determination of the area occupied by a train according to the instantaneous position of the train determined by the train itself. More precisely, the zone controller receives, from each computer 26 on board a train 16, the instantaneous position of this train. This position is determined by the on-board computer from the detection of beacons 24 placed along the track 12 and whose geographical positions are known, and from odometry means equipping the train and allowing the calculator to determine the distance traveled by the train since the last cross tag. In another embodiment, the train uses other means to determine its position: for example an accelerometer (instead of the odometer) or a GPS (instead of beacons).
  • the zone controller From the instantaneous position of a train, the zone controller deduces, by means of a geographical plane of the network, on which each zone is uniquely identified, the zone in which the train is currently located. A first state E1 of the zone in which the train is located then takes the value "occupied".
  • the zone controller continues to extrapolate the position of the train to cover its potential movements.
  • the first state E1 of the zones in which no train is at the current time takes the value "free".
  • a first occupancy information of each zone is determined by the zone controller.
  • the secondary detection system is able to redundant the primary detection system, in case, for example, the radio communication unit 27 of a train 16 no longer functions, the zone controller 50 can not obtain the instantaneous position. of the train.
  • the secondary detection system is able to detect the presence of a train in a particular area.
  • the secondary detection system to detect the presence of a train on an area, the secondary detection system counts the number of axles 17 entering and leaving the area.
  • the secondary system comprises an input sensor 28A located at the entrance to the zone 14B and an output sensor 28B located at the exit of the zone 14B.
  • the input and output sensors are connected by wiring to a device at the channel 30 associated with the zone 14B, hereinafter referred to as detection equipment.
  • the detection equipment is located in a technical room (common with signaling equipment).
  • a sensor can be connected to several detection equipment.
  • the sensor 28B is both the output sensor of the zone 14B and the input sensor of the zone 14C. it will be connected to the zone controller of zone 14B and that of zone 14C.
  • the detection equipment 30 is an electronic card to which the input and output sensors of the zone in question are connected.
  • the detection equipment is able to maintain a variable called axle counter C of the zone.
  • the detection equipment 30 increments the axle counter C of the zone by one unit.
  • the sensing equipment 30 decrement the axle counter C of the zone by one unit.
  • the zone is in a second state E2 taking the value "free" when the axle counter C of the zone is equal to zero. Otherwise, the second state of the zone takes the value "busy".
  • the second state E2 of a zone constitutes a second occupancy information which is periodically transmitted by the detection equipment 30 to the zone controller 50 via the interlocking computer 40.
  • the area controller 50 reconciles the first and second occupancy information. Different strategies are then implemented when these two pieces of information differ from each other.
  • a "pure" CBTC system can only work with primary detection.
  • the secondary detection is present on the one hand to cover the failure modes of the CBTC communication and on the other hand to allow the circulation, on the same railway network, of trains not equipped with CBTC.
  • the secondary detection system of the state of the art has the following operating disadvantage.
  • the train has N axles 17.
  • the input sensor 28A erroneously detects the passage of N-1 axles.
  • the state counter C then takes the value N-1 ("busy" state).
  • the zone controller 50 reconciles the first and second information which originate from the primary detection system and from the secondary detection system.
  • the zone controller 50 places the detection equipment 30 of the zone 14B into the "out of order” mode (OOO for "Out Of Operation”). This means that the status counter associated with this zone has been identified as erroneous and must be reset before being able to be taken into account again.
  • the information that a detection equipment is in the "out of service" mode is transmitted by the zone controller 50 to the ATS system.
  • the information is then displayed on the screen of an operator, for example in the form of an alarm.
  • the operator Before validating such a reset, the operator requests an agent to move along the path to physically see that the area in question is actually unoccupied. Once the operator has received confirmation from the agent, he must then stop the trains that may potentially enter the area during the reset procedure. It then validates the reset, which has the effect of issuing a reset authorization to the zone controller 50.
  • the zone controller 50 Upon receipt of this reset authorization request, the zone controller 50 transmits a reset request to the latch computer 40 managing the detection equipment 30 of the area of interest.
  • the latch computer 40 Upon receipt of the reset request, the latch computer 40 transmits a reset command adapted to the detection equipment 30.
  • the detection equipment 30 Upon receipt of the reset command, the detection equipment 30 is able to assign a default value (in this case zero) to the axle counter to be reset.
  • the detection equipment 30 indicates that the second state E2 of the zone is "free", consistent with the first state E1 of this same zone.
  • the zone controller 50 places the detection equipment 30 back into the "in service” mode.
  • the zone is considered as occupied by all, regardless of the number of axles indicated by the axle counter.
  • this reset method is slow to implement.
  • the primary detection system is not redundant, which presents problems of system availability in the event of failure of the system. radio communication system of a CBTC train or in the case of a non-equipped CBTC train.
  • the operator validates the issuance of a reset authorization to the zone controller.
  • the zone controller Upon receipt of this authorization, the zone controller verifies, by using the primary detection system, not only that no train is present on the area whose status counter is to be reset, but also that no train is within an approach volume around this area.
  • the approach volume defines a distance upstream and downstream of an area, to ensure that no train will return to the area during the implementation of the reset process.
  • the approach volume corresponds to a reset time multiplied by a maximum train speed on the zones upstream and downstream of the zone considered.
  • the approach volume depends on each zone.
  • the reset time takes into account the delay introduced by the communication between the zone controller and the trip computer and between the trip computer and the detection equipment, as well as the time required for the detection equipment for perform the reset itself.
  • the distance from each side of the zone considered is important, for example 300 m upstream or downstream of this zone.
  • the zone controller issues a reset request to the detection equipment only if all zones of the approach volume associated with the zone are in a first "free" state.
  • the zone controller does not issue a reset request to the detection equipment, which remains in the " out of order ". As a result, the alarm does not disappear from the ATS system screen.
  • This reset method has the advantage of being intrinsically safe since it is the signaling system itself that checks the absence of train in and around the area. In other words, this method does not rely on the operator, unlike the previous one. On the other hand, it also presents a certain number of difficulties of implementation. For example, it is impossible to implement it during peak hours of use of the network, the trains being too close to each other, so that the approach volume associated with a zone is only very rarely free. . In this case, the only alternative is a so-called "local" reset of the detection system, that is to say via a human intervention directly on the electronic card of the detection equipment, which has a button of reset ("reset").
  • the document EP 1 388 480 A1 discloses a CBTC system with a fast reset.
  • the present invention aims to overcome the aforementioned problems.
  • the implementation architecture of the method 100 is in accordance with that of the prior art shown schematically in FIG. figure 1 . It differs in that the detection equipment 30 is able to keep up to date, not only an axle counter C, indicating the number of axles on the zone at the current time t, but also a counter of CV variation of the number of axles detected by the input and output sensors of the zone during a sliding time window.
  • the window extends over a predetermined duration D before the current instant t.
  • this CV counter has two states: the first indicates that an interaction with the input / output sensors of the zone has occurred during the duration D preceding the current instant t. The second state indicates instead that no interaction with the input / output sensors of the zone has occurred during the duration D preceding the current time t.
  • the counter of axles C does not take again the value null, one of the input or output sensors of the zone 14B not having detected the good number of axles .
  • the detection equipment 30 transmits a message M0 indicating that the second state E2 of the zone 14B is "busy" towards the switching computer 40.
  • step 120 following receipt of the message M0, the switching computer 40 transmits a message M1 relaying the information that the second state E2 of the zone 14B is "busy" to the zone controller 50.
  • step 130 performed at time t1, zone controller ZC 50 compares the first state E1 of zone 14B with the second state E2 of zone 14B.
  • the first state E1 of the zone 14B is that delivered at the current time t1 by the primary detection system. Train 16 indicates an instantaneous position at time t1 such that zone controller 50 can conclude that the first state E1 of zone 14B is "free".
  • the second state E2 of the zone 14B is that indicated by the secondary detection system in the message M1.
  • the zone controller 50 can conclude that the second state E2 of the zone 14B is "occupied",
  • the zone controller 50 identifying that the primary system is operational, in particular because the zone controller periodically receives instantaneous position information from the computers 26 onboard the trains, he deduces that the inconsistency is caused by an axle counter C which is wrong.
  • the zone controller 50 will first try to reset the detection equipment 30 (as explained after) before deciding whether to put it "out of service” if the reset fails.
  • the zone controller 50 then initiates, by itself, the reinitialization of the axle counter C.
  • the zone controller 50 is able to request a reset of the state counter C of the zone 14B. issuing a reset request RI to the switch computer 46.
  • step 150 following receipt of the request RI, the switching computer 40 issues a reset command CI relaying the information that the axle counter C of the zone 14B must be reset.
  • step 160 the detection equipment 30 receives the CI reset command.
  • step 170 the detection equipment 30 then starts the reset of the counter C.
  • the reset ends at the instant t3.
  • step 180 which starts at time t4 (offset by a predetermined duration after time t3), the detection equipment 30 checks the value of the CV variation counter.
  • the duration D of the window used for the CV counter is greater than or equal to the duration between the instants t1 and t3.
  • the CV variation counter is zero, it means that no train has entered the zone from the time t1 when the zone controller has required the reset.
  • the reset is thus validated by the detection equipment 30.
  • the zone is therefore in the free state at time t4, consistent with the current value the axle counter C reset.
  • the detection equipment 30 then emits a validation message M2 indicating that the reset has been successful and that the zone is in the second "free" state.
  • step 190 following receipt of the message M2, the switching computer 40 transmits a message M3 relaying the information that the second state of the zone 14B is "free" to the zone controller 50.
  • step 200 the zone controller 50 compares the first state E1 of the zone 14B with the second state E2 of the zone 14B. These two states are now coherent with each other.
  • the reset was successful. It is important to note that, from an operational point of view, the detection equipment has never gone into the "out of service” mode. In other words, the reset process was completely transparent to the operator and did not in any way disturb the nominal running of the system as a whole.
  • step 180 ( figure 5 ) the reset is not validated by the detection equipment 30 and the area therefore remains the "busy” state at the current time.
  • the detection equipment 30 then transmits a failed reset message M4 indicating that the reset has not been performed and that the zone 14B is still busy.
  • step 290 the latch computer 40 transmits to the zone controller 50 a message M5 indicating that the zone 14B is still busy.
  • step 300 the zone controller 50 finds that at least one reset attempt has already been made without success. At this time, he places the detection equipment 30 in the "out of service” mode and transmits, in step 310, an alarm message MA to the ATS system.
  • step 320 when the alarm message MA is received, the ATS system displays an alarm on one of the screens of the central control unit.
  • An operator validates the reset of the state counter of the detection equipment 30, by performing a validation gesture, such as pressing a button specific or, in the case of a touch screen, an area of the screen associated with the displayed alarm. This has the effect of the issuing, in step 330, of an authorization in initialization MAI by the supervision system to the zone controller 50.
  • This validation by an operator may involve different sources of information allowing the operator to ensure that the zone 14B is actually free.
  • the zone controller 50 receives the authorization MAI and, as soon as the primary detection system allows the zone controller 30 to conclude that the zone 14B is free, the various steps 140 to 180, then 190 and 200 are then reiterated.
  • the detection equipment 30 indicates that the second state E2 of the zone is "free", consistent with the first state E1 of this same zone. Noting this consistency, the zone controller 50 places the detection equipment 30 back into the "in service” mode (step 410) and transmits a message adapted to the ATS allowing it to stop the alarm displayed on the screen. operator screen (step 420).
  • the first three graphs represent: at time t1, the zone controller 50, knowing from the primary system that the zone 14B is free issues a request for reset; at time t2, the detection equipment 30 receives the corresponding reset command; and at time t3, the axle counter is reset to zero.
  • the detection equipment then emits a successful reset message M2, that is to say a validation message taking the unit value.
  • the zone will therefore return to the "free" state
  • the last two graphs of the figure 6 represent the case of the figure 5 . Since in the sliding window D, between t3-D and t3, the variation counter CV has taken the unit value, an axle of a train entering or leaving the zone 14B having been detected, the reset is not validated and the area remains occupied.
  • the detection equipment transmits a reset message M4 failed, that is to say a validation message taking the value zero. It should be noted that at this moment the detection equipment 30 resets the counter CV.
  • the detection equipment upon receipt of the reset command, the detection equipment is able to verify a first time the current value of the CV variation counter.
  • the detection equipment proceeds to the reset step 170 and, upon resetting, checks the value of the CV change counter a second time as described above with reference to FIG. step 180.
  • step 180 the detection equipment goes directly to step 180 and sends a reset message M4 failed.
  • the process has a number of advantages over the state of the art.
  • a train equipped with an on-board computer circulates on the network. It is stationary in front of a restrictive signal on an area belonging to the approach volume of the out-of-service area. This situation can not be addressed by the state of the art, since the train is in the approach volume of the out-of-service area. With the method described above, the zone is put back into service, since it is detected that no train has entered the zone between the transmission times of the request to reset and the end of the reset.
  • This reset method is simpler than the known methods and leads to the feedback of information to the ATS system only in case of failure of a configurable number (equal to one in the embodiment presented above). in detail) of reset attempts initiated by the zone controller.
  • the first attempts of reinitialization being carried out automatically, a reinitialization is carried out more quickly than by the implementation of the methods of the state of the technical.
  • the automatic character removes the operational procedures to be implemented for the resets according to the state of the art.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Biomedical Technology (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
  • Time Recorders, Dirve Recorders, Access Control (AREA)
  • Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
EP15158359.8A 2014-03-19 2015-03-10 Procédé de réinitialisation d'un équipement à la voie d'un système secondaire de détection Active EP2921369B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR1452293A FR3018759B1 (fr) 2014-03-19 2014-03-19 Procede de reinitialisation d'un equipement a la voie d'un systeme secondaire de detection

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2921369A1 EP2921369A1 (fr) 2015-09-23
EP2921369B1 true EP2921369B1 (fr) 2017-05-10

Family

ID=50976866

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP15158359.8A Active EP2921369B1 (fr) 2014-03-19 2015-03-10 Procédé de réinitialisation d'un équipement à la voie d'un système secondaire de détection

Country Status (8)

Country Link
EP (1) EP2921369B1 (pt)
CN (1) CN104925089B (pt)
BR (1) BR102015006010B1 (pt)
CA (1) CA2885395C (pt)
ES (1) ES2629757T3 (pt)
FR (1) FR3018759B1 (pt)
HK (1) HK1209705A1 (pt)
SG (1) SG10201501982WA (pt)

Families Citing this family (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR3066746B1 (fr) * 2017-05-24 2019-07-19 Alstom Transport Technologies Procede optimise de gestion de la circulation d'un train et systeme de signalisation cbtc associe
FR3075145B1 (fr) * 2017-12-20 2021-05-21 Alstom Transp Tech Procede de localisation d'au moins un vehicule ferroviaire dans un reseau ferroviaire
FR3075742B1 (fr) * 2017-12-22 2020-01-10 Alstom Transport Technologies Procede de reinitialisation d'un controleur de zone et systeme associe de controle automatique des trains
CN112491685A (zh) * 2020-12-31 2021-03-12 郑州铁路职业技术学院 一种高可靠性的地铁信号传输保护方法
CN114802359B (zh) * 2021-01-27 2023-03-24 株洲中车时代电气股份有限公司 一种机车自动对标停车方法、系统及装置
CN113954922B (zh) * 2021-10-15 2023-10-20 浙江众合科技股份有限公司 适用于全线无次级列车占用检测设备的列车出入段方法

Family Cites Families (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6694231B1 (en) * 2002-08-08 2004-02-17 Bombardier Transportation Gmbh Train registry overlay system
DE102004038205B4 (de) * 2004-08-05 2008-05-15 Deutsche Bahn Ag Verfahren und Anordnung zum Durchführen eines Fahrbetriebs von Schienenfahrzeugen
US8200380B2 (en) * 2009-05-19 2012-06-12 Siemens Industry, Inc. Method and apparatus for hybrid train control device
US8576114B2 (en) * 2011-06-24 2013-11-05 Thales Canada Inc. Location of a transponder center point

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CA2885395A1 (fr) 2015-09-19
FR3018759A1 (fr) 2015-09-25
SG10201501982WA (en) 2015-10-29
CA2885395C (fr) 2022-08-23
CN104925089B (zh) 2018-11-27
BR102015006010B1 (pt) 2022-06-07
ES2629757T3 (es) 2017-08-14
BR102015006010A2 (pt) 2017-05-23
FR3018759B1 (fr) 2016-04-29
CN104925089A (zh) 2015-09-23
HK1209705A1 (en) 2016-04-08
EP2921369A1 (fr) 2015-09-23

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP2921369B1 (fr) Procédé de réinitialisation d'un équipement à la voie d'un système secondaire de détection
US20220157160A1 (en) Systems and Methods for Intra-Vehicle Pedestrian and Infrastructure Communication
CA3002937A1 (fr) Systeme ameliore de controle automatique des trains et procede associe
WO2020090146A1 (ja) 車両用システム及び制御方法
EP2550191B1 (fr) Méthode et système de gestion d'évènements particuliers liés au déplacement d'un véhicule guidé
FR3075742A1 (fr) Procede de reinitialisation d'un controleur de zone et systeme associe de controle automatique des trains
EP3406503B1 (fr) Procédé optimisé de gestion de la circulation d'un train et système de signalisation cbtc associé
EP2923915A1 (fr) Équipement pour un système secondaire de détection à la voie et système de signalisation intégrant un tel équipement
EP2891590B1 (fr) Véhicule terrestre guidé comprenant un dispositif de gestion d'un déraillement du véhicule , et procédé de gestion du déraillement associé
WO2014095914A1 (fr) Procédé de contrôle à distance d'un système de contrôle de manoeuvre(s) d'un véhicule par un boîtier de commande
EP3225500B1 (fr) Installation de controle du trafic sur un reseau ferroviaire et encodeur radio associe
FR3048942A1 (fr) Procede de gestion automatique du fonctionnement d'une ligne en cas de panne du systeme de supervision
EP3216673B1 (fr) Ensemble ferroviaire comprenant un système d'enclenchement simplifié pour une section d'aiguillage
JP2013091409A (ja) 無線列車信号システム
CA2913997C (fr) Procede de discrimination de la presence d'un vehicule ferroviaire sur un canton, procede de calcul d'un intervalle de securite et dispositif associe
JP6006753B2 (ja) 踏切保安システム、中央装置及び踏切制御装置
WO2008131569A1 (fr) Dispositif de controle et de commande de la signalisation routiere et ferroviaire
EP2300301A1 (fr) Méthode et système de communication pour un contrôle sécurisé d'itinéraire
JP4664009B2 (ja) 線区集中電子連動装置
EP3536579A1 (fr) Procédé de contrôle de véhicules ferroviaires, dispositif et système associés
JP6412375B2 (ja) 電子連動装置及び情報伝送方法
JPWO2018163509A1 (ja) 信号保安システム、地上管理装置、車上無線装置、及び、列車制御方法
FR3064221A1 (fr) Dispositif de securite pour un vehicule ferroviaire, vehicule ferroviaire, procede de mise en securite d'un tel vehicule ferroviaire, et programme d'ordinateur associe
JP5373935B2 (ja) 送受信器及び車上装置
FR3058514B1 (fr) Procede d'evaluation d'un risque d'eblouissement d'un capteur d'image et unite electronique associee

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

AX Request for extension of the european patent

Extension state: BA ME

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: HK

Ref legal event code: DE

Ref document number: 1209705

Country of ref document: HK

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20160323

RBV Designated contracting states (corrected)

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

GRAJ Information related to disapproval of communication of intention to grant by the applicant or resumption of examination proceedings by the epo deleted

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSDIGR1

RIC1 Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant

Ipc: B61L 1/16 20060101ALI20160428BHEP

Ipc: B61L 27/00 20060101AFI20160428BHEP

GRAP Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1

INTG Intention to grant announced

Effective date: 20160606

RAP1 Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred)

Owner name: ALSTOM TRANSPORT TECHNOLOGIES

GRAS Grant fee paid

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3

GRAA (expected) grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: B1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: FG4D

Free format text: NOT ENGLISH

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: AT

Ref legal event code: REF

Ref document number: 891994

Country of ref document: AT

Kind code of ref document: T

Effective date: 20170515

Ref country code: CH

Ref legal event code: EP

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: IE

Ref legal event code: FG4D

Free format text: LANGUAGE OF EP DOCUMENT: FRENCH

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R096

Ref document number: 602015002581

Country of ref document: DE

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: NL

Ref legal event code: FP

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: SE

Ref legal event code: TRGR

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: ES

Ref legal event code: FG2A

Ref document number: 2629757

Country of ref document: ES

Kind code of ref document: T3

Effective date: 20170814

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: LT

Ref legal event code: MG4D

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: AT

Ref legal event code: MK05

Ref document number: 891994

Country of ref document: AT

Kind code of ref document: T

Effective date: 20170510

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: FI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

Ref country code: HR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

Ref country code: GR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170811

Ref country code: NO

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170810

Ref country code: LT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

Ref country code: AT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: BG

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170810

Ref country code: IS

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170910

Ref country code: PL

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

Ref country code: RS

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

Ref country code: LV

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: SK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

Ref country code: RO

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

Ref country code: CZ

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

Ref country code: DK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

Ref country code: EE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R097

Ref document number: 602015002581

Country of ref document: DE

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: HK

Ref legal event code: GR

Ref document number: 1209705

Country of ref document: HK

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: SM

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

PLBE No opposition filed within time limit

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: FR

Ref legal event code: PLFP

Year of fee payment: 4

26N No opposition filed

Effective date: 20180213

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: SI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: MT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: CH

Ref legal event code: PL

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: MC

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: BE

Ref legal event code: MM

Effective date: 20180331

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: IE

Ref legal event code: MM4A

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: LU

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20180310

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: IE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20180310

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: CH

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20180331

Ref country code: LI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20180331

Ref country code: BE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20180331

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: PT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: CY

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

Ref country code: HU

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT; INVALID AB INITIO

Effective date: 20150310

Ref country code: MK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20170510

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: AL

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20170510

P01 Opt-out of the competence of the unified patent court (upc) registered

Effective date: 20230823

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: NL

Payment date: 20240320

Year of fee payment: 10

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DE

Payment date: 20240320

Year of fee payment: 10

Ref country code: GB

Payment date: 20240320

Year of fee payment: 10

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: TR

Payment date: 20240301

Year of fee payment: 10

Ref country code: SE

Payment date: 20240320

Year of fee payment: 10

Ref country code: IT

Payment date: 20240329

Year of fee payment: 10

Ref country code: FR

Payment date: 20240328

Year of fee payment: 10

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: ES

Payment date: 20240426

Year of fee payment: 10