EP2804798B1 - Procédé de commande, de protection et/ou de surveillance de la circulation ferroviaire et système d'exploitation - Google Patents
Procédé de commande, de protection et/ou de surveillance de la circulation ferroviaire et système d'exploitation Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP2804798B1 EP2804798B1 EP12708513.2A EP12708513A EP2804798B1 EP 2804798 B1 EP2804798 B1 EP 2804798B1 EP 12708513 A EP12708513 A EP 12708513A EP 2804798 B1 EP2804798 B1 EP 2804798B1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- control system
- operation control
- operating mode
- signal box
- operational control
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 24
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 title claims description 7
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 16
- 230000000903 blocking effect Effects 0.000 description 5
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000018109 developmental process Effects 0.000 description 4
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000007257 malfunction Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011835 investigation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003137 locomotive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011179 visual inspection Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012800 visualization Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L19/00—Arrangements for interlocking between points and signals by means of a single interlocking device, e.g. central control
- B61L19/06—Interlocking devices having electrical operation
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/10—Operations, e.g. scheduling or time tables
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for controlling, securing and / or monitoring the rail-bound traffic, wherein a signal box is remotely controlled by an operational control system in a first operating mode.
- the present invention has for its object to provide a method of the type mentioned, by the safety of the rail-bound traffic can be further increased.
- This object is achieved by a method for controlling, securing and / or monitoring of the rail-bound traffic, being remotely controlled by an operational control system in a first mode of operation a signal box, a fault of the interlocking or a malfunction of the communication is determined between the operational control system and the signal box, the operational control system is switched to the detection of the fault in a second mode of operation and of the operational control System in the second mode of operation a limited interlocking functionality is provided.
- the invention is based on the finding that after a (partial) failure of the technical safety systems required operation in a fallback level in the area of rail-bound traffic is to a considerable extent more dangerous than the technically secured normal operation.
- a (partial) failure of the technical safety systems required operation in a fallback level in the area of rail-bound traffic is to a considerable extent more dangerous than the technically secured normal operation.
- the method according to the invention is characterized in that, starting from a first operating mode in which a signal box is remotely controlled by an operational control system, a malfunction of the interlocking system or a malfunction in the communication between the operational control system and the interlocking system is detected.
- a possible reaction to this would be to switch off the operational control system, since an operation and monitoring of the signal box by means of the operational control system in the present situation is no longer or not sufficiently possible.
- the operational control system in this situation is now switched to a second operating mode in which a limited interlocking functionality is provided by the operational control system itself.
- the recognition of the fault and the switching of the operational control technology takes place
- the switching to the second mode of operation can optionally be triggered by a corresponding operation, such as confirmation of the switch.
- the provision of the limited interlocking functionality can, for example, take place such that a non-safety-related interlocking logic, which is reduced to the requisite or appropriate demand required for the fallback level, runs on the operational control system.
- a corresponding interlocking functionality in the first operating mode, ie in the undisturbed state, provided by the interlocking in unrestricted form this is done in the second mode of operation, ie in a disturbed state, in a functionally limited form by the operational control system itself the operators of the operational control system still automated support in the context of controlling, securing and / or monitoring of the system, ie in particular the on-track rail vehicles is provided despite the present disorder.
- the operational control system in practice usually several interlockings for the purpose of remote control of the same will be connected by the operational control system, which may be the interlockings to interlockings of any type, in particular electronic interlockings act.
- a switchover of the operational control system from the first to the second operating mode is preferably possible for the respective interlocking in the case of several connected to the operational control system interlockings preferably.
- This means that the operational control system can be switched to the second operating mode with respect to a first, faulty interlocking, while it remains in the first operating mode relative to a second, undisturbed interlocking.
- the operational control system it is also possible in principle for the operational control system to serve the control or operation of only one interlocking. Particularly in this case, the situation is conceivable that the operational control system - deviating from the rule - is located in the immediate vicinity of the interlocking.
- the operational control system may additionally include an integrated train number system, an integrated automatic train control system and / or a dispatching center.
- the method according to the invention is configured such that the restricted interlocking functionality is provided by the operational control system in the second operating mode based on status information transmitted by the interlocking prior to the fault.
- This preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention makes use of the fact that the operational control system is generally aware of all essential status information of the interlocking until the occurrence of the respective fault, since it represents, for example, the states of the interlocking or the components of the outside installation on operator stations.
- the relevant state information can now be used in the second operating mode as a starting point for the limited interlocking functionality of the operational control system. This offers the advantage that, at least with regard to the initial state at the time of the disturbance, visualization and control, assurance and / or monitoring by the operational control system or at least with its support can take place.
- the method according to the invention can also take place in such a way that manual inputs, in particular in the form of blocking notifications or clearances, are recorded by the operational control system in the second operating mode on at least one track section.
- manual inputs in particular in the form of blocking notifications or clearances
- the operational control system in the second operating mode on at least one track section.
- This is advantageous since it allows an operator to enter state information obtained from the field into the operational control system, which can then check this information for potential conflicts and hazards.
- corresponding manual inputs can relate, for example, to blocking notices for track sections for which the operator has issued driving orders.
- the manual inputs can relate, for example, to releases or free messages for track sections, which have been issued by a driver in response to a corresponding feedback.
- status messages of rail vehicles are received by the operational control system in the second operating mode and / or driving orders are issued to rail vehicles.
- safe or non-secure assistance systems can be installed in the locomotives, which automatically inform the operational control system of information such as location and speed of the vehicle.
- These status messages can be used, for example, to make plausibility checks for the respective driver or also to issue driving orders for the rail vehicle concerned or for other rail vehicles. If corresponding assistance systems - for example in the form of ATP (Automatic Train Protection System) vehicle devices already exist, the status messages can be transmitted, for example, in the usual way from the respective ATP vehicle device to an ATP route device and from there to the operational control system ,
- ATP Automatic Train Protection System
- the method according to the invention can also be developed in such a way that a warning message is issued by the operational control system if a conflict situation is detected on the basis of the limited interlocking functionality.
- a conflict situation is detected on the basis of the limited interlocking functionality.
- conflicting driving tasks which could lead to hazards or accidents, are recognized on the basis of the limited interlocking functionality on the part of the operational control system and signaled by issuing the warning message.
- the warning message can be output on the one hand directly to the operating personnel of the operational control system, this can be done in any form, ie, for example, acoustically or visually.
- the warning message is transmitted to a rail vehicle and output in the driver's cab.
- the invention further relates to an operational control system, which is designed in a first operating mode for remote control of a signal box.
- the present invention has for its object to provide a Radio Service Set (RESU) system by which the safety of the rail-bound traffic is further increased.
- a istsleittechnisches system which is designed in a first mode of operation for remote control of a signal box, wherein the operational control system on the detection of a fault in the interlocking or a fault in the communication between the operational control system and the interlocking towards a second mode of operation is switchable and the operational control system in the second mode of operation provides a limited interlocking functionality.
- the operational control system according to the invention is designed to provide the limited interlocking functionality in the second operating mode based on status information transmitted by the interlocking before the fault.
- the operational control system according to the invention can also be designed such that it is designed to detect in the second operating mode on at least one track section related manual inputs, in particular in the form of blocking notices or clearances.
- the operational control system is designed to receive status messages from rail vehicles in the second operating mode and / or to issue driving orders to rail vehicles.
- the operational control system according to the invention can also be embodied in such a way that it is designed to output a warning message if a conflict situation is detected on the basis of the limited interlocking functionality.
- a signal box 10 and a Radioactive System 20 are shown in schematic form.
- an operating device 30 is also shown separately, which, however, could itself also be added to the operational control system 20.
- the interlocking 10 which may be, for example, an electronic interlocking, connected via a communication link 40 to the operational control system 20.
- the operating device 30 is connected via a communication link 50 to the operational control system 20.
- the communication links 40 and 50 will typically be redundant and highly available.
- the interlocking 10 is remotely controlled by the plant control system 20 in a first mode of operation, such as by appropriate inputs on the operator 30.
- a first mode of operation such as by appropriate inputs on the operator 30.
- the relevant status information is transmitted from the interlocking 10 via the communication link 40 to the operational control system 20.
- an operator who may be, for example, a dispatcher, now has the option of operating or controlling the interlocking 10 by means of the operating device 30 or the operational control system 20.
- the plant control system 20 may provide additional automatic functions, such as an integrated train numbering system, integrated automatic train routing or disposition functions.
- additional automatic functions such as an integrated train numbering system, integrated automatic train routing or disposition functions.
- the operational control system 20 - or in the representation of the figure, the entirety of the operational control system 20 and the operating device 30 - can thus be designed as a remote control center, as an operating control center and / or as a dispatching center.
- the operational control system 20 is switched over to the detection of the disturbance 60 in a second operating mode, which thus realizes a fallback level.
- the operational control system 20 provides limited interlocking functionality. This means that instead of in the event of failure or partial failure of the interlocking 10 or the communication link 40, the operational control system 20 substantially shut down, provided by the operational control system 20 advantageously, for example, a non-safety, reduced to the necessary needs of the fallback level interlocking logic is provided or executed ,
- the operational control system 20 preferably takes into account such status information which has been transmitted by interlocking 10 prior to the fault. Due to the fact that the operational control system 20 represents the states of the interlocking 10 or the components of the outdoor unit, for example on the operating device 30, he is in principle at least the essential state information of the interlocking 10 known. Based on this state information can be done by means of the limited interlocking functionality providing at least some basic functionality of a signal box to allow at least partially automated operation even in a disturbed state.
- manual inputs can be detected by the operational control system 20, for example by a corresponding input on the operating device 30, on at least one track section.
- This will cause an operator, i. an operator, which is identified in the figure by the reference numeral 70, it is possible, for example, to enter such status information into the operational control system 20, which he by means of a communication device 80, such as a telephone, via a further communication link 90 from a trackside communication device 100 and a person using the trackside communication device 100 has received 110 people in the field of outdoor facilities.
- a communication device 80 such as a telephone
- state information such as in the form of the location and the speed of the rail vehicle 130
- the corresponding transmission can take place, for example, by means of a radio antenna 140 of the rail vehicle 130.
- Such, preferably automated transmission of state information from the outdoor installation to the operational control system 20 thus advantageously also enables at least partially automated operation in the second operating mode.
- the operator 70 Based on the available information, it is possible for the operator 70 to enter blocking notices relating to at least one track section into the operational control system 20 by means of the operating device 30.
- the blocking notices refer to those track sections for which the operator has issued 70 travel orders.
- a corresponding release for at least one corresponding track section by the operational control system 20 can be detected.
- the limited interlocking functionality of the operational control system 20 makes it possible to detect dangerous situations, such as in the form of conflicting driving jobs, and if necessary issue a warning message to the operating personnel.
- the method according to the invention and the operational control system according to the invention or the embodiments described above offer the advantage in particular that a substantially seamless support of the operating personnel is made possible in the fallback level realized by the second operating mode, such state information preferably being used or utilized which have been transmitted at an earlier date by the respective interlocking.
- a substantially seamless support of the operating personnel is made possible in the fallback level realized by the second operating mode, such state information preferably being used or utilized which have been transmitted at an earlier date by the respective interlocking.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
- Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
- Control Of Position, Course, Altitude, Or Attitude Of Moving Bodies (AREA)
- Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
Claims (10)
- Procédé de commande, de sécurisation et/ou de contrôle de la circulation ferroviaire, dans lequel- par un système (20) de la technique de commandement, on télécommande un poste (10) d'aiguillage dans un premier mode de fonctionnement,caractérisé en ce que- on constate une perturbation du poste (10) d'aiguillage ou une perturbation du système de communication entre le système (20) de la technique de commandement et le poste (10) d'aiguillage,- on fait passer le système (20) de la technique de commandement sur constatation de la panne dans un deuxième mode de fonctionnement et- on met à disposition une fonctionnalité restreinte du poste d'aiguillage dans le deuxième mode de fonctionnement par le système (20) de la technique de commandement.
- Procédé suivant la revendication 1,
caractérisé en ce que
l'on met à disposition la fonctionnalité restreinte du poste d'aiguillage par le système (20) de la technique de commandement dans le deuxième mode de fonctionnement en se fondant sur les informations d'état transmises par le poste (10) d'aiguillage avant la perturbation. - Procédé suivant la revendication 1 ou 2,
caractérisé en ce que
l'on détecte par le système (20) de la technique de commandement dans le deuxième mode de fonctionnement des entrées manuelles se rapportant à au moins un tronçon de voie, notamment sous la forme d'enregistrements de blocage ou de libération. - Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes,
caractérisé en ce qu'
il est reçu par le système (20) de la technique de commandement dans le deuxième mode de fonctionnement des messages d'état de véhicules (130) ferroviaires et/ou il est envoyé des ordres de circulation aux véhicules (130) ferroviaires. - Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes,
caractérisé en ce qu'
il est émis par le système (20) de la technique du commandement un message d'avertissement dans la mesure où une situation de conflit est détectée à l'aide de la fonctionnalité restreinte du poste d'aiguillage. - Système (20) de la technique de commandement, qui est constitué dans un premier mode de fonctionnement pour la télécommande d'un poste (10) d'aiguillage,
caractérisé en ce que- le système (20) de la technique de commandement peut, sur la constatation d'une perturbation du poste (10) d'aiguillage ou d'une perturbation de la communication entre le système (20) de la technique de commandement et le poste (10) d'aiguillage, passer dans un deuxième mode de fonctionnement et- le système (20) de la technique de commandement met à disposition dans le deuxième mode de fonctionnement une fonctionnalité restreinte du poste d'aiguillage. - Système de la technique de commandement suivant la revendication 6,
caractérisé en ce que
le système (20) de la technique de commandement est constitué pour mettre à disposition la fonctionnalité restreinte du poste d'aiguillage dans le deuxième mode de fonctionnement sur la base d'informations d'état transmises par le poste (10) d'aiguillage avant la perturbation. - Système de la technique de commandement suivant la revendication 6 ou 7,
caractérisé en ce que
le système (20) de la technique du commandement est constitué pour détecter dans le deuxième mode de fonctionnement des entrées manuelles se rapportant à au moins un tronçon de voie, notamment sous la forme d'enregistrements de blocage ou de libérations. - Système de la technique de commandement suivant l'une des revendications 6 à 8,
caractérisé en ce que
le système (20) de la technique de commandement est constitué pour recevoir dans le deuxième mode de fonctionnement des messages d'état de véhicules (130) ferroviaires et/ou envoyer des ordres de circulation aux véhicules (130) ferroviaires. - Système de la technique de commandement suivant l'une des revendications 6 à 9,
caractérisé en ce que
le système (20) de la technique du commande est constitué pour émettre un message d'avertissement dans la mesure où une situation de conflit est détectée à l'aide de la fonctionnalité restreinte du poste d'aiguillage.
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2012/053069 WO2013123989A1 (fr) | 2012-02-23 | 2012-02-23 | Procédé de commande, de protection et/ou de surveillance de la circulation ferroviaire et système d'exploitation |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2804798A1 EP2804798A1 (fr) | 2014-11-26 |
EP2804798B1 true EP2804798B1 (fr) | 2016-04-13 |
Family
ID=45819190
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP12708513.2A Active EP2804798B1 (fr) | 2012-02-23 | 2012-02-23 | Procédé de commande, de protection et/ou de surveillance de la circulation ferroviaire et système d'exploitation |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP2804798B1 (fr) |
CN (1) | CN104203714B (fr) |
DK (1) | DK2804798T3 (fr) |
ES (1) | ES2573777T3 (fr) |
RU (1) | RU2603708C2 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2013123989A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102014214918A1 (de) * | 2014-07-30 | 2016-02-04 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Betreiben einer Eisenbahnsicherungsanlage |
CN111497905B (zh) * | 2020-04-27 | 2022-06-24 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | 一种基于软件定义的轨道交通信号系统及其实现方法 |
Family Cites Families (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN1161670A (zh) * | 1994-09-23 | 1997-10-08 | 黑那·埃维·佩得森 | 一种交通管制系统、它的应用和控制移动单元移动的方法 |
TW279960B (fr) * | 1994-09-23 | 1996-07-01 | Traffic Object Supervision Systems | |
CN101167050A (zh) * | 2005-04-21 | 2008-04-23 | 阿尔斯通铁路公开有限公司 | 用于铁路信号网络的控制系统 |
CN201415689Y (zh) * | 2009-06-30 | 2010-03-03 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | 一种主备控制中心的热备体系结构 |
RU2422316C1 (ru) * | 2009-12-23 | 2011-06-27 | Открытое акционерное общество "Научно-исследовательский и проектно-конструкторский институт информатизации, автоматизации и связи на железнодорожном транспорте" (ОАО "НИИАС") | Система для управления движением поездов |
CN101791989A (zh) * | 2010-03-31 | 2010-08-04 | 上海磁浮交通发展有限公司 | 一种自律分散轨道交通信息网络架构系统 |
RU108393U1 (ru) * | 2011-03-02 | 2011-09-20 | Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" | Станционное устройство системы маневровой автоматической локомотивной сигнализации, интегрированной с микропроцессорной централизацией железнодорожной станции |
-
2012
- 2012-02-23 DK DK12708513.2T patent/DK2804798T3/en active
- 2012-02-23 RU RU2014138244/11A patent/RU2603708C2/ru not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2012-02-23 CN CN201280071723.XA patent/CN104203714B/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2012-02-23 WO PCT/EP2012/053069 patent/WO2013123989A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2012-02-23 ES ES12708513.2T patent/ES2573777T3/es active Active
- 2012-02-23 EP EP12708513.2A patent/EP2804798B1/fr active Active
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP2804798A1 (fr) | 2014-11-26 |
DK2804798T3 (en) | 2016-07-25 |
CN104203714B (zh) | 2016-06-01 |
ES2573777T3 (es) | 2016-06-10 |
RU2603708C2 (ru) | 2016-11-27 |
CN104203714A (zh) | 2014-12-10 |
WO2013123989A1 (fr) | 2013-08-29 |
RU2014138244A (ru) | 2016-04-10 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
EP3405377B1 (fr) | Dispositif de conduite automatique d'un véhicule ferroviaire, véhicule ferroviaire et procédé de conduite automatique d'un véhicule ferroviaire | |
AT501893B1 (de) | Verfahren und vorrichtung zum ausser-betrieb-nehmen defekter türen | |
EP2539200B1 (fr) | Réseau de communication pour véhicule ferroviaire | |
EP2874857B1 (fr) | Fonctionnement d'un véhicule ferroviaire au moyen d'un dispositif etcs, véhicule ferroviaire et dispositif | |
EP3036146B1 (fr) | Fonctionnement d'un véhicule ferroviaire | |
DE102019204135A1 (de) | Verfahren zum gemischten Betrieb eines gleisgebundenen Streckenabschnitts mit Weiche sowie Streckenabschnitt und Weiche | |
DE102012202046A1 (de) | System zur Steuerung, Sicherung und/oder Überwachung von Fahrwegen spurgebundener Fahrzeuge sowie Verfahren zum Betreiben eines solchen Systems | |
EP3075625B1 (fr) | Procede et systeme destine a la securisation dynamique de voie dans un embranchement ferroviaire multi-voies | |
EP2804798B1 (fr) | Procédé de commande, de protection et/ou de surveillance de la circulation ferroviaire et système d'exploitation | |
EP2819907B1 (fr) | Procédé de commande auxiliare d'un élément de voie et système de commande d'exploitation | |
EP2090492B1 (fr) | Procédé de réalisation d'une technique de sécurisation de voies universelle à l'aide de composants SPS disponibles de manière industrielle | |
EP3400161B1 (fr) | Installation technique ferroviaire et procédé de fonctionnement d'une installation technique ferroviaire | |
EP2088051B1 (fr) | Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail | |
EP2978654B1 (fr) | Procédé pour remplacer un premier poste d'aiguillage par un deuxième poste d'aiguillage | |
EP3092162B1 (fr) | Procédé de commande d'un véhicule ferroviaire relié à un système cbtc et système cbtc comportant au moins un véhicule ferroviaire | |
DE102004057907A1 (de) | Verfahren bei der Einbindung von Rangiervorgängen bei der Zugsteuerung und Zugsicherung mittels bidirektionaler Funk-Informationsübertragung | |
DE10240376B4 (de) | Sicheres Zugmeldebuch | |
EP3612429B1 (fr) | Procédé d'exploitation d'une installation de voie et contrôleur au sol pour une telle installation de voie | |
EP3580114B1 (fr) | Procédé et dispositif pour la commande d'au moins un itinéraire d'une installation ferroviaire | |
EP3943363B1 (fr) | Système de commande ferroviaire à blocage de commande | |
WO2017045863A1 (fr) | Dispositif de communication et procédé d'échange automatisé d'informations dans une installation technique ferroviaire | |
DE102009055676A1 (de) | Schaltung zur Ansteuerung und Überwachung einer Mehrlagenweiche | |
DE102005049217A1 (de) | Verfahren und Einrichtung zur Fernsteuerung eines Relais-Stellwerks unter Verwendung von hochverfügbaren Steuerungen | |
DE10239543A1 (de) | Unterstützung des Fahrdienstleiters bei Hilfshandlungen | |
EP3333041A1 (fr) | Procédé de fonctionnement d'un système d'affichage et procédé de fonctionnement d'un système de sécurité critique |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20140814 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR |
|
DAX | Request for extension of the european patent (deleted) | ||
GRAP | Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1 |
|
INTG | Intention to grant announced |
Effective date: 20151023 |
|
GRAS | Grant fee paid |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3 |
|
GRAA | (expected) grant |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: B1 Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: GB Ref legal event code: FG4D Free format text: NOT ENGLISH |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: AT Ref legal event code: REF Ref document number: 789772 Country of ref document: AT Kind code of ref document: T Effective date: 20160415 Ref country code: CH Ref legal event code: EP Ref country code: CH Ref legal event code: NV Representative=s name: SIEMENS SCHWEIZ AG, CH |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: IE Ref legal event code: FG4D Free format text: LANGUAGE OF EP DOCUMENT: GERMAN |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R096 Ref document number: 502012006707 Country of ref document: DE |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: ES Ref legal event code: FG2A Ref document number: 2573777 Country of ref document: ES Kind code of ref document: T3 Effective date: 20160610 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DK Ref legal event code: T3 Effective date: 20160718 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: LT Ref legal event code: MG4D Ref country code: NL Ref legal event code: FP |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: NO Ref legal event code: T2 Effective date: 20160413 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: PL Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 Ref country code: FI Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 Ref country code: LT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: LV Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 Ref country code: PT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160816 Ref country code: GR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160714 Ref country code: RS Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 Ref country code: HR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 Ref country code: SE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: IT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R097 Ref document number: 502012006707 Country of ref document: DE |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: SK Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 Ref country code: RO Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 Ref country code: EE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 Ref country code: CZ Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
PLBE | No opposition filed within time limit |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: SM Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
26N | No opposition filed |
Effective date: 20170116 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: SI Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: MC Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: CH Ref legal event code: PCOW Free format text: NEW ADDRESS: WERNER-VON-SIEMENS-STRASSE 1, 80333 MUENCHEN (DE) |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: IE Ref legal event code: MM4A |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: FR Ref legal event code: ST Effective date: 20171031 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: LU Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20170223 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: FR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20170228 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: IE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20170223 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: BE Payment date: 20180216 Year of fee payment: 7 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: CH Payment date: 20180516 Year of fee payment: 7 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: MT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: AL Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R081 Ref document number: 502012006707 Country of ref document: DE Owner name: SIEMENS MOBILITY GMBH, DE Free format text: FORMER OWNER: SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, 80333 MUENCHEN, DE |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: GB Ref legal event code: 732E Free format text: REGISTERED BETWEEN 20190207 AND 20190213 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: AT Ref legal event code: PC Ref document number: 789772 Country of ref document: AT Kind code of ref document: T Owner name: SIEMENS MOBILITY GMBH, DE Effective date: 20190506 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: HU Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT; INVALID AB INITIO Effective date: 20120223 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: BG Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: NO Ref legal event code: CHAD Owner name: SIEMENS MOBILITY GMBH, DE |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: NL Ref legal event code: PD Owner name: SIEMENS MOBILITY GMBH; DE Free format text: DETAILS ASSIGNMENT: CHANGE OF OWNER(S), ASSIGNMENT; FORMER OWNER NAME: SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT Effective date: 20190829 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: CH Ref legal event code: PL |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: CY Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: BE Ref legal event code: MM Effective date: 20190228 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: MK Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: CH Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20190228 Ref country code: LI Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20190228 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: BE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20190228 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: TR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160413 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: IS Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20160813 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: ES Ref legal event code: PC2A Owner name: SIEMENS MOBILITY GMBH Effective date: 20200805 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: DK Payment date: 20210219 Year of fee payment: 10 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DK Ref legal event code: EBP Effective date: 20220228 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: DK Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20220228 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: NL Payment date: 20240205 Year of fee payment: 13 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: AT Payment date: 20240109 Year of fee payment: 13 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: GB Payment date: 20240304 Year of fee payment: 13 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: NO Payment date: 20240207 Year of fee payment: 13 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: DE Payment date: 20240418 Year of fee payment: 13 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: ES Payment date: 20240521 Year of fee payment: 13 |