EP2321806A1 - Method and device for deflecting eavesdropping attempts in image data transfer at a self-service terminal - Google Patents
Method and device for deflecting eavesdropping attempts in image data transfer at a self-service terminalInfo
- Publication number
- EP2321806A1 EP2321806A1 EP09782032A EP09782032A EP2321806A1 EP 2321806 A1 EP2321806 A1 EP 2321806A1 EP 09782032 A EP09782032 A EP 09782032A EP 09782032 A EP09782032 A EP 09782032A EP 2321806 A1 EP2321806 A1 EP 2321806A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- image data
- self
- atm
- service terminal
- camera
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 32
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 31
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 11
- 230000036961 partial effect Effects 0.000 claims description 9
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000008676 import Effects 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 claims 1
- 230000004913 activation Effects 0.000 abstract 1
- 230000007123 defense Effects 0.000 description 7
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 5
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000000873 masking effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000003780 insertion Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000037431 insertion Effects 0.000 description 2
- 241000220450 Cajanus cajan Species 0.000 description 1
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002401 inhibitory effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010079 rubber tapping Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001629 suppression Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000036962 time dependent Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000007 visual effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
- G07F19/207—Surveillance aspects at ATMs
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for the defense against eavesdropping in the transmission of image data, the
- Image signals are obtained from one to one
- the invention also relates to a device carrying out the method as well as a self-service device equipped therewith according to the preamble of one of the independent claims.
- the invention relates to a method and a device for preventing eavesdropping during image data transmission on a self-service terminal designed as an ATM, wherein a camera detects a reception area covering an operating area of the self-service menu or ATM to be monitored.
- At least one camera is installed at the respective self-service terminal. This at least one camera then continuously supplies image signals, from which digital image data are usually obtained, since e are transmitted to an image data memory and remote computer or server in order to be evaluated there.
- terminals m in the form of ATMs are the subject of such camera surveillance.
- a typical ATM manipulation is the attachment of so-called skimmmg devices.
- replicas of keyboards and / or card readers are mounted in the operating area of the ATM in order to access sensitive data, in particular card data and PINs.
- attack scenarios in the form of eavesdropping or Abhor bathen have accumulated, in which the perpetrators want to gain access to the image signals generated by the camera or the image data obtained therefrom by transmitting these image signals or image data to the appropriate If such an eavesdropping attack succeeds, the offender can draw conclusions about the PIN entered by a customer from the screened image information and, if necessary, also read the map data into the card slot when the card is imported the offender can get to the sensitive data without the use of special skimming devices.
- the object of the invention is therefore to propose a method and a device for effective defense against eavesdropping in the image data transmission to a
- a method, a Device and a service term equipped therewith are proposed, which secure the image data transmission against such Lauschrersuche and protect.
- events occurring on the self-service timer in particular in the camera's recording area, but also outside thereof, be detected, and that, depending on at least one detected event, the generation of the image signals on the camera and / or the subsequent transmission of the image signals or the image data obtained is controlled.
- an event is detected which represents, for example, the operation of the keyboard and / or the insertion of a card into the card slot in order to then control the generation or transmission of the image signals and / or image data.
- the image generation or transmission is changed when such an event is detected which corresponds to a sensitive operation of the self-service feature. Therefore, even with a successful tapping of lines and transmission lines, it can be prevented that corresponding sensitive image signals or image data are ever generated or transmitted.
- an apparatus carrying out the method which recognizes events occurring in the recording area of the camera by means of evaluation of the image signals, the image data and / or of sensor signals, and controls the generation and / or transmission of the image signals or image data as a function thereof.
- a self-service terminal equipped with such a device is proposed, which may be designed in particular as an ATM.
- eavesdropping attempts are averted by completely inhibiting the generation of the image signals if at least one event is detected.
- the transmission of the image data obtained from the generated image signals is inhibited if at least one event is detected.
- the interruption of the generation or transmission of image signals / date is timed at least as long as the sensitive event is detected.
- at least partial image data is hidden in the acquired image data or replaced by artificially generated data if at least one event is detected.
- these are preferably those partial image data which relate to at least one partial area of the recording area, in particular relate to a first and second partial area which covers a keyboard or a card slot in the operating area of the self-service terminal.
- the events which are detected in particular in the operating area within the camera recording area or also outside thereof are, for example, operation of a keyboard or insertion of a card.
- the events in the camera Recording area can be detected by evaluating the image signals and / or the image data. This can be done in the inventive device.
- the events can be detected by evaluating at least one sensor signal which is generated by a sensor for monitoring a control element in the operating area of the self-service terminal, also outside the camera receiving area.
- events such as. For example, imports of a map are derived from the current state of the self-service ticket, in particular by querying or reading process states or state machines (state machines) or the like. Corresponding signals can then be sent to the device according to the invention.
- Fig. 1 shows schematically the operating area of a
- Fig. 2 shows in the form of a block diagram components of the device for the defense against eavesdropping in the image data transmission
- FIG. 3 shows the flow diagram of a method according to the invention for the defense against eavesdropping during image data transmission.
- FIG. 1 shows the operating area of a self-service menu, which here is designed as ATM ATM, the operating area having, among other things, the following operating elements: a keyboard KBD for entering numbers, in particular PIN numbers, several function keys BTN, in particular for confirming keyboard entries made, a screen MON for displaying operating information and a card slot SLT for importing cards, especially bank cards.
- the operating area has other fields, such as signs and labels LBL on.
- the operating area is monitored by at least one camera CAM arranged on the operating area, the camera CRM having a receiving area AO covering the entire operating area.
- FIG. 2 shows in the form of a block diagram the structure of a device according to the invention, which is designed in particular as a detection unit DET and is connected at least to an image processing unit PRC, which receives image signals Sa generated by the camera CAM and processes them.
- the image processing unit PRC generates the image signals Sa corresponding digital image data Sb and transmits them, for example, to a memory device MEM.
- This storage device may be located in a server remote from the self-service terminal.
- a first connection Ca is, for example, an analogue connection in the form of a coaxial cable which transmits corresponding image signals m of video signals from the camera to the image processing unit.
- the camera CAM and the image processing unit PRC are preferably integrated in a module MD so that third parties do not have direct access to the connection Ca in order to perform interrogation attempts there.
- connection Cb Between thessengnacsemheit PRC and the external memory MEM is a second connection Cb, via which the generated digital image data Sb or erfmdungsgelix in case of a sensitive event changed digital image data Sb 'are transmitted.
- This connection Cb thus represents a secure digital data transmission connection, e.g. via data or communication networks, e.g. IP connections, to remote computers (servers) can reach.
- the transmitted image data Sb or Sb 'are then buffered at the receiving end in the local memory MEM and then supplied to a data display and / or evaluation in order to evaluate the images captured by the camera.
- this second connection Cb offers a potential point of attack for eavesdropping attacks by third parties trying to tap this connection.
- erfmdungsgehunt now at least the transmission of the digital Image data Sb or Sb 'controlled so that no image data is transmitted, the sensitive processes or events, such as keyboard input or imports of a bank card could play.
- the control takes place according to the inventive method, which is described in more detail below with reference to FIG. 3.
- FIG. 3 shows the flow chart for a method 100 with the steps 110 to 130.
- the camera performs CAM image recordings and generates corresponding image signals Sb (see also FIGS. 1 and 2). From these analog image signals, digital image data Sb are generated in the image processing unit PRC.
- a step 120 by evaluating the generated image data, it is determined whether an event has occurred that could affect the operation of sensitive areas in the operating area. For example, it is recognized on the basis of the evaluation of the image data Sb that a person operates the keyboard KBD in the operating area of the ATM ATM. In addition, it can also be recognized whether a person introduces a bank card into the card slot SLT. If this is the case, the generation of a trigger signal TR (see FIG. 2) follows in a step 121 which controls the generation or transmission of the image data in such a way that at least partial image data which comprises the said sensitive image regions is hidden or replaced Al or A2 concern.
- a subsequent step 122 the image data Sb 'are then transmitted, the sensitive image data having been replaced by artificially generated data (dummy data).
- the transmission of the modified image data Sb 'then takes place via the second connection Cb. If, however, it was determined in step 120 that there is no event, a transmission of the image data Sb, ie the unchanged image data, takes place in accordance with step 130. This measure ensures that secure monitoring of the self-service terminal or cash dispenser ATM can still be carried out, but that in the case of events that are sensitive, corresponding image dales are not generated or not transmitted.
- the device DET in the event that a sensitive event is detected, can also generate a trigger TR * which directly drives the camera CAM to completely prevent the generation of the image signal Sa. In this case, the complete image acquisition is suppressed.
- the recognition of events can not only take place by evaluating the image signals Sa or the image data Sb obtained therefrom, but alternatively or additionally, they can also take place on the basis of sensor signals.
- the device DET is connected to sensors connected to the sensitive controls, e.g. the keyboard KBD and / or the card slot SLT are mounted.
- the sensor can also be the respective key of the keyboard itself or a detector at the entrance of the card slot SLT.
- the first connection Ca can be embodied, for example, as a coaxial cable for analogue image signals or, for example, as a USB cable for digitized image signals or image data.
- the image processing takes place in de Image processing unit PRC, which may be implemented, for example, as dedicated electronics or as a software program running on a personal computer.
- the processed image or the acquired image data is then forwarded via the second connection Cb to the memory MEM or to a remote computer, in particular a server, which further evaluates or displays the image data.
- the server resides in a surveillance center that simultaneously monitors multiple self-service terminals.
- the transmitted image signals Sa or image data Sb can additionally be encrypted in order to be even more secure against eavesdropping attempts by third parties.
- the camera CAM and the image processing unit PRC preferably form a structural unit in the form of a module MD. As described above, those areas of the image are hidden and / or made visible in the image processing, from which conclusions can be drawn on the PIN delivery or on card data. The modification of the image data takes place, for example, by setting all pixels in the said subregions to the same color and / or brightness value.
- the control of the generation of the image signals or transmission of the image data is time-dependent in that the described masking of image data is performed only at such times when an event is detected. This ensures that no sensitive or critical processes, such as inputs of PIN numbers or imports of cards, are recorded and / or transmitted.
- the determination of the hidden or modified Image data areas can also be developed in such a way that only dedicated subareas, such as text characters and numbers, are hidden or overwritten on bank cards.
- the defense against eavesdropping tests can also be carried out in such a way that the image recording is completely interrupted by means of a trigger. This happens, for example, as soon as a hand or a finger is located above the keyboard KBD and thus can be closed to the process of entering a PIN.
- a self-service terminal in addition to sensors additional information is used, which is usually present in a self-service terminal. This is, for example, the current status regarding the state of the self-service feature. For example, when the PIN is issued, the hand only needs to be masked in the image when a PIN number is actually entered. On the other hand, no masking is required if the hand only performs a menu control. Also, no masking is required as long as a magnetic or chip card is in the system.
- the proposed invention effectively prevents any eavesdropping on the transmission of camera signals or image data to a self-service terminal. LIST OF REFERENCE NUMBERS
- ATM self-service terminal here designed as an ATM
- DET device comprising a detection unit for
- MEM external storage device e.g., a server
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102008039689A DE102008039689A1 (en) | 2008-08-26 | 2008-08-26 | A method and apparatus for preventing eavesdropping during image data transmission at a self-service terminal |
PCT/EP2009/060774 WO2010023153A1 (en) | 2008-08-26 | 2009-08-20 | Method and device for deflecting eavesdropping attempts in image data transfer at a self-service terminal |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2321806A1 true EP2321806A1 (en) | 2011-05-18 |
EP2321806B1 EP2321806B1 (en) | 2015-10-28 |
Family
ID=41264181
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP09782032.8A Active EP2321806B1 (en) | 2008-08-26 | 2009-08-20 | Method and device for deflecting eavesdropping attempts in image data transfer at a self-service terminal |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20110134246A1 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2321806B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN102132328B (en) |
DE (1) | DE102008039689A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2010023153A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102010036350A1 (en) * | 2010-07-12 | 2014-01-16 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Device for video surveillance of a self-service terminal |
DE102010060624A1 (en) | 2010-11-17 | 2012-05-24 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Method and device for the prevention of manipulation attempts on a camera system |
EP2897112B1 (en) | 2014-01-17 | 2019-03-06 | Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH | Method and apparatus for the prevention of false alarms in monitoring systems |
US11215785B2 (en) | 2017-07-13 | 2022-01-04 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Selective defocus of cameras |
Family Cites Families (12)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6731778B1 (en) * | 1999-03-31 | 2004-05-04 | Oki Electric Industry Co, Ltd. | Photographing apparatus and monitoring system using same |
US6509926B1 (en) * | 2000-02-17 | 2003-01-21 | Sensormatic Electronics Corporation | Surveillance apparatus for camera surveillance system |
DE10037175A1 (en) * | 2000-07-31 | 2002-02-21 | Orga Kartensysteme Gmbh | transaction confirmation |
JP4187935B2 (en) * | 2000-08-23 | 2008-11-26 | 株式会社東芝 | RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM, TRANSMITTING DEVICE, RECEIVING DEVICE, AND CONTENT DATA TRANSFER METHOD |
WO2003021545A1 (en) * | 2001-08-30 | 2003-03-13 | Fujitsu Limited | Automatic money transacting apparatus, and paper currency unit having built-in camera |
US20040223054A1 (en) * | 2003-05-06 | 2004-11-11 | Rotholtz Ben Aaron | Multi-purpose video surveillance |
DE10326657B4 (en) * | 2003-06-11 | 2006-03-09 | Vin - Videotronic Infosystems Gmbh | Method for operating a camera system |
JP2005010826A (en) * | 2003-06-16 | 2005-01-13 | Fujitsu Ltd | Authentication terminal device, biometrics information authentication system and biometrics information acquisition system |
DE20318489U1 (en) * | 2003-11-26 | 2004-02-19 | Conect Kommunikations Systeme Gmbh | Monitoring system for use with cashpoint machines has pair of digital image capture units to observe user |
JP4433985B2 (en) * | 2004-11-09 | 2010-03-17 | 日本ビクター株式会社 | Surveillance image processing device |
JP4961158B2 (en) * | 2006-04-12 | 2012-06-27 | 日立オムロンターミナルソリューションズ株式会社 | Automatic transaction device and suspicious object detection system |
DE102006049518A1 (en) * | 2006-10-20 | 2008-04-24 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Self-service device with monitoring device |
-
2008
- 2008-08-26 DE DE102008039689A patent/DE102008039689A1/en not_active Ceased
-
2009
- 2009-08-20 EP EP09782032.8A patent/EP2321806B1/en active Active
- 2009-08-20 US US13/058,607 patent/US20110134246A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2009-08-20 CN CN200980133319.9A patent/CN102132328B/en active Active
- 2009-08-20 WO PCT/EP2009/060774 patent/WO2010023153A1/en active Application Filing
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of WO2010023153A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN102132328A (en) | 2011-07-20 |
DE102008039689A1 (en) | 2010-03-04 |
US20110134246A1 (en) | 2011-06-09 |
WO2010023153A1 (en) | 2010-03-04 |
CN102132328B (en) | 2015-11-25 |
EP2321806B1 (en) | 2015-10-28 |
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