EP2455925B1 - Method and device for defending against attempts to manipulate a camera system - Google Patents

Method and device for defending against attempts to manipulate a camera system Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2455925B1
EP2455925B1 EP11186780.0A EP11186780A EP2455925B1 EP 2455925 B1 EP2455925 B1 EP 2455925B1 EP 11186780 A EP11186780 A EP 11186780A EP 2455925 B1 EP2455925 B1 EP 2455925B1
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Prior art keywords
camera
cam
sys
image data
camera system
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EP11186780.0A
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German (de)
French (fr)
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EP2455925A2 (en
EP2455925A3 (en
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Dr. Steffen Priesterjahn
Dinh Khoi Le
Alexander Drichel
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Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH
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Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B29/00—Checking or monitoring of signalling or alarm systems; Prevention or correction of operating errors, e.g. preventing unauthorised operation
    • G08B29/02—Monitoring continuously signalling or alarm systems
    • G08B29/04—Monitoring of the detection circuits
    • G08B29/046—Monitoring of the detection circuits prevention of tampering with detection circuits
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07G—REGISTERING THE RECEIPT OF CASH, VALUABLES, OR TOKENS
    • G07G3/00—Alarm indicators, e.g. bells
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/18—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength
    • G08B13/189—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems
    • G08B13/194—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems using image scanning and comparing systems
    • G08B13/196—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems using image scanning and comparing systems using television cameras

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for repelling manipulation attempts on a camera system according to the preamble of claim 1 and an apparatus operating according to the system as well as a self-service terminal equipped therewith.
  • the invention relates to a method and a device for the prevention of manipulation attempts on a camera system, in which image data is generated by a camera installed on a self-service terminal and transmitted via a connection to a device receiving the image data, wherein the camera is a receiving area detected covering a monitored operating area of the self-service terminal.
  • self-service terminals such as ATMs
  • ATMs are often exposed to manipulation by strangers attaching replicated controls, particularly keyboard superstructures, to sensitive data such as PIN and / or card data from magnetic cards and the like in operation by the customer illegally read or tap.
  • PIN and / or card data from magnetic cards and the like in operation by the customer illegally read or tap.
  • the strangers or criminals can emulate the customer cards and use the PIN read, for example, to withdraw money from the customer's account.
  • Cameras are often used to monitor the operating area of the self-service terminal and local controls, such as the keyboard, to recognize when manipulated at the keyboard or other controls by strangers.
  • the cameras provide image data, which is usually transmitted via a cable connection to a receiving device, such as to a PC installed in the self-service terminal, to be evaluated locally there or then then via a remote monitoring system to a central office to be transferred. It has recently been shown that even the cameras or camera systems themselves are used by the criminals to perform manipulation attempts on the self-service terminal. In particular, the criminals try to directly divert the image data recorded by the surveillance camera or the transmitted image data (so-called "tapping the camera”) in order to thus illegally detect the entry of the PIN when the customer enters a key.
  • a self-service terminal with a camera arrangement having a plurality of cameras which are mounted in the vicinity of the control panel of the self-service terminal and detect there elements provided, such as keyboard, cash dispenser, card slot, tampering attempts to recognize the self-service terminal.
  • At least one camera is installed on the self-service terminal and a device connected to the camera is configured as a computer integrated in the self-service terminal.
  • Image data is generated by the respective camera and transmitted via a connection to the image data receiving device, wherein the respective camera detects a recording area, one to monitoring operating area of the self-service terminal. It is also possible to detect extraneous effects on the camera system, such as the coverage of a camera, by checking that brightness differences occur between the image recordings of several cameras.
  • the WO 2010/001282 A1 describes a method and apparatus for warding off manipulation attempts on camera systems in general.
  • a secure hardware-mesh consisting of ultrathin conducting wires, which are provided with transistor-based semiconductor devices transistor-based semi-conducting entities ") and thus represent a one-to-one configuration, the calculation of which leads to an unambiguous signature with the aid of a security hash algorithm.
  • This signature is used to secure the data transmission of camera image data, in particular using a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) Any physical intervention, such as the tearing of the reinforcement mat, changes the configuration and changes the calculated signature, so that manipulations in the form of physical interventions can be reliably detected manipulation attempts on camera-monitored selbs Service terminals are not made there.
  • a camera-based theft detection system in which the image data is transmitted from at least one camera to a first data storage via a communication channel.
  • a second memory is provided, the Preferably, a ring buffer is to store the data from the first memory as a data copy when a monitoring system detects that the at least one camera no longer transmits image data over the communication channel.
  • no reference is made to ward off manipulation attempts on camera-monitored self-service terminals.
  • a self-service terminal with a camera for detecting tampering attempts on the self-service terminal is disclosed.
  • the camera is mounted in a housing section that surrounds the control panel of the self-service terminal, with the camera being oriented to detect at least two of the elements provided in the control panel, such as the keyboard and cash dispenser, to allow for any superstructures and similar manipulation - or Skimming attempts clearly identified.
  • the object is achieved by a method having the features of claim 1, and by a device, a self-service terminal and a camera system with the features of one of the independent claims.
  • a foreign influence on the camera system be detected by a device connected to the camera checking whether a technical state change occurs within the camera system, wherein the device checks whether the camera is deactivated by external influences; and checks whether a device driver installed in the camera system as part of the device that drives the camera has no access to the camera because a driver of another computer drives the camera; and / or checks whether image data is received from the device, although the device does not request the transmission of image data.
  • the camera it is checked for this purpose whether the camera has been deactivated by external influence.
  • this should be used to detect whether the surveillance camera has been manipulated, for example, by removing or severing the Karnera cable, so that it can be assumed that the image data is stored directly, i. without transmission to the PC.
  • it is also checked whether the connection itself has been influenced by external influences, wherein the connection is designed in particular as a cable connection. Thus, it can be determined exactly by this measure, whether it has been manipulated on the cable connection.
  • the invention can also be further developed in such a way that an identifier which can be interrogated by the camera is checked. As a result, it can be determined whether the actual surveillance camera or the intended type of camera is connected to the PC or not. If this is not the case, then there is much to suggest that a manipulation of the camera is present, for example, in that another camera externally controllable by the criminal was connected to the system.
  • connection parameter typical for the camera are in particular parameters for connecting the camera to the cable connection, such as, for example, line resistance, voltage, signal level during image transmission and the like. It can also be determined that a different type of camera has probably been connected and / or there is a tapping of the image transmission.
  • a device driver installed in the camera system which controls the camera, has access to the camera. If this is not the case, then this may be an indication that the camera is driven by the driver of another computer. In other words, the event or the state "camera detected but no access" indicates a foreign influence.
  • the invention provides a particularly advantageous contribution to the already known event-driven deactivation of the camera (during card reading and PIN entry), in that preferably the entire self-service terminal is deactivated when the occurrence of a foreign influence on the camera system is detected. This can be ruled out very quickly that an event-driven Deactivation of the camera, as proposed in the prior art, can be bypassed by external influence.
  • the Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of the multi-element camera system SYS and a device PC, which is connected to the camera system SYS and is also designed to defend against manipulation attempts.
  • the device PC corresponds to a personal computer of the self-service terminal, which is also referred to as a self-service terminal for short and represents an ATM in the present example.
  • the camera system SYS essentially comprises a camera CAM, which transmits via a connection, here cable connection CBL, image data CD to the device PC.
  • the camera detects an area which is the operating area B of the ATM terminal ATM or a part thereof detected. In the present example, this is the keyboard KBD.
  • the device PC is that personal computer which is integrated in the self-service terminal and controls the processes during the operation of the self-service terminal, such as the card input, keyboard input, the forwarding of sensitive data (card data, PIN).
  • the device or the personal computer PC also controls, among other things, a device driver DRV or camera driver, which in turn controls the camera CAM in order to control the operation of the device To enable recording and transferring the image data VD.
  • the recording and transmission of the image data is also event-controlled here, which is indicated by the reference symbol CTR, which corresponds to a control or trigger signal sent by the camera driver DRV to the camera.
  • the assemblies and elements shown here are thus suitable for carrying out the method proposed in the prior art for the event-controlled recording of camera image data.
  • the device or the personal computer PC is suitable here to carry out the method described in more detail below for the defense against manipulation attempts on the camera systems SYS shown here.
  • the in Fig. 1 shown personal computer PC procure to detect extraneous effect on the camera system SYS by checking whether a technical state change occurs within the camera system, ie whether on the camera itself and / or at the connection CBL or on the Camera driver DRV was manipulated.
  • a technical state change occurs within the camera system VD.
  • a sub-step 111 in particular whether the camera has been deactivated by external influence.
  • an identifier which can be interrogated by the camera see ID in FIG Fig. 1 . This will determine if the Camera CAM camera has been removed, disabled, or replaced by a camera of a different type.
  • a connection parameter typical for the camera such as e.g. the cable connection to the cable connection CBL, to be tested.
  • it can be checked in a sub-step 115 whether the compound CBL itself was influenced or disconnected by external influences. This may, for example, be the severing of the cable connection CBL and / or the tapping thereof, which in turn may have effects on certain parameters, such as signal levels and the like.
  • a step 120 it is then checked whether a device driver installed in the camera system, here the camera driver DRV, still has access to the camera CAM (see also FIG Fig. 1 ).
  • step 125 it is checked in a step 125 whether the image data VD is received from the device PC, although the transmission of image data is not requested by this device PC (see trigger signal CTR in FIG Fig. 1 ). If this is the case, it must be assumed in this case too that there is a manipulation of the camera system.
  • a manipulation of the camera system is present, then in a step 150 the self-service terminal ATM is taken out of operation and / or an alarm is generated triggered.
  • the camera system SYS described here with the provided device PC is not only suitable for controlling one or more cameras in an event-controlled manner in order to counteract a manipulation attempt on the self-service terminal, but is also suitable for detecting manipulation attempts on the camera system itself and effectively counteracting them by the SB terminal is deactivated immediately and / or an alarm is triggered.
  • the present invention has been described using the example of an ATM, but is applicable to any type of self-service terminals and thus not limited to the specific embodiment described.

Description

Die Erfindung betrifft ein Verfahren zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an einem Kamera-System nach dem Oberbegriff des Anspruchs 1 und eine nach dem System arbeitende Vorrichtung sowie ein damit ausgestattetes Selbstbedienungs-Terminal. Die Erfindung betrifft insbesondere ein Verfahren sowie eine Vorrichtung zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an einem Kamera-System, bei dem von einer an einem Selbstbedienungs-Terminal installierten Kamera Bilddaten erzeugt und über eine Verbindung an eine die Bilddaten empfangende Vorrichtung übertragen werden, wobei die Kamera ein Aufnahmebereich erfasst, der einen zu überwachenden Bedienungsbereich des Selbstbedienungs-Terminals abdeckt.The invention relates to a method for repelling manipulation attempts on a camera system according to the preamble of claim 1 and an apparatus operating according to the system as well as a self-service terminal equipped therewith. In particular, the invention relates to a method and a device for the prevention of manipulation attempts on a camera system, in which image data is generated by a camera installed on a self-service terminal and transmitted via a connection to a device receiving the image data, wherein the camera is a receiving area detected covering a monitored operating area of the self-service terminal.

Es ist bekannt, dass Selbstbedienungs-Terminals, wie etwa Geldautomaten, nicht selten der Manipulation durch Fremde ausgesetzt sind, welche nachgebaute Bedieneinrichtungen, insbesondere Tastaturüberbauten, anbringen, um sensitive Daten, wie z.B. PIN und/oder Kartendaten von Magnetkarteh und dergleichen, bei der Bedienung durch den Kunden widerrechtlich mitzulesen bzw. abzugreifen. Anhand der abgegriffenen Daten können die Fremden bzw. Kriminellen die Kundenkarten nachbilden und mit der ausgelesenen PIN nutzen, um beispielsweise Geld von dem Konto des Kunden abzuheben. Um die Manipulationen an solchen Selbstbedienungs-Terminals zu erkennen, werden häufig Kameras eingesetzt, die den Bedienbereich des Selbstbedienungs-Terminals und dortige Bedienelemente, wie z.B. die Tastatur, überwachen, umerkennen zu können, wann an der Tastatur oder an anderen Bedienungselementen durch Fremde manipuliert wird. Die Kameras liefern Bilddaten, die in der Regel über eine Kabelverbindung an eine empfangende Vorrichtung, wie z.B. an einen in dem Selbstbedienungs-Terminal installierten PC, übertragen werden, um dort lokal ausgewertet zu werden oder aber um dann anschließend über ein Fernüberwachungssystem weiter an eine Zentrale übertragen zu werden. Es hat sich neuerdings gezeigt, dass auch die Kameras bzw. Kamera-Systeme selbst von den Kriminellen benutzt werden, um Manipulationsversuche an dem Selbstbedienungs-Terminal durchzuführen. Insbesondere versuchen die Kriminellen, die von der Überwachungs-Kamera aufgenommenen Bilddaten bzw. die übertragenen Bilddaten direkt abzuzweigen (sog. "Anzapfen der Kamera"), um somit bei einer Tastatureingabe des Kunden die Eingabe der PIN widerrechtlich zu erfassen.It is known that self-service terminals, such as ATMs, are often exposed to manipulation by strangers attaching replicated controls, particularly keyboard superstructures, to sensitive data such as PIN and / or card data from magnetic cards and the like in operation by the customer illegally read or tap. Based on the collected data, the strangers or criminals can emulate the customer cards and use the PIN read, for example, to withdraw money from the customer's account. To the manipulation of such self-service terminals too Cameras are often used to monitor the operating area of the self-service terminal and local controls, such as the keyboard, to recognize when manipulated at the keyboard or other controls by strangers. The cameras provide image data, which is usually transmitted via a cable connection to a receiving device, such as to a PC installed in the self-service terminal, to be evaluated locally there or then then via a remote monitoring system to a central office to be transferred. It has recently been shown that even the cameras or camera systems themselves are used by the criminals to perform manipulation attempts on the self-service terminal. In particular, the criminals try to directly divert the image data recorded by the surveillance camera or the transmitted image data (so-called "tapping the camera") in order to thus illegally detect the entry of the PIN when the customer enters a key.

In der DE 10 2009 018 321 A1 wird ein Selbstbedienungs-terminal (SB-Terminal) mit einer Kamera-Anordnung offenbart, die mehrere Kameras aufweist, welche im Nahbereich des Bedienfeldes des SB-Terminals montiert sind und dort vorgesehene Elemente, wie z.B. Tastatur, Geldausgabefach, Karteneinschubtrichter erfassen, um Manipulationsversuchen an dem SB-Terminal zu erkennen. Zumindest eine Kamera ist an dem SB-Terminal installiert und eine mit dem Kameras verbundene Vorrichtung ist als ein Computer ausgebildet, der in dem SB-Terminal integriert ist. Von der jeweiligen Kamera werden Bilddaten erzeugt und über eine Verbindung an die Bilddatenempfangende Vorrichtung übertragen, wobei die jeweilige Kamera einen Aufnahmebereich erfasst, der einen zu überwachenden Bedienbereich des SB-Terminals abdeckt. Es können auch Fremdeinwirkungen auf das Kamera-System detektiert wird, wie z.B. die Abdeckung einer Kamera, indem geprüft wird, dass Helligkeitsunterschiede zwischen den Bildaufnahmen mehrerer Kameras auftreten.In the DE 10 2009 018 321 A1 discloses a self-service terminal (SB terminal) with a camera arrangement having a plurality of cameras which are mounted in the vicinity of the control panel of the self-service terminal and detect there elements provided, such as keyboard, cash dispenser, card slot, tampering attempts to recognize the self-service terminal. At least one camera is installed on the self-service terminal and a device connected to the camera is configured as a computer integrated in the self-service terminal. Image data is generated by the respective camera and transmitted via a connection to the image data receiving device, wherein the respective camera detects a recording area, one to monitoring operating area of the self-service terminal. It is also possible to detect extraneous effects on the camera system, such as the coverage of a camera, by checking that brightness differences occur between the image recordings of several cameras.

Die WO 2010/001282 A1 beschreibt ein Verfahren und eine Vorrichtung zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an Kamera-Systemen allgemein. Dazu wird vorgeschlagen, in das Gehäuse der Kamera oder von Kamerakoponenten eine sichere Hardware-Bewehrungsmatte ("secure hardware mesh") zu integrieren, die aus ultradünnen leitenden Drähten ("ultra thin conducting wires") besteht, welche mit Transistor-basierenden Halbleiter-Gebilden transistor based semi-conducting entities") verbunden sind und somit einen eineindeutige Konfiguration darstellen, deren Berechnung mit Hilfe eines Sicherheits-Hash-Algorithmen zu eine eineideutigen Signatur führt. Diese Signatur wird zur Absicherung der Datenübertragung von Kamera-Bilddaten verwendet, insbesondere unter Verwendung einer PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). Jeder physische Eingriff, wie z.B. das Aufreißen der Bewehrungsmatte, führt zu einer Veränderung der Konfiguration und verändert die berechnete Signatur. Somit können Manipulationen, die in Form von physischen Eingriffen erfolgen, sicher erkannt werden. Ein Bezug zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an Kamera-überwachten Selbstbedienungsterminals wird dort nicht hergestellt.The WO 2010/001282 A1 describes a method and apparatus for warding off manipulation attempts on camera systems in general. For this purpose, it is proposed to integrate into the housing of the camera or of camera components a secure hardware-mesh ("secure hardware mesh") consisting of ultrathin conducting wires, which are provided with transistor-based semiconductor devices transistor-based semi-conducting entities ") and thus represent a one-to-one configuration, the calculation of which leads to an unambiguous signature with the aid of a security hash algorithm.This signature is used to secure the data transmission of camera image data, in particular using a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) Any physical intervention, such as the tearing of the reinforcement mat, changes the configuration and changes the calculated signature, so that manipulations in the form of physical interventions can be reliably detected manipulation attempts on camera-monitored selbs Service terminals are not made there.

In der US 2005 / 0226338 A1 wird Kamera-basiertes Diebstahl-Erfassungs-System beschrieben, bei dem die Bilddaten von mindestens einer Kamera über einen Übertragungs- bzw. Kommunikationskanal zu einem ersten Datenspeicher übertragen werden. Zusätzlich ist ein zweiter Speicher vorgesehen, der vorzugsweise ein Ringpufferspeicher ist, um die Daten aus dem ersten Speicher als Datenkopie abzuspeichern, wenn ein Uberwachungssystem erkennt, dass die mindestens eine Kamera keine Bilddaten mehr über den Kommunikationskanal überträgt. Auch hier wird kein Bezug zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an Kamera-überwachten Selbstbedienungsterminals hergestellt.In the US 2005/0226338 A1 there is described a camera-based theft detection system in which the image data is transmitted from at least one camera to a first data storage via a communication channel. In addition, a second memory is provided, the Preferably, a ring buffer is to store the data from the first memory as a data copy when a monitoring system detects that the at least one camera no longer transmits image data over the communication channel. Again, no reference is made to ward off manipulation attempts on camera-monitored self-service terminals.

In der DE 10 2009 018322 A1 wird ein Selbstbedienungsterminal (SB-Terminal) mit einer Kamera zum Erkennen von Manipulationsversuchen an dem SB-Terminal offenbart. Die Kamera ist in einem Gehäuseabschnitt montiert, der das Bedienfeld des SB-Terminals umgibt, wobei die Kamera so ausgerichtet ist, dass sie zumindest zwei der im Bedienfeld vorgesehenen Elemente, wie z.B. Tastatur und Geldausgabefach erfasst, um dort evtl. angebrachte Überbauten und ähnliche Manipulations- bzw. Skimming-Versuche eindeutig zu erkennen.In the DE 10 2009 018322 A1 a self-service terminal (SB terminal) with a camera for detecting tampering attempts on the self-service terminal is disclosed. The camera is mounted in a housing section that surrounds the control panel of the self-service terminal, with the camera being oriented to detect at least two of the elements provided in the control panel, such as the keyboard and cash dispenser, to allow for any superstructures and similar manipulation - or Skimming attempts clearly identified.

Um die eingangs genannten Sicherheitslücken bei kamera-überwachten Selbstbedienungs-Terminals zu schließen, wird in der DE 10 2008 039 689 A1 vorgeschlagen, die Aktivität einer Überwachungs-Kamera gezielt zu blockieren, indem beispielsweise bei Einführung einer Kundenkarten in den Kartenleser die Kamera für einen gewissen Zeitraum deaktiviert wird, sodass eine dann durchgeführte PIN-Eingabe durch den Kunden nicht mit aufgenommen wird. Somit geht jeder Manipulationsversuch, das Kamera-System "anzuzapfen" in Leere. Mit dieser bekannten Lösung wird somit die Sicherheit gegen Manipulationsversuche bereits deutlich verbessert. Allerdings greift diese Sicherheitsmaßnahme nur dann, wenn sichergestellt werden kann, dass die Deaktivierung der Kamera während der PIN-Eingabe erfolgt. Daher besteht der Bedarf, auch diese Lösung weiter verbessern.To close the aforementioned vulnerabilities in camera-monitored self-service terminals, is in the DE 10 2008 039 689 A1 proposed to block the activity of a surveillance camera targeted, for example, by the introduction of a customer cards in the card reader, the camera is disabled for a certain period, so that a then performed PIN entry by the customer is not included. Thus, any manipulation attempt to "tap" the camera system goes into emptiness. With this known solution thus the security against manipulation attempts is already significantly improved. However, this security measure only applies if it can be ensured that the deactivation of the camera takes place during the PIN entry. Therefore, there is a need to continue to improve this solution.

Demnach ist es Aufgabe der vorliegenden Erfindung, die sich aus dem Stand der Technik ergebenden Nachteile in vorteilhafter Weise zu überwinden. Insbesondere sollen ein Verfahren und Vorrichtungen vorgeschlagen werden, die zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an Kamera-Systemen geeignet sind, bei denen von einer an einem Selbstbedienungs-Terminal installierten Kamera Bilddaten erzeugt und weiter übertragen werden.Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to overcome the disadvantages resulting from the prior art in an advantageous manner. In particular, a method and devices are proposed which are suitable for the defense against manipulation attempts on camera systems in which image data is generated by a camera installed on a self-service terminal and transmitted further.

Die Aufgabe wird gelöst durch ein Verfahren mit den Merkmalen des Anspruchs 1, sowie durch eine Vorrichtung, ein Selbstbedienungs-Terminal und ein Kamera-System mit den Merkmalen nach einem der nebengeordneten Ansprüche.The object is achieved by a method having the features of claim 1, and by a device, a self-service terminal and a camera system with the features of one of the independent claims.

Demnach wird zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an einem Kamera-System vorgeschlagen, dass eine Fremdeinwirkung auf das Kamera-System detektiert wird, indem eine mit der Kamera verbundene Vorrichtung prüft, ob eine technische Zustandsänderung innerhalb des Kamera-Systems auftritt, wobei die Vorrichtung prüft, ob die Kamera durch Fremdeinwirkung deaktiviert wird; und prüft, ob ein in dem Kamera-System als Teil der Vorrichtung installierter Gerätetreiber, der die Kamera ansteuert, kein Zugriff auf die Kamera hat, weil ein Treiber eines anderen Computers die Kamera ansteuert; und/oder prüft, ob Bilddaten von der Vorrichtung empfangen werden, obwohl von der Vorrichtung das Senden von Bilddaten nicht angefordert wird.Accordingly, in order to avert manipulation attempts on a camera system, it is proposed that a foreign influence on the camera system be detected by a device connected to the camera checking whether a technical state change occurs within the camera system, wherein the device checks whether the camera is deactivated by external influences; and checks whether a device driver installed in the camera system as part of the device that drives the camera has no access to the camera because a driver of another computer drives the camera; and / or checks whether image data is received from the device, although the device does not request the transmission of image data.

Demnach wird vorgeschlagen, technische Zustandsänderungen innerhalb des Kamera-Systems selbst zu überprüfen bzw. zu überwachen, um somit festzustellen, ob eine Fremdeinwirkung an dem Kamera-System, d.h. an der Kamera und/oder an der die Bilddaten übertragenden Verbindung, aufgetreten ist.Accordingly, it is proposed to check technical state changes within the camera system itself or to monitor, so as to determine whether a foreign influence on the camera system, ie on the camera and / or on the image data transmitting connection has occurred.

Beispielsweise wird geprüft, ob eine technische Zustandsänderung an der Kamera, an einem Anschluss der Kamera zur Verbindung und/oder an der Verbindung selbst auftritt. Es wird also erkannt, ob eine Fremdeinwirkung bzw. Fremdsteuerung der Kamera und/oder des Kamera-Systems vorliegt, um dann ggf. einen Alarm auszulösen oder das Selbstbedienungs-Terminal außer Betrieb zu nehmen.For example, it is checked whether a technical change of state occurs at the camera, at a connection of the camera to the connection and / or to the connection itself. It is therefore recognized whether there is a foreign influence or external control of the camera and / or the camera system, in order then to trigger an alarm if necessary or to take the self-service terminal out of operation.

Gemäß der Erfindung wird hierzu geprüft, ob die Kamera durch Fremdeinwirkung deaktiviert wurde. Damit soll insbesondere erkannt werden, ob die Überwachungs-Kamera bspw. durch Abziehen oder Durchtrennen des Karnerakabels manipuliert wurde, sodass davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass die Bilddaten direkt, d.h. ohne Übertragung an den PC, abgegriffen werden. Alternativ oder ergänzend dazu wird auch geprüft, ob die Vebindung selbst durch Fremdeinwirkung beeinflusst wurde, wobei die Verbindung insbesondere als eine Kabelverbindung ausgebildet ist. Somit kann auch durch diese Maßnahme genau festgestellt werden, ob an der Kabelverbindung manipuliert wurde.According to the invention, it is checked for this purpose whether the camera has been deactivated by external influence. In particular, this should be used to detect whether the surveillance camera has been manipulated, for example, by removing or severing the Karnera cable, so that it can be assumed that the image data is stored directly, i. without transmission to the PC. Alternatively or additionally, it is also checked whether the connection itself has been influenced by external influences, wherein the connection is designed in particular as a cable connection. Thus, it can be determined exactly by this measure, whether it has been manipulated on the cable connection.

Die Erfindung kann auch dergestalt weiter ausgebildet werden, dass eine von der Kamera abfragbare Kennung geprüft wird. Dadurch kann festgestellt werden, ob die eigentliche Überwachungs-Kamera bzw. der vorgesehene Kameratyp mit dem PC verbunden ist oder nicht. Ist dies nicht der Fall, so spricht vieles dafür, dass eine Manipulation der Kamera vorliegt, indem bspw. eine andere von dem Kriminellen fremdsteuerbare Kamera an das System angeschlossen wurde.The invention can also be further developed in such a way that an identifier which can be interrogated by the camera is checked. As a result, it can be determined whether the actual surveillance camera or the intended type of camera is connected to the PC or not. If this is not the case, then there is much to suggest that a manipulation of the camera is present, for example, in that another camera externally controllable by the criminal was connected to the system.

Auch kann die Erfindung in vorteilhafter Weise dadurch weiter ausgebildet werden, dass mindestens ein für die Kamera typischer Anschlussparamenter geprüft wird. Hierbei handelt es sich insbesondere um Parameter für den Anschluss der Kamera an die Kabelverbindung, wie bspw. Leitungswiderstand, Spannung, Signalpegel bei der Bildübertragung und dergleichen. Hiermit kann auch festgestellt werden, dass wahrscheinlich ein anderer Kameratyp angeschlossen wurde und/oder eine Anzapfung der Bildübertragung vorliegt.Also, the invention can advantageously be further developed by testing at least one connection parameter typical for the camera. These are in particular parameters for connecting the camera to the cable connection, such as, for example, line resistance, voltage, signal level during image transmission and the like. It can also be determined that a different type of camera has probably been connected and / or there is a tapping of the image transmission.

Des Weiteren wird gemäß der Erfindung geprüft, ob ein in dem Kamera-System installierter Gerätetreiber, der die Kamera ansteuert, Zugriff auf die Kamera hat. Ist dies nämlich nicht der Fall, so kann dies ein Indiz dafür sein, dass die Kamera von dem Treiber eines anderen Computers angesteuert wird. Mit anderen Worten: Das Ereignis bzw. der Zustand "Kamera erkannt, aber kein Zugriff" deutet hier auf eine Fremdeinwirkung hin.Furthermore, it is checked according to the invention, whether a device driver installed in the camera system, which controls the camera, has access to the camera. If this is not the case, then this may be an indication that the camera is driven by the driver of another computer. In other words, the event or the state "camera detected but no access" indicates a foreign influence.

Außerdem kann geprüft werden, ob Bilddaten von der Vorrichtung empfangen werden, obwohl von dieser das Senden von Bilddaten nicht angefordert wird. Dadurch kann festgestellt werden, dass die installierte Kamera wohlmöglich fremd-gesteuert bzw. fremd-getriggert wird, was wiederum Indiz für eine Manipulation darstellt.In addition, it can be checked whether image data is received from the device although it is not requested to send image data. As a result, it can be established that the installed camera is probably externally controlled or externally triggered, which in turn represents an indication of manipulation.

Die Erfindung bildet einen besonders vorteilhaften Beitrag zu der bereits bekannten ereignisgesteuerten Deaktivierung der Kamera (während des Kartenlesens und der PIN-Eingabe), indem vorzugsweise das ganze SB-Terminal dann deaktiviert wird, wenn das Auftreten einer Fremdeinwirkung auf das Kamera-System detektiert wird. Dadurch kann sehr schnell ausgeschlossen werden, dass eine ereignisgesteuerte Deaktivierung der Kamera, sowie im Stand der Technik vorgeschlagen, durch Fremdeinwirkung umgangen werden kann.The invention provides a particularly advantageous contribution to the already known event-driven deactivation of the camera (during card reading and PIN entry), in that preferably the entire self-service terminal is deactivated when the occurrence of a foreign influence on the camera system is detected. This can be ruled out very quickly that an event-driven Deactivation of the camera, as proposed in the prior art, can be bypassed by external influence.

Diese und weitere Vorteile ergeben sich auch aus den Unteransprüchen.These and other advantages will become apparent from the dependent claims.

Im Weiteren wird die Erfindung näher anhand eines Ausführungsbeispiels und der beiliegenden Zeichnungen beschrieben, wobei die Zeichnungen folgende schematische Darstellung wiedergeben:

Fig. 1
zeigt den Aufbau eines Kamera-Systems mit einer erfindungsgemäßen Vorrichtung zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen;
Fig. 2
zeigt ein Flussdiagramm für das erfindungsgemäße Verfahren zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an dem gezeigten Kamera-System.
In the following, the invention will be described in more detail by means of an embodiment and the accompanying drawings, wherein the drawings show the following schematic representation:
Fig. 1
shows the construction of a camera system with a device according to the invention for the prevention of manipulation attempts;
Fig. 2
shows a flow chart for the inventive method for defense against manipulation attempts on the camera system shown.

Die Fig. 1 zeigt eine schematische Darstellung mit den aus mehreren Elementen bestehenden Kamera-System SYS und einer Vorrichtung PC, die mit dem Kamera-System SYS verbunden ist und hier auch zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen ausgebildet ist. Die Vorrichtung PC entspricht in dem gezeigten Beispiel einem Personal-Computer des Selbstbedienungs-Terminals, das im weiteren auch kurz SB-Terminal genannt wird und im vorliegenden Beispiel einen Geldautomaten darstellt. Das Kamera-System SYS umfasst im Wesentlichen eine Kamera CAM, die über eine Verbindung, hier Kabelverbindung CBL, Bilddaten CD an die Vorrichtung PC sendet. Die Kamera erfasst einen Bereich, der den Bedienbereich B des SB-Terminals ATM bzw. eines Teiles davon erfasst. Im vorliegenden Beispiel handelt es sich dabei um die Tastatur KBD.The Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of the multi-element camera system SYS and a device PC, which is connected to the camera system SYS and is also designed to defend against manipulation attempts. In the example shown, the device PC corresponds to a personal computer of the self-service terminal, which is also referred to as a self-service terminal for short and represents an ATM in the present example. The camera system SYS essentially comprises a camera CAM, which transmits via a connection, here cable connection CBL, image data CD to the device PC. The camera detects an area which is the operating area B of the ATM terminal ATM or a part thereof detected. In the present example, this is the keyboard KBD.

Bei der Vorrichtung PC handelt es sich um denjenigen Personal-Computer, der in dem SB-Terminal integriert ist und die Abläufe während der Bedienung des SB-Terminals steuert, wie bspw. die Karteneingabe, Tastatureingabe, das Weiterleiten von sensitiven Daten (Kartendaten, PIN) an ein zentrales System, die Ansteuerung eines Bedienbildschirmes, die Freigabe und das Ausführung einer Bargeldausgabe usw.. Die Vorrichtung bzw. der Personal-Computer PC steuert unter anderem auch einen Gerätetreiber DRV bzw. Kameratreiber, der wiederrum die Kamera CAM ansteuert, um die Aufnahme und das Übertragen der Bilddaten VD zu ermöglichen. Insbesondere wird die Aufnahme und Übertragung der Bilddaten auch hier ereignisgesteuert durchgeführt, was durch das Bezugszeichen CTR angedeutet ist, welches einem von dem Kameratreiber DRV an die Kamera gesendeten Steuerungs- bzw. Triggersignal entspricht.The device PC is that personal computer which is integrated in the self-service terminal and controls the processes during the operation of the self-service terminal, such as the card input, keyboard input, the forwarding of sensitive data (card data, PIN The device or the personal computer PC also controls, among other things, a device driver DRV or camera driver, which in turn controls the camera CAM in order to control the operation of the device To enable recording and transferring the image data VD. In particular, the recording and transmission of the image data is also event-controlled here, which is indicated by the reference symbol CTR, which corresponds to a control or trigger signal sent by the camera driver DRV to the camera.

Neben den von der Kamera aufgenommenen Bilddaten VD werden auch weitere Daten von der Kamera CAM an die Vorrichtung bzw. den Personal-Computer PC übertragen, wie etwa die Kennung bzw. Identifikation-Nummer ID der Kamera CAM.In addition to the image data VD recorded by the camera, further data are transmitted from the camera CAM to the device or the personal computer PC, such as the identification or identification number ID of the camera CAM.

Die hier dargestellten Baugruppen und Elemente sind demnach geeignet, das im Stand der Technik vorgeschlagene Verfahren zur ereignisgesteuerten Aufnahme von Kamera-Bilddaten auszuführen. Darüber hinaus ist hier insbesondere die Vorrichtung bzw. der Personal-Computer PC geeignet, das im Nachfolgenden noch näher beschriebene Verfahren zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an den hier dargestellten Kamera-Systemen SYS auszuführen. Somit ist der in Fig. 1 dargestellte Personal-Computer PC beschaffen, Fremdeinwirkung auf das Kamera-System SYS zu detektieren, indem geprüft wird, ob eine technische Zustandsänderung innerhalb des Kamera-Systems auftritt, d.h. ob an der Kamera CAM selbst und/oder an der Verbindung CBL bzw. an dem Kameratreiber DRV manipuliert wurde.The assemblies and elements shown here are thus suitable for carrying out the method proposed in the prior art for the event-controlled recording of camera image data. In addition, in particular the device or the personal computer PC is suitable here to carry out the method described in more detail below for the defense against manipulation attempts on the camera systems SYS shown here. Thus, the in Fig. 1 shown personal computer PC procure to detect extraneous effect on the camera system SYS by checking whether a technical state change occurs within the camera system, ie whether on the camera itself and / or at the connection CBL or on the Camera driver DRV was manipulated.

Das von der Vorrichtung bzw. dem Personal-Computer PC durchgeführte Verfahren 100 wird nun anhand der Fig. 2 näher erläutert. In einem ersten Schritt 110. wird geprüft, ob eine technische Zustandsänderung innerhalb des Kamera-Systems VD auftritt. Dazu wird in einem Teilschritt 111 insbesondere geprüft, ob die Kamera durch Fremdeinwirkung deaktiviert wurde. Alternativ oder ergänzend dazu wird in einem Teilschritt 112 auf eine von der Kamera abfragbare Kennung (siehe ID in Fig. 1) hin geprüft. Dadurch kann festgestellt werden, ob die Kamera CAM des Kamera-System entfernt wurde, deaktiviert wurde oder durch eine Kamera eines anderen Typs ersetzt wurde.The method 100 carried out by the device or the personal computer PC will now be described with reference to FIG Fig. 2 explained in more detail. In a first step 110, it is checked whether a technical state change occurs within the camera system VD. For this purpose, it is checked in a sub-step 111 in particular whether the camera has been deactivated by external influence. Alternatively or additionally, in a sub-step 112, an identifier which can be interrogated by the camera (see ID in FIG Fig. 1 ) checked. This will determine if the Camera CAM camera has been removed, disabled, or replaced by a camera of a different type.

Auch kann in einem teilschritt 113 auf einen für die Kamera typischen Anschlussparameter, wie z.B. den Leitungsanschluss zur Kabelverbindung CBL, hin geprüft werden. Außerdem kann in einem Teilschritt 115 geprüft werden, ob die Verbindung CBL selbst durch Fremdeinwirkung beeinflusst oder getrennt wurde. Dabei kann es sich bspw. um das Durchtrennen der Kabelverbindung CBL handeln und/oder um das Anzapfen derselben, was wiederum Auswirkungen auf bestimmte Parameter, wie etwa Signalpegel und dergleichen haben kann.Also, in a partial step 113, a connection parameter typical for the camera, such as e.g. the cable connection to the cable connection CBL, to be tested. In addition, it can be checked in a sub-step 115 whether the compound CBL itself was influenced or disconnected by external influences. This may, for example, be the severing of the cable connection CBL and / or the tapping thereof, which in turn may have effects on certain parameters, such as signal levels and the like.

In einem Schritt 120 wird dann geprüft, ob ein in dem Kamera-System installierter Gerätetreiber, hier der Kameratreiber DRV, noch Zugriff auf die Kamera CAM hat (siehe auch Fig. 1).In a step 120, it is then checked whether a device driver installed in the camera system, here the camera driver DRV, still has access to the camera CAM (see also FIG Fig. 1 ).

Ist dies nicht der Fall, so deutet dies auf eine Manipulation des Kamera-Systems hin. Danach wird in einem Schritt 125 geprüft, ob die Bilddaten VD von der Vorrichtung PC empfangen werden, obwohl von dieser Vorrichtung PC das Senden von Bilddaten nicht angefordert wird (siehe Triggersignal CTR in Fig. 1). Sollte dies nämlich der Fall sein, so ist auch in diesem Fall davon auszugehen, dass eine Manipulation des Kamera-Systems vorliegt.If this is not the case, this indicates a manipulation of the camera system. Thereafter, it is checked in a step 125 whether the image data VD is received from the device PC, although the transmission of image data is not requested by this device PC (see trigger signal CTR in FIG Fig. 1 ). If this is the case, it must be assumed in this case too that there is a manipulation of the camera system.

Wird in einem der oben genannten Teilschritte 111 bis 115 bzw. Schritte 120 und/oder 125 festgestellt, dass eine Manipulation des Kamera-Systems vorliegt, so wird in einem Schritt 150 das SB-Terminal ATM außer Betrieb genommen und/oder es wird ein Alarm ausgelöst. Das hier beschriebene Kamera-System SYS mit der vorgesehenen Vorrichtung PC (siehe Fig. 1) ist nicht nur dafür geeignet, eine oder mehrere Kameras ereignisgesteuert anzusteuern, um einem Manipulationsversuch an dem SB-Terminal entgegenzuwirken, sondern ist auch dafür geeignet, Manipulationsversuche am Kamera-System selbst zu detektieren und diesen effektiv entgegenzuwirken, indem das SB-Terminal ggf. sofort deaktiviert wird und/oder ein Alarm ausgelöst wird. Versuche mit üblichen Systemen haben nämlich gezeigt, dass eine ereignisgesteuerte Deaktivierung der Kamera allein nicht immer genügt, um eine ausreichende Sicherheit gegen Manipulationsversuche des Gesamtanlage (SB-Terminal und Kamera-System) zu garantieren. Denn mittels der bisherigen Systeme konnte nicht festgestellt werden, ob die Kamera während einer Tastatureingabe unerlaubt aktiviert bzw. ferngesteuert wurde und somit Bilder von der Eingabe der Kennung (PIN) trotz vorgesehener Sicherheitsmaßnahmen abgehört und an einen Dritten geliefert wurden.If it is determined in one of the above sub-steps 111 to 115 or steps 120 and / or 125 that a manipulation of the camera system is present, then in a step 150 the self-service terminal ATM is taken out of operation and / or an alarm is generated triggered. The camera system SYS described here with the provided device PC (see Fig. 1 ) is not only suitable for controlling one or more cameras in an event-controlled manner in order to counteract a manipulation attempt on the self-service terminal, but is also suitable for detecting manipulation attempts on the camera system itself and effectively counteracting them by the SB terminal is deactivated immediately and / or an alarm is triggered. Experiments with conventional systems have shown that an event-controlled deactivation of the camera alone is not always sufficient to guarantee sufficient security against manipulation attempts of the entire system (self-service terminal and camera system). Because of the previous systems could not be determined whether the camera was activated without authorization during a keyboard input or remotely controlled and thus images of the input of the identifier (PIN) despite the security measures were intercepted and delivered to a third party.

Mit der hier vorgeschlagenen Vorrichtung PC nun wird sichergestellt, dass auch Manipulationsversuche am Kamera-System selbst sofort und sicher erkannt werden und ggf. Gegenmaßnahmen (Abschalten des SB-Terminals und/oder Alarm-Auslösung) sofort ausgeführt bzw. eingeleitet werden. Somit ergibt sich ein deutlich erhöhtes Sicherheitsniveau für das Gesamtsystem.With the proposed device PC now it is ensured that even manipulation attempts on the camera system itself are detected immediately and safely and countermeasures (switching off the self-service terminals and / or alarm triggering) are executed or initiated immediately. This results in a significantly increased level of security for the entire system.

Die vorliegende Erfindung wurde am Beispiel eines Geldautomaten beschrieben, ist aber auf jede Art von Selbstbedienungs-Terminals anwendbar und somit nicht auf die konkret beschriebene Ausführungsform beschränkt.The present invention has been described using the example of an ATM, but is applicable to any type of self-service terminals and thus not limited to the specific embodiment described.

Claims (9)

  1. Method (100) for defending against attempts to manipulate a camera system (SYS), in which image data (VD) is generated by a camera (CAM) and transmitted via a link (CBL) to an apparatus (PC) that receives the image data (VD), wherein the camera (CAM) is mounted at an automated teller machine (ATM), wherein the apparatus (PC) is configured as a computer that is integrated in the automated teller machine (ATM), wherein the camera (CAM) captures a recording region which covers a control panel (B) of the automated teller machine (ATM) that is to be monitored, and wherein any outside influence on the camera system (SYS) is detected,
    characterized in that
    the outside influence on the camera system (SYS) is detected by checking (110) whether a technical change of state occurs within the camera system (SYS), wherein a check is carried out (111) by the apparatus (PC) as to whether the camera (CAM) is deactivated by an outside influence; and a check is carried out (120) as to whether a device driver (DRV) that is installed in the camera system (SYS) as part of the apparatus (PC) and that drives the camera (CAM) has no access to the camera (CAM) because the camera is driven by a driver of a different computer; and/or a check is carried out (125) as to whether image data (VD) is received by the apparatus (PC) even though the apparatus (PC) did not request the transmission of image data.
  2. Method (100) according to Claim 1, characterized in that a check is carried out as to whether a technical change of state occurs at the camera (CAM), at a terminal of the camera (CAM) to the link (CBL), and/or at the link (CBL).
  3. Method (100) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that an identifier (ID) that can be accessed by the camera (CAM) is checked (112).
  4. Method (100) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that at least one connection parameter that is typical of the camera (CAM) is checked (113).
  5. Method (100) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that a check is carried out as to whether the link (CBL) is influenced or severed by an outside influence (115), wherein the link is configured in particular in the form of a cable link (CBL).
  6. Method (100) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the automated teller machine (ATM) is disabled and/or an alarm is triggered (150) if the event of an outside influence on the camera arrangement (SYS) is detected.
  7. Apparatus (PC) for defending against attempts to manipulate a camera system (SYS), in which image data (VD) is generated by a camera (CAM) and transmitted via a link (CBL) to the apparatus (PC) that receives the image data (VD), wherein the camera (CAM) is mounted at an automated teller machine (ATM), wherein the apparatus (PC) is configured as a computer that is integrated in the automated teller machine (ATM), wherein the camera (CAM) captures a recording region (A) which covers a control panel of the automated teller machine (ATM) that is to be monitored, and wherein the apparatus (PC) detects any outside influence on the camera system (SYS),
    characterized in that
    the apparatus (PC) detects the outside influence on the camera system (SYS) by checking whether a technical change of state occurs within the camera system (SYS), wherein the apparatus (PC) checks (111) whether the camera (CAM) is deactivated by an outside influence; and checks (120) whether a device driver (DRV) that is installed in the camera system (SYS) as part of the apparatus and that drives the camera (CAM) has no access to the camera (CAM) because a driver of a different computer drives the camera; and/or checks (125) whether image data (VD) is received by the apparatus (PC) even though the apparatus (PC) did not request the transmission of image data.
  8. Automated teller machine (ATM) comprising an apparatus (PC) according to Claim 7.
  9. Camera system (SYS) comprising an apparatus (PC) according to Claim 7.
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