EP2455925B1 - Procédé et dispositif de défense contre les tentatives de manipulation sur un système de caméra - Google Patents

Procédé et dispositif de défense contre les tentatives de manipulation sur un système de caméra Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2455925B1
EP2455925B1 EP11186780.0A EP11186780A EP2455925B1 EP 2455925 B1 EP2455925 B1 EP 2455925B1 EP 11186780 A EP11186780 A EP 11186780A EP 2455925 B1 EP2455925 B1 EP 2455925B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
camera
cam
sys
image data
camera system
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
EP11186780.0A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP2455925A2 (fr
EP2455925A3 (fr
Inventor
Dr. Steffen Priesterjahn
Dinh Khoi Le
Alexander Drichel
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH
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Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH
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Publication of EP2455925A2 publication Critical patent/EP2455925A2/fr
Publication of EP2455925A3 publication Critical patent/EP2455925A3/fr
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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B29/00—Checking or monitoring of signalling or alarm systems; Prevention or correction of operating errors, e.g. preventing unauthorised operation
    • G08B29/02—Monitoring continuously signalling or alarm systems
    • G08B29/04—Monitoring of the detection circuits
    • G08B29/046—Monitoring of the detection circuits prevention of tampering with detection circuits
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07G—REGISTERING THE RECEIPT OF CASH, VALUABLES, OR TOKENS
    • G07G3/00—Alarm indicators, e.g. bells
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/18—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength
    • G08B13/189—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems
    • G08B13/194—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems using image scanning and comparing systems
    • G08B13/196—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems using image scanning and comparing systems using television cameras

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for repelling manipulation attempts on a camera system according to the preamble of claim 1 and an apparatus operating according to the system as well as a self-service terminal equipped therewith.
  • the invention relates to a method and a device for the prevention of manipulation attempts on a camera system, in which image data is generated by a camera installed on a self-service terminal and transmitted via a connection to a device receiving the image data, wherein the camera is a receiving area detected covering a monitored operating area of the self-service terminal.
  • self-service terminals such as ATMs
  • ATMs are often exposed to manipulation by strangers attaching replicated controls, particularly keyboard superstructures, to sensitive data such as PIN and / or card data from magnetic cards and the like in operation by the customer illegally read or tap.
  • PIN and / or card data from magnetic cards and the like in operation by the customer illegally read or tap.
  • the strangers or criminals can emulate the customer cards and use the PIN read, for example, to withdraw money from the customer's account.
  • Cameras are often used to monitor the operating area of the self-service terminal and local controls, such as the keyboard, to recognize when manipulated at the keyboard or other controls by strangers.
  • the cameras provide image data, which is usually transmitted via a cable connection to a receiving device, such as to a PC installed in the self-service terminal, to be evaluated locally there or then then via a remote monitoring system to a central office to be transferred. It has recently been shown that even the cameras or camera systems themselves are used by the criminals to perform manipulation attempts on the self-service terminal. In particular, the criminals try to directly divert the image data recorded by the surveillance camera or the transmitted image data (so-called "tapping the camera”) in order to thus illegally detect the entry of the PIN when the customer enters a key.
  • a self-service terminal with a camera arrangement having a plurality of cameras which are mounted in the vicinity of the control panel of the self-service terminal and detect there elements provided, such as keyboard, cash dispenser, card slot, tampering attempts to recognize the self-service terminal.
  • At least one camera is installed on the self-service terminal and a device connected to the camera is configured as a computer integrated in the self-service terminal.
  • Image data is generated by the respective camera and transmitted via a connection to the image data receiving device, wherein the respective camera detects a recording area, one to monitoring operating area of the self-service terminal. It is also possible to detect extraneous effects on the camera system, such as the coverage of a camera, by checking that brightness differences occur between the image recordings of several cameras.
  • the WO 2010/001282 A1 describes a method and apparatus for warding off manipulation attempts on camera systems in general.
  • a secure hardware-mesh consisting of ultrathin conducting wires, which are provided with transistor-based semiconductor devices transistor-based semi-conducting entities ") and thus represent a one-to-one configuration, the calculation of which leads to an unambiguous signature with the aid of a security hash algorithm.
  • This signature is used to secure the data transmission of camera image data, in particular using a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) Any physical intervention, such as the tearing of the reinforcement mat, changes the configuration and changes the calculated signature, so that manipulations in the form of physical interventions can be reliably detected manipulation attempts on camera-monitored selbs Service terminals are not made there.
  • a camera-based theft detection system in which the image data is transmitted from at least one camera to a first data storage via a communication channel.
  • a second memory is provided, the Preferably, a ring buffer is to store the data from the first memory as a data copy when a monitoring system detects that the at least one camera no longer transmits image data over the communication channel.
  • no reference is made to ward off manipulation attempts on camera-monitored self-service terminals.
  • a self-service terminal with a camera for detecting tampering attempts on the self-service terminal is disclosed.
  • the camera is mounted in a housing section that surrounds the control panel of the self-service terminal, with the camera being oriented to detect at least two of the elements provided in the control panel, such as the keyboard and cash dispenser, to allow for any superstructures and similar manipulation - or Skimming attempts clearly identified.
  • the object is achieved by a method having the features of claim 1, and by a device, a self-service terminal and a camera system with the features of one of the independent claims.
  • a foreign influence on the camera system be detected by a device connected to the camera checking whether a technical state change occurs within the camera system, wherein the device checks whether the camera is deactivated by external influences; and checks whether a device driver installed in the camera system as part of the device that drives the camera has no access to the camera because a driver of another computer drives the camera; and / or checks whether image data is received from the device, although the device does not request the transmission of image data.
  • the camera it is checked for this purpose whether the camera has been deactivated by external influence.
  • this should be used to detect whether the surveillance camera has been manipulated, for example, by removing or severing the Karnera cable, so that it can be assumed that the image data is stored directly, i. without transmission to the PC.
  • it is also checked whether the connection itself has been influenced by external influences, wherein the connection is designed in particular as a cable connection. Thus, it can be determined exactly by this measure, whether it has been manipulated on the cable connection.
  • the invention can also be further developed in such a way that an identifier which can be interrogated by the camera is checked. As a result, it can be determined whether the actual surveillance camera or the intended type of camera is connected to the PC or not. If this is not the case, then there is much to suggest that a manipulation of the camera is present, for example, in that another camera externally controllable by the criminal was connected to the system.
  • connection parameter typical for the camera are in particular parameters for connecting the camera to the cable connection, such as, for example, line resistance, voltage, signal level during image transmission and the like. It can also be determined that a different type of camera has probably been connected and / or there is a tapping of the image transmission.
  • a device driver installed in the camera system which controls the camera, has access to the camera. If this is not the case, then this may be an indication that the camera is driven by the driver of another computer. In other words, the event or the state "camera detected but no access" indicates a foreign influence.
  • the invention provides a particularly advantageous contribution to the already known event-driven deactivation of the camera (during card reading and PIN entry), in that preferably the entire self-service terminal is deactivated when the occurrence of a foreign influence on the camera system is detected. This can be ruled out very quickly that an event-driven Deactivation of the camera, as proposed in the prior art, can be bypassed by external influence.
  • the Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of the multi-element camera system SYS and a device PC, which is connected to the camera system SYS and is also designed to defend against manipulation attempts.
  • the device PC corresponds to a personal computer of the self-service terminal, which is also referred to as a self-service terminal for short and represents an ATM in the present example.
  • the camera system SYS essentially comprises a camera CAM, which transmits via a connection, here cable connection CBL, image data CD to the device PC.
  • the camera detects an area which is the operating area B of the ATM terminal ATM or a part thereof detected. In the present example, this is the keyboard KBD.
  • the device PC is that personal computer which is integrated in the self-service terminal and controls the processes during the operation of the self-service terminal, such as the card input, keyboard input, the forwarding of sensitive data (card data, PIN).
  • the device or the personal computer PC also controls, among other things, a device driver DRV or camera driver, which in turn controls the camera CAM in order to control the operation of the device To enable recording and transferring the image data VD.
  • the recording and transmission of the image data is also event-controlled here, which is indicated by the reference symbol CTR, which corresponds to a control or trigger signal sent by the camera driver DRV to the camera.
  • the assemblies and elements shown here are thus suitable for carrying out the method proposed in the prior art for the event-controlled recording of camera image data.
  • the device or the personal computer PC is suitable here to carry out the method described in more detail below for the defense against manipulation attempts on the camera systems SYS shown here.
  • the in Fig. 1 shown personal computer PC procure to detect extraneous effect on the camera system SYS by checking whether a technical state change occurs within the camera system, ie whether on the camera itself and / or at the connection CBL or on the Camera driver DRV was manipulated.
  • a technical state change occurs within the camera system VD.
  • a sub-step 111 in particular whether the camera has been deactivated by external influence.
  • an identifier which can be interrogated by the camera see ID in FIG Fig. 1 . This will determine if the Camera CAM camera has been removed, disabled, or replaced by a camera of a different type.
  • a connection parameter typical for the camera such as e.g. the cable connection to the cable connection CBL, to be tested.
  • it can be checked in a sub-step 115 whether the compound CBL itself was influenced or disconnected by external influences. This may, for example, be the severing of the cable connection CBL and / or the tapping thereof, which in turn may have effects on certain parameters, such as signal levels and the like.
  • a step 120 it is then checked whether a device driver installed in the camera system, here the camera driver DRV, still has access to the camera CAM (see also FIG Fig. 1 ).
  • step 125 it is checked in a step 125 whether the image data VD is received from the device PC, although the transmission of image data is not requested by this device PC (see trigger signal CTR in FIG Fig. 1 ). If this is the case, it must be assumed in this case too that there is a manipulation of the camera system.
  • a manipulation of the camera system is present, then in a step 150 the self-service terminal ATM is taken out of operation and / or an alarm is generated triggered.
  • the camera system SYS described here with the provided device PC is not only suitable for controlling one or more cameras in an event-controlled manner in order to counteract a manipulation attempt on the self-service terminal, but is also suitable for detecting manipulation attempts on the camera system itself and effectively counteracting them by the SB terminal is deactivated immediately and / or an alarm is triggered.
  • the present invention has been described using the example of an ATM, but is applicable to any type of self-service terminals and thus not limited to the specific embodiment described.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Studio Devices (AREA)
  • Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
  • Alarm Systems (AREA)

Claims (9)

  1. Procédé (100) de défense contre des tentatives de manipulation sur un système de caméra (SYS), dans lequel des données d'images (VD) sont générées par une caméra (CAM) et sont transmises par l'intermédiaire d'une ligne de connexion (CBL) à un dispositif (PC) recevant les données d'images (VD), dans lequel la caméra (CAM) est installée sur un terminal de distribution automatique (ATM), dans lequel le dispositif (PC) est réalisé sous la forme d'un ordinateur qui est intégré au terminal de distribution automatique (ATM), dans lequel la caméra (CAM) détecte une zone d'acquisition qui couvre une zone d'utilisation (B) à surveiller du terminal de distribution automatique (ATM), et dans lequel une intervention extérieure sur le système de caméra (SYS) est détectée,
    caractérisé en ce que l'intervention extérieure sur le système de caméra (SYS) est détectée en vérifiant (110) si une modification d'état technique se produit au sein du système de caméra (SYS), dans lequel il est vérifié (111) par le dispositif (PC) si la caméra (CAM) est désactivée par une intervention extérieure ; et il est vérifié (120) si un pilote d'appareil (DRV) installé dans le système de caméra (SYS) en tant que partie du dispositif (PC), qui commande la caméra (CAM), n'a aucun accès à la caméra (CAM) alors que la caméra est commandée par un pilote d'un autre ordinateur ; et/ou il est vérifié (125) si des données d'images (VD) sont reçues par le dispositif (PC) bien que l'émission par le dispositif (PC) de données d'images ne soit pas demandée.
  2. Procédé (100) selon la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce qu'il est vérifié si une modification d'état technique se produit sur la caméra (CAM), sur un raccord de la caméra (CAM) à la ligne de connexion (CBL) et/ou sur la ligne de connexion (CBL).
  3. Procédé (100) selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce qu'un identifiant (ID) interrogeable par la caméra (CAM) est vérifié (112).
  4. Procédé (100) selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce qu'au moins un paramètre de raccordement typique de la caméra (CAM) est vérifié (113).
  5. Procédé (100) selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce qu'il est vérifié si la ligne de connexion (CBL) est influencée ou est séparée (115) par une intervention extérieure, dans lequel la ligne de connexion est notamment réalisée sous la forme d'une ligne de connexion par câble (CBL).
  6. Procédé (100) selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le terminal de distribution automatique (ATM) est mis hors service et/ou déclenche une alarme (150) lorsque la survenue d'une intervention extérieure sur le système de caméra (SYS) est détectée.
  7. Dispositif (PC) de défense contre des tentatives de manipulation sur un système de caméra (SYS), dans lequel des données d'images (VD) sont générées par une caméra (CAM) et sont transmises par l'intermédiaire d'une liaison par câble (CBL) au dispositif (PC) recevant les données d'images (VD), dans lequel la caméra (CAM) est installée sur un terminal de distribution automatique (ATM), dans lequel le dispositif (PC) est réalisé sous la forme d'un ordinateur qui est intégré au terminal de distribution automatique (ATM), dans lequel la caméra (CAM) détecte une zone d'acquisition (A) qui couvre une zone d'utilisation à surveiller du terminal de distribution automatique (ATM), et dans lequel le dispositif (PC) détecte une intervention extérieure sur le système de caméra (SYS),
    caractérisé en ce que le dispositif (PC) détecte l'intervention extérieure sur le système de caméra (SYS) en faisant en sorte que le dispositif (PC) vérifie si une modification d'état technique se produit au sein du système de caméra (SYS), dans lequel le dispositif (PC) vérifie (111) si la caméra (CAM) est désactivée par une intervention extérieure ; et vérifie (120) si un pilote d'appareil (DRV) installé dans le système de caméra (SYS) en tant que partie du dispositif, qui commande la caméra (CAM), n'a aucun accès à la caméra (CAM), alors qu'un pilote d'un autre ordinateur commande la caméra ; et/ou vérifie (125) si des données d'images (VD) sont reçues par le dispositif (PC) bien que l'émission par le dispositif (PC) de données d'images ne soit pas demandée.
  8. Terminal de distribution automatique (ATM) comportant un dispositif (PC) selon la revendication 7.
  9. Système de caméra (SYS) comportant un dispositif (PC) selon la revendication 7.
EP11186780.0A 2010-11-17 2011-10-26 Procédé et dispositif de défense contre les tentatives de manipulation sur un système de caméra Active EP2455925B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102010060624A DE102010060624A1 (de) 2010-11-17 2010-11-17 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Abwehr von Manipulationsversuchen an einem Kamera-System

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EP2455925A2 EP2455925A2 (fr) 2012-05-23
EP2455925A3 EP2455925A3 (fr) 2012-07-11
EP2455925B1 true EP2455925B1 (fr) 2016-05-18

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Cited By (1)

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US11610457B2 (en) 2020-11-03 2023-03-21 Bank Of America Corporation Detecting unauthorized activity related to a computer peripheral device by monitoring voltage of the peripheral device

Families Citing this family (1)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2897112B1 (fr) 2014-01-17 2019-03-06 Wincor Nixdorf International GmbH Procédé et dispositif de prévention des fausses alertes dans les systèmes de surveillance

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DE102009018320A1 (de) * 2009-04-22 2010-10-28 Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh Verfahren zum Erkennen von Manipulationsversuchen an einem Selbstbedienungsterminal und Datenverarbeitungseinheit dafür

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US11610457B2 (en) 2020-11-03 2023-03-21 Bank Of America Corporation Detecting unauthorized activity related to a computer peripheral device by monitoring voltage of the peripheral device

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DE102010060624A1 (de) 2012-05-24
EP2455925A2 (fr) 2012-05-23
EP2455925A3 (fr) 2012-07-11

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