EP2242027A2 - Procédé de sécurisation d'une communication d'entrée sans clé pour véhicules automobiles - Google Patents

Procédé de sécurisation d'une communication d'entrée sans clé pour véhicules automobiles Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2242027A2
EP2242027A2 EP10158623A EP10158623A EP2242027A2 EP 2242027 A2 EP2242027 A2 EP 2242027A2 EP 10158623 A EP10158623 A EP 10158623A EP 10158623 A EP10158623 A EP 10158623A EP 2242027 A2 EP2242027 A2 EP 2242027A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
wake
transmitter
vehicle
circuit
time
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP10158623A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP2242027A3 (fr
Inventor
Boris Ziller
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Huf Huelsbeck and Fuerst GmbH and Co KG
Original Assignee
Huf Huelsbeck and Fuerst GmbH and Co KG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huf Huelsbeck and Fuerst GmbH and Co KG filed Critical Huf Huelsbeck and Fuerst GmbH and Co KG
Publication of EP2242027A2 publication Critical patent/EP2242027A2/fr
Publication of EP2242027A3 publication Critical patent/EP2242027A3/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00365—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks in combination with a wake-up circuit
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
    • G07C2209/08—With time considerations, e.g. temporary activation, valid time window or time limitations

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for improving the security of access control for keyless entry systems in motor vehicles.
  • Such keyless entry devices offer users of motor vehicles the opportunity to obtain access to a motor vehicle without a mechanical closing operation of a door lock.
  • the user usually carries with it a so-called ID transmitter, which enters into radio communication with the systems of the motor vehicle. Triggering event for the reception of such radio communication is an approach of the user to the motor vehicle, for example, the approach of the hand to the door handle area.
  • an on-vehicle wake-up device Upon detection of such an event, an on-vehicle wake-up device sends out a wake-up radio signal which receives a user-carried ID transmitter.
  • the wake-up radio signal is evaluated by the ID transmitter by a circuit, in particular it is checked whether the wake-up radio signal comes from a motor vehicle, which is assigned to the ID transmitter.
  • this emits a high-frequency enable radio signal, which is received and decoded on the vehicle side.
  • a vehicle-side release of the locking device takes place, so that the user can access it.
  • Such communication is extremely fast, so that the accessing user usually does not take note of it, as long as the access authorization is successfully checked.
  • the door lock is Usually already released as soon as the user actually accesses it.
  • relay station attacks there are attacks on such communications, referred to as relay station attacks.
  • the wake-up signal from the vehicle is received by a first extension station and sent to a second station located near the ID transmitter. In this way, an unauthorized person can gain access to the vehicle when he is near the vehicle and stops the second radio station in the vicinity of the ID transmitter.
  • the object of the invention is therefore to provide an improved system for securing keyless entry systems.
  • the object is achieved by a method for controlling the access authorization for a motor vehicle with the features of claim 1.
  • a resonant circuit is controlled by the wake-up circuit for generating the wake-up radio signal under control of the power supply of the resonant circuit such that the settling time of the resonant circuit is variable.
  • the settling time is thereby varied in dependence on a randomly generated parameter, which by controlling the Power supply happens.
  • the duty cycle or duty cycle is varied.
  • the settling time of the resonant circuit can be varied between a minimum, realizable in practice value and a maximum value.
  • a time component is deliberately and specifically introduced into the sequence of radio communications, which is subject to the control of the vehicle-side circuits.
  • the system runtime ie the time from the start of the transmission of the wake-up signal to the reception of the enable signal, consists of several components.
  • the resonant circuit oscillates under control of the wake-up circuit. until the response threshold of the receiving ID transmitter has been reached, and sends its wake-up signal to the ID transmitter.
  • the ID transmitter receives this signal, checks the information content encoded therein (e.g., a so-called wake-up pattern), and sends a high-frequency response signal back to the vehicle, with a time component T2 to be considered for reception and verification.
  • the high-frequency enable signal is received, checked and sent an enable signal to the mechanical lock device of the door lock, with a time component T3 added.
  • Such an expected system runtime is initially calculated according to the invention as a function of the generated random parameter. This calculated system runtime results in a time window within which an uncorrected connection without a prolonged radio link is expected to provide feedback for the release of the door lock.
  • the actually required time duration for the transmission of the radio signal and until the receipt of the release signal ie the real system run time
  • the actually required time duration for the transmission of the radio signal and until the receipt of the release signal ie the real system run time, is measured and compared to the expected System runtime adjusted. If the time period deviates by more than a predetermined value from the expected system run time, a release of the closing device is inhibited.
  • the invention is based on the finding that, in the case of a radio link extension, the emitted wake-up signal was generated as a function of the randomly generated parameter and therefore contains a specifically influenced time component.
  • this extension component of time appears a second time, namely when extending the radio link to the ID transmitter.
  • the wake-up signal is newly generated with another resonant circuit and forwarded to the ID transmitter.
  • the time component is then included twice in the system runtime and the entire system runtime then no longer matches the expected system runtime.
  • the response signal is thus not obtained within the time window which was calculated for the receipt.
  • the core of the invention is therefore the deliberate and artificial variation of the settling time of the wake-up circuit and the comparison of the expected system runtime with the actual system runtime.
  • this concept is suitable for different frequencies of the wake-up signal, in particular for systems with a transmission frequency of 20 kHz, but also for systems with a transmission frequency of 125 kHz.
  • a time proportion known on the vehicle side is deliberately introduced into the system runtime, so that the system run time is different for each communication process for verification of the access authorization.
  • An extended radio link can not adjust to such a different time delay from case to case.
  • a delay given on the vehicle side according to another scheme can also be provided be achieved. This can prevent the delays in successive closing operations from being too similar due to chance.
  • the duty cycle of the power supply can be influenced.
  • other possibilities for changing the transient response can also be used.
  • the parameter which determines the delay of the transient response is sent to the ID transmitter.
  • a value generated from the parameter can be sent from the wake-up circuit to the ID transmitter.
  • the ID transmitter receives information about the settling time and can then make a verification of the consistency of various existing data. For example, so-called RSSI data, ie data representative of the field strength or reception quality, can be used to determine the distance dependence of the ID transmitter from the vehicle and to include it in the evaluation of the data.
  • the communication between ID transmitter and vehicle-mounted devices is performed in several sections.
  • a message is first sent from the wake-up circuit in the vehicle to the ID transmitter.
  • the ID transmitter can set its threshold for the subsequent wake-up signal. In this way, the security of the process can be further increased.
  • the wake-up circuit is designed such that it can transmit on different frequencies.
  • different channels can be provided at eg 20 kHz, 22 kHz and 24 kHz.
  • the wake-up signal can be sent on these channels.
  • the respectively The next channel used can be coded in a message and transmitted from the wake-up circuit to the ID transmitter. This can then match in the subsequent communication based on the received frequency this with the channel according to the previously transmitted message and so further increase the security of the authentication process.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic view of the arrangement of the components in the application of the method according to the invention according to a first embodiment.
  • FIG. 1 a vehicle 1 is shown which has a keyless access authorization control.
  • An ID transmitter 2 is carried by a user and can perform radio communication with the vehicle 1 to check the legitimacy for access to the vehicle 1.
  • a radio communication 1a, 2a initiated by the vehicle 1 with the ID transmitter 2, in the course of which the legitimacy of the accessing user is checked.
  • the identifier stored in the ID transmitter is stored in the vehicle as a license-authorized identifier.
  • the usual and uncorrupted radio communication link between vehicle 1 and ID transmitter 2 is a few meters at maximum. It should be ensured that the vehicle can not be accessed if the user is too far away from the vehicle with the legitimizing ID transmitter, in particular out of sight.
  • the relay station attack is carried out by artificially prolonging the radio link between the vehicle 1 and the ID transmitter 2 so that the radio communication between the vehicle and the ID transmitter takes place, although the distance between the vehicle 1 and ID transmitter 2 is actually so large that the radio communication due to the transmission power should not be possible.
  • an unauthorized attacker will go in the vicinity of the vehicle 1 and with a device 3, the z. B. may be hidden in a suitcase, start an attempt to access the vehicle.
  • a remote station 4 is located at another attacker in the vicinity of the authorized user with the ID transmitter 2.
  • the vehicle transmits its directed to the ID transmitter 2 communication 1b, received by the device 3 and via a further radio link 3c the device 4 is passed.
  • message 4d the latter transmits the received message again to the ID transmitter 2, which perceives it as a message from the vehicle 1 and sends its legitimization check and response.
  • the reply 2d from the ID transmitter 2 to the vehicle 1 in turn runs (4c, 3b) via the stations 4 and 3.
  • the vehicle-side communication device to a resonant circuit, which is brought to the start of the communication request to settle.
  • the settling time required by the resonant circuit to reach the ID threshold of the ID transmitter is influenced on the vehicle by specifying the duty cycle or duty cycle. In this way, the delay of the transient process can be influenced in a targeted manner. According to the invention delays between 1 and several 10 ms are possible.
  • the settling time is set as a function of a random parameter generated on the vehicle side. This random parameter may be coupled to other vehicle systems to generate a pseudorandom number from any sensory vehicle size.
  • all available data in the vehicle in question such as mileage, battery voltage, tire pressure or other sizes.
  • Such a generated pseudorandom number provides values that are not traceable or predictable by an attacker.
  • a delay is determined by which the natural settling time of the oscillatory circuit is prolonged.
  • the settling time is influenced accordingly via the duty cycle of the supply of the resonant circuit, so that after a rise time T1 the threshold of communication with the ID transmitter is reached (in the figure, the messages 1a and 1b are subject to this time factor). If the ID transmitter is in the vicinity of the vehicle (message 1a), that is, if authorized access is available, then the ID transmitter answers immediately after evaluation and checking of the message or with a slight delay T2.
  • the ID transmitter's response is transmitted in the high-frequency range to the vehicle-side communication device, so that the entire system runtime requires an acceptable time window for the settling time of the capacitor plus the time T2 for the evaluation in the ID transmitter 2 and the high-frequency response. If, for example, a deliberate delay T1 of 5 ms is set, the accepted time window for a response of the ID transmitter will be, for example, between 5 and 5.5 ms. Responses of the ID transmitter which arrive outside this time window are ignored and do not lead to a release of the vehicle 1.
  • a wake-up message 10 with 20 kHz is generated on the vehicle side.
  • the ID transmitter receives this message 10, evaluates it and sends back a high-frequency response signal 11. Since much less time is required for the high-frequency communication, the time window is correspondingly close to the predetermined settling time to arrange.
  • the device 3 receives the message 1b of the vehicle 1.
  • the device 3 transmits the received message in the high-frequency range to the device 4, for which purpose a hardly relevant time span is required on a regular basis.
  • the transmission 4d of the station 4 and the ID transmitter 2 which must take place in the lower frequency range, but now again enters the predetermined settling time T1 ', which was specified on the vehicle side in response to a random parameter, since the capacitors of the system at startup are not loaded.
  • the time-delayed message 1b is accordingly forwarded to the ID transmitter 2 with approximately twice the delay as the message 4d.
  • the vehicle deliberately introduced time delay factor is therefore present twice in the system, so that the response 2d of the ID transmitter 2 is sent to the vehicle 1 delayed. Now, the answer message of the ID transmitter 2 does not fall within the previously calculated time slot, and therefore access is denied to the vehicle.
  • time delay parameter This can be determined at random, or derived from vehicle-side parameters. It is essential that the invention can be realized with conventional, usually already existing means, since in particular the settling time of the resonant circuit via the duty cycle in the control unit can be adjusted, so that no significant structural changes are required.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
EP10158623A 2009-04-16 2010-03-31 Procédé de sécurisation d'une communication d'entrée sans clé pour véhicules automobiles Withdrawn EP2242027A3 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102009002448A DE102009002448A1 (de) 2009-04-16 2009-04-16 Verfahren zur Sicherung einer Keyless-Entry-Kommunikation für Kraftfahrzeuge

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2242027A2 true EP2242027A2 (fr) 2010-10-20
EP2242027A3 EP2242027A3 (fr) 2011-12-21

Family

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EP10158623A Withdrawn EP2242027A3 (fr) 2009-04-16 2010-03-31 Procédé de sécurisation d'une communication d'entrée sans clé pour véhicules automobiles

Country Status (4)

Country Link
US (1) US20100265035A1 (fr)
EP (1) EP2242027A3 (fr)
CN (1) CN101866537A (fr)
DE (1) DE102009002448A1 (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR3007875A1 (fr) * 2013-06-28 2015-01-02 Continental Automotive France Procede de protection d'un systeme d'acces et/ou de demarrage main libre d'un vehicule en modifiant la vitesse de reception de signaux
DE102017200668A1 (de) 2017-01-17 2018-07-19 Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zur Absicherung eines Zugangs

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JP5685073B2 (ja) 2010-12-17 2015-03-18 株式会社東海理化電機製作所 電子キーシステム
DE102012003015A1 (de) 2012-02-15 2013-08-22 Audi Ag Startsystem für einen Kraftwagen, Kraftwagen mit einem Startsystem und Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Startsystems für einen Kraftwagen
CN102795172B (zh) * 2012-08-17 2015-08-05 马瑞利汽车电子(广州)有限公司 一种汽车智能进入系统的车门把手感应装置
US8930045B2 (en) 2013-05-01 2015-01-06 Delphi Technologies, Inc. Relay attack prevention for passive entry passive start (PEPS) vehicle security systems
US9114720B2 (en) 2013-07-11 2015-08-25 Delphi Technologies, Inc. Vehicle positioning system for wireless charging stations
US9802574B2 (en) * 2014-09-16 2017-10-31 Qualcomm Incorporated Relay attack inhibiting
DE102015203661A1 (de) 2015-03-02 2016-09-08 Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft Funktionsabschaltung für ein Fahrzeugzugangssystem
CN108698561B (zh) * 2016-02-26 2021-11-23 胡夫·许尔斯贝克和福斯特有限及两合公司 用于激活车辆安全系统的至少一项安全功能的方法
EP3306576B1 (fr) * 2016-10-05 2023-03-15 The Swatch Group Research and Development Ltd Procédé et système d'accès securisé à un espace déterminé au moyen d'un objet portable
EP3335942B1 (fr) * 2016-12-14 2019-11-20 Nxp B.V. Système d'accès sécurisé de véhicule, clé, véhicule et procédé associé
EP3425420B1 (fr) * 2017-07-03 2021-11-17 Nxp B.V. Appareil et procédé de télémétrie
EP4148694A1 (fr) * 2021-09-14 2023-03-15 Nagravision Sàrl Accès à un actif avec un dispositif utilisateur

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR3007875A1 (fr) * 2013-06-28 2015-01-02 Continental Automotive France Procede de protection d'un systeme d'acces et/ou de demarrage main libre d'un vehicule en modifiant la vitesse de reception de signaux
US9430889B2 (en) 2013-06-28 2016-08-30 Continental Automotive France Method for protecting a hands-free access and/or starting system of a vehicle by modifying the speed of signal reception
DE102017200668A1 (de) 2017-01-17 2018-07-19 Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zur Absicherung eines Zugangs
DE102017200668B4 (de) * 2017-01-17 2019-01-17 Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zur Absicherung eines Zugangs

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE102009002448A1 (de) 2010-10-21
US20100265035A1 (en) 2010-10-21
CN101866537A (zh) 2010-10-20
EP2242027A3 (fr) 2011-12-21

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