EP1125094A1 - Dispositif d'allumage pour amorces pouvant etre declenchees par radio et procede pour declencher ces amorces - Google Patents

Dispositif d'allumage pour amorces pouvant etre declenchees par radio et procede pour declencher ces amorces

Info

Publication number
EP1125094A1
EP1125094A1 EP99971499A EP99971499A EP1125094A1 EP 1125094 A1 EP1125094 A1 EP 1125094A1 EP 99971499 A EP99971499 A EP 99971499A EP 99971499 A EP99971499 A EP 99971499A EP 1125094 A1 EP1125094 A1 EP 1125094A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
ignition
unit
trigger
ignition device
detonators
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP99971499A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1125094B1 (fr
Inventor
Heinz Schäfer
Ulrich Steiner
Andreas Zemla
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Dynamit Nobel AG
Dynamit Nobel GmbH Explosivstoff und Systemtechnik
Original Assignee
Dynamit Nobel AG
Dynamit Nobel GmbH Explosivstoff und Systemtechnik
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from DE19945790A external-priority patent/DE19945790A1/de
Application filed by Dynamit Nobel AG, Dynamit Nobel GmbH Explosivstoff und Systemtechnik filed Critical Dynamit Nobel AG
Publication of EP1125094A1 publication Critical patent/EP1125094A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1125094B1 publication Critical patent/EP1125094B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • FMECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42DBLASTING
    • F42D1/00Blasting methods or apparatus, e.g. loading or tamping
    • F42D1/04Arrangements for ignition
    • F42D1/045Arrangements for electric ignition
    • F42D1/05Electric circuits for blasting
    • FMECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42CAMMUNITION FUZES; ARMING OR SAFETY MEANS THEREFOR
    • F42C13/00Proximity fuzes; Fuzes for remote detonation
    • F42C13/04Proximity fuzes; Fuzes for remote detonation operated by radio waves
    • F42C13/047Remotely actuated projectile fuzes operated by radio transmission links
    • FMECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42CAMMUNITION FUZES; ARMING OR SAFETY MEANS THEREFOR
    • F42C15/00Arming-means in fuzes; Safety means for preventing premature detonation of fuzes or charges
    • F42C15/40Arming-means in fuzes; Safety means for preventing premature detonation of fuzes or charges wherein the safety or arming action is effected electrically

Definitions

  • Ignition device for detonators that can be triggered by radio and method for
  • the invention relates to an ignition device for detonators which can be triggered by radio, in accordance with the preamble of the first claim and a method for triggering these detonators in accordance with the preamble of claim eighteen.
  • a remote control system for mines which consists of a remote control device with a microprocessor, program memory for storing the control commands for the mine and a radio transmitter and in which each mine has a radio receiver, a microprocessor and a program memory corresponding to the remote control device Has program memory.
  • various parameters of the command transmission can be changed in a time-dependent manner by the synchronously operating time control devices installed both in the mine and in the operating device remote therefrom.
  • This type of security requires that a time elapses to arm the mine, which cannot be influenced by the selection by a random generator. Securing the detonators in this way, especially when civilly using an ignition device, is incalculable for planning processes with work progress.
  • the object of the present invention is to present a radio-controlled ignition device which is safe from external interference and unwanted triggering, in which the time sequence from the start-up of the radio-controlled ignition device to the ignition of the detonators can be determined and tracked in time.
  • OPTIONAL COPY The object is achieved according to the device with the aid of the characterizing features of the first claim. With the help of the characterizing features of the eighteenth claim, the object is achieved according to the method.
  • the ignition device according to the invention for detonators which can be triggered by radio consists of an ignition device and at least one trigger unit which can be arranged spatially separately from the ignition device and to which at least one detonator is connected. Ignitor and trigger unit communicate using radio signals.
  • the tripping unit has the following modules, the function of which will be explained in more detail later: energy module, system control, transmitter and receiver unit, first safety device, second safety device and the safety ignition level.
  • the trigger unit contains a data carrier on which the information required for the ignition is stored. This data carrier is not permanently connected to the release unit and can be removed from it in order to insert it into the ignition device and to read the data there into a memory.
  • the ignition device therefore contains a reading device for the data of the data carriers.
  • Chip cards are preferably used as the data carrier. However, it is also possible to use other data carriers which are able to store data and from which data can be read, for example cards with magnetic strips or barcodes.
  • the release unit and the data carrier assigned to it must contain identical identification marks. If this is not the case, after the data have been read in from the data carrier into the ignition device, no identification can take place during communication with the triggering unit. If an attempt is therefore made to trigger an ignition with a faulty data carrier or with a data carrier with faulty data, the triggering unit will refuse appropriate commands due to the faulty identification marks.
  • the trigger unit In order to be able to ignite a detonator, it is first necessary to activate the trigger unit.
  • the igniter as well as the one that can be spatially arranged by it Trip unit can be protected against misuse by an access lock. Only after this access block, which can consist, for example, of a mechanical lock or of an electronic block, which can be released by entering a code, or even a combination of both, can the access control device according to the invention be made ready for operation.
  • the release of the operating option can also release the data carrier for removal.
  • an unlocking time elapses, which can be up to 15 minutes, for example. Triggering is not possible during this time and the user can be safely removed from the danger zone. If the data on the data carrier has been read into the igniter, it will be set to send and receive. However, communication between the ignitor and the trigger unit is only possible after the safety time has expired.
  • triggering units can be controlled, to which several igniters can be assigned.
  • Each trigger unit can be controlled individually via the igniter and thus also each igniter connected to a trigger unit in accordance with the data stored in the igniter and in the trigger unit.
  • the user starts a program, the program monitoring itself in a result-oriented manner and preventing triggering if errors are detected.
  • the ignition command to the detonators can only be given after successive release of predetermined trigger locks within security levels.
  • a process step required to prepare the ignition takes place within a security level in order to release a trigger lock.
  • the next block can only be lifted if the result of this procedural step fulfills a specification.
  • the igniter can only be ignited when all the locks are released. If a procedural step cannot be started or a If the method step does not lead to a predetermined result, the subsequent method step cannot be started.
  • the process is interrupted immediately. On the basis of the elapsed time and, for example, by checking the voltage present at the connections of the ignition line to the detonators, it is possible to identify the cause of the fault.
  • trigger locks can also be generated using the detonator electronics.
  • the detonators are advantageously secured against unwanted triggering, for example due to high voltage or the influence of high frequency.
  • An electronic detonator secured in this way is only activated by entering an unlocking code in the electronics for so-called ignition readiness. All other voltages present at the input of the igniter electronics are ignored.
  • the unlocking code is therefore a release lock and prevents accidental ignition.
  • the ignition is generated by the release unit after releasing the safety by a so-called ignition code. With each code sent by the release unit and accepted by the electronic detonator, the ignition is released step by step in the order of energy supply, provision of the ignition voltage, unlocking and ignition command.
  • the energy supply is initially only released for certain assemblies of the release unit, by means of which the specified release locks can be released within the security levels.
  • the electronic circuits in the trip unit assemblies are self-tested. In particular, the voltage status of the system control and the safety ignition level are checked. You have to be dead. For example, by a faulty relay or by a If a voltage is detected in the electronics, the electronics are "switched off", which means that they can no longer receive further commands.
  • the voltage is supplied at a voltage level which is preferably below the level required for the ignition of electrical or electronic detonators.
  • the so-called Action CPU generates a defined time span, the unlocking time, in the first securing device.
  • a quartz-controlled clock can run.
  • a charge store is charged to a voltage level required for the release of the first trigger lock within a period of time which is determined by the RC element and which should match that generated in the Action CPU.
  • two equally long periods of time now run independently of one another, taking into account a tolerance specification, as the releasing time.
  • the first security level has been overcome.
  • a special security is given by the fact that the charge store is at the same time the time-determining component of the one-way RC timer. The charging behavior of the cargo storage is checked during the expiry of the unlocking time.
  • the first release lock can be canceled after the safety time has expired.
  • the achieved process step can be shown to the user in the event of possible bidirectional communication on the display of the release unit, so that he himself can decide whether to release the release lock and release it by means of a radio signal.
  • the cancellation can also take place directly, program-controlled. It consists in releasing the ignition line to the detonators, which was previously short-circuited, for example by a fuse.
  • the resistance of the fuse and the given The charge level of the charge storage device is matched to one another in such a way that the fuse is only destroyed after this level has been reached, for example by melting the fuse wire.
  • the trigger lock cannot be released and the ignition cable cannot be released for signal transmission because, for example, the safety wire does not melt. Furthermore, the sending and receiving unit is not released. This means that the trip unit is still locked.
  • the user can initiate the so-called arming in the second security level using a radio command.
  • the sharpening can only take place if the identification number of the release unit matches the identification number that was read into the igniter.
  • the sharpening can also run automatically under program control. Only with this command is the system control and the safety ignition level supplied with voltage in the release unit by closing a relay from the energy module. This releases the second trip lock.
  • the electronics of the trip unit independently checks whether the voltage required for ignition is maintained at the output of the safety ignition level. From now on it is possible to give the command to trigger a detonator. In the event of a fault, the tripping unit is switched off and, in the case of bidirectional communication, with a message to the igniter.
  • the triggering of the individual triggering units takes place individually, in groups or in a group, depending on the equipment of the triggering units and the requirements of the user.
  • the trigger unit When using an electronic detonator, the trigger unit must generate the unlocking code and then the ignition code to initiate the detonator. Electronic detonators are therefore not fired until a defined sequence of codes has been accepted. First, the electronics of the detonators are activated by a first code, then unlocked and an energy store is charged to provide the ignition energy. The second code generated by the system control of the triggering unit is compared with the code stored in the memory of the detonator. If there is a match, the ignition is finally triggered by discharging the energy store using a third code.
  • FIG. 1 shows a radio ignition device according to the invention
  • FIG. 2 shows the structure of the trigger unit with igniter, as a block diagram
  • Figure 3 shows the circuit diagram of the One Way RC timer as a module of
  • Figure 5 is a block diagram of the electronic part of the igniter.
  • a radio ignition device 1 according to the invention is shown schematically in FIG.
  • the radio ignition device 1 consists of at least one triggering unit 2a and one ignition device 3. However, depending on the capacity of the ignition device 3, further triggering units can also be provided, as indicated by the broken line of the triggering unit 2b.
  • the trigger unit 2a has an access lock 4, which protects it against unauthorized use. This can consist of a mechanically acting lock or an electronic lock or a combination of both. With the electronic lock, for example, it can be overcome by entering a code.
  • the trigger unit 2a has a device 5 for receiving a data carrier 6a.
  • This data carrier 6a can be a chip card, for example, which contains a microchip 7 and protrudes from an insertion slot.
  • the identification numbers (ID) of the electronic assemblies of the trip units are stored on the data carriers. These identification numbers are also stored in the respective memory of the trip units.
  • the data carrier 6a can furthermore contain information about electronic detonators connected to the trigger unit 2a, for example the detonator addresses and the ignition sequence.
  • the access block 4 If the access block 4 has been lifted, it is also possible to remove the data carrier 6a from the device 5, as is indicated by the dashed representation 6a 'of the data carrier. With the removal of the data carrier 6a, a switch 8 is closed, which enables the provision of energy for the operation of the release unit 2a. At the same time, a self-test of the electronics of the trigger unit 2a is carried out by closing the switch 8.
  • detonators 10a to 10n are connected to the trigger unit 2a via an ignition line.
  • the trigger unit 2a also has an antenna 11, as is indicated by the lightning symbol 12. If the trigger unit 2a is equipped with only one receiving part, the antenna 11 is used exclusively for unidirectional communication, for signal reception from the igniter 3. If the trigger unit 2a is additionally equipped with a transmitter, the antenna 11 serves for bidirectional communication with the igniter 3.
  • the trigger unit 2b has an identical structure. However, the data carrier 6b contains a different identification number than the data carrier 6a and data of the electronic detonators 10a 'to 10n'.
  • the ignition device 3 can also have an access lock 13, which is configured in the same way as the access lock 4 of the trigger unit 2a. Only after the access block 13 has been lifted is it possible to insert the data carrier 6a into a device 14 suitable for receiving. In this a reader 15 is installed, by means of which the data stored on the data carrier 6a is read and a memory is stored in the ignition device 3.
  • the data carriers 6a and 6b as well as further data carriers of triggering units, not shown here, can be inserted one after the other into the receiving device 14 and the data can be read in one after the other.
  • the ignition device 3 contains a central processor unit (CPU) 16 with EEPROM, which is provided for data processing and storage, and, depending on the equipment, also a receiving unit for bidirectional communication, 17 with antenna 18, via which the communication with the trigger unit 2a or other trigger units, such as the trigger unit 2b, is possible.
  • the further equipment includes a display 19 for displaying data or commands to be transmitted or transmitted.
  • an input device 20 is provided for data and command input.
  • FIG. 2 shows the structure of the trigger unit 2a with its individual assemblies.
  • the housing 21 encloses an energy module 22, a system control 23, a first safety device 24, a second safety device 25, a safety ignition stage 26, and in the present exemplary embodiment a transmission and reception unit 27 with antenna 11, the transmission unit being provided for bidirectional communication.
  • a single-cell primary battery 28 is provided for energy supply in the energy module 22. With regard to its resilience and shelf life, it can be matched to the duration of use and duration of action. As not shown here, the battery compartment is accessible so that the battery can be changed easily after the storage period has expired.
  • a switch S1 is closed mechanically. If the switch S1 is closed, a current flows into a direct current converter 29. It is a step-up voltage converter with a standard circuit and is therefore state of the art.
  • This 5 converter 29 initially supplies the first securing device 24 and, in the present exemplary embodiment, the transmitting and receiving unit 27 with a basic voltage of, for example, 5 V.
  • the system control 23 and the safety ignition stage 26 are still de-energized at this point in time, since the first securing device 24 relays the relay S2 has not yet driven.
  • the first securing device 24 comprises an action CPU 30 and a one-way RC timer 31.
  • the structure of the one-way RC timer 31 is explained in more detail with reference to FIG. 3.
  • the one-way RC timer 31 contains a self-starting (auto-startable) resistance capacitor timing element (RC element) as the first timing element.
  • an up converter 58 in the RC timer 31 starts automatically and loads by means of a clock generator 37 by means of suitable control pulses 59 at certain charge rates
  • the capacitor 32 is discharged with a semiconductor switch, a transistor 34, via a fuse 35, in the present exemplary embodiment a fuse.
  • the discharge pulse is dimensioned so that at one
  • the release time can be predetermined by the choice of the capacitance of the capacitor 32 and the power dimensioning of the step-up converter 58.
  • the unlocking time which can be up to 15 minutes, for example, can be selected by the user and is preset at the factory.
  • the capacitor 32 is charged as a charge store after the supply voltage supplied by the step-up converter 29 has been applied at certain charge rates which are predetermined by the duration and magnitude of the pulses 59 of the step-up converter 58.
  • the charging time of the capacitor 32 is compared with a time period which is started with the start of the charging of the capacitor 32 in a second timing element. It is a quartz-controlled clock, not shown here, in the Action CPU 30, in which a factory-set time period expires as the unlocking time.
  • the system-related charging time of the capacitor 32 must correspond within a tolerance with the time period generated by the clock in the Action CPU.
  • the capacitor 32 must be charged with the intended charge within this period of time, otherwise the first trip lock cannot be released.
  • the voltage comparator 33 constantly compares the voltage when charging the charge store 32.
  • the time-determining capacitor 32 fulfills a double function. It is both a time-determining link and a store for the load.
  • the fuse 35 is opened by discharging the capacitor 32.
  • the fuse 35 is the second fuse device 25 and provides in the present Embodiment a short circuit forth between the two connections 43 and 44 of the ignition line 9, the connection between the safety ignition stage 26 and the electronic detonators 10a to 10n.
  • the short circuit means that no signals are sent from the safety ignition stage 26 to the detonators via the ignition line, and thus no detonators can be ignited.
  • the fuse 35 blows to a potential increase at the point at which the negative path of the voltage supply to the RC element is connected.
  • the ground connection E of the supply voltage for the first timer is connected in series with the first trip lock 35, so that the capacitor 32 can only be charged once.
  • the timer is without power supply. For this reason, the RC link can only be used once.
  • the fuse for the One Way RC timer 31 is physically independent of the rest of the electronic circuit and the other modules. Since the One Way RC-Timer 31 contains no moving mechanical parts, it is acceleration-resistant and suitable for a wide temperature range.
  • the action CPU 30 controls the voltage status of the system controller 23 and the safety ignition stage 26. Furthermore, it is responsible for checking the functional processes within the first safety device 24 and compares the unlocking time specified by its clock with the charging time of the capacitor 32 of the one-way RC timer 31. At the end of her safety release time, she checks whether the charge storage device, the capacitor 32, contains a predetermined charge which is sufficient to destroy the fuse 35. If this is the case, it initiates the destruction of the fuse 35, as a result of which the first trigger lock is released. The action CPU 30 is responsible for the communication with the transmitting and receiving unit 27 during the unlocking time. If the fuse 35 has been destroyed and the first trigger lock has been overcome, communication with the ignition device 3 is possible.
  • relay S2 is actuated, thereby supplying system control 23 and safety ignition stage 26 with voltage. With the so-called sharpening is the second trigger lock is released.
  • the data required for generating the code signals are stored in the CPU 48 of the system controller 23. These code signals are required to ignite electronic detonators. If voltage is present at the safety ignition stage 26, the action CPU 30 of the first securing device 24 and the CPU 48 of the system controller 23 communicate with one another and log on to one another using a protocol. Furthermore, the action CPU 30 controls the step-up converter 49 for compliance with the voltage which is required to ignite the detonators. In the event of a fault, there is a controlled shutdown with radio signal to the ignitor 3.
  • the voltage is converted from the supply voltage 5 V to the ignition voltage 15 V.
  • the signals of the codes are generated in the generator 50 of the safety ignition stage 26, with which the releasing, programming and ignition of the detonators takes place.
  • the ignition trigger command is possible. It is also conceivable to couple the release of the second trigger lock to the ignition trigger command. It would then be possible to open the switch S1 again at the level of the first release lock by inserting the data carrier belonging to the release unit and thus to release the release lock again.
  • the transmitting and receiving unit 27 communicates with the ignition device 3 via its antenna 11.
  • a standard transceiver 47 which transmits and receives in the UHF range can be used as the transceiver.
  • the frequency range is, for example, 433 MHz.
  • the transmission takes place in the almost optical range, which means that the transmitter and receiver should have visual contact. By selecting a suitable frequency range, a further distance between the igniter and the trigger unit can be made possible.
  • the signal transmission is preferably carried out by frequency modulation, but can also be done by means of amplitude modulation.
  • the encoding of the digital data can be done directly via frequency shift keying (FSK) with a usual frequency change between 400 and 450 MHz. Communication with Audio Frequency Shift Keying (AFSK) is preferred because of the higher operational reliability.
  • the frequencies for this transmission are in the range of audible tones.
  • the structure of an electronic detonator 60 which is used, for example, in particular in mining and civil engineering, is explained with reference to FIG.
  • the sleeve 61 contains a secondary charge 62, which is ignited by a primary charge 63.
  • the ignition is initiated by the so-called squib 64.
  • the squib is connected directly to the ignition cable. There the squib is ignited directly by the electrical current pulse of up to several amps. It is a purely energetic ignition.
  • the electronics 65 essentially consist of an electronic circuit 66, which is embedded in a housing and the structure of which is explained in more detail with reference to the block diagram in FIG.
  • Another essential component is a capacitor 67, in which the energy required for the ignition is stored.
  • an SMD resistor 68 and a ferrite filter 69 as a limiter and filter circuit ensure that the input voltage does not exceed a certain value and that interference signals are kept away.
  • the sleeve 61 closes a plug 70 through which the connections of the electronics 65 are made.
  • the connections protrude as contact pins 71 from the plug 70 formed into a socket 72.
  • the plug 70 is pushed into the open end of the sleeve 61 and, for example in the present exemplary embodiment, is fastened therein by choking 73.
  • the plug 70 closes the sleeve watertight and thus protects the electronics.
  • the plug contact formed by the socket 72 offers the connection of a plug 74 which is connected to the ignition line 75.
  • the ignition line 75 opens into contact sleeves 76, in the the contact pins 71 are inserted. In the sectional view, only one contact sleeve and one contact pin can be seen here.
  • the plug 74 also has a sealing cone 77 which surrounds the contact sleeves 76 and can be pushed into the socket 72 of the plug 70.
  • Latching lamellae 78 located on the plug 74 engage recesses 79 arranged on the outside of the socket 72 and thus form a secure connection between the ignition line 75 and the electronic detonator 60.
  • This plug connection is dust and water protected and is therefore also suitable for rough blasting operations.
  • FIG. 5 shows the block diagram of the electronics 65 of the electronic detonator 60. It essentially consists of four assemblies: the analog part 80, which is connected to the ignition line 9, the ignition stage 81, to the connections 64a of which the ignition pill 64 is connected, the digital data controller 82 with the CPU 83 and the information part 84.
  • An electronic detonator can only be ignited if information, control signals, coded with a corresponding voltage level is sent to the detonator on the ignition line.
  • the detonator 60 is made ready for operation by means of an unlocking code, code 1.
  • the unlocking code 85 is stored in the information part 84.
  • the same code is stored in the CPU 48 of the system controller 23 (FIG. 2). On command, it is generated and transmitted by generator 50 of safety ignition level 26.
  • the capacitor 67 is first with a defined charging current charged.
  • a powerful limiter and filter circuit 87 as input protection ensures that the input voltage does not exceed a certain value.
  • external voltages such as those that can occur under the influence of external electricity, are intercepted.
  • the signal decoupling 88 a change occurs with every change of direction of the input current, with every zero crossing of the voltage Issued signal that is further processed in the digital data controller 82. After the signal coupling 88, the energy store, the capacitor 67 in the ignition stage 81, is charged via a rectifier 89.
  • a digitally adjustable two-stage voltage regulator 90 Between the rectifier 89 and the energy store 67 there is a digitally adjustable two-stage voltage regulator 90. It keeps the voltage so low during the unlocking that an ignition is ruled out due to a lack of ignition energy, but the electronics can be operated safely.
  • Each change in the polarity of the input voltage at the igniter 60 causes a pulse to be generated in the electronics 65 of the igniter. After a defined pulse sequence, the charging of the capacitor 67 is released as an energy store.
  • the unlocking code code 1
  • the signals coming from the signal decoupling 88 run on the input pulse counter 91 in the digital data controller 82. The pulses are evaluated in the CPU 83 and compared with the unlocking code 85 in the information part 84.
  • an oscillator 92 is provided in the digital data controller 82, which feeds signals into the CPU 83 via a clock generator 93 and passes them to a reference counter 94. If an attempt is made to carry out the programming with an incorrect code, the fuse is self-locking. Reactivation is only possible by trained personnel.
  • the second stage of the voltage regulator 90 is released.
  • the capacitor 67 is then charged to the voltage at the input of the igniter 60 in a very short time, for example in 3 seconds.
  • an electronic switch must be released by means of a further code (code 2) consisting of further defined voltage changes.
  • code 2 is also stored in the system controller 23 of the triggering unit 2a and is also generated by the generator 50 of the safety ignition stage 26. If the number of pulses contained in code 2 coincides with the number of pulses specified by reference counter 94, a switching transistor 95 is activated, with which the detonator is armed.
  • the next pulse coming from the input counter, code 3 is then used by the CPU 83 to control the switching transistor 95. With this pulse, the capacitor 67 is discharged and the squib 64 is ignited.
  • the capacitor 67 discharges in a short time, for example in two minutes, without ignition. The igniter is then passive again, which means that it is safe to use and ready for operation again.
  • the manufacturing data 96 and the customer data 97 are additionally stored in the information part 84 and these data can be accessed by the CPU 83 of the digital data controller 82.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Air Bags (AREA)
EP99971499A 1998-10-29 1999-10-27 Dispositif d'allumage pour amorces pouvant etre declenchees par radio et procede pour declencher ces amorces Expired - Lifetime EP1125094B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19849653 1998-10-29
DE19849653 1998-10-29
DE19945790A DE19945790A1 (de) 1998-10-29 1999-09-24 Zündeinrichtung für Zünder, die mittels Funk auslösbar sind und Verfahren zum Auslösen dieser Zünder
DE19945790 1999-09-24
PCT/EP1999/008122 WO2000026607A1 (fr) 1998-10-29 1999-10-27 Dispositif d'allumage pour amorces pouvant etre declenchees par radio et procede pour declencher ces amorces

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1125094A1 true EP1125094A1 (fr) 2001-08-22
EP1125094B1 EP1125094B1 (fr) 2002-06-05

Family

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP99971499A Expired - Lifetime EP1125094B1 (fr) 1998-10-29 1999-10-27 Dispositif d'allumage pour amorces pouvant etre declenchees par radio et procede pour declencher ces amorces

Country Status (4)

Country Link
EP (1) EP1125094B1 (fr)
AT (1) ATE218698T1 (fr)
AU (1) AU1376900A (fr)
WO (1) WO2000026607A1 (fr)

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US6851369B2 (en) 2002-08-30 2005-02-08 Orica Explosives Technology Pty Ltd. Access control for electronic blasting machines

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AU2001216836A1 (en) * 2000-02-11 2001-08-20 Inco Limited Remote wireless detonator system
US7559269B2 (en) * 2001-12-14 2009-07-14 Irobot Corporation Remote digital firing system
EP1842026B1 (fr) * 2005-01-24 2012-05-30 Orica Explosives Technology Pty Ltd Communication de donnees dans des systemes d'abattage a l'explosif electroniques
AU2006225079B2 (en) * 2005-03-18 2011-02-24 Orica Australia Pty Ltd Wireless detonator assembly, and methods of blasting
RS49942B (sr) * 2007-01-30 2008-09-29 Lazar Kričak Sistem za programirano iniciranje mreža električnih i neelektričnih detonatora primenom rf sistema prenosa
CN102278924B (zh) * 2010-06-11 2013-08-07 南京理工大学 智能起爆控制系统及其方法
CN105423833B (zh) * 2015-11-30 2017-05-03 无锡力芯微电子股份有限公司 一种电子雷管快速施工装置及其使用方法
CN111435419A (zh) * 2019-01-11 2020-07-21 毛龙飞 基于多种生物识别的虹膜识别方法
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AU1376900A (en) 2000-05-22
ATE218698T1 (de) 2002-06-15
WO2000026607A1 (fr) 2000-05-11

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