EP0825316A2 - Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé - Google Patents

Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0825316A2
EP0825316A2 EP97202546A EP97202546A EP0825316A2 EP 0825316 A2 EP0825316 A2 EP 0825316A2 EP 97202546 A EP97202546 A EP 97202546A EP 97202546 A EP97202546 A EP 97202546A EP 0825316 A2 EP0825316 A2 EP 0825316A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
information
key
identification information
data carrier
location
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP97202546A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0825316B2 (fr
EP0825316A3 (fr
EP0825316B1 (fr
Inventor
Wolfgang Buhr
Helmut Hörner
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH
Koninklijke Philips NV
Original Assignee
Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH
Philips Patentverwaltung GmbH
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV
Philips Electronics NV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Family has litigation
First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=7803302&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=EP0825316(A2) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Application filed by Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH, Philips Patentverwaltung GmbH, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV, Philips Electronics NV filed Critical Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH
Publication of EP0825316A2 publication Critical patent/EP0825316A2/fr
Publication of EP0825316A3 publication Critical patent/EP0825316A3/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0825316B1 publication Critical patent/EP0825316B1/fr
Publication of EP0825316B2 publication Critical patent/EP0825316B2/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G07C2009/0088—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed centrally

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a system for writing one of transferred from a central location to a remote location Key information in an existing data carrier.
  • the disk is a key for a motor vehicle
  • the Keys from a dealer to the rightful owner of the motor vehicle should be output, for example because it contains an additional key required or one originally received when purchasing the motor vehicle Lost key.
  • the method according to the invention or system is also suitable for other applications, for example for Key for access control to certain rooms or areas. With the The method or system according to the invention can be selected quite generally assigned information is securely written into a data carrier.
  • a key information stored in a central location in a disk to be written in a remote location must be with conventional systems prevent the transmission of key information can be intercepted to the remote location without authorization, otherwise a fraudster can write unauthorized eavesdropping of key information into their own data carriers and thus, for example, unauthorized access to secure rooms or Areas.
  • the other option in the central location is the To write key information into the data carrier and then to the Sending it to a remote location is also inconvenient, since the data carrier is Transport can be stolen.
  • the object of the invention is to provide a method for securely registering a Specify key information in a data carrier that is in a position other than the place where the key information is generated or stored, is issued.
  • this object is achieved in that the key contains identification information stored contains that cannot be read from outside and is therefore secret and that the key information is in the central location with this identification information encrypted and the encrypted information on the disk on the Issuing point is transferred. This is encrypted in the data carrier Key information decrypted and saved again.
  • This method has the advantage that the data carriers can be sent freely, since they do not contain any key information, so that a possible thief steals the Can not use disk.
  • the unauthorized eavesdropping on a broadcast encrypted key information is also not for a fraudster Use if he does not have a data medium with the correct identification information in that he could write the encrypted key information.
  • each data carrier has additional, open identification information contains that can be read out. It is then possible for each data carrier to have one individual, different identification information from other data carriers saved by the assignment between the further, open identification information and the secret identification information is stored at the central location becomes. With this measure, encrypted key information can be obtained decrypted only from one, the correct data carrier will.
  • the key information to be transmitted to the data carrier is at least one individual object, for example clearly assigned to a motor vehicle. If a data carrier is to be assigned to such an individual object, the object information characterizing this object must go to the central location be transmitted. In order to secure this transmission path too, it is It is advisable to use the object information before transferring it to the central location the further, open identification information to be encrypted.
  • Encryption methods are used, with the encryption of the Object information or the encrypted object information is the open key is used, while the decryption with the secret key of the asymmetrical encryption process performed becomes.
  • the invention further relates to a system for writing one from a central one Secured key information transmitted to a remote location in a location data carriers available there as well as a data carrier and a terminal Use in such a system.
  • a central location 20 contains two memories 21 and 25
  • Memory 21 contains two groups 22 and 23 of memory locations, each are assigned to one another in pairs.
  • Data carriers with identical ident information in groups will become associated Ident information is read out from the allocated storage space of group 22.
  • the memory 25 in this example comprises three groups 26, 27 and 28 of memory locations.
  • group 26 In the storage locations of group 26 are Object information is saved, and each of these locations is a certain storage space assigned to group 27, the one of this object contains associated key information.
  • each memory location is the Group 26 preferably assigned several storage locations to group 28 Number of identification numbers included. Their meaning will be closer later explained.
  • a data carrier 10 is located at another point Of course, there are many data carriers that have the same structure are and for which the data carrier 10 indicated here is representative.
  • This Data carrier 10 contains a processing unit 11 and four storage locations 12 to 15.
  • the storage space 12 is used to store identification information that only can be processed internally in data carrier 10 and in no case externally is delivered.
  • the storage space 13 contains the individual data carrier characteristic further, open identification information, which is read outwards can be.
  • These two pieces of information are preferably from the central Point 20 is delivered where these two pieces of information are associated in two Memory locations of groups 22 and 23 of memory 21 are written, and this information is also at the further point where the Data carrier 10 is initially located in the memory locations 12 and 13.
  • the further location can be identical to the central station 20.
  • This writing in memory locations 12 and 13 takes place for a large number of Data carriers, and these data carriers are then via a transport route 19 transported to a remote location.
  • This transport route runs at least to the Part over an unprotected area, which is shown by the dash-dotted line 39 is indicated.
  • the data carriers can possibly be stolen. However, no one can do this through theft Significant damage occurs because the data media does not yet contain any key information included and therefore cannot be used on any object.
  • the part 42 of the encryption device is here as an exclusive-OR link executed.
  • the linked information that is the one with the open identification information represents encrypted object information becomes part 44 supplied, the asymmetrical encryption, for example, according to the RSA method, with a fixed key, which here as an input 45 supplied is indicated.
  • This key need not be secret, since with decryption is not possible.
  • the additional encryption with the open identification information brings one significant improvement in security.
  • a workshop transmitted data namely encrypted object information and open Identity information is listened to by a fraudster who pre-programmed himself Owns the key. If this scammer has the same encrypted object information transmits, but with the open identification information of its key, without the encryption with the open identification information it would Key information for the object received, with the secret identification information of his key is encrypted and therefore correct in the key is decrypted so that a valid key for the object is unlawful is obtained.
  • the additional encryption with the open identification information the encrypted object information transmitted by the fraudster the central position is not decrypted correctly, so that the desired one Key information is not read from the memory 25.
  • the encrypted information provided by part 44 via line 47 becomes now as well as the open identification information via line 43 of the central location 20 fed. This transmission can take place via an unsecured path, since the encrypted information on line 47 without knowing the secret Key of asymmetrical encryption cannot be decrypted and the open identification information does not directly indicate that in the data carrier contains the required key information.
  • the encrypted information is on the line 47 in the central location 20 to a decryption device comprising parts 32 and 34.
  • the Part 34 becomes a decryption of the information transmitted via line 47 carried out, with the help of a secret key, which is here over a Input 35 supplied is indicated.
  • a secret key which is here over a Input 35 supplied is indicated.
  • the decryption device then has the same information as at the exit the exclusive-OR link 42 in the terminal 40. However, this is not yet the Object information supplied via the input 41 of the terminal 40. Hence leads the line 37 to an exclusive-OR link 32, which is connected to another Received the open identification information on line 43.
  • the exclusive-OR link 32 now contains the decrypted object information with which the memory 25 is controlled.
  • group 26 the Storage location selected that contains this object information and from which The key information is read out from the associated storage space in group 27. Furthermore, with the help of the open identification information on line 43, the memory 21 driven by looking for the storage space of group 23, the latter Contains ident information, and the associated storage space of group 22, which the contains secret identification information is read out.
  • the information read out from the memory 21 and the memory 25 becomes one Encryption arrangement 30 supplied, which also here as an exclusive OR link is executed.
  • the information appearing at its output 31 becomes now transfer to the remote location, the transmission path being unsafe must, since the decrypted key information from the information on the line 31 can only be obtained with the help of the correct secret identification information that however, it is hidden in the data carrier and is not transferred directly.
  • the memory 25 also becomes a assigned storage location of group 28 read an identification number and transmitted via line 38 to the remote location, also a unsecured way can be used.
  • the information on line 31 and Line 38 is fed via the terminal 40 to the data carrier 10 '.
  • the Identification number on line 38 is in the data carrier 10 'directly in the Storage space 15 'is written while the encrypted key information on line 31 is supplied to a decryption device 17, which the secret identification information from the memory location 12 'to a further input receives.
  • This decryption device is again an exclusive-OR link executed and thus outputs the decrypted key information at the exit, which is written into the memory location 14 '.
  • the data carrier 10 'thus contains now all for its use with a certain object, for example with a Motor vehicle, necessary information without the crucial important Key information during transmission can be determined in an unauthorized manner can.
  • the identification number in memory location 15 ' is for the described method not absolutely necessary and serves if the disk is a key for one Motor vehicle is, in that in the motor vehicle first through this Identification number is checked whether it is a permissible key, before the key information is used to check whether it is a authorized key. If namely with an unauthorized Key, i.e. with wrong key information, a number of start attempts have been carried out, all functions of the motor vehicle become permanent blocked, the blocking only with a certain, secret procedure can be canceled. The identification number thus prevents with a wrong key, e.g. belongs to another motor vehicle and thus naturally contains other key information than recognized as valid Failed attempts can be made.
  • Each key authorized for a motor vehicle expediently contains a different one Identification number, and there are in memory 25 for each object information and a number of identification numbers are also stored in the associated object.

Landscapes

  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
EP97202546A 1996-08-22 1997-08-19 Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé Expired - Lifetime EP0825316B2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19633802A DE19633802A1 (de) 1996-08-22 1996-08-22 Verfahren und System zum Einschreiben einer Schlüsselinformation
DE19633802 1996-08-22

Publications (4)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0825316A2 true EP0825316A2 (fr) 1998-02-25
EP0825316A3 EP0825316A3 (fr) 2001-05-16
EP0825316B1 EP0825316B1 (fr) 2004-07-28
EP0825316B2 EP0825316B2 (fr) 2008-02-06

Family

ID=7803302

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP97202546A Expired - Lifetime EP0825316B2 (fr) 1996-08-22 1997-08-19 Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé

Country Status (4)

Country Link
US (1) US6337912B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP0825316B2 (fr)
JP (1) JP4065347B2 (fr)
DE (2) DE19633802A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE19901277A1 (de) * 1999-01-15 2000-07-20 Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag Verfahren zum Authentisieren eines Ersatzschlüssels zum Benutzen eines Fahrzeugs
DE19934098A1 (de) * 1999-07-21 2001-01-25 Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd Verfahren zum eingabefreien Starten eines gegen unbefugte Nutzung mit einer PIN geschützten Geräts
GB2381040B (en) * 2000-08-24 2004-04-28 Siemens Automotive Corp Lp Remote entry transmitter with transmission identification codes
US7490348B1 (en) 2003-03-17 2009-02-10 Harris Technology, Llc Wireless network having multiple communication allowances
US7664966B2 (en) * 2004-05-17 2010-02-16 Microsoft Corporation Secure storage on recordable medium in a content protection system
DE102006010821B4 (de) * 2006-03-07 2011-12-22 Joachim Becker Selbstzielsuchendes Datenübertragungssystem und Verfahren hierzu
US20080250251A1 (en) * 2007-04-04 2008-10-09 Cyberlink Corp. Systems and Methods for Hardware Driven Program Execution
ITPN20070040A1 (it) * 2007-05-29 2008-11-30 Bianchi 1770 S P A "metodo per la duplicazione di chiavi con codice elettronico"

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4123666A1 (de) * 1991-01-04 1992-07-09 Inteleplex Corp Sicherheitssystem fuer einen mobilen ausruestungsgegenstand
EP0663650A2 (fr) * 1993-12-14 1995-07-19 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Méthode à attribuer à un porteur mobile d'information à une station fixe
DE4441415A1 (de) * 1994-11-22 1996-05-23 Audi Ag Verfahren für die Handhabung von Ersatzschlüsseln
EP0723896A2 (fr) * 1995-01-26 1996-07-31 TEMIC TELEFUNKEN microelectronic GmbH Procédé de protection anti-vol pour véhicules à moteur
DE19532067C1 (de) * 1995-08-31 1996-10-24 Daimler Benz Ag Verfahren und Einrichtung zur Einprogrammierung von Betriebsdaten in Fahrzeugbauteile

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB8705892D0 (en) * 1987-03-12 1987-04-15 Security Services Plc Keys
JPH04213242A (ja) * 1990-12-07 1992-08-04 Hitachi Ltd 限定同報通信システム
EP0634038B1 (fr) * 1992-03-30 2001-10-24 Telstra Corporation Limited Methode et systeme de communication cryptographique
JP3568970B2 (ja) * 1993-04-12 2004-09-22 株式会社東芝 Ｉｃカード発行装置
WO1995016238A1 (fr) * 1993-12-06 1995-06-15 Telequip Corporation Carte memoire de securite pour ordinateur

Patent Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4123666A1 (de) * 1991-01-04 1992-07-09 Inteleplex Corp Sicherheitssystem fuer einen mobilen ausruestungsgegenstand
EP0663650A2 (fr) * 1993-12-14 1995-07-19 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Méthode à attribuer à un porteur mobile d'information à une station fixe
DE4441415A1 (de) * 1994-11-22 1996-05-23 Audi Ag Verfahren für die Handhabung von Ersatzschlüsseln
EP0723896A2 (fr) * 1995-01-26 1996-07-31 TEMIC TELEFUNKEN microelectronic GmbH Procédé de protection anti-vol pour véhicules à moteur
DE19532067C1 (de) * 1995-08-31 1996-10-24 Daimler Benz Ag Verfahren und Einrichtung zur Einprogrammierung von Betriebsdaten in Fahrzeugbauteile
EP0788946B1 (fr) * 1995-08-31 2001-10-24 DaimlerChrysler AG Procédé et dispositif pour la programmation de données opérationnelles dans des pièces de voitures

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US6337912B2 (en) 2002-01-08
EP0825316B2 (fr) 2008-02-06
EP0825316A3 (fr) 2001-05-16
EP0825316B1 (fr) 2004-07-28
US20010040966A1 (en) 2001-11-15
DE19633802A1 (de) 1998-02-26
DE59711801D1 (de) 2004-09-02
JP4065347B2 (ja) 2008-03-26
JPH10107789A (ja) 1998-04-24

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