EP0825316B2 - Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé - Google Patents

Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0825316B2
EP0825316B2 EP97202546A EP97202546A EP0825316B2 EP 0825316 B2 EP0825316 B2 EP 0825316B2 EP 97202546 A EP97202546 A EP 97202546A EP 97202546 A EP97202546 A EP 97202546A EP 0825316 B2 EP0825316 B2 EP 0825316B2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
information
identification information
key
data carrier
encrypted
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP97202546A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0825316A2 (fr
EP0825316A3 (fr
EP0825316B1 (fr
Inventor
Wolfgang Buhr
Helmut Hörner
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH
Koninklijke Philips NV
Original Assignee
Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Family has litigation
First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=7803302&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=EP0825316(B2) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Application filed by Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV filed Critical Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH
Publication of EP0825316A2 publication Critical patent/EP0825316A2/fr
Publication of EP0825316A3 publication Critical patent/EP0825316A3/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0825316B1 publication Critical patent/EP0825316B1/fr
Publication of EP0825316B2 publication Critical patent/EP0825316B2/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G07C2009/0088—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed centrally

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a system for writing a key information transmitted from a central location to a remote location into a data carrier present there.
  • the data carrier is a key for a motor vehicle, wherein the key is to be issued by a dealer to the rightful owner of the motor vehicle, for example because this additionally requires a key or has lost a key originally received when buying the motor vehicle.
  • the method or system according to the invention is also suitable for other applications, for example keys for access control to specific rooms or areas.
  • selected information can generally be stored in a data carrier in a secured manner.
  • the central office registers the identification numbers and the secret numbers of the theft-relevant system components.
  • the identification numbers used to identify the relevant theft-related system components are transmitted in clear text within the anti-theft system and between the anti-theft system and the central office.
  • the non-clear-transmitted secret numbers of theft-relevant system components serve as communication keys for layptological protocols in the data transmission of theft-relevant system components within the anti-theft system or / and with the central office.
  • a key information stored in a central location is to be written to a data carrier at a remote location, it must be prevented in conventional systems that the transmission of key information to the remote site can be intercepted without authorization, otherwise a fraudster who was listening unauthorized Enroll key information in their own media and thus, for example, unauthorized access to secure rooms or areas can procure.
  • the other possibility of writing in the central location the key information in the disk and then send it to the remote location is also unfavorable, since the disk can be stolen during transport.
  • the object of the invention is to specify a method for securely writing a key information in a data carrier, which is output at a location other than the location where the key information is generated or stored.
  • the key contains an ident information stored that is not readable from outside and thus secret, and that the key information encrypted in the central location with this identification information and the encrypted information to the disk at the issuing office is transmitted. In the data carrier, this encrypted key information is decrypted and stored again.
  • This method has the advantage that the data carriers can be sent free because they contain no key information, so that a possible thief can not use the disk. Unauthorized interception of transmitted encrypted key information is also of no use to a fraudster if he does not have a volume with the correct identity information to which he could enroll the encrypted key information.
  • each volume contains another, open Ident information that is readable. This makes it possible for each data carrier to contain an individual identification information that is different from other data carriers, in that the association between the further open identification information and the secret identification information is stored at the central location. With this measure, encrypted key information can only be decrypted correctly by one, the correct data medium.
  • the identity information and the open ident information are written to the data carrier at a further point before the Data carrier is transported to the remote location.
  • This additional location must then be coupled via a protected information transfer connection with the central location so that the same information can be written there.
  • the further location can also be identical to the central location.
  • the key information to be transferred to the data carrier is uniquely assigned to at least one individual object, for example a motor vehicle. If a data carrier is to be assigned to such an individual object, the object information characterizing this object must be transmitted to the central location. In order to secure this transmission path as well, it is expedient to encrypt the object information before transmission to the central location with the further, open identification information.
  • the encryption of data a variety of different methods are known.
  • the method according to the invention can be used as a particularly simple encryption and decryption of the key information and the object information, an exclusive OR link with the Ident information. Since the identification information is secret, decryption without knowledge of the key information is not possible even with knowledge of the encryption method.
  • an asymmetrical encryption method can be used for the encryption of the object information before the transmission from the remote location to the central location, wherein for the encryption of the object information or the encrypted object -Information the open key is used, while in the central office, the decryption is performed with the secret key of the asymmetric encryption method.
  • the invention further relates to a system for writing a key information transmitted from a central location to a remote location into a data carrier present there, as well as a data carrier and a terminal for use in such a system.
  • a central location 20 contains two memories 21 and 25.
  • the memory 21 contains two groups 22 and 23 of memory locations, which are each assigned in pairs to one another.
  • a specific information namely an open Ident information of a particular disk for data carriers with individual different ident information or specifying a volume group for data carriers with groups of identical Ident information, this is associated Ident information the assigned memory space of the group 22 read out.
  • memory 25 in this example includes three groups 26, 27 and 28 of memory locations.
  • Object information is stored in the memory locations of the group 26, and each of these memory locations is assigned a specific memory location of the group 27, which contains a key information associated with this object.
  • each memory location of the group 26 is preferably assigned a plurality of memory locations of the group 28 which contain a number of identification numbers. Their meaning will be explained later.
  • This data carrier 10 contains a processing unit 11 and four memory locations 12 to 15.
  • the memory location 12 is used to store identification information that can only be processed internally in the data carrier 10 and is never output to the outside.
  • the memory location 13 contains a further identification information which identifies the individual data carrier and which can be read out to the outside.
  • These two pieces of information are preferably provided by the central location 20, where these two pieces of information are written in two mutually associated memory locations of the groups 22 and 23 of the memory 21, and this information will also be at the other location where the volume 10 is initially located , inscribed in the memory slots 12 and 13.
  • the further location may be identical to the central station 20.
  • This writing into memory locations 12 and 13 takes place for a plurality of data carriers, and these data carriers are then transported via a transport path 19 to a remote location.
  • This transport path runs at least partially over an unprotected area, which is indicated by the dot-dash line 39.
  • the media may possibly be stolen. However, such a theft can not cause any significant damage since the data carriers do not yet contain any key information and thus can not be used on any object.
  • this data carrier 10' is connected to a terminal 40.
  • the open identification information contained therein is read from the memory location 13 'and supplied via the connection 43 to the terminal 40.
  • object information is input via an input 41, for example via a keyboard.
  • the part 42 of the encryption device is embodied here as an exclusive OR connection.
  • the linked information which thus represents the object information encrypted with the open identification information, is supplied to a part 44 which performs an asymmetrical encryption, for example according to the RSA method, with a fixed key, which is indicated here as being supplied via an input 45.
  • This key does not need to be secret, because with its help a decryption is not possible.
  • the additional encryption with the open Ident information brings a significant improvement in security. Assuming that the data transmitted by a workshop, namely encrypted object information and open identification information, is being intercepted by a fraudster who himself possesses pre-programmed keys. If this fraudster transmits the same encrypted object information, but with the key's ID open, he would get the key information for the object encrypted with the secret ID information of his key without the encryption with the open identity information and thus decrypted correctly in the key so that a valid key for the object is unlawfully obtained. Due to the additional encryption with the open identity information, the encrypted object information transmitted by the fraudster is not properly decrypted at the central location, so that the desired key information is not read from the memory 25.
  • the fraudster also transmits the likewise intercepted open identity information, he merely receives key information which is not encrypted with the secret identity information stored in his key and which therefore can not be decrypted. It is therefore not possible, by eavesdropping on an authorized transfer for an object to obtain data with which a key for the same object can be generated without justification.
  • the encrypted information delivered by the part 44 via the line 47 is now supplied via the line 43 to the central point 20 as well as the open identification information. This transmission can take place via an unsecured way, since the encrypted information on the line 47 can not be decrypted without knowledge of the secret key of the asymmetrical encryption and the open identity information contains no direct indication of the key information required in the data carrier.
  • the encrypted information on the line 47 is supplied to a decryption device comprising the parts 32 and 34.
  • a decryption of the transmitted information via the line 47 information is performed, with the help of a secret key, which is indicated here supplied via an input 35.
  • the line 37 of the part 34 of the decryption device is then the same information as at the output of the exclusive OR operation 42 in the terminal 40. However, this is not yet the input 41 of the terminal 40 supplied object information. Therefore, the line 37 leads to an exclusive-OR operation 32, which receives the open identification information via the line 43 at a further input.
  • the output 33 of the exclusive-OR operation 32 is now the decrypted object information with which the memory 25 is driven.
  • the memory location containing this object information is selected in the group 26, and the key information is read from the associated memory location of the group 27. Furthermore, with the help of the open identification information on the line 43, the memory 21 is driven by looking up the memory location of the group 23 containing this identification information and the associated memory space of the group 22 containing the secret identification information. is read out.
  • the information read from the memory 21 and the memory 25 is supplied to an encryption device 30, which is also designed here as an exclusive OR connection.
  • the information appearing at the output 31 is now transmitted to the remote location, the transmission path need not be secure, since the decrypted key information from the information on the line 31 can only be obtained with the help of the correct secret ident information, but in the disk is stored hidden and is not transmitted directly.
  • an identification number is also read from the memory 25 from an assigned memory location of the group 28 and transmitted via the line 38 to the remote location, whereby an unsecured path can also be used.
  • the information on the line 31 and the line 38 via the terminal 40 to the disk 10 ' is supplied.
  • the identification number on the line 38 is written in the data carrier 10 'directly in the memory location 15', while the encrypted key information is supplied on the line 31 to a decryption device 17, which receives the secret ident information from the memory location 12 'at another input.
  • This decryption device is again executed as exclusive-OR operation and thus outputs at the output the decrypted key information which is written into the memory location 14 '.
  • the volume 10 ' now contains all the information necessary for its use in a particular object, for example in a motor vehicle, without the crucial key information can be determined in the transmission in an unauthorized manner.
  • the identification number in memory location 15 ' is not absolutely necessary for the described method and serves, if the data carrier is a key for a motor vehicle, that the vehicle is first checked via this identification number, whether it is a permissible key, before Help the key information is checked if it is a legitimate key. Namely, if a number of start attempts have been made with an unauthorized key, ie with a wrong key information, all will Functions of the motor vehicle permanently blocked, the blocking can be canceled only with a specific, secret procedure. By identifying number is thus prevented that with a wrong key, for example, belongs to another motor vehicle and thus of course contains a different key information can be performed as valid failed attempts.
  • each authorized key for a motor vehicle contains a different identification number, and therefore a number of identification numbers are stored in the memory 25 for each object information and also in the associated object.

Claims (10)

  1. Procédé d'enregistrement d'une information de clé transmise de manière sécurisée d'un site central vers un site éloigné dans un support de données présent dans celui-ci qui, après enregistrement, est affecté de manière univoque à un objet sélectionné parmi plusieurs sur l'information de clé et qui contient une information d'identification enregistrée à ne pas délivrer vers l'extérieur ainsi qu'une information d'identification ouverte supplémentaire qui peut être lue, lesquelles sont respectivement enregistrées après avoir été affectées l'une à l'autre dans le site central, une information d'objet caractérisant l'objet individuel ainsi que l'autre information d'identification ouverte étant d'abord transmises vers le site central, l'information de clé enregistrée à propos de l'information d'objet y étant lue et codée avec l'information d'identification supplémentaire à transmettre enregistrée avec l'information d'identification ouverte et l'information de clé codée étant transmise vers le support de données et décodée dans le support de données avec l'information d'identification qui y est enregistrée et l'information de clé décodée y étant enregistrée,
    l'information d'identification et l'information d'identification supplémentaire ouverte étant enregistrées avant le transport du support de données vers le site éloigné dans le support de données à un autre endroit qui est couplé par l'intermédiaire d'une liaison protégée de transmission d'information avec le site central et cette information d'identification est également enregistrée dans le site central,
    et l'information d'objet étant codée avant la transmission vers le site central avec l'information d'identification ouverte.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, le codage et le décodage de l'information de clé et de l'information d'objet étant assurés par une fonction OU exclusif avec l'information d'identification ouverte supplémentaire.
  3. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel l'information d'objet codée est codée en supplément avant la transmission par un procédé de codage asymétrique avec la clé publique affectée à celui-ci, et décodée dans le site central avec la clé secrète du procédé de codage.
  4. Système d'enregistrement d'une information de clé transmise de manière sécurisée d'un site central vers un site éloigné dans un support de données présent dans celui-ci qui, après enregistrement, est affecté de manière univoque à un objet sélectionné parmi plusieurs sur l'information de clé, le site central contenant une première mémoire qui contient au moins une information d'identification ainsi qu'une information d'identification supplémentaire affectée ainsi que, pour chacun des plusieurs objets, une information d'objet caractérisant l'objet et l'information de clé affectée à l'objet, et un dispositif de codage pour le codage d'une information de clé lue de la première mémoire avec l'information d'identification ainsi qu'un dispositif de transmission pour la transmission de l'information de clé codée au site central, le support de données contenant une deuxième mémoire qui comprend un premier emplacement de mémoire pour une information d'identification, un deuxième emplacement de mémoire pour une information de clé et un troisième emplacement de mémoire pour une information d'identification supplémentaire caractérisant le support de données ainsi qu'un dispositif de décodage qui est relié à une entrée d'information du support de données et au premier emplacement de mémoire en vue de la délivrance d'une information de clé décodée après réception d'une information de clé codée, et de l'enregistrement de l'information de clé décodée dans le deuxième emplacement de mémoire,
    un terminal avec lequel le support de données peut être couplé étant prévu sur le site éloigné pour déclencher la lecture de l'information d'identification supplémentaire et transmettre cette information d'identification supplémentaire au site central et recevoir l'information de clé codée transmise ensuite par le site central et la transmettre au support de données, et
    le terminal contenant un dispositif de codage afin de coder une information d'objet introduite avec l'information d'identification supplémentaire et la transmettre au point central et le point central contenant un dispositif de décodage afin de décoder l'information d'objet codée reçue à l'aide de l'information d'identification supplémentaire également transmise et de commander la première mémoire avec l'information d'objet décodée et de lire l'information de clé affectée.
  5. Système selon la revendication 4, le dispositif de codage étant conçu dans le site central et le dispositif de décodage dans le support de données comme un élément de fonction OU exclusif.
  6. Système selon la revendication 4 ou 5, le dispositif de codage étant prévu dans le terminal pour coder l'information d'objet codée en plus de la clé publique à l'aide d'un codage asymétrique et les transmettre au site central et le dispositif de décodage dans le site central est organisé pour pouvoir décoder l'information d'objet codée supplémentaire reçue avec la clé secrète du codage asymétrique et avec l'information d'identification supplémentaire également reçue et délivrer l'information d'objet décodée à la première mémoire.
  7. Support de données pour la mise en oeuvre dans un système selon l'une des revendications 4 à 6, avec un dispositif de décodage et une mémoire avec un premier emplacement de mémoire pour l'enregistrement d'une information d'identification et un deuxième emplacement de mémoire pour l'enregistrement d'une information de clé, le dispositif de décodage étant couplé avec le premier emplacement de mémoire afin de décoder une information de clé codée reçue à l'aide de l'information d'identification lue à partir du premier emplacement de mémoire et d'enregistrer l'information de clé décodée dans le deuxième emplacement de mémoire et la délivrance de l'information d'identification hors du support de données étant bloquée, le dispositif de décodage étant conçu comme un élément de fonction OU exclusif.
  8. Support de données selon la revendication 7, la mémoire présentant un troisième emplacement de mémoire pour l'enregistrement d'une information d'identification supplémentaire et la mémoire pouvant être commandée de l'extérieur du support de données afin de délivrer vers l'extérieur l'information de modification supplémentaire à partir de la mémoire.
  9. Terminal pour la mise en oeuvre dans un système selon l'une des revendications 4 à 6, avec un dispositif de couplage pour un support de données, un dispositif de transmission pour les informations, un dispositif d'introduction pour l'introduction d'informations et un dispositif de codage avec deux entrées qui sont reliées au dispositif d'introduction et au dispositif de couplage et une sortie qui est reliée au dispositif de transmission afin de coder une information d'objet introduite par l'intermédiaire du dispositif d'introduction avec une information d'identification amenée par l'intermédiaire du dispositif de couplage et délivrer l'information d'objet codée au dispositif de transmission.
  10. Terminal selon la revendication 9, le dispositif de codage étant conçu pour coder l'information d'objet codée en supplément avec la clé ouverte d'un codage asymétrique et délivrer seulement l'information d'objet codée en supplément au dispositif de transmission.
EP97202546A 1996-08-22 1997-08-19 Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé Expired - Lifetime EP0825316B2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19633802 1996-08-22
DE19633802A DE19633802A1 (de) 1996-08-22 1996-08-22 Verfahren und System zum Einschreiben einer Schlüsselinformation

Publications (4)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0825316A2 EP0825316A2 (fr) 1998-02-25
EP0825316A3 EP0825316A3 (fr) 2001-05-16
EP0825316B1 EP0825316B1 (fr) 2004-07-28
EP0825316B2 true EP0825316B2 (fr) 2008-02-06

Family

ID=7803302

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP97202546A Expired - Lifetime EP0825316B2 (fr) 1996-08-22 1997-08-19 Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé

Country Status (4)

Country Link
US (1) US6337912B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP0825316B2 (fr)
JP (1) JP4065347B2 (fr)
DE (2) DE19633802A1 (fr)

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DE19901277A1 (de) * 1999-01-15 2000-07-20 Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag Verfahren zum Authentisieren eines Ersatzschlüssels zum Benutzen eines Fahrzeugs
DE19934098A1 (de) * 1999-07-21 2001-01-25 Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd Verfahren zum eingabefreien Starten eines gegen unbefugte Nutzung mit einer PIN geschützten Geräts
GB2381040B (en) 2000-08-24 2004-04-28 Siemens Automotive Corp Lp Remote entry transmitter with transmission identification codes
US7490348B1 (en) * 2003-03-17 2009-02-10 Harris Technology, Llc Wireless network having multiple communication allowances
US7664966B2 (en) * 2004-05-17 2010-02-16 Microsoft Corporation Secure storage on recordable medium in a content protection system
DE102006010821B4 (de) * 2006-03-07 2011-12-22 Joachim Becker Selbstzielsuchendes Datenübertragungssystem und Verfahren hierzu
US20080250251A1 (en) * 2007-04-04 2008-10-09 Cyberlink Corp. Systems and Methods for Hardware Driven Program Execution
ITPN20070040A1 (it) * 2007-05-29 2008-11-30 Bianchi 1770 S P A "metodo per la duplicazione di chiavi con codice elettronico"

Family Cites Families (10)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB8705892D0 (en) * 1987-03-12 1987-04-15 Security Services Plc Keys
US5229648A (en) * 1989-08-10 1993-07-20 Autosafe International, Inc. Multi element security system
JPH04213242A (ja) * 1990-12-07 1992-08-04 Hitachi Ltd 限定同報通信システム
EP0634038B1 (fr) * 1992-03-30 2001-10-24 Telstra Corporation Limited Methode et systeme de communication cryptographique
JP3568970B2 (ja) * 1993-04-12 2004-09-22 株式会社東芝 Ｉｃカード発行装置
WO1995016238A1 (fr) * 1993-12-06 1995-06-15 Telequip Corporation Carte memoire de securite pour ordinateur
DE4342641A1 (de) * 1993-12-14 1995-06-22 Siemens Ag Verfahren zur Authentifikation zwischen einem mobilen Datenträger und einer stationären Datenstation
DE4441415C2 (de) * 1994-11-22 2003-06-18 Audi Ag Verfahren für die Handhabung von Ersatzschlüsseln
DE19502373C2 (de) * 1995-01-26 1997-07-03 Telefunken Microelectron Verfahren zur Diebstahlsicherung motorangetriebener Kraftfahrzeuge
DE19532067C1 (de) * 1995-08-31 1996-10-24 Daimler Benz Ag Verfahren und Einrichtung zur Einprogrammierung von Betriebsdaten in Fahrzeugbauteile

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US6337912B2 (en) 2002-01-08
JPH10107789A (ja) 1998-04-24
US20010040966A1 (en) 2001-11-15
EP0825316A2 (fr) 1998-02-25
DE19633802A1 (de) 1998-02-26
DE59711801D1 (de) 2004-09-02
EP0825316A3 (fr) 2001-05-16
EP0825316B1 (fr) 2004-07-28
JP4065347B2 (ja) 2008-03-26

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