EP0825316B1 - Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé - Google Patents

Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0825316B1
EP0825316B1 EP97202546A EP97202546A EP0825316B1 EP 0825316 B1 EP0825316 B1 EP 0825316B1 EP 97202546 A EP97202546 A EP 97202546A EP 97202546 A EP97202546 A EP 97202546A EP 0825316 B1 EP0825316 B1 EP 0825316B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
information
identification information
key
data carrier
encrypted
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP97202546A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0825316A3 (fr
EP0825316A2 (fr
EP0825316B2 (fr
Inventor
Wolfgang Buhr
Helmut Hörner
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH
Koninklijke Philips NV
Original Assignee
Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Family has litigation
First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=7803302&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=EP0825316(B1) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Application filed by Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV filed Critical Philips Intellectual Property and Standards GmbH
Publication of EP0825316A2 publication Critical patent/EP0825316A2/fr
Publication of EP0825316A3 publication Critical patent/EP0825316A3/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0825316B1 publication Critical patent/EP0825316B1/fr
Publication of EP0825316B2 publication Critical patent/EP0825316B2/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G07C2009/0088—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed centrally

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a system for writing one of key information transmitted to a central location secured to a remote location into an existing data carrier.
  • the disk is a key for a motor vehicle
  • the key issued by a dealer to the rightful owner of the motor vehicle should be, for example because it additionally requires a key or lost a key originally received when purchasing the motor vehicle Has.
  • the method or system according to the invention is also suitable for other applications, for example for keys for access controls to certain rooms or areas.
  • the method or system can generally be selected Information is securely written into a data carrier.
  • EP 0 723 896 A2 describes a method for theft protection of motor-driven vehicles Motor vehicles described using an anti-theft system a control unit containing the immobilizer function, at least one further one theft-relevant system components and transmission links for bidirectional Communication between the theft-relevant system components, an external one Central office, as well as a transmission unit for data transmission between the theft-relevant system components and the central office.
  • all theft-relevant system components of the anti-theft system one before the first start-up for the respective one System component characteristic identification number and one from outside of the system component, non-readable, individual secret number in one stored non-volatile data memory of the system component, provided.
  • the central office provides the identification numbers and the secret numbers the theft-relevant system components are registered. To identify the respective theft-relevant system components serving identification numbers are within the anti-theft system and between the anti-theft system and transmitted to the central office in plain text. Those not transmitted in plain text Secret numbers of the theft-relevant system components serve as Communication key for layptological protocols during data transmission of the theft-relevant system components within the anti-theft system or / and with the central office.
  • a key information stored in a central location in a disk to be written in a remote location must be at conventional systems prevent the transmission of key information can be eavesdropped on to the remote location without authorization, otherwise a fraudster write the unauthorized eavesdropping of key information into your own data carrier can and thus, for example, gain unauthorized access to secured Can create spaces or areas.
  • the other way in the central Place the key information in the disk and write it then shipping to the remote location is also inconvenient because of the disk can be stolen during transportation.
  • the object of the invention is to provide a method for securely registering a Specify key information in a disk in another location as the location where the key information is generated or stored, is issued.
  • the key identifying information stored contains that cannot be read from outside and is therefore secret and that the key information is in the central location with this identification information encrypted and the encrypted information on the disk at the Issuing point is transferred. This is encrypted in the data carrier Key information decrypted and saved again.
  • This method has the advantage that the data carriers can be sent freely, since they do not contain any key information, so that a possible thief will Can not use disk.
  • the unauthorized eavesdropping on a broadcast encrypted key information is also not for a fraudster Use if he does not have a data medium with the correct identification information in that he could write the encrypted key information.
  • each data carrier has additional, open identification information contains that can be read out. It is then possible for each data carrier to have one individual, different identification information from other data carriers contains stored by the assignment between the further, open identification information and the secret identification information is stored at the central location becomes. With this measure, encrypted key information can be obtained decrypted only from one, the correct data carrier become.
  • the key information to be transmitted to the data carrier is at least one individual object, for example clearly assigned to a motor vehicle. If a data medium is to be assigned to such an individual object, the object information characterizing this object must go to the central location be transmitted. In order to secure this transmission path too, it is It is advisable to use the object information before transferring it to the central location the further, open identification information to be encrypted.
  • Encryption methods are used, with the encryption of the Object information or the encrypted object information is the open key is used, while the decryption with the secret key of the asymmetrical encryption process performed becomes.
  • the invention further relates to a system for writing one from a central one Secured key information transmitted to a remote location in a location data carriers available there as well as a data carrier and a terminal for Use in such a system.
  • a central location 20 contains two memories 21 and 25
  • Memory 21 contains two groups 22 and 23 of memory locations, each are assigned to one another in pairs.
  • Data carriers with identical ident information in groups will become associated Ident information is read out from the allocated storage space of group 22.
  • the memory 25 in this example comprises three groups 26, 27 and 28 of memory locations.
  • group 26 In the storage locations of group 26 are Object information is saved, and each of these locations is a certain storage space assigned to group 27, the one of this object contains associated key information.
  • each memory location is the Group 26 preferably assigned several storage locations to group 28 Number of identification numbers included. Their meaning will be closer later explained.
  • a data carrier 10 is located at another point Of course, there are many data carriers, which are constructed identically to one another are and for which the data carrier 10 indicated here is representative.
  • This Data carrier 10 contains a processing unit 11 and four storage locations 12 to 15.
  • the storage space 12 serves to store identification information, which is only can be processed internally in data carrier 10 and in no case externally is delivered.
  • the storage space 13 contains the individual data carrier characteristic further, open identification information, which is read outwards can be.
  • These two pieces of information are preferably from the central Point 20 is delivered where these two pieces of information are assigned in two Memory locations of groups 22 and 23 of memory 21 are written, and this information is also at the further point where the Data carrier 10 is initially located in the memory locations 12 and 13.
  • the further location can be identical to the central station 20.
  • This writing in memory locations 12 and 13 takes place for a large number of Data carriers, and these data carriers are then via a transport route 19 transported to a remote location.
  • This transport route runs at least to the Part over an unprotected area, which is shown by the dash-dotted line 39 is indicated.
  • the media can possibly be stolen. However, no one can do this through theft Significant damage occurs because the data media does not yet contain any key information included and therefore cannot be used on any object.
  • the part 42 of the encryption device is here as an exclusive-OR link executed.
  • the linked information that is, the one with the open identification information represents encrypted object information becomes part 44 supplied, the asymmetrical encryption, for example according to the RSA method, with a fixed key, which here as an input 45 supplied is indicated.
  • This key need not be secret, since with decryption is not possible.
  • the additional encryption with the open identification information brings one significant improvement in security.
  • a workshop transmitted data namely encrypted object information and open Identity information is listened to by a fraudster who pre-programmed himself Owns the key. If this scammer has the same encrypted object information transmits, but with the open identification information of its key, without the encryption with the open identification information he would Key information for the object obtained with the secret identification information his key is encrypted and therefore correct in the key is decrypted so that a valid key for the object is unlawful is obtained.
  • the additional encryption with the open identification information the encrypted object information transmitted by the fraudster the central position is not decrypted correctly, so that the desired one Key information is not read from the memory 25.
  • the encrypted information provided by part 44 via line 47 becomes now as well as the open identification information via line 43 of the central location 20 fed. This transmission can take place via an unsecured path, since the encrypted information on line 47 without knowing the secret Key of asymmetrical encryption cannot be decrypted and the open identification information does not directly indicate that in the data carrier contains the required key information.
  • the encrypted information is on the line 47 in the central location 20 to a decryption device comprising parts 32 and 34.
  • the Part 34 becomes a decryption of the information transmitted via line 47 carried out, with the help of a secret key, which is here over a Input 35 supplied is indicated.
  • a secret key which is here over a Input 35 supplied is indicated.
  • the decryption device then has the same information as at the exit the exclusive-OR link 42 in the terminal 40. However, this is not yet the Object information supplied via the input 41 of the terminal 40. Hence leads the line 37 to an exclusive-OR link 32, which is connected to another Received the open identification information on line 43.
  • the exclusive-OR link 32 now contains the decrypted object information with which the memory 25 is controlled.
  • group 26 the Storage location selected that contains this object information and from which The key information is read out from the associated storage location in group 27. Furthermore, with the help of the open identification information on line 43, the memory 21 controlled by visiting the memory location of group 23, the latter Contains ident information, and the associated storage space of group 22, which the contains secret identification information is read out.
  • the information read out from the memory 21 and the memory 25 becomes one Encryption arrangement 30 supplied, which also here as an exclusive OR link is executed.
  • the information appearing at its output 31 becomes now transfer to the remote location, the transmission path being unsafe must, since the decrypted key information from the information on the line 31 can only be obtained with the help of the correct secret identification information that however, it is hidden in the data carrier and is not transferred directly.
  • the memory 25 also becomes a assigned storage location of group 28 read an identification number and transmitted over line 38 to the remote location, also a unsecured way can be used.
  • the information on line 31 and Line 38 is supplied via the terminal 40 to the data carrier 10 '.
  • the Identification number on line 38 is in the data carrier 10 'directly in the Storage space 15 'registered while the encrypted key information on line 31 is supplied to a decryption device 17 which is on the secret identification information from the memory location 12 'to a further input receives.
  • This decryption device is again an exclusive-OR link executed and thus outputs the decrypted key information at the exit, which is written into the memory location 14 '.
  • the data carrier 10 'thus contains now all for its use with a certain object, for example with a Motor vehicle, necessary information without the crucial important Key information during transmission can be determined in an unauthorized manner can.
  • the identification number in memory location 15 ' is for the described method not absolutely necessary and serves if the disk is a key for one Motor vehicle is, in that in the motor vehicle first through this Identification number is checked whether it is a permissible key, before the key information is used to check whether it is a authorized key. If with an unauthorized Key, i.e. with wrong key information, a number of start attempts have been carried out, all functions of the motor vehicle become permanent blocked, the blocking only with a certain, secret procedure can be canceled. The identification number thus prevents with a wrong key, e.g. belongs to another motor vehicle and thus naturally contains other key information than recognized as valid Failed attempts can be made.
  • Each key authorized for a motor vehicle expediently contains a different one Identification number, and there are in memory 25 for each object information and a number of identification numbers are also stored in the associated object.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Claims (15)

  1. Procédé d'enregistrement d'une information de clé transmise de manière sécurisée d'un site central vers un site éloigné dans un support de données présent dans celui-ci qui, après enregistrement, est affecté de manière univoque à un objet sélectionné parmi plusieurs sur l'information de clé et qui contient une information d'identification enregistrée à ne pas délivrer vers l'extérieur ainsi qu'une information d'identification ouverte supplémentaire qui peut être lue, lesquelles sont respectivement enregistrées après avoir été affectées l'une à l'autre dans le site central, une information d'objet caractérisant l'objet individuel ainsi que l'autre information d'identification ouverte étant d'abord transmises vers le site central, l'information de clé enregistrée à propos de l'information d'objet y étant lue et codée avec l'information d'identification supplémentaire à transmettre enregistrée avec l'information d'identification ouverte et l'information de clé codée étant transmise vers le support de données et décodée dans le support de données avec l'information d'identification qui y est enregistrée et l'information de clé décodée y étant enregistrée.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, l'information d'identification et l'information d'identification supplémentaire ouverte étant enregistrées avant le transport du support de données vers le site éloigné dans le support de données à un autre endroit qui est couplé par l'intermédiaire d'une liaison protégée de transmission d'information avec le site central et cette information d'identification est également enregistrée dans le site central.
  3. Procédé selon la revendication 2, l'information d'objet étant codée avant la transmission vers le site central avec l'information d'identification ouverte.
  4. Procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 3, le codage et le décodage de l'information de clé et de l'information d'objet étant assurés par une liaison ou exclusive avec l'information d'identification ouverte supplémentaire.
  5. Procédé selon la revendication 3, dans lequel l'information d'objet codée est codée en supplément avant la transmission par un procédé de codage asymétrique avec la clé ouverte affectée à celui-ci et décodée dans le site central avec la clé secrète du procédé de codage.
  6. Système d'enregistrement d'une information de clé transmise de manière sécurisée d'un site central vers un site éloigné dans un support de données présent dans celui-ci qui, après enregistrement, est affecté de manière univoque à un objet sélectionné parmi plusieurs sur l'information de clé, le site central contenant une première mémoire qui contient au moins une information d'identification ainsi qu'une information d'identification supplémentaire affectée ainsi que, pour chacun des plusieurs objets, une information d'objet caractérisant l'objet et l'information de clé affectée à l'objet et un dispositif de codage pour le codage d'une information de clé lue de la première mémoire avec l'information d'identification ainsi qu'un dispositif de transmission pour la transmission de l'information de clé codée au site central, le support de données contenant une deuxième mémoire qui comprend un premier emplacement de mémoire pour une information d'identification, un deuxième emplacement de mémoire pour une information de clé et un troisième emplacement de mémoire pour une information d'identification supplémentaire caractérisant le support de données ainsi qu'un dispositif de décodage qui est relié à une entrée d'information du support de données et au premier emplacement de mémoire en vue de la délivrance d'une information de clé décodée après réception d'une information de clé codée et de l'enregistrement de l'information de clé décodée dans le deuxième emplacement de mémoire.
  7. Système selon la revendication 6, un terminal avec lequel le support de données peut être couplé étant prévu sur le site éloigné pour déclencher la lecture de l'information d'identification supplémentaire et transmettre cette information d'identification supplémentaire au site central et recevoir l'information de clé codée transmise ensuite par le site central et la transmettre au support de données.
  8. Système selon la revendication 7, dans lequel le terminal contient un dispositif de codage afin de coder une information d'objet introduite avec l'information d'identification supplémentaire et la transmettre au point central et le point central contient un dispositif de décodage afin de décoder l'information d'objet codée reçue à l'aide de l'information d'identification supplémentaire également transmise et de commander la première mémoire avec l'information d'objet décodée et de lire l'information de clé affectée.
  9. Système selon l'une des revendications 6 à 8, le dispositif de codage étant conçu dans le site central et le dispositif de décodage dans le support de données comme un élément de liaison ou exclusif
  10. Système selon l'une des revendications 8 ou 9, le dispositif de codage étant prévu dans le terminal pour coder l'information d'objet codée en plus de la clé ouverte à l'aide d'un codage asymétrique et les transmettre au site central et le dispositif de décodage dans le site central est organisé pour pouvoir décoder l'information d'objet codée supplémentaire reçue avec la clé secrète du codage asymétrique et avec l'information d'identification supplémentaire également reçue et délivrer l'information d'objet décodée à la première mémoire.
  11. Support de données pour la mise en oeuvre dans un système selon l'une des revendications 6 à 10 avec un dispositif de décodage et une mémoire avec un premier emplacement de mémoire pour l'enregistrement d'une information d'identification et un deuxième emplacement de mémoire pour l'enregistrement d'une information de clé, le dispositif de décodage étant couplé avec le premier emplacement de mémoire afin de décoder une information de clé codée reçue à l'aide de l'information d'identification lue à partir du premier emplacement de mémoire et d'enregistrer l'information de clé décodée dans le deuxième emplacement de mémoire et la délivrance de l'information d'identification hors du support de données étant bloquée.
  12. Support de données selon la revendication 11, la mémoire présentant un troisième emplacement de mémoire pour l'enregistrement d'une information d'identification supplémentaire et la mémoire pouvant être commandée de l'extérieur du support de données afin de délivrer vers l'extérieur l'information de modification supplémentaire à partir de la mémoire.
  13. Support de données selon l'une des revendications 11 ou 12, le dispositif de décodage étant conçu comme un élément de liaison ou exclusive.
  14. Terminal pour la mise en oeuvre dans un système selon l'une des revendications 6 à 10 avec un dispositif de couplage pour un support de données, un dispositif de transmission pour les informations, un dispositif d'introduction pour l'introduction d'informations et un dispositif de codage avec deux entrées qui sont reliées au dispositif d'introduction et au dispositif de couplage et une sortie qui est reliée au dispositif de transmission afin de coder une information d'objet introduite par l'intermédiaire du dispositif d'introduction avec une information d'identification amenée par l'intermédiaire du dispositif de couplage et délivrer l'information d'objet codée au dispositif de transmission.
  15. Terminal selon la revendication 14, le dispositif de codage étant conçu pour coder l'information d'objet codée en supplément avec la clé ouverte d'un codage asymétrique et délivrer seulement l'information d'objet codée en supplément au dispositif de transmission.
EP97202546A 1996-08-22 1997-08-19 Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé Expired - Lifetime EP0825316B2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19633802A DE19633802A1 (de) 1996-08-22 1996-08-22 Verfahren und System zum Einschreiben einer Schlüsselinformation
DE19633802 1996-08-22

Publications (4)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0825316A2 EP0825316A2 (fr) 1998-02-25
EP0825316A3 EP0825316A3 (fr) 2001-05-16
EP0825316B1 true EP0825316B1 (fr) 2004-07-28
EP0825316B2 EP0825316B2 (fr) 2008-02-06

Family

ID=7803302

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP97202546A Expired - Lifetime EP0825316B2 (fr) 1996-08-22 1997-08-19 Procédé et système pour inscrire une information de clé

Country Status (4)

Country Link
US (1) US6337912B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP0825316B2 (fr)
JP (1) JP4065347B2 (fr)
DE (2) DE19633802A1 (fr)

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DE19901277A1 (de) * 1999-01-15 2000-07-20 Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag Verfahren zum Authentisieren eines Ersatzschlüssels zum Benutzen eines Fahrzeugs
DE19934098A1 (de) * 1999-07-21 2001-01-25 Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd Verfahren zum eingabefreien Starten eines gegen unbefugte Nutzung mit einer PIN geschützten Geräts
GB2381040B (en) 2000-08-24 2004-04-28 Siemens Automotive Corp Lp Remote entry transmitter with transmission identification codes
US7490348B1 (en) * 2003-03-17 2009-02-10 Harris Technology, Llc Wireless network having multiple communication allowances
US7664966B2 (en) * 2004-05-17 2010-02-16 Microsoft Corporation Secure storage on recordable medium in a content protection system
DE102006010821B4 (de) * 2006-03-07 2011-12-22 Joachim Becker Selbstzielsuchendes Datenübertragungssystem und Verfahren hierzu
US20080250251A1 (en) * 2007-04-04 2008-10-09 Cyberlink Corp. Systems and Methods for Hardware Driven Program Execution
ITPN20070040A1 (it) * 2007-05-29 2008-11-30 Bianchi 1770 S P A "metodo per la duplicazione di chiavi con codice elettronico"

Citations (3)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4123666A1 (de) * 1991-01-04 1992-07-09 Inteleplex Corp Sicherheitssystem fuer einen mobilen ausruestungsgegenstand
DE4441415A1 (de) * 1994-11-22 1996-05-23 Audi Ag Verfahren für die Handhabung von Ersatzschlüsseln
EP0788946B1 (fr) * 1995-08-31 2001-10-24 DaimlerChrysler AG Procédé et dispositif pour la programmation de données opérationnelles dans des pièces de voitures

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GB8705892D0 (en) * 1987-03-12 1987-04-15 Security Services Plc Keys
JPH04213242A (ja) * 1990-12-07 1992-08-04 Hitachi Ltd 限定同報通信システム
AU671986B2 (en) * 1992-03-30 1996-09-19 Telstra Corporation Limited A cryptographic communications method and system
JP3568970B2 (ja) * 1993-04-12 2004-09-22 株式会社東芝 Ｉｃカード発行装置
AU1265195A (en) * 1993-12-06 1995-06-27 Telequip Corporation Secure computer memory card
DE4342641A1 (de) * 1993-12-14 1995-06-22 Siemens Ag Verfahren zur Authentifikation zwischen einem mobilen Datenträger und einer stationären Datenstation
DE19502373C2 (de) * 1995-01-26 1997-07-03 Telefunken Microelectron Verfahren zur Diebstahlsicherung motorangetriebener Kraftfahrzeuge

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4123666A1 (de) * 1991-01-04 1992-07-09 Inteleplex Corp Sicherheitssystem fuer einen mobilen ausruestungsgegenstand
DE4441415A1 (de) * 1994-11-22 1996-05-23 Audi Ag Verfahren für die Handhabung von Ersatzschlüsseln
EP0788946B1 (fr) * 1995-08-31 2001-10-24 DaimlerChrysler AG Procédé et dispositif pour la programmation de données opérationnelles dans des pièces de voitures

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE59711801D1 (de) 2004-09-02
EP0825316A3 (fr) 2001-05-16
US6337912B2 (en) 2002-01-08
US20010040966A1 (en) 2001-11-15
EP0825316A2 (fr) 1998-02-25
EP0825316B2 (fr) 2008-02-06
JP4065347B2 (ja) 2008-03-26
JPH10107789A (ja) 1998-04-24
DE19633802A1 (de) 1998-02-26

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