EP0097203A2 - Système de détection de supports de données falsifiées et support de données utilisé dans ce système - Google Patents

Système de détection de supports de données falsifiées et support de données utilisé dans ce système Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0097203A2
EP0097203A2 EP82109732A EP82109732A EP0097203A2 EP 0097203 A2 EP0097203 A2 EP 0097203A2 EP 82109732 A EP82109732 A EP 82109732A EP 82109732 A EP82109732 A EP 82109732A EP 0097203 A2 EP0097203 A2 EP 0097203A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data carrier
machine
stored
data
counterfeit
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP82109732A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0097203B1 (fr
EP0097203A3 (en
Inventor
Hans-Jürgen Walter
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
MICO DATENSYSTEME GmbH
Original Assignee
MICO DATENSYSTEME GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by MICO DATENSYSTEME GmbH filed Critical MICO DATENSYSTEME GmbH
Priority to AT82109732T priority Critical patent/ATE35335T1/de
Publication of EP0097203A2 publication Critical patent/EP0097203A2/fr
Publication of EP0097203A3 publication Critical patent/EP0097203A3/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0097203B1 publication Critical patent/EP0097203B1/fr
Expired legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/12—Card verification

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for detecting counterfeit data carriers, in particular copied magnetic cards, on which, in addition to identification data and other data, a financial credit can be stored and with which a number of machines installed in a permitted area can be used during a usage process by presenting a data carrier selectable machine service is called up, the counter value of the machine service provided being debited from the previous credit and the remaining credit is stored on the data carrier.
  • the invention further relates to a data carrier for carrying out the method according to the invention.
  • the invention has for its object to provide a method for detecting counterfeit data carriers of the type mentioned in the introduction, with which at least so high security against the use of counterfeit data carriers can be achieved with very little expenditure on equipment that practically no incentive to use of counterfeit media.
  • serial number stored in the machine currently in use and the number of uses of a single data carrier previously used in the machine currently used are applied to the present data carrier.
  • a greater number of data carriers previously used in the machine currently in use can be used to ensure even greater security.
  • a particularly preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention provides that after the triggering of a counterfeit detection signal, the data carrier recognized as a counterfeit is retained by the machine and is therefore withdrawn from the user's access. This not only ensures reliable preservation of evidence, it also prevents any further misuse with a forged data carrier from the outset. In addition, the psychological effect on the user of a counterfeit data carrier should also be particularly strong in that the counterfeit data carrier is withdrawn from its access.
  • a particularly rapid and effective dissemination of the fact that a certain data carrier has been identified as a forgery can preferably be achieved in that, after the recognition of a counterfeit data carrier, the sequence number and number of uses of the counterfeit data carrier are temporary for a predeterminable number of subsequent uses be applied to the data carrier present during use. It can preferably be provided that the sequence number and number of uses of the counterfeit data carrier are applied in ten subsequent uses.
  • the information about a data carrier recognized as a forgery is transmitted to all other machines in the area of use at a speed that increases like a avalanche. As a result, the likelihood that a forgery remains undetected is arbitrarily low.
  • a certain data medium for example a checking card
  • a certain data medium for example a checking card
  • All machines in the approved area only accept data carriers with a valid authorization code.
  • counterfeiting of a data carrier can be reliably detected at the central point and excluded from further misuse.
  • a data carrier which is particularly well suited for carrying out the method according to the invention is distinguished by this.
  • the data carrier is designed as a magnetic card on which the data are stored magnetically coded, in the memories already mentioned above.
  • the arrangement is advantageously such that the data can be stored in a predefinable map track.
  • a data carrier is also briefly referred to below as a magnetic card or also as a checking card.
  • the card sequence number of a specific magnetic card is assigned continuously during the initial issuance and thus enables each magnetic card issued to be clearly identified.
  • the process counter is set to "one" when a magnetic card is first issued and is increased by “one” each time the magnetic card is used in the machine.
  • a machine pre-user is understood to mean a user who happened to have used a particular machine in front of the holder of a magnetic card who currently has a magnetic card for obtaining machine service.
  • the process counter of the present magnetic card is increased by "one", apart from the debiting of the corresponding goods price. This increase takes place in the memory cell which is assigned to the associated card run number.
  • the transaction counter updated in this way is written back to the magnetic card together with the other data required for handling the transaction.
  • process counter and the card run number of the machine prior user are also transferred to the magnetic card currently in use.
  • a magnetic card or generally a data carrier is considered correct if the counter reading of the process counter on the data carrier is equal to or greater than the counter reading of the process counter stored in the machine that is currently being used for this data carrier.
  • a data carrier is forged, for example a magnetic card has been copied
  • the original and the copy have the same counter reading of the transaction counter and of course the same card sequence number.
  • the update procedure described above is carried out. As soon as the copy is presented to the machine after the original has been used, this copy can be recognized as a forgery in that the count of the process counter is smaller than the counter stored in the machine was standing.
  • the magnetic card or generally the data carrier is then retained in accordance with the above explanations.
  • the process counters are updated independently of the habits of a particular user and without his influence by the fact that each user, without being able to prevent this, also includes the process counter and the card run number of the machine user written on his magnetic card. This results in an indirect communication, which is beyond the influence of the user, between all the machines in the approved area of application, so that the information about a possibly counterfeited data carrier, such as a copied magnetic card, is quickly disseminated.
  • the process counter is set to "zero" and this counter reading is registered in the machine together with the associated card sequence number.
  • the card run number is written with the count "zero" of the process counter.
EP82109732A 1982-06-19 1982-10-21 Système de détection de supports de données falsifiées et support de données utilisé dans ce système Expired EP0097203B1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AT82109732T ATE35335T1 (de) 1982-06-19 1982-10-21 Verfahren zur erkennung von gefaelschten datentraegern sowie datentraeger zur durchfuehrung des verfahrens.

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE3223034 1982-06-19
DE3223034A DE3223034C2 (de) 1982-06-19 1982-06-19 Verfahren zur Erkennung von gefälschten Datenträgern

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0097203A2 true EP0097203A2 (fr) 1984-01-04
EP0097203A3 EP0097203A3 (en) 1986-01-29
EP0097203B1 EP0097203B1 (fr) 1988-06-22

Family

ID=6166424

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP82109732A Expired EP0097203B1 (fr) 1982-06-19 1982-10-21 Système de détection de supports de données falsifiées et support de données utilisé dans ce système

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US4510382A (fr)
EP (1) EP0097203B1 (fr)
JP (1) JPS5936873A (fr)
AT (1) ATE35335T1 (fr)
DE (1) DE3223034C2 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2561841A1 (fr) * 1984-03-24 1985-09-27 Philips Nv Procede pour reconnaitre l'utilisation illicite d'une identification

Families Citing this family (17)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4800520A (en) * 1985-10-29 1989-01-24 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Portable electronic device with garbage collection function
FR2592510B1 (fr) * 1985-12-31 1988-02-12 Bull Cp8 Procede et appareil pour certifier des services obtenus a l'aide d'un support portatif tel qu'une carte a memoire
ATE82418T1 (de) * 1986-08-26 1992-11-15 Siemens Ag Verfahren zum erkennen einer missbraeuchlichen benutzung von chipkarten.
US4908521A (en) * 1987-01-06 1990-03-13 Visa International Service Association Transaction approval system
US5239166A (en) * 1989-01-17 1993-08-24 Graves Marcel A Secure data interchange system erasing a card memory upon an invalid response
US5251259A (en) * 1992-08-20 1993-10-05 Mosley Ernest D Personal identification system
DE19604876C1 (de) * 1996-02-10 1997-09-04 Deutsche Telekom Ag Verfahren zur Transaktionskontrolle elektronischer Geldbörsensysteme
DE19611632A1 (de) * 1996-03-25 1997-10-02 Deutsche Telekom Ag Off-Line-Datenstationen mit virtueller On-Line-Fähigkeit
DE19627534A1 (de) * 1996-07-09 1998-01-15 Deutsche Telekom Ag Verfahren zur Verhinderung des Mißbrauchs von Modulen
US6029154A (en) * 1997-07-28 2000-02-22 Internet Commerce Services Corporation Method and system for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction over the internet
US7403922B1 (en) 1997-07-28 2008-07-22 Cybersource Corporation Method and apparatus for evaluating fraud risk in an electronic commerce transaction
US7096192B1 (en) 1997-07-28 2006-08-22 Cybersource Corporation Method and system for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction over a computer network
US6317650B1 (en) * 1999-04-29 2001-11-13 Softcard Systems, Inc. System and method employing portable cards to monitor a commercial system
JP4101420B2 (ja) 1999-12-27 2008-06-18 株式会社日立製作所 電子認証方法及びその実施装置
US7044394B2 (en) * 2003-12-17 2006-05-16 Kerry Dennis Brown Programmable magnetic data storage card
US7865427B2 (en) 2001-05-30 2011-01-04 Cybersource Corporation Method and apparatus for evaluating fraud risk in an electronic commerce transaction
DE502006000840D1 (de) * 2006-01-30 2008-07-10 Skidata Ag System mit mehreren Leistungseinrichtungen mit Zugangskontrolleinrichtungen

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3657702A (en) * 1970-08-19 1972-04-18 Digital Data Systems Corp Transaction accumulator for a credit verification system
US3662343A (en) * 1970-07-29 1972-05-09 Docutel Corp Credit card automatic currency dispenser
US4048475A (en) * 1974-03-07 1977-09-13 Omron Tateisi Electronics Company Apparatus for checking the user of a card in card-actuated machines
FR2496294A1 (fr) * 1980-12-15 1982-06-18 Thomson Csf Dispositif protege d'authentification des utilisateurs d'un terminal de transmission de messages et systeme de transactions comportant de tels dispositifs

Family Cites Families (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB1285445A (en) * 1968-08-30 1972-08-16 Smiths Industries Ltd Improvements in or relating to access-control equipment and item-dispensing systems including such equipment
JPS5213245B2 (fr) * 1973-05-18 1977-04-13
FR2386080A1 (fr) * 1977-03-31 1978-10-27 Cii Honeywell Bull Systeme de comptabilisation d'unites homogenes predeterminees
US4295041A (en) * 1977-08-26 1981-10-13 Compagnie Internationale Pour L'informatique Cii-Honeywell Bull (Societe Anonyme) Device for the protection of access to a permanent memory of a portable data carrier
JPS5828277Y2 (ja) * 1977-12-02 1983-06-20 オムロン株式会社 自動取引処理装置
DE2924325B2 (de) * 1979-06-15 1981-06-11 Hermann 7742 St. Georgen Stockburger Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur geheimen Kennzeichnung und Auswertung maschinenlesbarer Datenträger

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3662343A (en) * 1970-07-29 1972-05-09 Docutel Corp Credit card automatic currency dispenser
US3657702A (en) * 1970-08-19 1972-04-18 Digital Data Systems Corp Transaction accumulator for a credit verification system
US4048475A (en) * 1974-03-07 1977-09-13 Omron Tateisi Electronics Company Apparatus for checking the user of a card in card-actuated machines
FR2496294A1 (fr) * 1980-12-15 1982-06-18 Thomson Csf Dispositif protege d'authentification des utilisateurs d'un terminal de transmission de messages et systeme de transactions comportant de tels dispositifs

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
IBM TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE BULLETIN, Band 16, Nr. 1, Juni 1973, Seite 286, New York, US, M.A. AUSLANDER et al.: "Magnetic card access control." *

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2561841A1 (fr) * 1984-03-24 1985-09-27 Philips Nv Procede pour reconnaitre l'utilisation illicite d'une identification

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
JPH0421226B2 (fr) 1992-04-09
JPS5936873A (ja) 1984-02-29
US4510382A (en) 1985-04-09
DE3223034A1 (de) 1983-12-22
EP0097203B1 (fr) 1988-06-22
ATE35335T1 (de) 1988-07-15
EP0097203A3 (en) 1986-01-29
DE3223034C2 (de) 1986-12-11

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