DK2819907T3 - Method for auxiliary operation of a roadway element and operating control system - Google Patents

Method for auxiliary operation of a roadway element and operating control system Download PDF

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Publication number
DK2819907T3
DK2819907T3 DK13715179.1T DK13715179T DK2819907T3 DK 2819907 T3 DK2819907 T3 DK 2819907T3 DK 13715179 T DK13715179 T DK 13715179T DK 2819907 T3 DK2819907 T3 DK 2819907T3
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DK
Denmark
Prior art keywords
control system
operating control
driving data
auxiliary operation
train
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Application number
DK13715179.1T
Other languages
Danish (da)
Inventor
Thomas Gehrke
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Siemens Ag
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Publication of DK2819907T3 publication Critical patent/DK2819907T3/en

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Classifications

    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L1/00Devices along the route controlled by interaction with the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. pedals
    • B61L1/16Devices for counting axles; Devices for counting vehicles
    • B61L1/162Devices for counting axles; Devices for counting vehicles characterised by the error correction
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L19/00Arrangements for interlocking between points and signals by means of a single interlocking device, e.g. central control
    • B61L19/06Interlocking devices having electrical operation
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B61L2027/202Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)

Description

Description
The invention relates to a method for the auxiliary operation of a track element. A method of this kind is known, for example, from the published European patent application EP 1 396 413 A1.
In the field of rail automation, an auxiliary operation of a track element, which is also designated a command release or CR operation, is applied in particular in such cases where a normal operation of the signal box would be rejected for reasons of safety. A typical scenario for the use of an auxiliary operation is thus the rectification of faults, for example. Since, in the event of an auxiliary operation, the operation bypasses the fail-safe signalling logic, the safety responsibility in such cases lies to a not inconsiderable extent with the respective operating personnel. A method in accordance with the precharacterising clause of claim 1 is known from the technical article by Antweiler B. "Vernetzte Leittechnik fur sicherheitskritische Anwendungen am Beispiel Schweiz" ["Networked control technology for safety-critical applications in the example of Switzerland"], Signal + Draht (99) 3/2007.
The present invention is based on the object of specifying a method for auxiliary operation of a track element having a particularly high degree of operational safety.
This object is achieved according to the invention by a method for the auxiliary operation of a track element, wherein an operation control system receives travel data related to at least one rail-bound vehicle from a control facility of a train control system and the received travel data is taken into consideration by the operation control system, as part of an auxiliary operation of the track element, such that the operation control system performs an assessment on the basis of the travel data with regard to potentially hazardous situations arising from the auxiliary operation. A track element is understood in the context of the present invention as an element used in rail-bound transportation, which is usually arranged outdoors and can occupy or capture different statuses in order to control and/or monitor the rail-bound transportation. Corresponding track elements may involve wheel sensors, axle counters, points, derailers or even level crossings, for example. Furthermore, the term track element also comprises logical units formed with the aid of a plurality of such components, such as track sections or routes, for example.
In accordance with the first step of the method according to the invention, an operation control system receives travel data related to at least one rail-bound vehicle from a control facility of a train control system. This can be effected both with a direct temporal connection with an auxiliary operation of a track element, i.e. for example after triggering or starting an auxiliary operation by way an operator, and also decoupled in time from the actual auxiliary operation, i.e. at regular temporal intervals, for example. The travel data received in such a manner is taken into consideration by the operation control system as part of an auxiliary operation of the track element, corresponding to the second step of the method according to the invention. This means that before or during the performance of the auxiliary operation, i.e. before a complete execution of the auxiliary operation, a consideration of the travel data received by the control facility of the train control system takes place.
The method according to the invention offers the advantage that travel data related to at least one rail-bound vehicle is used to make additional information available to the operation control system beyond conventional system boundaries, which enable a more reliable decision, and thus one which increases the operational safety, regarding whether or not a requested auxiliary operation may or should be executed in the respective situation. Thus, the respective signal operator -or even other operating personnel of the operation control system - can be provided with a more accurate overview of the current hazardous situation during an auxiliary operation. In addition to an increase in safety, this is also connected with a reduced burden for the operator responsible.
According to the invention, the received travel data is taken into consideration by the operation control system, as part of the auxiliary operation of the track element, such that the operation control system performs an assessment on the basis of the travel data with regard to potentially hazardous situations arising from the auxiliary operation. This is advantageous as thus an assessment or evaluation on the basis of the travel data is effected by the operation control system itself, as to whether potential hazardous situations could arise from a triggered or requested auxiliary operation. The operating personnel or operators of the operation control system hereby thus advantageously have a reduced burden with regard to an analysis of the travel data received by the control facility of the train control system and, if required, visualised on the display apparatus of the operation control system.
In accordance with a particularly preferred development of the method according to the invention, the received travel data is additionally taken into consideration by the operation control system, as part of the auxiliary operation of the track element, such the travel data is visualised by means of at least one display apparatus of the operation control system.
By way of a corresponding visualisation, it is advantageously possible for the operating personnel to estimate more reliably whether or not an auxiliary operation of a particular track element is possible or permissible in the respective situation. Thus, in the event of an auxiliary operation of a set of points by means of the travel data for example, a display apparatus of the operation control system can display whether a train is currently travelling in the manner in question or is located in an at least dangerous proximity to said points.
In accordance with a further particularly preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention, the operation control system outputs a warning signal in the event that a potentially hazardous situation arising from the auxiliary operation is detected. In doing so, the outputting of the warning signal can take place on the one hand for example by way of a corresponding visualisation, such as in the form of a flashing display and/or by warning symbols popping up, as well as on the other hand, as an alternative or in addition thereto, also by way of an acoustic warning signal for example .
Preferably, the method according to the invention can also be developed such that the operation control system receives travel data related to the location, the speed and/or a movement authority of the at least one rail-bound vehicle from the control facility of the train control system. This is advantageous as the said variable involves such travel data which is particularly suitable for recognising hazardous situations as part of an auxiliary operation and are conventionally available for a control facility of a train control system. As a function of the type of the respective train control system, the location and speed of rail-bound vehicles can be reported by said vehicles, in corresponding position indications for example, which are also known as "position reports", to a stationary, central control facility of the train control system. Furthermore, the control facility of the train control system conventionally has information available regarding movement authorities which have been distributed to the rail-bound vehicles monitored and secured by the train control system. This relates in particular to an item of information also designated "Movement Authority" to the effect of up to which location or point on the line the respective rail-bound vehicle may move based on a present movement authority. By transmitting corresponding travel data to the operation control system, it is made possible for said system and/or the operating personnel thereof to recognise potential risks in the event of an auxiliary operation or, on the basis of the travel data, to even detect that such an auxiliary operation is possible without risk. It can thus be signalled or become clear by incorporating a movement authority that a movement authority of a train is present for the track or line element which is to be operated and that such an operation would therefore have an extremely high level of risk. Conversely, however, it is also conceivable that it becomes clear on the basis of the movement authority that, although a rail-bound vehicle is located in a track section, the movement authority of said vehicle ends before the track element which is to be actuated by means of the auxiliary operation.
In accordance with a further particularly preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention fail-safe travel data related to the at least one rail-bound vehicle is received by the operation control system from the control facility of the train control system. Designated as fail-safe in this case is such data which fulfils the particularly high safety requirements of the rail operation according to the authoritative regulations for the respective regulatory authority. This means that with fail-safe data, an undetected corruption can advantageously be excluded with near-certain probability. Conventionally, the travel data used by a control facility of a train control system to control and secure the rail-bound vehicle involves such fail-safe data. The consequence of this is that such fail-safe data is also able to be used on the part of the operation control system as part of a fail-safe auxiliary operation, whereby the safety of the auxiliary operation is further increased as a result.
Within the framework of the method according to the invention, the control facility of the train control system may in principle involve any type of control facility. This includes the control facility being able to involve a vehicle-side control facility, i.e. a control facility which is mobile together with the vehicle, which is arranged on the respective rail-bound vehicle in the form of a vehicle device. In this case, the travel data is thus transmitted directly or indirectly - for example on a radio basis - straight from the respective rail-bound vehicle to the operation control system.
Preferably, the method according to the invention can also be embodied such that the travel data related to the at least one rail-bound vehicle is received by the operation control system from a stationary control facility of the train control system. Train control systems conventionally have stationary control facilities which are preferably arranged in a control centre and are in communication with the monitored and secured rail-bound vehicles and carry the safety responsibility in relation to the securing and influencing of the rail-bound vehicles. Corresponding stationary control facilities of the train control system thus generally have available the travel data of a plurality of rail-bound vehicles, which can be forwarded or transmitted to the operation control system. This offers the advantage that it is possible to dispense with additional communication connections between the rail-bound vehicles and the operation control system, whereby the expense for implementing the method according to the invention is advantageously reduced.
Furthermore, the invention relates to an arrangement with an operation control system as well as a control facility of a train control system.
An operation control system is known, for example, from the company publication "Effizienter Schienenverkehr mit der Leitsystemfamilie VICOS OC - Wirtschaftliche Betriebsfuhrung" ["Efficient rail transport with the Vicos OC operations control system family - Cost-effective operations management"]^ Siemens AG 2008, order no. A19100-V100-B874-V1.
With regard to the arrangement, the present invention is based on the object of specifying an arrangement which supports a method for auxiliary operation of a track element which has a particularly high operational safety.
This object is achieved according to the invention by an arrangement with an operation control system as well as a control facility of a train control system, wherein the operation control system is embodied to receive travel data related to at least one rail-bound vehicle from the control facility of the train control system, wherein the operation control system is embodied to take into consideration the received travel data as part of an auxiliary operation of a track element, such that it performs an assessment on the basis of the travel data with regard to potentially hazardous situations arising from the auxiliary operation of the track element.
The advantages of the inventive arrangement correspond to those of the inventive method so that in this regard reference is made to the corresponding embodiments above. The same applies with regard to the preferred developments of the inventive arrangement mentioned below in relation to the corresponding preferred developments of the inventive method, so that in this regard also, reference is made to the corresponding embodiments above.
In accordance with a particularly preferred embodiment of the arrangement according to the invention, the operation control system is embodied to take into consideration the received travel data as part of the auxiliary operation of the track element, such that it visualises the travel data by means of at least one display apparatus of the operational control system.
In accordance with a further particularly preferred embodiment of the arrangement according to the invention, the operation control system is embodied to output a warning signal in the event that a potential hazardous situation arising from the auxiliary operation is detected.
Preferably, the arrangement according to the invention can also be embodied such that the operation control system is embodied to receive travel data related to the location, the speed and/or a movement authority of the at least one rail-bound vehicle from the control facility of the train control system.
Preferably the arrangement according to the invention is embodied such that the operation control system receives failsafe travel data related to the at least one rail-bound vehicle from the control facility of the train control system.
In accordance with a further particularly preferred embodiment of the invention according to the invention, the control facility is a stationary control facility of the train control system.
The invention will now be described in greater detail making reference to exemplary embodiments. For this purpose the
Figure shows an arrangement with an exemplary embodiment of the operation control system according to the invention in order to illustrate an exemplary embodiment of the method according to the invention in a schematic diagram.
It should be noted that the representation in the Figure involves a significantly simplified schematic representation, in which solely the components necessary to illustrate the exemplary embodiments of the method according to the invention as well as of the operation control system according to the invention are taken into consideration.
In the Figure, a rail-bound vehicle 10 in the form of a rail vehicle, which moves along a line or a track 20, can be recognised. The rail-bound vehicle 10 has a vehicle-side transmission facility 30, by means of which it is possible for the rail-bound vehicle 10 to communicate with a track-side transmission facility 40 on a radio basis. The track-side transmission facility 40 is tethered to a stationary control facility 60 of a train control system via a communication connection 50. It is hereby possible for the control facility 60 of the train control system to receive data, for example in the form of information regarding the position and speed of the vehicle 10, from the rail-bound vehicle 10 and also to transmit control commands to the rail-bound vehicle 10. Suitable control commands may involve a movement authority (designated MA), for example. This stipulates the location or point on the line, up to which the rail-bound vehicle 10 may move based on the present clearance by the control facility 60 .
In addition to the components already stated, a signal box 70 is indicated in the Figure. The signal box 70 is tethered for communication purposes via communication connections 80 and 90 to track elements 100 or 110 in the form of two-channel wheel sensors or axle counters embodied for recognising the direction of travel. In this case the communication connections 80 and 90 make it possible, on the one hand, that information, in the form of axle counting pulses, can be transmitted from the track elements 100, 110 to the signal box 70 and can be used thereby for the detection of the occupancy state of the track section formed by the track elements 100, 110. Furthermore, on the other hand, it can also be possible for the signal box 70 to transmit control commands to the track elements 100 or 110, respectively, via the communication connections 80, 90.
Moreover, the signal box 70 is tethered to an operation control system 130 via a further communication connection 120. The operation control system 130 serves the operation and observation of the signal box 70 and the elements outdoors tethered thereto, i.e. the track elements 100, 110. To this end, the operation control system 130 has - in addition to further components not shown in the figure - a processing facility 140 as well as a display apparatus 150.
In standard operation of the system shown in the figure, operator actions are made by an operator by means of the operation control system 130 and, after transmission of corresponding commands or data, are executed by the signal box 70 via the communication connection 120.
In this case, the safety responsibility lies with the failsafe signalling logic, so that hazards due to potential operator error can usually be excluded.
In practice, however, the situation may now emerge that, in particular operational situations or during interruptions by the operating personnel of the operation control system 130, so-called auxiliary operations, which are referred to as command release or CR operations due to their conventional operating procedure, are to be executed. Here, the responsibility in terms of safety lies to a significant extent with the operating personnel of the operation control system 130, since the safe signalling logic is not involved with corresponding auxiliary operations. The reason for this is that auxiliary operations are applied specifically in those situations in which a normal operation of the signal box would be rejected for safety reasons. In the context of the exemplary embodiment described, for example, this could relate to the case in which the track element 110 in the form of an axle counter - or a further track element tethered to the track element 100, 110 in the form of an axle counting computer - is to be reset by a signal operator by means of the operation control system 130. As an alternative, the auxiliary operation in question could, for example, involve an auxiliary route release, a relief signal activation or the setting of a disrupted set of points.
In all of the situations listed above, it is conceivable for the execution of the auxiliary operation in question to lead to a hazardous situation directly or indirectly. In order to now relieve the signal operator in this situation, which is exceedingly difficult and demanding, and also to provide additional information regarding the decision as to whether an intended or triggered auxiliary operation should actually be put into action, the operation control system 130 is tethered to the control facility 60 of the train control system via a communication connection 160. As a result, this advantageously enables the operation control system 130 to receive travel data related to the rail-bound vehicle 10 from the control facility 60 of the train control system. In the context of the exemplary embodiment described, it should be assumed here that the travel data in question comprises information regarding the location, the speed and a movement authority of the rail-bound vehicle 10. Advantageously, said transmitted travel data involves fail-safe information, which thus has a very high level of reliability.
As a result, the travel data transmitted by the control facility 60 of the train control system to the operation control system 130 is used or taken into consideration by said operation control system in the context of the auxiliary operation of a track element, i.e. of the track element 110. This may take place on the one hand by the travel data being displayed or visualised on the display apparatus 150 of the operation control system 130. To this end, for example, the position of the rail-bound vehicle 10 and/or the movement authority valid for the rail-bound vehicle 10 may be displayed in an overview representation of the track topology. If information regarding train locations determined by means of other track vacancy detection methods is available on the part of the operation control system 130, a comparative display of the information in question is also possible. It should be taken into consideration here as a function of the respective application that the location or position information provided on the part of the train control system may have a higher degree of accuracy than may be the case with conventional track vacancy detection systems. This means that the rail-bound vehicle 10 may be localised precisely within the track section formed by the track elements 100, 110 in the form of the axle counters, for example. In the case of an auxiliary operation of a set of points, for example, this can be used to indicate to the operating personnel whether a train is currently travelling on the set of points in question or is in dangerously close proximity to said points.
In addition or as an alternative to a visualisation of the travel data on the display apparatus 150 of the operation control system 130, the operation control system 130 itself may also perform an assessment with regard to potential hazardous situations arising from the auxiliary operation on the basis of the travel data received. This offers the advantage that recognised hazardous situations can be signalled by the operation control system 130. It is thus conceivable, for example, that in the event of a current movement authority of a train being sufficient up to the set of points which is to be switched as part of this auxiliary operation, this hazard is signalled to the signal operator or by a flashing display of the range of the movement authority in a representation of the network topology and/or by warning symbols popping up, perhaps in the form of symbols highlighted in a conspicuous manner or a flashing screen edge. In addition to a representation in a network overview, corresponding warning information may furthermore also pop up in other diagrams, such as time/distance diagrams for example, or in the form of acoustic warning indications.
An evaluation of the travel data on the part of the operation control system 130 thus leads to an increase in the safety of auxiliary operations overall. Furthermore, however, it can also become clear that desired auxiliary operations are possible in a risk-free manner in spite of information indicating a possible hazard. For example, this relates to the case in which an axle counter belonging to a route currently set, i.e. the track element 110 for example, is to be reset.
In this case, in systems exclusively based on signal box information, conventionally the entire route is displayed as occupied, without the exact position of the train in the route and the part of the route, for which the train possesses a movement authority, being recognisable for the signal operator. Incorporating this information, i.e. the travel data which is safely managed by the control facility 60 of the train control system, makes it simpler during the performance of the auxiliary operation for the signal operator to decide whether or not the desired auxiliary operation is possible in the respective situation. Thus, it is conceivable for example that a train occupies a route, but the movement authority of the train does not extend up to the track element to be operated and so an operation is thus possible without risk.
In summary, it should thus be said that according to the exemplary embodiments described above, the method according to the invention and the operation control system according to the invention increase the safety during auxiliary operations and relieve the operating personnel in question by providing travel data related to at least one rail-bound vehicle, which data originates from a train control system. In this regard, the method and the operation control system can advantageously be implemented in conjunction with different train control systems and different types of rail-bound vehicles. The train control system, from the control facility of which the travel data is transmitted to the operation control system, may thus involve the European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 2, for example. It is equally also conceivable for the train control system to involve a train control system implemented in the mass transit sector, such as for underground railways and metros. Accordingly, the rail-bound vehicles monitored and controlled by the respective train control system may involve different kinds of vehicles. On the one hand, this includes rail-bound vehicles, such as in the form of trains, underground trains or metros, and on the other hand also other kinds of rail-bound vehicles, such as in the form of rail-guided vehicles with rubber tyres.

Claims (12)

1. Fremgangsmåde til hjælpebetjening af et kørevejselement (100, 110), hvor - køredata, der er baseret på mindst et sporbundet køretøj (10), modtages fra en styreindretning (60) i et togpåvirkningssystem via et driftsstyringssystem (130), kendetegnet ved, at - der tages hensyn til de modtagne køredata af driftsstyringssystemet (130) inden for rammerne af en hjælpebetjening af kørevejselementet (100, 110) i en sådan form, at driftsstyringssystemet (130) ved hjælp af køredataene foretager en kontrol med hensyn til potentielle faresituationer, der resulterer af hjælpebetjeningen.A method of auxiliary operation of a roadway element (100, 110), wherein - driving data based on at least one tracked vehicle (10) is received from a control device (60) in a train impact system via an operating control system (130), characterized by, - taking into account the received driving data of the operating control system (130) in the context of an auxiliary operation of the roadway element (100, 110) in such a form that the operating control system (130) makes use of the driving data to check for potential danger situations, resulting from the auxiliary service. 2. Fremgangsmåde ifølge krav 1, kendetegnet ved, at der tages hensyn til de modtagne køredata af driftsstyringssystemet (130) inden for rammerne af hjælpebetjeningen af kørevejselementet (100, 110) i en sådan form, at køredataene visualiseres ved hjælp af mindst en visningsindretning (150) afdriftsstyringssystemet (130).Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the received driving data of the operating control system (130) is taken into account within the framework of the auxiliary operation of the driving element (100, 110) in such a form that the driving data is visualized by at least one display device ( 150) the drift control system (130). 3. Fremgangsmåde ifølge krav 1 eller 2, kendetegnet ved, at et advarselssignal afgives af driftsstyringssystemet (130) i tilfælde af, at der konstateres en potentiel faresituation, der resulterer af hjælpebetjeningen.Method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that a warning signal is issued by the operating control system (130) in the event of a potential danger situation resulting from the auxiliary operation. 4. Fremgangsmåde ifølge et af de foregående krav, kendetegnet ved, at køredata, der er baseret på stedet, hastigheden og/eller en køreautorisation af det mindst ene sporbundne køretøj (10), modtages fra togpåvirkningssystemets styreindretning (60) via driftsstyringssystemet (130).Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that driving data based on the location, speed and / or a driving authorization of the at least one tracked vehicle (10) is received from the control device (60) of the train actuation system (130) via the operating control system (130). . 5. Fremgangsmåde ifølge et af de foregående krav, kendetegnet ved, at signalteknisk sikre køredata, der er baseret på det mindst ene sporbundne køretøj (10), modtages fra togpåvirkningssystemets styreindretning (60) via driftsstyringssystemet (130).Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that signal-technically safe driving data based on the at least one track-bound vehicle (10) is received from the control device (60) of the train actuation system via the operating control system (130). 6. Fremgangsmåde ifølge et af de foregående krav, kendetegnet ved, at køredataene, der er baseret på det mindst ene sporbundne køretøj (10), modtages fra en stationær styreindretning af togpåvirkningssystemet via driftsstyringssystemet (130).Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the driving data based on the at least one tracked vehicle (10) is received from a stationary control device of the train impact system via the operating control system (130). 7. Anordning med et driftsstyringssystem (130) og en styreindretning (60) af et togpåvirkningssystem, hvor driftsstyringssystemet (130) er udformet til at modtage køredata, der er baseret på mindst et sporbundet køretøj (10), fra togpåvirkningssystemets styreindretning (60), kendetegnet ved, at driftsstyringssystemet (130) er udformet til at tage hensyn til de modtagne køredata inden for rammerne af en hjælpebetjening af et kørevejselement (100, 110) i en sådan form, at det ved hjælp af køredataene foretager en kontrol med hensyn til potentielle faresituationer, der resulterer af kørevejselementets (100,110) hjælpebetjening.An apparatus with an operating control system (130) and a steering device (60) of a train impact system, wherein the operating control system (130) is designed to receive driving data based on at least one tracked vehicle (10) from the train impact control system (60), characterized in that the operating control system (130) is designed to take into account the received driving data in the context of an auxiliary operation of a road element (100, 110) in such a form that it makes use of the driving data to check for potential hazard situations resulting from the auxiliary operation of the roadway element (100,110). 8. Anordning ifølge krav 7, kendetegnet ved, at driftsstyringssystemet (130) er udformet til at tage hensyn til de modtagne køredata inden for rammerne af hjælpebetjeningen af kørevejselementet (100, 110) i en sådan form, at det visualiserer køredataene ved hjælp af mindst en visningsindretning (150) af driftsstyringssystemet (130).Device according to claim 7, characterized in that the operating control system (130) is designed to take into account the received driving data within the framework of the auxiliary operation of the driving element (100, 110) in such a form that it visualizes the driving data by at least a display device (150) of the operating control system (130). 9. Anordning ifølge krav 7 eller 8, kendetegnet ved, at driftsstyringssystemet (130) er udformet til at afgive et advarselssignal i tilfælde af, at der konstateres en potentiel faresituation, der resulterer af hjælpebetjeningen.Device according to claim 7 or 8, characterized in that the operating control system (130) is designed to provide a warning signal in the event of a potential danger situation resulting from the auxiliary operation. 10. Anordning ifølge et af kravene 7 til 9, kendetegnet ved, at driftsstyringssystemet (130) er udformet til at modtage køredata, der er baseret på stedet, hastigheden og/eller en køreautorisation af det mindst ene sporbundne køretøj (10), fra togpåvirkningssystemets styreindretning (60).Device according to one of claims 7 to 9, characterized in that the operating control system (130) is designed to receive driving data based on the location, speed and / or a driving authorization of the at least one tracked vehicle (10) from the train impact system. control device (60). 11. Anordning ifølge et af kravene 7 til 10, kendetegnet ved, at anordningen er udformet på en sådan måde, at signalteknisk sikre køredata, der er baseret på det mindst ene sporbundne køretøj (10), modtages fra togpåvirkningssystemets styreindretning (60) via driftsstyringssystemet (130).Device according to one of Claims 7 to 10, characterized in that the device is designed in such a way that signal-safe driving data based on the at least one tracked vehicle (10) is received from the control device (60) of the train impact system via the operating control system. (130). 12. Anordning ifølge et af kravene 7 til 11, kendetegnet ved, at styreindretningen (60) er en stationær styreindretning af togpåvirkningssystemet.Device according to one of claims 7 to 11, characterized in that the control device (60) is a stationary control device of the train actuation system.
DK13715179.1T 2012-04-19 2013-04-02 Method for auxiliary operation of a roadway element and operating control system DK2819907T3 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102012206479A DE102012206479A1 (en) 2012-04-19 2012-04-19 Method for the auxiliary operation of a track element and operational control system
PCT/EP2013/056899 WO2013156299A2 (en) 2012-04-19 2013-04-02 Method for the auxiliary operation of a track element, and operation control system

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DK2819907T3 true DK2819907T3 (en) 2018-03-12

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WO2013156299A3 (en) 2014-06-05
DE102012206479A1 (en) 2013-10-24
CN104334436A (en) 2015-02-04
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