DE102022204795A1 - Method and system for the automated determination of the train integrity of a train set - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for automatically determining the train integrity of a train set (1), comprising the steps: - determining the tail car (S) of the train set (1), - sending data (D) of the tail car (S) to a first central control device ( 3a) of the train group (1) during the journey of the train group (1), whereby this data (D) is sent continuously throughout the entire journey and the sending of the data (D) is designed in such a way that it is assigned to the final car (S). can be, - generating status information (St) based on the data (D) of the final car (S), whereby in the event that correct data (D) from the final car (S) is received by the first central control device (3a). , status information (St) is generated, which indicates correct train integrity and in the event that no correct data (D) from the tail car (S) is received by the first central control device (3a) within a predetermined period of time, status information ( St) is generated, which indicates a disturbed train integrity, - output of the status information (St).The invention also relates to a corresponding system and a train set.

Description

The invention relates to a method and a system for the automated determination of the train integrity of a train set, in particular for the activation of route sections, for example within the framework of ETCS Level 3.

With the planned operation with ETCS Level 3, a train integrity monitoring (TIM) is required as standard. An automatic train safety system (“ATP system” for “Automatic Train Protection”) expects train integrity information (English “Train Integrity Information” about the vehicle) at the interface to the vehicle. The Train Integrity Information provides the current status of the train Train integrity again. The train integrity information must be secured with a specific safety integrity level, “SIL 2”.

SILs are the measure of the performance or reliability of safety functions and are defined in the standards IEC61508 and EC61511 for “Functional safety of electrical / electronic / programmable electronic (E/E/PE) systems”. There are a total of four SIL levels, with the level of protection required increasing as the level increases.

The most important aspect that needs to be taken into account in SIL 2 here is the uninterrupted control of train integrity through a safety controller, which should have redundant CPUs and power supplies, redundant network communication infrastructure and processing units, so that further control of train integrity is possible in the event of a device failure .

Since operation with ETCS Level 3 has not yet been implemented, automated control of train integrity has not yet been relevant in practice.

It is an object of the present invention to provide an alternative, more convenient method and a corresponding system for the automated determination of train integrity, with which the disadvantages described above are avoided and in particular enables safe train operation within the framework of ETCS Level 3.

This object is achieved by a method according to patent claim 1, a system according to patent claim 10 and a train assembly according to patent claim 11.

• - Optional: Bereitstellen von Zusammenstellungs-Daten zum Aufbau des Zugverbands umfassend zumindest Informationen zu den Wagen, aus denen der Zugverband zusammengestellt ist, an ein erstes zentrales Steuergerät des Zugverbands,
• - Ermitteln des Schlusswagens des Zugverbands,
• - Senden von Daten des Schlusswagens an das erste zentrale Steuergerät des Zugverbands während der Fahrt des Zugverbands, wobei diese Daten kontinuierlich über die gesamte Fahrt hinweg gesendet werden und das Senden der Daten so gestaltet ist, dass diese dem Schlusswagen zugeordnet werden können,
• - Generieren einer Statusinformation basierend auf den Daten des Schlusswagens, wobei in dem Falle, dass korrekte Daten von dem Schlusswagen von dem ersten zentralen Steuergerät empfangen werden, eine Statusinformation generiert wird, die eine korrekte Zugintegrität angibt und in dem Falle, dass innerhalb einer vorgegebenen Zeitspanne keine korrekten Daten von dem Schlusswagen von dem ersten zentralen Steuergerät empfangen werden, eine Statusinformation generiert wird, die eine gestörte Zugintegrität angibt,
• - Ausgabe der Statusinformation.

The method according to the invention for automatically determining the train integrity of a train set includes the following steps:

• - Optional: Providing compilation data for setting up the train set, comprising at least information about the wagons from which the train set is composed, to a first central control device of the train set,
• - Determine the final car of the train set,
• - Sending data from the tail car to the first central control unit of the train set during the train set's journey, whereby this data is sent continuously throughout the entire journey and the sending of the data is designed in such a way that it can be assigned to the tail car,
• - Generating status information based on the data of the tail car, whereby in the event that correct data from the tail car is received by the first central control device, status information is generated which indicates correct train integrity and in the case that within a predetermined period of time no correct data from the final car is received by the first central control device, status information is generated which indicates a disturbed train integrity,
• - Output of status information.

An automated determination of the train integrity of a train set checks whether the train set is still complete, i.e. that it has not lost any cars. When operating under ETCS Level 3, track clearance notification and train completeness checks are no longer carried out by a signal box, but by the trains. A track-side track vacancy signal, for example through axle counters or track circuits, is no longer necessarily available. In order to be able to run in ETCS Level 3, trains must therefore have a train integrity control system, which makes the method according to the invention possible.

The optionally provided composition data shows information about the structure of the train set, i.e. about its cars and, if necessary, the train sequence (which is not absolutely necessary, but can simplify the determination of the final car). There may also be information about the length of the train set. Mind you, the method can certainly deliver meaningful results even without compilation data, but this data is very advantageous because it can be used to check whether the determination of the final car was correct. They therefore represent redundancy that serves security. For example, in the event that a car is due to faulty sensors in its Coupling was mistakenly identified as the final car, this error can be corrected based on information about the car sequence.

As indicated above, the final car can be determined using a predetermined car sequence. However, it is preferably determined independently, namely particularly preferably with components that are available to a car for driving. These are, for example, sensors on a coupling that measure whether this coupling is coupled to another car. In a train set, all but two cars are normally coupled with their two couplings. Only the two cars at the beginning and at the end of the train are only coupled with a single coupling. Since the driver is in the car at the beginning of the train, the car at the end of the train (without the driver) can be identified as the rear car due to this and its coupling status. So the information “car is only coupled to one coupling” and “car is not occupied by a driver” could be used to automatically determine the final car. For train sets made up of two or more trainsets, it may be sufficient to check the condition of the end cars of the trainsets in order to determine the final car. In such a train set of multiple units, for example, a central control unit (ZSG) in the train sets can automatically determine whether an end car is at the head of the train, in the middle of the train or at the end of the train based on the signals “driver's cab occupied” and “coupled”. . In practice, the ZSG can then determine the status of its two end cars in each trainset of the train set and forward this status to the first (or “leading”) central train control unit in the train set.

A train set may have a single central control device, but this is rare. More often there are several ZSGs in a train set, especially in a train set that is made up of several multiple units. It can also happen that there are several ZSGs in a trainset, e.g. in each of the two end cars of the trainset. A “first” central control device should then be selected. As a rule, this currently happens automatically, with the ZSG being selected as the first (leading) ZSG which is in the trainset (or the end car) that is occupied by the driver.

What is very important for the process is that the tail car continuously sends data to the first central control unit throughout the entire train journey. This can be done directly, but in practice it is often the case that boundaries to different hierarchies have to be crossed when sending data. For example, the data from the tail car can be collected at a car level, sent to the central control unit of a trainset (train set) and from there sent to the first ZSG (train group level).

Protocols such as “Flexicom”, “Profisafe” or “SPCSsafe” already exist for data transmission and can be used for secure data transmission.

It is important that data is sent continuously, so that a data set from the final car always arrives at the first ZSG. These data sets can certainly be separated by time intervals, but these should preferably be shorter than one second. In practice it can happen that the data from the final car arrives at the first ZSG after 0.1 s.

The data must be sent in such a way that it can be assigned to the final car. This means that the data itself contains information, e.g. an address or identification information, that makes this association possible and/or the data channel on which the transmission takes place enables this association, e.g. because the data is sent over a special cable or a special frequency which can be assigned to the final car. The only important thing here is that the first ZSG can reliably determine that the data record received also comes from the final car.

From the knowledge about the receipt or non-reception of the data from the tail car, the status information can now be generated, which basically only has to reflect two states: a state (e.g. "OK") that indicates correct train integrity and a state (e.g. "Lost" ), which indicates incorrect train integrity. A third state (e.g. “Unknown”) is also advantageous, which can preferably only be achieved when the train set is at a standstill and indicates that the architecture of the train set has changed, e.g. by coupling or uncoupling train components.

The status information is generated based on the tail car data. When correct data is received, for example, status information with the status “OK” is generated and if no correct data was received within a specified period of time, status information with the status “Lost”.

It should be noted that by “correct data” we mean data that is normally sent from the tail car or includes a specified information. The expression “No correct data” here means that no data set arrived at the first ZSG or that this data set was not complete or was otherwise incorrect, arrived on an incorrect data channel or the transmission of which was otherwise falsified or disrupted. Any data set for the final car whose shipment (which also means its contents) was different than specified is considered incorrect. This means that in this case no correct data from the tail car was received by the first central control unit. In this regard, it is preferred that the tail car no longer sends data or sends data that deviates from normal in the event of a detected error, for example if something from the car was lost, its connection to the rest of the train is impaired, or there is another (serious) error condition Sends a data set that can be interpreted by the first ZSG as “not correct data”.

The status information can be output to another control device, e.g. to a so-called “European Vital Computer” (EVC), which can take over control tasks relating to the operational process within the framework of ETCS Level 3 or pass on relevant information. The status information is therefore preferably made available to the EVC. The EVC reads the status and forwards the status to a control center via the radio-land connection. If the status “Unknown” or “Lost” is reported, the section of route last passed by the train set will no longer be released for subsequent trains.

• - Optional: eine Datenschnittstelle ausgelegt zum Empfang von Zusammenstellungs-Daten zum Aufbau des Zugverbands umfassend zumindest Informationen zu den Wagen, aus denen der Zugverband zusammengestellt ist,
• - eine Ermittlungseinheit ausgelegt zum Ermitteln des Schlusswagens des Zugverbands,
• - eine Datenübertragungseinheit ausgelegt zum Übertragen von Daten des Schlusswagens an ein erstes zentrales Steuergerät des Zugverbands während der Fahrt des Zugverbands, wobei diese Daten kontinuierlich über die gesamte Fahrt hinweg übertragen werden und das Übertragen der Daten so gestaltet ist, dass diese dem Schlusswagen zugeordnet werden können,
• - ein erstes zentrales Steuergerät (eben jenes, an das die Daten gesendet werden) ausgelegt zum Generieren einer Statusinformation basierend auf den Daten des Schlusswagens, wobei in dem Falle, dass korrekte Daten von dem Schlusswagen von dem ersten zentralen Steuergerät empfangen werden, eine Statusinformation generiert wird, die eine korrekte Zugintegrität angibt und in dem Falle, dass keine korrekten Daten von dem Schlusswagen von dem ersten zentralen Steuergerät empfangen werden, eine Statusinformation generiert wird, die eine gestörte Zugintegrität angibt,
• - eine Datenschnittstelle ausgelegt zur Ausgabe der Statusinformation.

A system according to the invention for the automated determination of the train integrity of a train set, in particular uses a method according to the invention and includes the following components:

• - Optional: a data interface designed to receive composition data for setting up the train set, comprising at least information about the wagons from which the train set is made up,
• - an investigation unit designed to determine the tail car of the train set,
• - a data transmission unit designed to transmit data from the tail car to a first central control device of the train set while the train set is traveling, this data being transmitted continuously over the entire journey and the transmission of the data being designed in such a way that it can be assigned to the tail car ,
• - a first central control device (the one to which the data is sent) designed to generate status information based on the data of the final car, wherein status information is generated in the event that correct data from the final car is received by the first central control device which indicates correct train integrity and in the event that no correct data from the final car is received by the first central control device, status information is generated which indicates disturbed train integrity,
• - a data interface designed to output the status information.

A train set according to the invention comprises a number of multiple units and a system according to the invention.

The invention can be implemented in particular in the form of a computer unit, in particular in a control device, with suitable software. For this purpose, the computer unit can, for example, have one or more cooperating microprocessors or the like. In particular, it can be implemented in the form of suitable software program parts in the computer unit. A largely software-based implementation has the advantage that previously used computer units in multiple units or train sets or in their cars can be easily retrofitted by a software or firmware update in order to work in the manner according to the invention. In this respect, the task is also solved by a corresponding computer program product with a computer program which can be loaded directly into a storage device of a computer unit, with program sections in order to carry out all steps of the method according to the invention when the program is executed in the computer unit. In addition to the computer program, such a computer program product may optionally contain additional components such as documentation and/or additional components, including hardware components such as. B. Hardware keys (dongles etc.) for using the software. A computer-readable medium, for example a memory stick, a hard drive or another transportable or permanently installed data carrier, on which the program sections of the computer program that can be read and executed by a computer unit are stored, can be used for transport to the computer unit and/or for storage on or in the computer unit. Further, particularly advantageous refinements and developments of the invention result from the dependent claims and the following description, with the claims of a claim category also analogous to the claims and description parts can be developed into a different claim category and in particular individual features of different exemplary embodiments or variants can be combined to form new exemplary embodiments or variants.

According to a preferred method, in order to determine the final car, it is determined which car of the train set is not coupled to one of its two couplings (or is only coupled to one coupling) and whether this car is occupied by a driver and in the case that one If one of its two couplings is not coupled, i.e. it is traveling at the beginning or end of the train set, and it is not occupied (with the said vehicle driver), this car is designated as the rear car. The usual dome signals and “driver’s cab occupied” signals, which are present during train operation anyway, can be used. The final car can therefore be determined automatically and no additional devices have to be used for this, but rather signals that are usually present during a train journey can be used. Compared to determining the final car from a given row of cars, this automatic determination has the security advantage that the current train is actually taken into account. This prevents incorrect acceptance of a final car due to an incorrect car sequence. However, the information about the car sequence can represent an advantageous check by checking whether the automatically determined final car matches the specified final car of the car sequence. Only the end cars of a multiple unit can be viewed as “cars” in the sense of this embodiment, as these complete the multiple unit at its ends.

According to a preferred method, the data sent by the tail car is sent via a communication channel that can be assigned to the tail car, e.g. via a specific cable, a specific radio frequency or another specific data channel. Alternatively or additionally, the data of the tail car has identification information, for example an address or an identification number, which can be assigned to the tail car. Theoretically, simply the presence of data could represent an association if only data is sent from the tail car. In practice, however, it is often the case that at least the end cars of a trainset send data. In this case, it should be clear which data comes from the final car.

According to a preferred method, after a coupling process in which a number of cars have been uncoupled from the train set or a number of cars have been coupled to the train set, a final car and a first central control device are first determined (again). It should be noted here that after a coupling process, e.g. when a train set has been separated or multiple units have been added to a train set, the end car usually changes or the first central control unit, at least if the driver has changed the end car.

The method can preferably also be reinitialized by providing (new) compilation data for setting up the train set.

According to a preferred method, the train set is formed from a plurality of multiple units. Each multiple unit preferably includes at least one central control device. The central control device of the trainset or the end car that has an occupied driver's cab during the journey is then preferably selected as the first (leading) central control device. It is preferred that the data of the final car be sent from a central control device of the trainset comprising this final car to the first central control device of another trainset, since the vehicle driver is normally in the front trainset and the final car is at the rear.

According to a preferred method, at least the data of the tail car is transmitted from a car hierarchy, preferably via a trainset hierarchy, to a train set hierarchy using a data transmission protocol. Alternatively or additionally, the status information is output by means of a data transmission protocol from a train set hierarchy, preferably via a trainset hierarchy, to a wagon hierarchy. It is preferred that the data of the tail car and/or the status information are secured using checksums and are preferably transmitted using architectural patterns that have been defined for SIL 2. This guarantees sufficiently secure data transmission.

According to a preferred method, the generation of the status information and the output of the status information is designed so that this entire process takes less than a second. Normally a data transfer only takes a fraction of a second. However, if several hierarchies are crossed and special security protocols are applied, a transfer from one hierarchy can certainly occur chie to another can take up to 200 ms. Transmission times between hierarchies of more than 10 ms or more than 50 ms are preferred and can typically be assumed to be 100 ms. In addition, time intervals can lie between the transmission of data sets and separate the transmission of successive sets of data from the final car. These time intervals should be shorter than 1 s, as a quick response should be made if a car is lost.

It is particularly preferred that the predetermined period of time after which status information is generated that indicates a disturbed train integrity when no data from the tail car is received by the first central control device is longer than the time of transmission of successive sets of data from the tail car , especially longer than twice that time. This ensures that a “lost” status is not set prematurely in the event of a brief disruption in the transmission. After all, in such a case the route would be completely closed and only reopened once it had been completely driven and examined. This means that a “lost” status should only be generated if there is really an emergency situation and not if there is a brief disruption in data transmission. For example, the time in which a “lost” status must be accepted after a car is lost should be less than one second in Germany. It would therefore be advantageous if the final car could send its data at least twice within a second, so that in the event that a data set does not arrive at the first ZSG due to a short-term disruption, the second data set still arrives at the first ZSG within the second can arrive and no “lost” status is set.

According to a preferred method, the status information is output to an EVC control device (EVC: European Vital Computer).

According to a preferred method, when generating the status information, a rapid braking loop (SBS) assigned to the tail car is also checked. It is preferred that in the event that the rapid braking loop is open or faulty, status information is generated which indicates a disturbed train integrity and in the event that the rapid braking loop is intact, a predetermined period of time is waited again for data from the tail car. The SBS therefore represents a second instance so that a status can be determined more reliably (after all, an incorrectly determined “lost” signal has a significant impact on operations). If the SBS is open, a car demolition is very likely (but the information from the SBS alone is not safe enough). However, in conjunction with the method according to the invention, checking the SBS represents a very advantageous means of increasing the security of the statement. If the SBS is not open, the car may still have been demolished. However, to be on the safe side, we wait again for data from the final car. If these arrive correctly, the information from the SBS was incorrect and you can continue with the status “OK”. If the data for the final car is missing (or incorrect), the status would have to be set to “Lost”.

According to a preferred train set, each trainset includes a central control device which is designed to generate status information based on the data from the tail car. Preferably, in the event that data from the final car is received by the first central control device, status information is generated which indicates existing train integrity and in the case that no data from the final car is received by the first central control device, status information is generated which indicates a disturbed train integrity.

According to a preferred train set, each end car of a trainset is designed to determine the condition of its couplings and the occupancy status of a driver's cab and to send data to a central control unit.

A big advantage of this invention is that it can be implemented using existing means of communication. No additional hardware is necessary. It can be implemented immediately on any turn in a simple manner.

• 1 ein Beispiel für einen erfindungsgemäßen Zugverband mit zwei Triebzügen,
• 2 ein Beispiel für ein erfindungsgemäßes System,
• 3 ein Blockdiagramm für ein Beispiel eines erfindungsgemäßen Verfahrens,
• 4 ein Ablaufplan für eine Ausführung eines bevorzugten Verfahrens.

The invention is explained in more detail below with reference to the attached figures using exemplary embodiments. The same components are provided with identical reference numbers in the various figures. The figures are usually not to scale. Show it:

• 1 an example of a train set according to the invention with two multiple units,
• 2 an example of a system according to the invention,
• 3 a block diagram for an example of a method according to the invention,
• 4 a flowchart for carrying out a preferred method.

1 shows an example of a train set 1 according to the invention with two multiple units 2. The train set 1 moves from left to right, which is indicated by the sketched driver F in the right end car E of the right multiple unit 2. The Train set 1 has a system 4 according to the invention, as shown, for example, in 2 is carried out in more detail. In 1 The central control devices 3 are shown in the end car E, of which the central control device in the end car E with the vehicle driver F is viewed as the first central control device 3a. Each end car E of a multiple unit 2 is designed here to determine the state of its couplings and the occupancy status of a driver's cab and to send data to a central control unit 3.

2 shows an example of a system 4 according to the invention for the automated determination of the train integrity of a train set 1, as shown, for example, in 1 is shown. System 4 includes the following components:

A determination unit 6 designed to determine the tail car S of the train set 1. In this example, the determination unit sends an identification number of the determined tail car S to the first central control unit 3a, which is indicated by an arrow. a determination unit 6 can certainly be a central control device 3 of an end car E or all central control devices 3 of the end cars E as in 1 shown.

A data transmission unit 7 designed to transmit (arrow) data D of the tail car S to the first central control device 3a of the train set 1 during the journey of the train set 1, this data D being transmitted continuously over the entire journey and the transfer of the data D so is designed so that they can be assigned to the final car S.

Said first central control device 3a is designed to generate status information St based on the data D of the tail car S, whereby in the event that correct data D from the tail car S is received by the first central control device 3a, status information St is generated which is a indicates correct train integrity and in the event that no correct data D from the tail car S is received by the first central control device 3a within a predetermined period of time, status information St is generated which indicates a disturbed train integrity.

A data interface 5 designed to output the status information St.

3 shows a block diagram for an example of a method according to the invention for automatically determining the train integrity of a train set 1.

In step I, compilation data for setting up the train set is provided, which includes at least information about the cars from which the train set is put together. The provision is made to the first central control device of the train set (see for example 2 ). Although this step is essentially optional, it is very beneficial.

In step II, the final car S of train set 1 is determined. For this purpose, it is preferably determined which car of the train set 1 is not coupled to one of its two couplings and whether this car is occupied by a driver F. In the event that one of the two couplings of a car is not coupled and this car is not occupied, this car is designated as the final car S. In 1 For example, the end car E on the far right is the final car S as indicated.

It is preferred that after a coupling process in which a number of cars have been uncoupled from the train set 1 or a number of cars have been coupled to the train set 1, the final car S and the first central control device 3a are determined again. It is also preferred to re-provide or update the compilation data.

In step III, data D of the tail car S is sent to the first central control device 3a of the train set 1 while the train set 1 is traveling. This data D is sent continuously throughout the entire journey and the data D is sent in such a way that it can be assigned to the final car S.

The data D sent by the tail car S can be sent via a communication channel that can be assigned to the tail car S and / or include identification information that can be assigned to the tail car S.

In step IV, status information St is generated based on the data D of the tail car S. In the event that correct data D from the tail car S is received by the first central control device 3a, status information St is generated, which indicates correct train integrity. In the event that no correct data D from the tail car S is received by the first central control device 3a within a predetermined period of time, status information St is generated, which indicates a disturbed train integrity.

The thick arrow on the status information symbol St is intended to indicate that the status information St will then be output.

4 shows a flowchart for carrying out a preferred method. If you consider a train set 1, which is as in 1 As seen from a plurality of multiple units 2, each multiple unit 2 generally includes at least one central control device 3a (in 1 Each trainset includes 2 two). Data originating from cars is often sent through several hierarchies until it arrives at the first central control device 3a.

Shown is a table whose columns from right to left symbolize different hierarchies (hereinafter referred to as “levels”). The right hierarchy is that of the European Vital Computer EVC, which is positioned here in an end car and is contacted by the car level. To the left of the EVC level is the car level, followed by the drive level and the level of the first central control device 3a, which can also be the train set level. On the far left and far right, the origins of signals are shown, which are not assigned to a specific level here, but certainly are can also come from the individual levels.

The process begins on the far right with two signals, one of which indicates the occupied status of an end car E with a driver F (top) and one of which indicates the coupling status. The dashed coupling is intended to indicate that the search is for the case in which an end car E is coupled to only one coupling and the other coupling is free. It should be noted that in addition to the state of the coupling, the state of the coupling status contactor is often also measured. This indicates whether a coupling should be coupled as intended or not. The process of recognizing the tail car takes, for example, 8 ms.

At the car level, it is then determined which car is the final car S. This then sends its data D via the drive input to the first central control device 3a, for example via “Flexicom” and/or using the “SPCSsafe” protocol. This process can take between 10 ms and 200 ms, and here, for example, takes 100 ms.

The first central control device 3a evaluates all signals from the end cars and recognizes the signal from the final car S.

In addition, as indicated from the left, information about a clutch process (above) and the rapid braking loop (SBS, below) can also be made available to the first central control device 3a.

The first central control unit 3a now generates status information St from the data D of the tail car S and here also with data about coupling processes and data from the SBS. For example, the status information St is “OK” if the tail car S sends correct data D and “Lost” if no or incorrect data D arrives at the first central control device 3a. Here you can also determine whether the SBS of trainset 2 with the final car is still intact. If it is torn, the status “Lost” will definitely be set. If it is intact, we will wait again for data D from the final car S to be on the safe side. In the event of a coupling process, the status can be set to “Unknown” and a tail car S and a first central control device 3a can be determined again.

In this example, the status information St is then sent from the first central control device 3a via the drive level and the car level to the European Vital Computer EVC and used for the journey of the train set. Secure data transfer takes between 10 ms and 200 ms per level (e.g. 100 ms here) and can be done with “Flexicom” and the “Profisafe” protocol. As an additional safeguard, a function could be used that checks whether the EVC has contact with the first central control device 3a and if the contact is broken, the EVC automatically sets the status “Lost”.

Finally, it should be pointed out once again that the methods described in detail above and the system shown are merely exemplary embodiments which can be modified in a variety of ways by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope of the invention. Furthermore, the use of the indefinite articles “a” or “an” does not exclude the fact that the characteristics in question can be present multiple times. Likewise, the terms “unit” and “device” do not exclude that the components in question consist of several interacting sub-components, which may also be spatially distributed. The expression “a number” is to be understood as “at least one”.

Claims (15)

Method for the automated determination of the train integrity of a train set (1) comprising the steps: - determining the tail car (S) of the train set (1), - sending data (D) of the tail car (S). a first central control device (3a) of the train set (1) during the journey of the train set (1), this data (D) being sent continuously throughout the entire journey and the sending of the data (D) being designed in such a way that it corresponds to the Tail car (S) can be assigned, - Generating status information (St) based on the data (D) of the tail car (S), in the case that correct data (D) from the tail car (S) from the first central control device (3a) are received, status information (St) is generated which indicates correct train integrity and in the event that no correct data (D) from the tail car (S) is received by the first central control device (3a) within a predetermined period of time are generated, status information (St) is generated, which indicates a disturbed train integrity, - output of the status information (St). Procedure according to Claim 1 , whereby to determine the final car (S), it is determined which car of the train set (1) is not coupled to one of its two couplings and whether this car is occupied by a driver (F) and in the case that one of the cars is If both couplings are not coupled and this car is not occupied, this car is designated as the final car (S). Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the data (D) sent by the final car (S) is sent via a communication channel that can be assigned to the final car (S) and/or includes identification information that can be assigned to the final car (S). . Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein after a coupling process in which a number of cars have been uncoupled from the train set (1) or a number of cars have been coupled to the train set (1), first a final car (S) and a first central control device (3a) is determined. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the train set (1) is formed from a plurality of multiple units (2), each multiple unit (2) comprising at least one central control device (3a) and the central control device (3a) as the first central control device (3a). 3) of the trainset (2) or the end car (E) is selected which has an occupied driver's cab during the journey, preferably the data (D) of the final car (S) from a central control unit (3) of this final car (S) comprehensive multiple unit (2) are sent to the first central control device (3a) of another multiple unit (2). Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein at least the data (D) of the tail car (S) is transmitted from a car hierarchy, preferably via a trainset hierarchy, to a train set hierarchy by means of a data transmission protocol and/or the output of the status information (St) by means of a data transmission protocol a train set hierarchy, preferably via a trainset hierarchy, to a wagon hierarchy, preferably, the data (D) of the final carriage (S) and / or the status information (St) are secured by means of checksums and are preferably transmitted using architectural patterns that have been defined for SIL 2. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the generation of the status information (St) and the output of the status information (St) is designed such that this entire process lasts less than one second, preferably with time intervals which enable the transmission of successive sets of data ( D) separate the final car (S), are shorter than 1 s, preferably the predetermined period of time after which status information (St) is generated which indicates a disturbed train integrity if no data from the final car (S) is received from the first central control device (3a) is received is longer than the time of transmission of successive sets of data (D) of the final car (S). Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the status information (St) is output to an EVC control device. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein when the status information (St) is generated, a rapid braking loop assigned to the tail car (S) is additionally checked, in particular wherein in the event that the rapid braking loop is open or faulty, status information (St) is generated which indicates a disturbed train integrity and in the case that the rapid braking loop is intact, a predetermined period of time is waited for data (D) from the final car (S). System (4) for the automated determination of the train integrity of a train set (1), in particular using a method according to one of the preceding claims, comprising: - a determination unit (6) designed to determine the tail car (S) of the train set (1), - a Data transmission unit (7) designed to transmit data (D) of the tail car (S) to a first central control device (3a) of the train set (1) while the train set (1) is traveling, this data (D) being continuously transmitted over the be transmitted throughout the entire journey and the transmission of the data (D) is designed so that it can be assigned to the final car (S), - a first central control device (3a) designed to generate status information (St) based on the data (D ) of the final car (S), whereby in the event that correct data (D) from the final car (S) is received by the first central control device (3a), status information (St) is generated which indicates correct train integrity and in in the event that no correct data (D) from the tail car (S) is received by the first central control device (3a) within a predetermined period of time, status information (St) is generated which indicates a disturbed train integrity, - a data interface (5 ) designed to output status information (St). Train set (1) comprising a number of multiple units (2), the train set (1) having a system (4). Claim 10 having. Train formation to Claim 11 , wherein each multiple unit (2) comprises a central control device (3, 3a), which is designed to generate status information (St) based on the data (D) of the final car (S), in the event that data ( D) are received from the final car (S) by the first central control device (3a), status information (St) is generated which indicates existing train integrity and in the event that no data (D) is received from the final car (S). are received by the first central control device (3a), status information (St) is generated, which indicates a disturbed train integrity. Train formation to Claim 11 or 12 , whereby each end car (E) of a multiple unit (2) is designed to determine the state of its couplings and the occupancy status of a driver's cab and to send data (D) to a central control unit (3, 3a). Computer program product, comprising commands which, when the program is executed by a computer, cause it to follow the steps of the method Claim 1 until 9 to carry out. Computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions which, when executed by a computer, cause it to follow the steps of the method Claim 1 until 9 to carry out.

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