WO2024055639A1 - 中继攻击的检测方法、装置、车辆及介质 - Google Patents

中继攻击的检测方法、装置、车辆及介质 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2024055639A1
WO2024055639A1 PCT/CN2023/098072 CN2023098072W WO2024055639A1 WO 2024055639 A1 WO2024055639 A1 WO 2024055639A1 CN 2023098072 W CN2023098072 W CN 2023098072W WO 2024055639 A1 WO2024055639 A1 WO 2024055639A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
communication module
wireless communication
vehicle
target
target vehicle
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PCT/CN2023/098072
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
顾江飞
陈先通
陈维鑫
单宏寅
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上海银基信息安全技术股份有公司
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Publication of WO2024055639A1 publication Critical patent/WO2024055639A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B17/00—Monitoring; Testing
    • H04B17/30—Monitoring; Testing of propagation channels
    • H04B17/309—Measuring or estimating channel quality parameters
    • H04B17/318—Received signal strength
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/009—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity specially adapted for networks, e.g. wireless sensor networks, ad-hoc networks, RFID networks or cloud networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the technical field of Internet of Vehicles, and in particular to a detection method, device, vehicle and medium for relay attacks.
  • Bluetooth digital keys usually include: one or more car-side devices with Bluetooth functions installed on the car, and key devices with Bluetooth functions held by the user. (Such as mobile phones, Bluetooth physical keys, etc.).
  • the vehicle-side device determines the distance or position of the key device relative to the vehicle based on the received signal strength indication (RSSI), and further provides the key device with corresponding vehicle permissions.
  • RSSI received signal strength indication
  • the car-side device and the key device establish a connection through Bluetooth, and apply encryption, decryption, signature verification and other security algorithms to ensure the security of the key.
  • the invention provides a detection method, device, vehicle and medium for relay attacks to detect relay attacks and improve the safety performance of the vehicle.
  • a detection method for relay attacks including:
  • the target characteristic data is sent by the master wireless communication module, the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module are configured in the target vehicle;
  • a relay attack detection device including:
  • the Acquisition module used to obtain the signal strength value of the target characteristic data received from the wireless communication module, the target characteristic data is sent by the main wireless communication module, the main wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module are configured on the target in a vehicle;
  • Determining module configured to based on the signal strength value and the base corresponding to the slave wireless communication module accurate range to determine whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack.
  • a vehicle comprising:
  • the memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the at least one processor, and the computer program is executed by the at least one processor, so that the at least one processor can execute the method described in any embodiment of the present invention. Detection methods for relay attacks.
  • a computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions.
  • the computer instructions are used to enable a processor to implement any embodiment of the present invention when executed. Detection methods of relay attacks.
  • Embodiments of the present invention provide a detection method, device, vehicle and medium for relay attacks.
  • the method includes: obtaining the signal strength value of the target characteristic data received from the wireless communication module.
  • the target characteristic data is obtained by the host.
  • the wireless communication module sends, the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module are configured in the target vehicle; based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module, determine whether the target vehicle suffers Relay attack.
  • Figure 1 is a flow chart of a relay attack detection method provided according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • Figure 2 is a flow chart of a relay attack detection method provided according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • Figure 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a relay attack detection device provided according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • Figure 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a vehicle provided according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • Figure 1 is a flow chart of a method for detecting relay attacks provided according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. This embodiment can be applied to the situation of detecting relay attacks.
  • the method can be executed by a detection device for relay attacks.
  • the relay attack detection device can be implemented in the form of hardware and/or software, and the relay attack detection device can be configured in the vehicle.
  • Bluetooth-based digital key applications such as unlocking, car control, keyless entry and starting systems, etc.
  • Bluetooth-based digital key applications are already very widespread.
  • the security of the Bluetooth protocol itself is relatively high, but Bluetooth technology There is a serious flaw in itself: it cannot resist relay attacks.
  • the implementation of a Bluetooth digital key usually includes: one or more Bluetooth-enabled car-side devices installed in the car and a Bluetooth-enabled key device held by the user, such as a mobile phone, bracelet, tablet device and/or Bluetooth physical keys, etc.
  • the car-side device and the key device can establish a connection through Bluetooth, and apply encryption, decryption, signature verification and other security algorithms to ensure the security of the key device.
  • the distance or position of the user of the key device relative to the car is determined based on the Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) received by the car-side device from the key device, and further provides the user with corresponding car permissions. For example, open the car door, start the vehicle, etc.
  • RSSI Received Signal Strength Indication
  • the method of Bluetooth relay attack is to enhance the Bluetooth radio frequency signal in the air, so that the key device that is originally far away from the vehicle can establish a Bluetooth connection with the vehicle (i.e., the vehicle end device), and pass the security certification without any cracking, and Obtain the corresponding car permissions.
  • the corresponding RSSI value is also enhanced, which can simulate that the key device is beside or in the car, so it can open the door, start the car or perform other improper operations.
  • relay attacks can be divided into two categories:
  • the first category of relays amplifies all airborne radio signals in the 2.4G frequency band indiscriminately (without the need for demodulation and data processing), thereby enhancing the The strength of the Bluetooth signal in the frequency band achieves the purpose of relay attack;
  • the second type of repeater demodulates all signals in the 2.4G channel according to the Bluetooth channel division and signal modulation method, and parses out the original corresponding to each signal. data packets, and then filter all parsed original data packets and transmit them with greater power.
  • This method can achieve the purpose of relay attack without decrypting and cracking the encrypted fields in the data packets.
  • the relay attack detection method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is used to solve the security problem of the above-mentioned "Bluetooth relay attack", that is, when a relay attack occurs, the technical means of the embodiment of the present invention can be used to detect the middle attack. After the attack is occurring, security measures are implemented to intervene, such as temporarily disabling risky functions, reminding users (such as car owners), etc. At the same time, when a relay attack occurs, users can continue to use the car safely, and when the relay attack disappears, they can continue to use the car normally.
  • the detection method of relay attacks provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes:
  • the target characteristic data is sent by the master wireless communication module.
  • the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module are configured in the target vehicle.
  • the slave wireless communication module can be considered as a wireless communication module in the target vehicle, which is used to determine the signal strength value of the received target characteristic data.
  • the number of slave wireless communication modules can be one or more, and the target characteristic data can be Corresponds one-to-one with the slave wireless communication module; the target characteristic data can refer to the data sent by the master wireless communication module.
  • the specific content of the target characteristic data is not limited. For example, it can include the media access control address (Media Access Control Address) of the master wireless communication module itself. Control Address, MAC address), etc., the signal strength value can be used to indicate the signal strength of the target feature data.
  • the main wireless communication module may refer to the wireless communication module in the target vehicle, such as a vehicle-side device with Bluetooth function, used to connect to the key device held by the user.
  • the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module are only used to distinguish different functions and positions, which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • the signal strength value of the target characteristic data received from the wireless communication module can be obtained.
  • the specific steps of acquisition are not limited here.
  • the wireless communication module can receive the radio signal in the air in real time, and then according to the main wireless communication module
  • the MAC address of the module filters out the target characteristic data of the main wireless communication module, and determines the signal strength value of the target characteristic data received in real time.
  • the reference range can be understood as the range of the signal strength value of the target characteristic data received from the wireless communication module under normal circumstances (such as when the target vehicle is not subject to a relay attack). It can be determined in advance according to the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module. The module detects or learns. For example, after the target vehicle goes offline, the slave wireless communication module can learn the target feature data sent by the main wireless communication module several times to obtain the corresponding reference range of the slave wireless communication module. At this time The obtained reference range can be applied to all vehicles of the same model; it can also be triggered by secondary detection of the reference range under other circumstances, such as during the use of the target vehicle, and the reference range is re-detected only for the target vehicle to accurately determine the range. The reference range corresponding to the wireless communication module improves the accuracy of subsequent determination of whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack.
  • each slave wireless communication module when multiple slave wireless communication modules are installed on the target vehicle, the corresponding reference range of each slave wireless communication module needs to be detected.
  • the obtained signal strength value can be compared with the corresponding reference range to determine whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack. It is not necessary to determine whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack.
  • the specific methods of relay attacks are further expanded. For example, the specific methods can differ according to the number of slave wireless communication modules.
  • the detection method of relay attacks provided by the embodiment of the present invention can be executed by the master wireless communication module, can also be executed by the slave wireless communication module, or can also be executed by a motor control unit (Motor Control Unit, MCU). Execution, the specific steps of execution may differ. For example, when the main wireless communication module or the motor control unit executes, the determined signal strength value can be sent to the main wireless communication module after determining the signal strength value of the target characteristic data from the wireless communication module. Or the motor control unit, the main wireless communication module or the motor control unit receives and obtains the signal strength value, and performs subsequent operations.
  • MCU Motor Control Unit
  • Embodiment 1 of the present invention provides a relay attack detection method that obtains the signal strength value of target characteristic data received from the wireless communication module.
  • the target characteristic data is sent by the main wireless communication module, and the main wireless communication module
  • the module and the slave wireless communication module are configured in the target vehicle; based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module, it is determined whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack.
  • Using this method by setting up the slave wireless communication module, it is possible to determine whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module, thereby realizing the detection of the relay attack, thereby improving the safety performance of the vehicle. .
  • determining whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module includes:
  • the target vehicle is not subject to a relay attack
  • the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack.
  • the signal strength value can be compared with this reference range. If the signal strength value is within the reference range Within, it means that the signal strength value does not exceed the critical range of signal strength value, then it can be determined that the target vehicle has not suffered a relay attack; if the signal strength value is greater than each benchmark strength value within the reference range, it means that the signal strength value exceeds the signal strength value. If the value is within the critical range, it can be considered that the target vehicle is suffering from a relay attack.
  • the number of slave wireless communication modules may be multiple, and correspondingly, the number of received signal strength values may also be multiple.
  • the number of received signal strength values may also be multiple.
  • the method of determining whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack based on each comparison result is not limited here, for example , if the difference between at least a certain signal strength value and the maximum reference strength value in the corresponding reference range is greater than the set threshold, it can be determined that the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack.
  • the comparison result is that the signal strength value is greater than the corresponding
  • the number of each reference strength value within the reference range exceeds half of the total number of signal strength values
  • the target characteristic data includes data sent by the main communication module to a terminal device corresponding to the target vehicle, and/or, the main communication module sends data to other terminals other than the terminal device. sent data.
  • the target characteristic data sent is also different.
  • the main communication module will send a message to all terminal devices.
  • Send target characteristic data (such as broadcast data) to achieve connection; and when the main communication module is connected to a certain terminal device, such as the terminal device corresponding to the target vehicle, then the target characteristic data includes the main communication module sending to the terminal device corresponding to the target vehicle.
  • the data On this basis, by judging whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack based on target characteristic data in different periods, the detection range of the relay attack can be increased and the safety performance of the vehicle can be further improved.
  • the method further includes:
  • preset defensive measures are executed.
  • Preset defense measures may refer to preset processing measures for protecting the target vehicle. It can be understood that after it is determined that the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack, preset defense measures can be implemented to intervene with security means to protect the target vehicle. Among them, the specific content of the preset defense measures is not limited and can be set by relevant personnel according to the actual situation. This will not be further elaborated here.
  • the preset defense measures include one or more of the following:
  • the target control function includes a target fully automatic control function and/or a target semi-automatic control function
  • the alarm notification can be considered as a reminder to the terminal device corresponding to the target vehicle, which is used to remind the target vehicle that it has suffered a relay attack.
  • the method of alarm notification can include one or more. For example, after it is determined that the target vehicle has suffered a relay attack and the alarm has been reported, Send text messages or make phone calls to the terminal device through the phone system of the target vehicle, or vibrate or ring through the software in the terminal device to notify the target vehicle of a relay attack.
  • the target control function can be considered as a Bluetooth function with security risks, including the target fully automatic control function and/or the target semi-automatic control function.
  • the target fully automatic control function can refer to the function of automatically identifying and automatically controlling the operation of the target vehicle based on Bluetooth, such as
  • the target fully automatic control function can include automatic unlocking and/or automatic vehicle control (such as controlling lights) based on Bluetooth positioning;
  • the target semi-automatic control function can be considered as a function that passively controls the operation of the target vehicle based on Bluetooth, such as keyless
  • the entry and start system passive entry passive start, peps means that when the user approaches the vehicle a certain distance and presses the vehicle button or pulls the door handle, the vehicle will automatically ignite or unlock.
  • the preset defense measures may include any combination of the following measures: sending an alarm notification to the terminal device corresponding to the target vehicle; closing the communication connection between the main communication module and the terminal device corresponding to the target vehicle; closing the target vehicle The target control function; closes the communication connection between the main communication module and the target vehicle's physical key.
  • the specific method of closing the communication connection between the main communication module and the terminal device or closing the communication connection between the main communication module and the physical key is not limited.
  • the Bluetooth connection can be closed on the main communication module side, or the terminal device can be closed.
  • the method of turning off the target control function of the target vehicle is not limited.
  • a shutdown instruction can be sent to the main wireless communication module or MCU to control the target vehicle to turn off the target control function.
  • the shutdown instruction can be considered as an instruction to control the vehicle to disable the target control function.
  • this step needs to be performed by the main wireless communication module or MCU, that is, when the main wireless communication module performs the relay attack detection operation before this step, after it is determined that the target vehicle has suffered a relay attack, the main wireless communication module can Continue to execute the preset defense measures, or you can send the result of determining the relay attack to the MCU, so that the MCU executes the preset defense measures; when the MCU performs the relay attack detection operation before this step, it determines that the target vehicle has suffered a relay attack.
  • the MCU can continue to perform pre- To set up defensive measures, the result of determining the relay attack can also be sent to the main wireless communication module, so that the main wireless communication module executes the preset defensive measures; and when the slave wireless communication module performs the relay attack detection operation before this step, After determining that the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack, the slave wireless communication module can send the result of determining the relay attack to the main wireless communication module or MCU, so that the main wireless communication module or MCU executes preset defensive measures.
  • the vehicle when the vehicle suffers a relay attack, the vehicle can also send a disabling instruction to the terminal device to instruct the terminal device to turn off the target control function of the target vehicle;
  • the terminal device is configured to: when receiving a disabling instruction sent by the vehicle, turn off the target control function of the target vehicle; and identify the user on the terminal device side based on a preset password or preset user characteristic data. Verification; when the identity verification is passed, control instructions are sent to the vehicle according to the user's control operation.
  • the disabling instruction is used to control the terminal device to turn off the target control function of the target vehicle.
  • the preset password or the preset user characteristic data is used to authenticate the user on the terminal device side.
  • the preset password may refer to the password preset by the user on the terminal device side
  • the preset user characteristic data may refer to the password on the terminal device side.
  • Feature data preset by the user such as fingerprints, facial data, etc. Users can choose whether to set a preset password or preset user characteristic data according to the actual situation.
  • control instructions can be sent to the vehicle according to the user's control operations.
  • the terminal device is also used for:
  • the user authentication includes password authentication and/or user characteristic data authentication.
  • Specific user authentication may include password authentication and/or user characteristic data authentication.
  • the vehicle is also equipped with at least one slave Bluetooth module (i.e., the slave wireless communication module):
  • the master Bluetooth module is usually installed in the center of the car; at least one slave Bluetooth module is installed in the car.
  • the arrangement of the slave Bluetooth modules outside the car should ensure that there is one on the roof of the car, and other slave Bluetooth modules outside the car should be placed in all directions of the vehicle. Keep a fixed distance between the slave Bluetooth module and the main Bluetooth module, and try to ensure that the obstruction in the middle does not change.
  • isolation materials can be added between the slave Bluetooth module and the master Bluetooth module to keep the RSSI value (i.e., the signal strength value of the target characteristic data) of the Bluetooth signal received from the slave Bluetooth module from the master Bluetooth module at a smaller value. , close to the receiving sensitivity of the slave Bluetooth module.
  • the vehicle needs a learning process, usually after the vehicle goes offline, or other methods are used to trigger the vehicle to learn signals to prevent relay attacks.
  • the main Bluetooth module sends Bluetooth signals (ie target characteristic data) on a certain channel with daily working power; each slave Bluetooth module receives signals on the module; and saves the strength value (RSSI) of the received signal to form The reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module.
  • Bluetooth signals ie target characteristic data
  • each slave Bluetooth module receives signals on the module; and saves the strength value (RSSI) of the received signal to form The reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module.
  • the Bluetooth digital key When the Bluetooth digital key works normally, it receives the Bluetooth signal of the main Bluetooth module from the Bluetooth module and obtains the RSSI value. If the RSSI value is greater than the reference range, it is considered that a Bluetooth relay attack has occurred (that is, if the signal strength value is greater than the From each reference intensity value within the corresponding reference range of the wireless communication module, it is determined that the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack). Defensive measures can be taken at this time.
  • the car side usually uses light authentication and heavy authentication.
  • a relay attack if only light authentication is currently performed, re-authentication must be performed before active vehicle control such as RKE can be run.
  • the mobile phone operator needs to be authenticated before using the APP: the digital key APP requires the user to log in again to verify the identity of the operator.
  • the mobile phone verification code login method can only use password, fingerprint, faceID, voiceprint, etc. (i.e. password authentication and/or user characteristic data authentication).
  • this embodiment also provides a processing method for the impact of differences in radio frequency characteristics between Bluetooth channels: whether it is Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) or classic Bluetooth, the 2.4G frequency band is divided into several channels to Communicate data on the channel. Affected by the radio frequency characteristics of RF circuits and antennas, there are differences in the receiving sensitivity and the actual transmitted radio frequency power on different channels. Therefore, in order to better detect and judge relay attacks, it is necessary to distinguish and process them by channel. .
  • BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
  • classic Bluetooth the 2.4G frequency band is divided into several channels to Communicate data on the channel. Affected by the radio frequency characteristics of RF circuits and antennas, there are differences in the receiving sensitivity and the actual transmitted radio frequency power on different channels. Therefore, in order to better detect and judge relay attacks, it is necessary to distinguish and process them by channel. .
  • the vehicle in this embodiment is installed with multiple slave Bluetooth modules at the same time.
  • the master Bluetooth module can first send its own mac address and other characteristic data to the slave Bluetooth module, and then receive the Bluetooth signal sent by the master Bluetooth module from the Bluetooth module and obtain the corresponding RSSI value (that is, the target characteristics received from the slave wireless communication module The signal strength value of the data), because the distance and obstacles between the master Bluetooth module and the slave Bluetooth module are fixed, the RSSI value is also constant within a range, that is, the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module.
  • the RSSI value received from the Bluetooth module will also increase because the Bluetooth signal is amplified. Therefore, by determining whether the RSSI value is greater than the calibrated range value, it is known whether a relay attack is currently occurring (that is, based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module, it is determined whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack).
  • the car If the car detects a relay attack, it can immediately deactivate risky functions (such as automatic unlocking, PEPS, functions based on positioning results); and notify the user through some methods, and the user can only use the mobile APP, buttons, etc. to require the car owner to take the initiative. Intervening behaviors for safe vehicle use.
  • risky functions such as automatic unlocking, PEPS, functions based on positioning results
  • the relay attack detection method provided by this embodiment can be applied to Bluetooth-based digital keys in the automobile and motorcycle industries; products in other industries that are at risk of Bluetooth relay attacks, or other wireless connection-based products, such as WiFi-based products. , zigbee, sub1G and other products to improve the ability to prevent relay attacks.
  • FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a relay attack detection method provided according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • Embodiment 2 is optimized on the basis of the above embodiments.
  • it will be determined whether the target vehicle is attacked based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module.
  • Being subject to a relay attack is further embodied as: determining whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module and the channel identifier.
  • Embodiment 1 Please refer to Embodiment 1 for details that are not yet detailed in this embodiment.
  • a relay attack detection method provided by Embodiment 2 of the present disclosure includes the following steps:
  • S210 Obtain the signal strength value of the target characteristic data received from the slave wireless communication module.
  • the target characteristic data is sent by the master wireless communication module.
  • the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module are configured in the target vehicle;
  • S220 Determine whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module and the channel identifier.
  • the target characteristic data may carry a channel identifier, and the channel identifier is used to characterize the channel through which the target characteristic data is transmitted.
  • the wireless communication frequency band can be divided into several channels to achieve signal transmission in specific channels. Therefore, in the process of benchmark range learning or detection by the slave wireless communication module, the benchmark range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module and channel identifier can be determined for each channel, so that in the process of relay attack detection, the target characteristics can be determined based on the target characteristics.
  • the channel identification carried in the data determines whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack based on the signal strength value of the target characteristic data and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module and the channel identification.
  • Embodiment 2 of the present invention provides a method for detecting relay attacks. According to the channel identifier carried by the target characteristic data, it can achieve accurate detection of relay attacks based on the signal strength value and the corresponding reference range, further improving the safety of the vehicle. performance.
  • FIG 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a relay attack detection device provided according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention. As shown in Figure 3, the device includes:
  • the acquisition module 310 is used to acquire the signal strength value of the target characteristic data received from the slave wireless communication module.
  • the target characteristic data is sent by the master wireless communication module.
  • the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module are configured in in the target vehicle;
  • the determining module 320 is configured to determine whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module.
  • a relay attack detection device obtains the signal strength value of the target characteristic data received from the wireless communication module through the acquisition module 310, and the target characteristic data is obtained by The master wireless communication module sends, and the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module are configured in the target vehicle; the determination module 320 determines the signal strength value based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module. Describe whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack. Using this device, by setting up a slave wireless communication module, it can be determined based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack, thereby realizing the detection of the relay attack, thereby improving the safety performance of the vehicle. .
  • the determining module 320 includes:
  • the target vehicle is not subject to a relay attack
  • the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack.
  • the target characteristic data carries a channel identifier
  • the determination module 320 is specifically configured to: determine the target based on the signal strength value and the reference range corresponding to the slave wireless communication module and the channel identifier. Describe whether the target vehicle is subject to a relay attack.
  • the target characteristic data includes data sent by the main communication module to the terminal device corresponding to the target vehicle, and/or data sent by the main communication module to other terminals other than the terminal device. data.
  • the relay attack detection device provided by this embodiment of the present invention also includes:
  • preset defensive measures are executed.
  • the preset defense measures include one or more of the following:
  • the target control function includes a target fully automatic control function and/or a target semi-automatic control function
  • the relay attack detection device provided by the embodiment of the present invention can execute the relay attack detection method provided by any embodiment of the present invention, and has functional modules and beneficial effects corresponding to the execution method.
  • FIG 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a vehicle provided according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • the vehicle includes a processor 40, a memory 41, an input device 42 and an output device 43; the number of processors 40 in the vehicle may be one or more, and one processor 40 is taken as an example in Figure 4; the processor 40, memory in the vehicle 41.
  • the input device 42 and the output device 43 can be connected through a bus or other means. In Figure 4, the connection through a bus is taken as an example.
  • the memory 41 can be used to store software programs, computer executable programs and modules, such as program instructions/modules corresponding to the relay attack detection method in Embodiment 1 of the present disclosure (for example, the acquisition module 310 , determination module 320).
  • the processor 40 executes software programs, instructions and modules stored in the memory 41 to execute various functional applications and data processing of the vehicle, that is, to implement the above-mentioned detection method of relay attacks.
  • the memory 41 may mainly include a stored program area and a stored data area, where the stored program area may store an operating system and at least one application program required for a function; the stored data area may store data created based on the use of the terminal, etc.
  • the memory 41 may include high-speed random access memory, and may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one magnetic disk storage device, flash memory device, or other non-volatile solid-state storage device.
  • memory 41 may further include memory located remotely relative to processor 40 , and these remote memories may be connected to the vehicle via a network. Examples of the above-mentioned networks include but are not limited to the Internet, intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks and combinations thereof.
  • the input device 42 may be used to receive input of numeric or character information and to generate key signal inputs related to user settings and function control of the vehicle.
  • the output device 43 may include a display device such as a display screen.
  • the processor in this step can be configured in the main wireless communication module or the slave wireless communication module of the vehicle to perform the detection method of relay attacks in the main wireless communication module or the slave wireless communication module. ;
  • the processor in this step can also be independent of the main wireless communication module or the slave wireless communication module, that is, after the slave wireless communication module determines the signal strength value of the received target characteristic data, the signal strength value is sent to The processor, so that the processor performs the detection method of the relay attack.
  • the processor is configured in a master wireless communication module or a slave wireless communication module of the vehicle.
  • the vehicle further includes a master wireless communication module and a slave wireless communication module, and the processor is communicatively connected to the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module respectively.
  • the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module can be configured in the vehicle.
  • the number of the master wireless communication module is usually one, which is configured at a central position inside the vehicle.
  • the number of the slave wireless communication modules can be one or more.
  • the specific configuration location can be set according to the actual situation. For example, when there is a slave wireless communication module, the slave wireless communication module needs to be configured in the car; when there are two slave wireless communication modules, a slave wireless communication module can be configured in the car.
  • the communication module connect another wireless communication module to the
  • the communication module is arranged on the roof outside the vehicle; and when there are more than two slave wireless communication modules, one slave wireless communication module can be configured inside the vehicle and one on the roof outside the vehicle, and the other slave wireless communication modules can be configured Communication modules are arranged in all directions outside the vehicle. It should be noted that a fixed distance needs to be maintained between the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module, and the intermediate obstruction between the two is guaranteed not to change.
  • an isolation material is provided between the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module.
  • An isolation material can be provided between the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module, so that the signal strength value of the target characteristic data received by the slave wireless communication module is smaller, so as to be close to the receiving sensitivity of the slave wireless communication module, thereby ensuring that the target characteristic data received by the slave wireless communication module is During a relay attack, the signal strength value changes more obviously, which improves the sensitivity of relay attack detection.
  • the specific material of the isolation material in this embodiment is not limited, as long as it can reduce the signal strength value of the target characteristic data received from the wireless communication module and have a certain shielding effect on the target characteristic data.
  • Embodiment 5 of the present disclosure also provides a storage medium containing computer-executable instructions, which when executed by a computer processor are used to perform a detection method for relay attacks.
  • the method includes:
  • the target characteristic data is sent by the master wireless communication module, the master wireless communication module and the slave wireless communication module are configured in the target vehicle;
  • the embodiments of the disclosure provide a storage medium containing computer-executable instructions, and the computer-executable instructions are not limited to the method operations described above, and can also execute the methods provided in the first or second embodiment of the disclosure. Relevant operations in the detection method of subsequent attacks.
  • the present disclosure can be implemented with the help of software and necessary general hardware. Of course, it can also be implemented with hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation. . Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present disclosure can be embodied in the form of a software product in nature or in part that contributes to the existing technology.
  • the computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as a computer floppy disk.
  • ROM read-only memory
  • RAM random access memory
  • FLASH flash memory
  • hard disk or optical disk etc., including a number of instructions to make a computer device (which can be a personal computer , server, or network device, etc.) to perform the methods described in various embodiments of the present disclosure. Law.

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Abstract

一种中继攻击的检测方法、装置、车辆及介质，所述方法包括：获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中(S110)；基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击(S120)。该方法通过设置从无线通信模块，能够基于信号强度值以及与从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击，实现对中继攻击的检测，进而提高车辆的安全性能。

Description

中继攻击的检测方法、装置、车辆及介质
本申请要求在2022年09月16日提交中国专利局、申请号为202211125400.6的中国专利申请的优先权，以上申请的全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本发明涉及车联网技术领域，尤其涉及一种中继攻击的检测方法、装置、车辆及介质。
背景技术
目前，基于蓝牙数字钥匙的应用已经相当广泛，以汽车为例，蓝牙数字钥匙通常包括：安装在车上的一个或多个有蓝牙功能的车端设备，用户持有的拥有蓝牙功能的钥匙设备(如手机、蓝牙物理钥匙等)。车端设备根据接收信号的强度指示(Received Signal Strength Indication，RSSI)来判断钥匙设备相对于车辆的距离或位置，进一步给钥匙设备提供相应的用车权限。其中，车端设备和钥匙设备通过蓝牙建立连接，并应用加解密、签名验签等安全算法来保障钥匙的安全性。
然而，现有的蓝牙数字钥匙会受到中继攻击，存在很大的安全隐患。
发明内容
本发明提供了一种中继攻击的检测方法、装置、车辆及介质，以对中继攻击进行检测，提高车辆的安全性能。
根据本发明的一方面，提供了一种中继攻击的检测方法，包括：
获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中；
基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
根据本发明的另一方面，提供了一种中继攻击的检测装置，包括：
获取模块，用于获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中；
确定模块，用于基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基 准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
根据本发明的另一方面，提供了一种车辆，所述车辆包括：
至少一个处理器；以及
与所述至少一个处理器通信连接的存储器；其中，
所述存储器存储有可被所述至少一个处理器执行的计算机程序，所述计算机程序被所述至少一个处理器执行，以使所述至少一个处理器能够执行本发明任一实施例所述的中继攻击的检测方法。
根据本发明的另一方面，提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质存储有计算机指令，所述计算机指令用于使处理器执行时实现本发明任一实施例所述的中继攻击的检测方法。
本发明实施例提供了一种中继攻击的检测方法、装置、车辆及介质，所述方法包括：获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中；基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。利用上述技术方案，通过设置从无线通信模块，能够基于信号强度值以及与从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击，实现对中继攻击的检测，进而提高车辆的安全性能。
应当理解，本部分所描述的内容并非旨在标识本发明的实施例的关键或重要特征，也不用于限制本发明的范围。本发明的其它特征将通过以下的说明书而变得容易理解。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例中的技术方案，下面将对实施例描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1是根据本发明实施例一提供的一种中继攻击的检测方法的流程图；
图2是根据本发明实施例二提供的一种中继攻击的检测方法的流程图；
图3是根据本发明实施例三提供的一种中继攻击的检测装置的结构示意图；
图4是根据本发明实施例四提供的一种车辆的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
为了使本技术领域的人员更好地理解本发明方案，下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图，对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述，显然，所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分的实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于本发明中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都应当属于本发明保护的范围。
需要说明的是，本发明的说明书和权利要求书及上述附图中的术语“目标”、“原始”等是用于区别类似的对象，而不必用于描述特定的顺序或先后次序。应该理解这样使用的数据在适当情况下可以互换，以便这里描述的本发明的实施例能够以除了在这里图示或描述的那些以外的顺序实施。此外，术语“包括”和“具有”以及他们的任何变形，意图在于覆盖不排他的包含，例如，包含了一系列步骤或单元的过程、方法、系统、产品或设备不必限于清楚地列出的那些步骤或单元，而是可包括没有清楚地列出的或对于这些过程、方法、产品或设备固有的其它步骤或单元。
实施例一
图1是根据本发明实施例一提供的一种中继攻击的检测方法的流程图，本实施例可适用于对中继攻击进行检测的情况，该方法可以由中继攻击的检测装置来执行，该中继攻击的检测装置可以采用硬件和/或软件的形式实现，该中继攻击的检测装置可配置于车辆中。
可以认为的是，在汽车行业，基于蓝牙的数字钥匙应用(如解闭锁、车控、无钥匙进入及启动系统等功能)已经非常广泛，蓝牙协议自身的安全性是比较高的，但是蓝牙技术本身存在一个严重的缺陷：无法抵御中继攻击。
蓝牙数字钥匙的实现通常包括：安装在车上的一个或多个有蓝牙功能的车端设备和用户持有的拥有蓝牙功能的钥匙设备，钥匙设备如为手机、手环、平板设备和/或蓝牙物理钥匙等。车端设备和钥匙设备可以通过蓝牙建立连接，应用加解密、签名验签等安全算法来保障钥匙设备的安全性。具体的，根据车端设备接收到钥匙设备的射频信号的强度(Received Signal Strength Indication，RSSI)来判断钥匙设备的使用者相对于车的距离或位置，进一步给使用者提供相应的用车权限，比如，打开车门，启动车辆等。
需要说明的是，蓝牙中继攻击的方式是通过增强空中的蓝牙射频信号，从而让本来远离车辆的钥匙设备能够跟车辆(即车端设备)建立蓝牙连接，无需任何破解而通过安全认证，并获取相应的用车权限。同时，因为增强了射频信 号，相应的RSSI值也被增强，进而可以模拟钥匙设备就在车边或者车内，故可以打开车门、启动汽车或者进行其他不正当的操作。
根据中继的方式，中继攻击可分为两类：第一类中继器对2.4G频段的所有空中无线电信号进行无差别的整体放大(不需要进行解调和数据处理)，从而增强该频段内蓝牙信号的强度，达到中继攻击的目的；第二类中继器对2.4G频道中的所有信号按照蓝牙的信道划分和信号调制方式进行解调，并解析出每个信号对应的原始数据包，然后将解析出的所有原始数据包进行筛选，并以更大的功率发射出去，此方式不需要对数据包中的加密字段进行解密和破解，就可以达到中继攻击的目的。
基于此，本发明实施例提供的中继攻击的检测方法用于解决上述“蓝牙中继攻击”的安全问题，即当出现中继攻击时，通过本发明实施例的技术手段，能够检测到中继攻击正在发生，并进行安全手段的干预，例如临时禁用风险功能，提醒用户(如车主)等。同时，当出现中继攻击时，能够让用户继续安全用车，且当中继攻击消失时，能继续正常用车。
如图1所示，本发明实施例提供的中继攻击的检测方法包括：
S110、获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中。
其中，从无线通信模块可以认为是目标车辆中的无线通信模块，用于确定所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，从无线通信模块的个数可以为一个或多个，目标特征数据可以与从无线通信模块一一对应；目标特征数据可以是指主无线通信模块发送的数据，目标特征数据的具体内容不限，如可以包含主无线通信模块自身的媒体存取控制位址(Media Access Control Address，MAC地址)等，信号强度值即可以用于指示目标特征数据的信号强度。
在本实施例中，主无线通信模块可以是指目标车辆中的无线通信模块，如具有蓝牙功能的车端设备，用于连接用户持有的钥匙设备。主无线通信模块与从无线通信模块仅用于区分不同的功能和位置，本实施例对此不作限定。
具体的，可以获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，此处不对获取的具体步骤进行限定，如首先从无线通信模块可以实时接收空中的无线电信号，然后根据主无线通信模块的MAC地址筛选出主无线通信模块的目标特征数据，并对实时接收的目标特征数据的信号强度值进行确定，此处对信号强度值的确定方式不作限定，只要能得到信号强度值即可。
S120、基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围， 确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
基准范围可以理解为正常情况下(如目标车辆未遭受中继攻击时)从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值所处的范围，可以预先根据主无线通信模块和从无线通信模块检测或学习得到，示例性的，可以在目标车辆下线后，从无线通信模块对主无线通信模块发送的目标特征数据进行若干次学习，来得到从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，此时得到的基准范围可以适用于同一型号的所有车辆；还可以通过在其他情况下触发基准范围的二次检测，如在目标车辆使用过程中，只针对目标车辆进行基准范围的重新检测，以精确从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，提高后续确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击的准确率。
其中，当目标车辆上设置有多个从无线通信模块时，需要针对每一个从无线通信模块对其对应的基准范围进行检测。
在本实施例中，当从无线通信模块得到信号强度值后，可以将得到的信号强度值与对应的基准范围进行比较，来确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击，此处不对确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击的具体方法作进一步展开，如具体方法可以根据从无线通信模块个数的不同而有所区别。
需要说明的是，本发明实施例提供的中继攻击的检测方法可以由主无线通信模块来执行，也可以由从无线通信模块来执行，还可以由电机控制单元(Motor Control Unit，MCU)来执行，具体执行的步骤可能存在差异，如当主无线通信模块或电机控制单元执行时，可以在从无线通信模块确定目标特征数据的信号强度值后，将确定的信号强度值发送至主无线通信模块或电机控制单元，主无线通信模块或电机控制单元接收并获取所述信号强度值，并执行后续操作。
本发明实施例一提供的一种中继攻击的检测方法，获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中；基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。利用该方法，通过设置从无线通信模块，能够基于信号强度值以及与从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击，实现对中继攻击的检测，进而提高车辆的安全性能。
在一个实施例中，所述基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击，包括：
如果所述信号强度值位于所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围之内，则确定所述目标车辆未遭受中继攻击；
如果所述信号强度值大于所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围内的各基准强度值，则确定所述目标车辆遭受中继攻击。
可以认为的是，在基于信号强度值以及与从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击时，可以将信号强度值与此基准范围进行比较，若信号强度值位于基准范围之内，说明信号强度值未超过信号强度值的临界范围，则可以确定目标车辆未遭受中继攻击；若信号强度值大于基准范围内的各基准强度值时，说明信号强度值超过了信号强度值的临界范围，那么可以认为目标车辆在遭受中继攻击。
在一个实施方式中，从无线通信模块的个数可能为多个，相应的，接收到信号强度值的个数也为多个，此时在确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击时，则需要将每个信号强度值与其对应的基准范围进行比较，然后根据各比较结果来确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击，此处不对根据各比较结果来确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击的方式进行限定，例如，若至少存在某一信号强度值与其对应基准范围中的最大基准强度值的差值大于设定阈值时，则可以认定目标车辆遭受中继攻击，又如，当比较结果为信号强度值大于对应基准范围内的各基准强度值的个数超过信号强度值总个数的一半时，也可以认定目标车辆遭受中继攻击，本实施例对此不作限定。
在一个实施例中，所述目标特征数据包括所述主通信模块向所述目标车辆对应的终端设备发送的数据，和/或，所述主通信模块向除所述终端设备之外的其他终端发送的数据。
在本实施例中，当主通信模块的连接情况不同时，所发送的目标特征数据也存在差异，如当主通信模块未连接至任意终端设备时，此时，主通信模块将会向所有的终端设备发送目标特征数据(如广播数据)，以实现连接；而当主通信模块连接至某一终端设备，如目标车辆对应的终端设备时，那么目标特征数据包括主通信模块向目标车辆对应的终端设备发送的数据。在此基础上，通过对不同时期的目标特征数据进行目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击的判断，能够加大对中继攻击的检测范围，进一步提高车辆的安全性能。
在一个实施例中，所述方法还包括：
如果确定所述目标车辆遭受中继攻击，则执行预设防御措施。
预设防御措施可以是指预先设定的处理措施，用于保护目标车辆。可以理解的是，在确定目标车辆遭受中继攻击之后，可以执行预设防御措施来进行安全手段的干预，实现对目标车辆的保护。其中，预设防御措施的具体内容不限，可以由相关人员根据实际情况进行设置，此处不作进一步展开。
在一个实施例中，所述预设防御措施包括下述一个或多个：
向所述目标车辆对应的终端设备发送报警通知，其中，所述报警通知用于通知所述目标车辆遭受中继攻击；
关闭所述主通信模块与所述目标车辆对应的终端设备之间的通信连接；
关闭所述目标车辆的目标控制功能，所述目标控制功能包括目标全自动控制功能和/或目标半自动控制功能；
关闭所述主通信模块与所述目标车辆的物理钥匙之间的通信连接。
其中，报警通知可以认为是对目标车辆对应终端设备的提醒，用于提醒目标车辆遭受中继攻击，报警通知的方式可以包括一个或多个，例如在确定目标车辆遭受中继攻击报警后，可以通过目标车辆的电话系统向终端设备发送短信或进行电话通知，也可以通过终端设备中的软件进行震动或铃声以通知目标车辆遭受中继攻击。
目标控制功能可以认为是具有安全风险的蓝牙功能，包括目标全自动控制功能和/或目标半自动控制功能，目标全自动控制功能可以是指基于蓝牙自动识别并自动控制目标车辆进行操作的功能，如目标全自动控制功能可以包括基于蓝牙定位的自动解闭锁和/或自动车控(如控制车灯)等；目标半自动控制功能可以认为是基于蓝牙来被动控制目标车辆进行操作的功能，如无钥匙进入及启动系统(passive entry passive start，peps)，即当用户走近车辆一定距离，按压车辆按钮或拉门把手时，车辆会自动进行点火或解锁。在本实施例中，预设防御措施可以包括下述措施的任意组合：向目标车辆对应的终端设备发送报警通知；关闭主通信模块与目标车辆对应的终端设备之间的通信连接；关闭目标车辆的目标控制功能；关闭主通信模块与目标车辆的物理钥匙之间的通信连接。其中，关闭主通信模块与终端设备之间的通信连接或关闭主通信模块与物理钥匙之间的通信连接的具体方式不限，如可以在主通信模块端关闭蓝牙的连接，也可以在终端设备或物理钥匙端断开通信连接，还可以上述两种情况同时进行。关闭目标车辆目标控制功能的手段不限，如可以向主无线通信模块或MCU发送关闭指令以控制目标车辆关闭目标控制功能，其中，关闭指令可以认为是控制车辆禁用目标控制功能的指令。
需要说明的是，本步骤需要由主无线通信模块或MCU来执行，即当主无线通信模块执行本步骤之前的中继攻击检测操作时，在确定目标车辆遭受中继攻击后，主无线通信模块可以继续执行预设防御措施，也可以将确定中继攻击的结果发送至MCU，以由MCU执行预设防御措施；当MCU执行本步骤之前的中继攻击检测操作时，在确定目标车辆遭受中继攻击后，MCU可以继续执行预 设防御措施，也可以将确定中继攻击的结果发送至主无线通信模块，以由主无线通信模块执行预设防御措施；而当从无线通信模块执行本步骤之前的中继攻击检测操作时，在确定目标车辆遭受中继攻击后，从无线通信模块可以将确定中继攻击的结果发送至主无线通信模块或MCU，以由主无线通信模块或MCU执行预设防御措施。
在一个实施例中，在车辆遭受中继攻击时，车辆还可以向终端设备发送禁用指令，以指示终端设备关闭对目标车辆的目标控制功能；
所述终端设备用于：当接收到所述车辆发送的禁用指令时，关闭对所述目标车辆的目标控制功能；基于预设密码或者预设用户特征数据对所述终端设备侧的用户进行身份验证；当身份验证通过时，根据用户的控制操作向所述车辆发送控制指令。
在本实施例中，禁用指令用于控制终端设备关闭对目标车辆的目标控制功能。预设密码或者预设用户特征数据用于对终端设备侧的用户进行身份验证，预设密码可以是指终端设备侧的用户预先设置的密码，预设用户特征数据则可以是指终端设备侧的用户预先设置的特征数据，如指纹、面部数据等。用户可以根据实际情况选择是否进行预设密码或者预设用户特征数据的设置。
具体的，在遭受中继攻击时，需要在存在预设密码和预设用户特征数据的情况下，基于预设密码或者预设用户特征数据对终端设备侧的用户进行身份验证；当身份验证通过时，则可以根据用户的控制操作向车辆发送控制指令。
在一个实施例中，所述终端设备还用于：
针对不存在预设密码和预设用户特征数据的情况，提示用户进行用户认证，所述用户认证包括密码认证和/或用户特征数据认证。
可以理解的是，当不存在预设密码和预设用户特征数据时，则需要引导用户进行认证，只有在认证完成后才能根据控制操作向车辆发送控制指令。具体的用户认证可以包括密码认证和/或用户特征数据认证。
下面对本实施例提供的中继攻击的检测方法、装置及车辆进行示例性的描述：
首先，车辆上除了安装跟手机通信的主蓝牙模块(即主无线通信模块)外，同时安装至少1个从蓝牙模块(即从无线通信模块)：
主蓝牙模块通常安装在车内中央位置；至少有一个从蓝牙模块安装在车内，车外从蓝牙模块的布置尽量保证车顶一个，其它车外的从蓝牙模块尽量放在车辆的各个方向。从蓝牙模块与主蓝牙模块保持固定距离，尽量保证中间遮挡物不会变化。
同时，可以在从蓝牙模块和主蓝牙模块之间增加隔离材料，让从蓝牙模块接收到主蓝牙模块的蓝牙信号的RSSI值(即目标特征数据的信号强度值)，保持在一个较小的值，接近从蓝牙模块的接收灵敏度。
其次，学习基准RSSI值：
车辆需要一个学习过程，通常在车辆下线后，或者通过其他方式触发车辆进行防中继攻击的信号学习。主蓝牙模块以日常工作的功率在某个信道上发送蓝牙信号(即目标特征数据)；各个从蓝牙模块在该模块上接收信号；并将接收到的信号的强度值(RSSI)保存下来，形成与从无线通信模块对应的基准范围。
继而，进行中继攻击的检测和判断：
蓝牙数字钥匙正常工作时，从蓝牙模块接收主蓝牙模块的蓝牙信号，并获取RSSI值，如果该RSSI值大于基准范围，则认为发生了蓝牙中继攻击(即如果所述信号强度值大于所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围内的各基准强度值，则确定所述目标车辆遭受中继攻击)。此时可以进行防御性措施处理。
进一步的，还可以通过对所有从蓝牙模块的RSSI偏大值进行综合评估计算，再进行是否发生中继攻击的决策判断，以此更加准确地判断中继攻击，减少误报。
最后，防御性处理措施，即预设防御措施：
(1)通过手机震动、铃声、电话等方式通知车主和车辆使用者，提醒用户查看车辆是否安全(即向目标车辆对应的终端设备发送报警通知)，如有必要，临时关闭蓝牙(即关闭主通信模块与目标车辆对应的终端设备之间的通信连接；关闭主通信模块与目标车辆的物理钥匙之间的通信连接)。
(2)限制具有安全风险的蓝牙数字钥匙功能(即关闭所述目标车辆的目标控制功能)，比如(但不限于)：基于定位的所有功能(peps，自动车控，自动解闭锁等)。此种情况下只能通过数字钥匙APP进行主动操作(如RKE等)。在允许用户通过数字钥匙APP进行主动操作之前，需要满足以下两个前提条件：
第一，车端为了用户体验，通常用轻认证和重认证。在检测到中继攻击时，如果当前只是进行了轻认证，则必须进行重认证，然后才能运行RKE等主动车控。
第二，为了应对可能有攻击者在使用手机，在使用APP之前，需要对手机操作者进行身份验证：数字钥匙的APP要求用户重新登录，以验证操作者的身份。重新登录时，禁用手机验证码登录的方式，只能用密码、指纹、faceID，声纹等(即密码认证和/或用户特征数据认证)。
此外，本实施例还针对蓝牙信道间射频特性差异性的影响，提供了处理方法：不论是蓝牙低能耗(Bluetooth Low Energy，BLE)还是经典蓝牙，都把2.4G频段分成了若干个信道，以在信道上进行数据通信。而受到RF电路和天线的射频特性的影响，在不同信道上的接受灵敏度和实际发射出去的射频功率存在差异，所以，为了更好的对中继攻击进行检测和判断，需要按信道进行区分处理。
即在基准RSSI学习的时候，需要对所有信道分别学习，并分别计算基准RSSI范围(即与从无线通信模块和信道标识对应的基准范围)；然后在检测中继攻击时，对接收到的信号按信道给基准RSSI进行比较和计算(即基于信号强度值以及与从无线通信模块和信道标识对应的基准范围)，来确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
通过上述描述可以发现，本实施例的车辆上除了安装用于建立连接并进行通信的主蓝牙模块外，同时安装多个从蓝牙模块。主蓝牙模块首先可以将自己的mac地址等特征数据发送给从蓝牙模块，随后从蓝牙模块接收主蓝牙模块发送的蓝牙信号，并获取相应的RSSI值(即从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值)，因为主蓝牙模块和从蓝牙模块之间的距离和阻挡物等是固定的，所以RSSI值也是恒定在一个范围区间内，即与从无线通信模块对应的基准范围。
如果发生了中继攻击，因为蓝牙信号被放大的缘故，从蓝牙模块接收到的RSSI值也会增大。因此，通过判断该RSSI值是否大于标定的范围值来获知当前是否发生了中继攻击(即基于信号强度值以及与从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击)。
车端如果检测到了中继攻击，可以立即停用风险的功能(比如自动解闭锁，peps，基于定位结果的功能)；并通过一些方式通知用户，用户只能通过手机APP、按键等需要车主主动干预的行为进行安全用车。
故本实施例提供的中继攻击的检测方法可以适用于汽车、摩托车行业的基于蓝牙的数字钥匙；其它行业有蓝牙中继攻击风险的产品，或者其它基于无线连接的产品，如基于wifi的，zigbee，sub1G等产品，来提升防中继攻击的能力。
实施例二
图2是根据本发明实施例二提供的一种中继攻击的检测方法的流程图，本实施例二在上述各实施例的基础上进行优化。在本实施例中，将基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭 受中继攻击进一步具体化为：基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块和所述信道标识对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
本实施例尚未详尽的内容请参考实施例一。
如图2所示，本公开实施例二提供的一种中继攻击的检测方法，包括如下步骤：
S210、获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中；
S220、基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块和所述信道标识对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
在本步骤中，目标特征数据中可以携带有信道标识，信道标识用于表征目标特征数据所传输的信道。
在一个实施方式中，无线通信频段可以划分为若干个信道，以实现信号在特定信道中的传输。故在从无线通信模块进行基准范围学习或检测的过程中，可以针对每一信道，确定与从无线通信模块和信道标识对应的基准范围，从而在中继攻击检测的过程中，能够根据目标特征数据所携带的信道标识，基于目标特征数据的信号强度值以及与从无线通信模块和信道标识对应的基准范围来确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
本发明实施例二提供的一种中继攻击的检测方法，根据目标特征数据所携带的信道标识，能够基于信号强度值与对应的基准范围实现对中继攻击的精准检测，进一步提高车辆的安全性能。
实施例三
图3是根据本发明实施例三提供的一种中继攻击的检测装置的结构示意图，如图3所示，该装置包括：
获取模块310，用于获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中；
确定模块320，用于基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
本发明实施例三提供的一种中继攻击的检测装置，通过获取模块310获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由 主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中；通过确定模块320基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。利用该装置，通过设置从无线通信模块，能够基于信号强度值以及与从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击，实现对中继攻击的检测，进而提高车辆的安全性能。
可选的，确定模块320包括：
如果所述信号强度值位于所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围之内，则确定所述目标车辆未遭受中继攻击；
如果所述信号强度值大于所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围内的各基准强度值，则确定所述目标车辆遭受中继攻击。
可选的，所述目标特征数据中携带有信道标识，所述确定模块320具体用于：基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块和所述信道标识对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
可选的，所述目标特征数据包括所述主通信模块向所述目标车辆对应的终端设备发送的数据，和/或，所述主通信模块向除所述终端设备之外的其他终端发送的数据。
可选的，本发明实施例提供的中继攻击的检测装置还包括：
如果确定所述目标车辆遭受中继攻击，则执行预设防御措施。
可选的，所述预设防御措施包括下述一个或多个：
向所述目标车辆对应的终端设备发送报警通知，其中，所述报警通知用于通知所述目标车辆遭受中继攻击；
关闭所述主通信模块与所述目标车辆对应的终端设备之间的通信连接；
关闭所述目标车辆的目标控制功能，所述目标控制功能包括目标全自动控制功能和/或目标半自动控制功能；
关闭所述主通信模块与所述目标车辆的物理钥匙之间的通信连接。
本发明实施例所提供的中继攻击的检测装置可执行本发明任意实施例所提供的中继攻击的检测方法，具备执行方法相应的功能模块和有益效果。
实施例四
图4是根据本发明实施例四提供的一种车辆的结构示意图，如图4所示，车 辆包括处理器40、存储器41、输入装置42和输出装置43；车辆中处理器40的数量可以是一个或多个，图4中以一个处理器40为例；车辆中的处理器40、存储器41、输入装置42和输出装置43可以通过总线或其他方式连接，图4中以通过总线连接为例。
存储器41作为一种计算机可读存储介质，可用于存储软件程序、计算机可执行程序以及模块，如本公开实施例一中的中继攻击的检测方法对应的程序指令/模块(例如，获取模块310、确定模块320)。处理器40通过运行存储在存储器41中的软件程序、指令以及模块，从而执行车辆的各种功能应用以及数据处理，即实现上述的中继攻击的检测方法。
存储器41可主要包括存储程序区和存储数据区，其中，存储程序区可存储操作系统、至少一个功能所需的应用程序；存储数据区可存储根据终端的使用所创建的数据等。此外，存储器41可以包括高速随机存取存储器，还可以包括非易失性存储器，例如至少一个磁盘存储器件、闪存器件、或其他非易失性固态存储器件。在一些实例中，存储器41可进一步包括相对于处理器40远程设置的存储器，这些远程存储器可以通过网络连接至车辆。上述网络的实例包括但不限于互联网、企业内部网、局域网、移动通信网及其组合。
输入装置42可用于接收输入的数字或字符信息，以及产生与车辆的用户设置以及功能控制有关的键信号输入。输出装置43可包括显示屏等显示设备。
可以认为的是，一方面，本步骤中的处理器可以配置于车辆的主无线通信模块或者从无线通信模块内，以在主无线通信模块或者从无线通信模块内执行对中继攻击的检测方法；另一方面，本步骤中的处理器也可以独立于主无线通信模块或者从无线通信模块，即在从无线通信模块确定所接收目标特征数据的信号强度值后，将此信号强度值发送至处理器，以使处理器执行对中继攻击的检测方法。
在一个实施例中，所述处理器配置于所述车辆的主无线通信模块或者从无线通信模块内。
在一个实施例中，所述车辆还包括主无线通信模块和从无线通信模块，所述处理器分别与主无线通信模块和从无线通信模块通信连接。
其中，主无线通信模块和从无线通信模块可以配置于车辆中，主无线通信模块的个数通常为一个，配置在车辆内部的中央位置，从无线通信模块的个数可以为一个或多个，具体配置位置可以根据实际情况来进行设置，如当存在一个从无线通信模块时，此从无线通信模块需要配置在车内；当存在两个从无线通信模块时，可以在车内配置一个从无线通信模块的同时，将另一个从无线通 信模块布置在车辆外部的车顶处；而当存在多于两个从无线通信模块时，则可以在车内和车辆外部的车顶处各配置一个从无线通信模块之外，将其他从无线通信模块布置在车辆外部的各个方向上。需要注意的是，主无线通信模块和从无线通信模块之间需要保持固定距离，且两者之间的中间遮挡物保证不会变化。
在一个实施例中，所述主无线通信模块与所述从无线通信模块之间设置有隔离材料。
在主无线通信模块与从无线通信模块之间可以设置有隔离材料，使得从无线通信模块所接收目标特征数据的信号强度值较小，以接近从无线通信模块的接收灵敏度，从而能够保证在遭受中继攻击时，信号强度值的变化较为明显，提高中继攻击检测的灵敏性。其中，本实施例中隔离材料的具体材质不作限定，只要能降低从无线通信模块所接收目标特征数据的信号强度值，对目标特征数据有一定屏蔽作用即可。
实施例五
本公开实施例五还提供一种包含计算机可执行指令的存储介质，所述计算机可执行指令在由计算机处理器执行时用于执行中继攻击的检测方法，该方法包括：
获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中；
基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
当然,本公开实施例所提供的一种包含计算机可执行指令的存储介质,其计算机可执行指令不限于如上所述的方法操作,还可以执行本公开实施例一或实施例二所提供的中继攻击的检测方法中的相关操作。
通过以上关于实施方式的描述，所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，本公开可借助软件及必需的通用硬件来实现，当然也可以通过硬件实现，但很多情况下前者是更佳的实施方式。基于这样的理解，本公开的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，如计算机的软盘、只读存储器(Read-Only Memory,ROM)、随机存取存储器(Random Access Memory,RAM)、闪存(FLASH)、硬盘或光盘等，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)执行本公开各个实施例所述的方 法。
值得注意的是，上述搜索装置的实施例中，所包括的各个单元和模块只是按照功能逻辑进行划分的，但并不局限于上述的划分，只要能够实现相应的功能即可；另外，各功能单元的具体名称也只是为了便于相互区分，并不用于限制本公开的保护范围。
注意，上述仅为本公开的较佳实施例及所运用技术原理。本领域技术人员会理解，本公开不限于这里所述的特定实施例，对本领域技术人员来说能够进行各种明显的变化、重新调整和替代而不会脱离本公开的保护范围。因此，虽然通过以上实施例对本公开进行了较为详细的说明，但是本公开不仅仅限于以上实施例，在不脱离本公开构思的情况下，还可以包括更多其他等效实施例，而本公开的范围由所附的权利要求范围决定。

Claims (12)

  1. 一种中继攻击的检测方法，其特征在于，包括：
    获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中；
    基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击，包括：
    如果所述信号强度值位于所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围之内，则确定所述目标车辆未遭受中继攻击；
    如果所述信号强度值大于所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围内的各基准强度值，则确定所述目标车辆遭受中继攻击。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述目标特征数据中携带有信道标识，所述基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击，包括：
    基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块和所述信道标识对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
  4. 根据权利要求1-3任一所述的方法，其特征在于，所述目标特征数据包括所述主通信模块向所述目标车辆对应的终端设备发送的数据，和/或，所述主通信模块向除所述终端设备之外的其他终端发送的数据。
  5. 根据权利要求1-3任一所述的方法，其特征在于，还包括：
    如果确定所述目标车辆遭受中继攻击，则执行预设防御措施。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的方法，其特征在于，所述预设防御措施包括下述一个或多个：
    向所述目标车辆对应的终端设备发送报警通知，其中，所述报警通知用于通知所述目标车辆遭受中继攻击；
    关闭所述主通信模块与所述目标车辆对应的终端设备之间的通信连接；
    关闭所述目标车辆的目标控制功能，所述目标控制功能包括目标全自动控制功能和/或目标半自动控制功能；
    关闭所述主通信模块与所述目标车辆的物理钥匙之间的通信连接。
  7. 一种中继攻击的检测装置，其特征在于，包括：
    获取模块，用于获取从无线通信模块所接收到的目标特征数据的信号强度值，所述目标特征数据由主无线通信模块发送，所述主无线通信模块和所述从无线通信模块配置于目标车辆中；
    确定模块，用于基于所述信号强度值以及与所述从无线通信模块对应的基准范围，确定所述目标车辆是否遭受中继攻击。
  8. 一种车辆，其特征在于，所述车辆包括：
    至少一个处理器；以及
    与所述至少一个处理器通信连接的存储器；其中，
    所述存储器存储有可被所述至少一个处理器执行的计算机程序，所述计算机程序被所述至少一个处理器执行，以使所述至少一个处理器能够执行权利要求1-6中任一项所述的中继攻击的检测方法。
  9. 根据权利要求8所述的车辆，其特征在于，所述处理器配置于所述车辆的主无线通信模块或者从无线通信模块内。
  10. 根据权利要求8所述的车辆，其特征在于，所述车辆还包括主无线通信模块和从无线通信模块，所述处理器分别与主无线通信模块和从无线通信模块通信连接。
  11. 根据权利要求9或10所述的车辆，其特征在于，所述主无线通信模块与所述从无线通信模块之间设置有隔离材料。
  12. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，所述计算机可读存储介质存储有计算机指令，所述计算机指令用于使处理器执行时实现权利要求1-6中任一项所述的中继攻击的检测方法。
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