WO2018050994A1 - Procédé de détection de défaillances - Google Patents
Procédé de détection de défaillances Download PDFInfo
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- WO2018050994A1 WO2018050994A1 PCT/FR2017/052403 FR2017052403W WO2018050994A1 WO 2018050994 A1 WO2018050994 A1 WO 2018050994A1 FR 2017052403 W FR2017052403 W FR 2017052403W WO 2018050994 A1 WO2018050994 A1 WO 2018050994A1
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 52
- 230000004913 activation Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 21
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 20
- 230000009471 action Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 18
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 15
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims description 18
- FGUUSXIOTUKUDN-IBGZPJMESA-N C1(=CC=CC=C1)N1C2=C(NC([C@H](C1)NC=1OC(=NN=1)C1=CC=CC=C1)=O)C=CC=C2 Chemical compound C1(=CC=CC=C1)N1C2=C(NC([C@H](C1)NC=1OC(=NN=1)C1=CC=CC=C1)=O)C=CC=C2 FGUUSXIOTUKUDN-IBGZPJMESA-N 0.000 claims description 8
- 230000000295 complement effect Effects 0.000 claims description 7
- 230000009849 deactivation Effects 0.000 abstract description 3
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- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 description 36
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Classifications
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- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/0703—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation
- G06F11/0751—Error or fault detection not based on redundancy
- G06F11/0754—Error or fault detection not based on redundancy by exceeding limits
- G06F11/0757—Error or fault detection not based on redundancy by exceeding limits by exceeding a time limit, i.e. time-out, e.g. watchdogs
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/02—Ensuring safety in case of control system failures, e.g. by diagnosing, circumventing or fixing failures
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/22—Safety or indicating devices for abnormal conditions
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/24—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means
- F02D41/26—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means using computer, e.g. microprocessor
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02M—SUPPLYING COMBUSTION ENGINES IN GENERAL WITH COMBUSTIBLE MIXTURES OR CONSTITUENTS THEREOF
- F02M51/00—Fuel-injection apparatus characterised by being operated electrically
- F02M51/06—Injectors peculiar thereto with means directly operating the valve needle
- F02M51/0603—Injectors peculiar thereto with means directly operating the valve needle using piezoelectric or magnetostrictive operating means
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- G06F11/0703—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation
- G06F11/0706—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation the processing taking place on a specific hardware platform or in a specific software environment
- G06F11/0736—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation the processing taking place on a specific hardware platform or in a specific software environment in functional embedded systems, i.e. in a data processing system designed as a combination of hardware and software dedicated to performing a certain function
- G06F11/0739—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation the processing taking place on a specific hardware platform or in a specific software environment in functional embedded systems, i.e. in a data processing system designed as a combination of hardware and software dedicated to performing a certain function in a data processing system embedded in automotive or aircraft systems
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- G06F11/0703—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation
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- G06F11/0703—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation
- G06F11/0793—Remedial or corrective actions
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/02—Ensuring safety in case of control system failures, e.g. by diagnosing, circumventing or fixing failures
- B60W50/0205—Diagnosing or detecting failures; Failure detection models
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/20—Output circuits, e.g. for controlling currents in command coils
- F02D2041/202—Output circuits, e.g. for controlling currents in command coils characterised by the control of the circuit
- F02D2041/2024—Output circuits, e.g. for controlling currents in command coils characterised by the control of the circuit the control switching a load after time-on and time-off pulses
- F02D2041/2027—Control of the current by pulse width modulation or duty cycle control
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/20—Output circuits, e.g. for controlling currents in command coils
- F02D2041/202—Output circuits, e.g. for controlling currents in command coils characterised by the control of the circuit
- F02D2041/2055—Output circuits, e.g. for controlling currents in command coils characterised by the control of the circuit with means for determining actual opening or closing time
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/20—Output circuits, e.g. for controlling currents in command coils
- F02D41/2096—Output circuits, e.g. for controlling currents in command coils for controlling piezoelectric injectors
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/22—Safety or indicating devices for abnormal conditions
- F02D41/221—Safety or indicating devices for abnormal conditions relating to the failure of actuators or electrically driven elements
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/0796—Safety measures, i.e. ensuring safe condition in the event of error, e.g. for controlling element
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- G06F2201/81—Threshold
Definitions
- the present invention relates generally to the protection of electronic devices such as a computer.
- It relates more particularly to a method dedicated to the detection of a failure of a computer on at least one output that may result in a partial or total destruction of said computer.
- the invention finds applications, in particular, in the automotive field. It can be implemented, for example, in an engine control computer.
- a motor vehicle nowadays includes more and more embedded electronics such as calculators. These computers can be dedicated to cabin management, braking and also engine management.
- An engine computer also called engine control computer is adapted to manage engine functions such as admission, exhaust and / or injection.
- the engine control computer has a calculation and control unit adapted to perform tasks allowing control and control of the engine, for example thermal, at least one memory suitable for storing for example a computer program, floors adaptation and power stages.
- the engine control computer has a power stage adapted to control injectors. Relatively high powers are generated and sometimes failures can occur and cause a partial or total destruction of the engine control computer.
- failures can be software failures such as, for example, a loss of information at the level of the adaptation stage provoking a continuous activation or during a relatively long duration of the injector that can cause destruction of the injector and / or a setting engine or even in the worst case a breakage of said engine.
- failures can also damage the engine control computer. Indeed, the activation for a relatively long duration of one or more power outputs of the engine control computer can cause overconsumption of said outputs and cause overheating or destruction of either the power stage or the engine control computer .
- protection means At the engine control computer to monitor, according to a specific strategy, the state of the output stages. These protection means, when detecting a failure at the output stage, cause a partial or total reset of the engine control computer thus avoiding a breakage of the latter.
- the protection means do not detect early enough the failure at the outputs of the power stage which can cause the destruction of the engine control computer.
- the invention proposes a method for protecting a failure of an engine control computer to partially or completely remedy the technical shortcoming of the cited prior art.
- a first aspect of the invention proposes a method for detecting failures of an engine control computer; the engine control computer comprising at least:
- a software layer executed at least partially by the computing and control unit and comprising n launching steps of at least one charge activation cycle, a charge activation cycle comprising m phase (s) for activating said charge, a charge activation phase comprising the following steps:
- the fault detection method comprises a measurement time window having a duration equal to the duration of a load activation phase, during which the steps following are carried out:
- step c) recording values of the measurements made in step c):
- Threshold_max stored in step d) at respective reference values AT1_ref, AT2_ref, AT3_ref, AT4_ref, Threshold_min_ref, Threshold_max_ref, f) reset action of the engine control computer if at least one of the following conditions is valid:
- step f) a complementary step of reset action of the software layer and the hardware layer of the engine control computer in the case where the default variable> 1.
- the steps performed in a measurement time window are repeated a number of times; the number e corresponding to the number n of launching steps of at least one load activation cycle.
- the load is an injector.
- the method can control an injector of a diesel engine.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an architecture of an engine control computer
- FIG. 2 is a simplified view of the engine control computer shown in FIG.
- FIG. 3 is a graph illustrating states of the main signals transiting in the engine control computer of the two preceding figures
- FIG. 4 is a failure detection flowchart according to the method of the present invention.
- Fig. 5 is an illustrative block diagram of the software layer of the method of Fig. 4.
- FIG. 1 represents a block diagram of an architecture of a computer 2.
- the computer 2 of FIG. 1 is for example an engine control computer installed on a motor vehicle having a diesel engine.
- the engine control computer 2 comprises inter alia, a calculation and control unit 4, a control unit 6, a power module 8 coupled to power outputs 10 and a communication bus 12.
- the calculation and control unit 4 comprises inter alia a master microcontroller 14, at least one memory 16 adapted to store programs and input / output stages 18.
- the various elements of the calculation and control unit 4 are coupled together by links not shown in the figures to avoid overloading the drawings.
- the master microcontroller 14 is for example a 32-bit multi-core microcontroller clocked at a frequency of 128 MHz.
- the communication bus 12 is for example a communication bus type SPI for "Serial Peripheral Interface" in English, adapted to receive and deliver communication signals and control signals to the modules of the computer 2 engine control.
- the input / output stages 18 are, for example, analog / digital converters adapted to receive and deliver control signals to the modules of the engine control computer 2.
- the calculation and control unit 4 comprises, among other things, a previously described component layer that can also be named by the person skilled in the "hardware or HW" layer art and a software layer or also called a "software or SW" layer. .
- the software layer is very complex and comprises different software sections for controlling and / or controlling an internal combustion engine. In the rest of the description, the internal combustion engine will sometimes be called a heat engine. There are so-called application software sections for controlling various parameters of the heat engine and at least one software section adapted to control and control at least one injector 20 of the engine.
- This software section is adapted to control and control the injectors 20 of the engine and is often called by the person skilled in the art "basic software". As a function of a given strategy, it makes it possible to control the injection of the heat engine via the injectors 20.
- the software layer is adapted to deliver, with the aid of suitable electronic components, control signals to the different modules of the engine control computer 2, that is to say the control unit 6 and the power module 8.
- it is delivered requests, called injection requests, depending real-time events, interrupts, internal clocks, also named by those skilled in the art “internal timer”, calculations performed by the master microcontroller 14 and also in response to signals from the engine.
- the signals used to control the injectors will be presented later in the description.
- the control unit 6 comprises, for example, a first slave microcontroller 22 and at least one conversion module 23 adapted to convert electrical signals from the calculation unit 4.
- the first slave microcontroller 22 is adapted to perform tasks requested by the master microcontroller 14 and for analyzing / processing signals from the power module 8.
- the first slave microcontroller 22 comprises a software layer adapted to track the position of the injectors 20.
- the control unit 6 receives on one of these inputs a signal named V inj return from power module 8, signal representative of the position of the injectors 20.
- the first slave microcontroller 22 can be a programmable component of the ASIC type, abbreviation of the English "Application Specifies Integrated Circuit”.
- the power module 8 will not be further described in the description because its architecture is well known to those skilled in the art.
- a monitoring module 24 is integrated in the computer 2 of engine control.
- This monitoring module 24 comprises, for example, a second slave microcontroller 26.
- the monitoring module 24 is coupled to the calculation and control unit 4 by means of the communication bus 12 and to the power module 8 using of a control bus 28.
- the control bus 28 has a single connection.
- the control bus 28 may comprise a number n of connections.
- This type of control bus 28 may for example be an asynchronous serial communication bus known to those skilled in the art.
- failures occur during the control and injection control of the internal combustion engine. These failures can be physical, that is to say for example a failure of an injector 20; in this case the engine control computer 2 detects the faulty injector 20 and informs the driver. Due to the complexity of the architecture of the engine control computer 2 and the real-time control of the injectors 20, it is possible for software failures to occur such as for example requests made by the control unit 6 with a time of injector control 20 too long or offset from the combustion cycle of the engine. Thus, when a failure of this type occurs then a breakage of the computer is possible.
- the injectors 20 are, for example, piezoelectric injectors.
- injectors 20 will be considered in a first approach as capabilities. This simplification of the behavior of the injectors 20 will better understand the invention. It should be noted that those skilled in the art often use this type of approach to illustrate the operation of a piezoelectric injector.
- FIG. 2 is a simplified view of the engine control computer 2 shown in FIG. It includes the calculation and control unit 4, the control unit 6, the power module 8, the injectors 20, the monitoring module 24 and the control bus 28. Only the signals useful for understanding the method of the invention are represented in place of the communication bus 12.
- a first link 30 and a second link 32 couple the calculation and control unit 4 to the control unit 6.
- the first link 30 and the second link 32 respectively deliver a first control signal 30_1 and a second signal order 32 1.
- a third link 34 and a fourth link 36 couple the control unit 6 to the power module 8.
- the third link 34 and the fourth link 36 respectively deliver a third control signal 34 1 and a fourth control signal 36_1.
- the first link 30, the second link 32, the third link 34 and the fourth link 36 are links with unidirectional data transfer.
- at least one of these four links is bidirectional, thus reducing the complexity of the internal wiring of the engine control computer 2.
- a fifth link 38 couples the power module 8 to an injector 20.
- the number of fifth links 38 is proportional to the number of injectors 20 to be controlled.
- This fifth link 38 is adapted to deliver to an injector 20 a fifth control signal 38_1 for controlling it.
- FIG. 3 shows the first control signal 30_1, the second signal 32 1, the third control signal 34 1, the fourth control signal 36_1 and the fifth control signal 38_1 during an injection phase of a cycle. injection.
- a single injection phase has been shown in FIG. 3.
- an injection cycle comprises a determined number of injection phases.
- the first control signal 30_1 delivered by the calculation and control unit 4 is representative of an injection command, or as mentioned above in the description, if we consider an injector 20 as a capacity then, the first signal control 30_1 is representative of a load order of the capacity.
- the second control signal 32 1 delivered by the calculation and control unit 4 is representative of an injection stop command, or as mentioned above in the description if we consider an injector 20 as a capacity then, the second control signal 32 1 is representative of a discharge order of the capacitance.
- the third control signal 34 has a third duration 34 1 D of a value of 200 ⁇ . In a preferred embodiment, the value of the third duration 34 1 D is identical to the value of the first duration 30_1_D.
- the fourth control signal 36 has a fourth duration 36_1_D of a value of 200 ⁇ .
- the value of the fourth duration 36_1_D is identical to the value of the second duration 34 1 D.
- the third control signal 34 and the fourth control signal 36 are, for example PWM type signals, for "Pulse Width Modulation" in English, or pulse width modulation in French.
- a PWM signal is mainly characterized by a frequency and especially by a duty cycle value.
- the frequency as well as the duty ratio of the third control signal 34 1 and the fourth control signal 36_1 can be modified.
- the third control signal 34 1 and the fourth control signal 36_1 are in the low state or at "0".
- the fifth control signal 38_1 presents, on an injection phase of duration D, a general form of charging and discharging of a capacitor in response to the third control signal 34 1 and the fourth signal of command 36_1.
- the fifth control signal 38_1 has a minimum amplitude 38_1_m and a maximum amplitude 38_1_M.
- the value of the minimum amplitude 38_1_m is for example 27V. This minimum value corresponds to the threshold value from which the injector 20 is no longer considered active.
- the value of the maximum amplitude 38_1_M is for example 140V.
- the value of the maximum amplitude 38_1_M is given by way of example and is preferably between 130V and 180V.
- the value of the maximum amplitude 38_1_M corresponds to the value from which the injector 20 is activated, that is to say that fuel is sprayed into a corresponding combustion chamber of the engine.
- the values of the minimum amplitude 38_1_m and the maximum amplitude 38_1_M are controlled by the third duration 34 1 D and the fourth duration 36_1_D respectively of the third control signal 34 and the fourth control signal 36.
- the method of the present invention which will be described below makes it possible to detect a control failure of at least one injector 20 in order to protect both said injector 20 but also the engine control computer 2.
- Fig. 4 shows said failure detection method in the form of a flowchart. This failure detection method can be implemented either in the calculation and control unit 4 or in the control unit 6 or in the monitoring module 24.
- FIG. 5 symbolically illustrates the software layer of the method of the invention of FIG. 4.
- the software layer of the method of the invention illustrated in FIG. 4 can be added to software layers already present in the FIG. control 6.
- the latter can be implemented in a programmable component of the ASIC type.
- Said ASIC type program component may be either the control unit 6 or the control unit 4. It may also be envisaged to implement the method of the invention in a dedicated component. This dedicated component can be either added to the internal structure of the engine control computer 2 (in its case) or externally, such as for example with a remote module coupled to the engine control computer 2 via a communication bus.
- the method of the invention consists in the addition of a measurement window 50.
- This measurement window 50 makes it possible to measure the state of the signals delivered by the control unit 6 and by the power module 8. as shown in FIG. 5, the signals monitored by the method of the present invention are the third control signal 34 1, the fourth control signal 36_1 and the fifth control signal 38_1.
- the method of the invention processes information from the communication bus 12.
- the method of the invention (and its software layer) is also adapted to generate information via said communication bus 12.
- the failure detection method presented here is adapted to emit a sixth control signal 60_1, a seventh control signal 60_2 and an eighth control signal 60_3. These three control signals are in one embodiment integrated in the bus of communication 12 and allow communication with the calculation and control unit 4 for failure monitoring.
- the method of the present invention begins with a first launching step 70_1.
- This first step 70_1 may for example be activated during the placement of the ignition key in the neiman of the motor vehicle.
- a second initialization step 70_2 is performed.
- several variables are reset.
- eight variables are used and are called FLAG, ⁇ 1, ⁇ 2, ⁇ 3, ⁇ 4, Threshold_min, Threshold_max and default.
- the number of variables is dependent on the type of engine control computer 2 and / or the type of engine and its injection.
- the number of variables can be modified.
- a third step 70_3 charge order monitoring or discharge is then performed.
- a fourth measurement activation step 70_4 is started.
- an injection phase comprises a charge order and a discharge order (of the injector 20).
- This fourth measurement activation step 70_4 consists of measuring during the injection phase:
- a duration T cd between a charge command and a discharge command is a duration T cd between a charge command and a discharge command.
- the fourth step 70_4 is active during a complete injection phase, that is to say as long as the injection phase is not completed, which is represented by a fifth step 70_5 waiting for the end of the injection. injection phase.
- the method comprises a sixth step 70_6 of recording the values of the variables as follows:
- an injection cycle may comprise several injection phases.
- the method of the invention comprises a seventh step 70_7 of end of detection of an injection cycle.
- the method of the invention performs five measurements and five recordings of the variables presented in the previous step.
- the data will be stored independently in memories provided for this purpose.
- the method may comprise at the end of an injection cycle, a step which consists of a mathematical operation for averaging the five values of each variable (not shown on the flowchart).
- This eighth parameter analysis step 70_8 is then performed.
- This eighth step 70_8 consists of a comparison of the values of the variables ⁇ 1, ⁇ 2, ⁇ 3, ⁇ 4, Threshold_min and Threshold_max with reference values previously recorded for example in a flash memory of the computer 2 engine control.
- the reference values are for example recorded during the factory programming of the engine control computer 2 according to the type of injection to be controlled. These values are named: AT1_ref, AT2_ref, AT3_ref, AT4_ref, Threshold_min_ref, Threshold_max_ref.
- the values of the variables ⁇ 1, ⁇ 2, ⁇ 3, ⁇ 4, Threshold_min and Threshold_max are then compared to the values AT1_ref, AT2_ref, AT3_ref, AT4_ref, Threshold_min_ref, Threshold_max_ref.
- the method of the invention will perform different actions. The method provides that if no failure case is detected then the fault variable remains at "0" and in the case where at least one of the conditions is not met then the fault variable is set to "1".
- a ninth step 70_9 for testing the default variable is performed.
- the default variable is "0" then this means, according to the method of the invention, that no failure has been detected during an injection cycle.
- the failure detection method is repositioned at the third step 70_3 and the previously described steps are performed again.
- the method of the invention provides, depending on the results comparisons made in the eighth step 70_8, cases which are considered destructive for the engine control computer 2 and cases which are considered less risky for the engine control computer 2 but which, according to the method of the invention, require an action on at least one module of the engine control computer 2. Table 1 below mentions these cases.
- case # 1, case # 2 and ca # 3 are considered by the method of the invention as destructive for the engine control computer 2.
- Case No. 4 Case No. 6 and Case No. 7 are conferred by the method of the invention as being non-destructive for the engine control computer 2 but requiring action on at least one module of said computer. 2 engine control.
- case No. 5 and the case No. 8 are considered as potentially destructive for the engine control computer 2 and therefore requires action on at least one module of the engine control computer 2.
- the method comprises a tenth step 70_10 for identifying the type of failure.
- a tenth step 70_10 for identifying the type of failure.
- Cases 1 to 3 correspond, according to the method of the invention, to cases of destruction of the engine control computer 2. More precisely, these three cases correspond to a possible destruction of the power module 8 if no action is performed.
- the method of the invention advantageously proposes an eleventh step 71 1 of complete reset of the engine control computer 2, that is to say a resetting of the software layer and the material layer.
- This eleventh step 71 1 requires only a few milliseconds and is imperceptible to the driver. Thanks to the method of the invention, no engine stall is performed during this step of the method of the invention.
- the method provides for a twelfth step 2 to reset the FLAG variant further.
- a thirteenth failure identification step 72 1 is performed.
- This thirteenth step 72 1 makes it possible to identify whether we are in the presence of a "potential destruction” type of failure, that is to say with reference to Table 1, cases 5 and 8, or a failure of the "non-destructive" type, that is to say with reference in Table 1 the cases n ° 4, n ° 6 and n ° 7. For this fairp the thirteenth step 72 1 tests the variable FLAG.
- This fourteenth step 72 2 consists of a reset of the control unit 6.
- the method provides a fifteenth step 72 which increments the FLAG variable by "1". Once this fifteenth step 72 3 is performed the method provides to return to the third step 70_3.
- variable FLAG has a value other than "0”
- a sixteenth step 73_1 for testing the variable FLAG is performed.
- the sixteenth step 73_1 of the method consists in knowing whether the variable FLAG has a value equal to "1".
- a seventeenth step 73_2 is performed and consists of a software reset of the control unit 6.
- the method provides an eighteenth step 73_3 in which the variable FLAG is incremented by "1".
- a nineteenth step 74 1 consisting of a complete reset of the engine control computer 2 is performed.
- the hardware part and the software part of the engine control computer 2 is performed.
- variable FLAG is then in a twentieth step 74 2 reset. As illustrated in the flow chart of FIG. 4 after steps 73_3 and 74 2, the process is restarted at the third step 70_3.
- the method of the invention it is now possible to detect failure cases by monitoring through a time window for measuring the control signals of the injectors and to detect possible cases of failure.
- the risk of destruction of the engine control computer is decreased thereby improving the driving quality of the vehicle and also improving the safety of said vehicle. Indeed, when an engine control computer is destroyed the engine stops and the vehicle stops which, in some cases, can be dangerous.
- such a method will be easily integrated and integrable into already existing software layers of a motor control computer.
- such a method will occupy very little additional memory space thus generating a very small extra cost.
- the present invention is not limited to the preferred embodiment described above and illustrated in the drawing and the embodiments mentioned above but extends to all variants within the reach of the skilled person.
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- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
- Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
- Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Biomedical Technology (AREA)
- Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
- Transportation (AREA)
- Combined Controls Of Internal Combustion Engines (AREA)
- Electrical Control Of Air Or Fuel Supplied To Internal-Combustion Engine (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US16/330,816 US11003520B2 (en) | 2016-09-14 | 2017-09-11 | Method of detecting failures |
CN201780056220.8A CN109716300B (zh) | 2016-09-14 | 2017-09-11 | 故障检测方法 |
BR112019004777A BR112019004777A8 (pt) | 2016-09-14 | 2017-09-11 | Método de detecção de falhas |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR1658574A FR3055991B1 (fr) | 2016-09-14 | 2016-09-14 | Procede de detection de defaillances |
FR1658574 | 2016-09-14 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2018050994A1 true WO2018050994A1 (fr) | 2018-03-22 |
Family
ID=57750089
Family Applications (1)
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PCT/FR2017/052403 WO2018050994A1 (fr) | 2016-09-14 | 2017-09-11 | Procédé de détection de défaillances |
Country Status (5)
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US (1) | US11003520B2 (fr) |
CN (1) | CN109716300B (fr) |
BR (1) | BR112019004777A8 (fr) |
FR (1) | FR3055991B1 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2018050994A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US10922203B1 (en) * | 2018-09-21 | 2021-02-16 | Nvidia Corporation | Fault injection architecture for resilient GPU computing |
CN112255542B (zh) * | 2020-09-30 | 2022-07-15 | 潍柴动力股份有限公司 | 一种pwm驱动负载的故障诊断方法、装置和驱动系统 |
CN115013152B (zh) * | 2022-06-30 | 2023-06-02 | 东风商用车有限公司 | Doc入口高温报警方法、装置、设备及可读存储介质 |
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EP1860308A1 (fr) * | 2006-05-23 | 2007-11-28 | Delphi Technologies, Inc. | Procédé de commande d'un injecteur à carburant |
US20080004765A1 (en) * | 2004-04-27 | 2008-01-03 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Electronic Control Device and Method for Controlling the Operation of Motor Vehicle Components |
US20090121724A1 (en) * | 2007-10-11 | 2009-05-14 | Perryman Louisa J | Detection of faults in an injector arrangement |
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US8204611B2 (en) * | 2007-02-20 | 2012-06-19 | Caterpillar Inc. | Method for reducing quiescent power draw and machine using same |
JP4859803B2 (ja) * | 2007-10-01 | 2012-01-25 | 日立オートモティブシステムズ株式会社 | 電動アクチュエータの制御装置 |
JP4476320B2 (ja) * | 2007-11-26 | 2010-06-09 | 三菱電機株式会社 | 監視制御回路を有する車載電子制御装置 |
JP5267425B2 (ja) * | 2009-11-04 | 2013-08-21 | アンデン株式会社 | フェールセーフ機能を有する負荷駆動装置 |
JP5212391B2 (ja) * | 2010-01-27 | 2013-06-19 | 日産自動車株式会社 | アイドルストップ制御装置 |
US9567918B2 (en) * | 2010-05-10 | 2017-02-14 | Go Natural Cng, Llc | Bi-fuel control systems for automotive vehicles and related methods |
US8604630B2 (en) * | 2010-06-01 | 2013-12-10 | Caterpillar Inc. | Power distribution system having priority load control |
CN103019921B (zh) * | 2011-09-20 | 2015-04-15 | 中国人民解放军63928部队 | 一种基于故障注入的操作系统容错性测试系统及其方法 |
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JP6297931B2 (ja) * | 2014-06-06 | 2018-03-20 | ヤンマー株式会社 | エンジン制御装置 |
JP2018054419A (ja) * | 2016-09-28 | 2018-04-05 | ルネサスエレクトロニクス株式会社 | 入力バッファ、半導体装置及びエンジン制御ユニット |
-
2016
- 2016-09-14 FR FR1658574A patent/FR3055991B1/fr active Active
-
2017
- 2017-09-11 WO PCT/FR2017/052403 patent/WO2018050994A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2017-09-11 US US16/330,816 patent/US11003520B2/en active Active
- 2017-09-11 CN CN201780056220.8A patent/CN109716300B/zh active Active
- 2017-09-11 BR BR112019004777A patent/BR112019004777A8/pt not_active Application Discontinuation
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US20030078744A1 (en) * | 2000-06-08 | 2003-04-24 | Rainer Hirn | Method for testing a capacitive actuator |
US20080004765A1 (en) * | 2004-04-27 | 2008-01-03 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Electronic Control Device and Method for Controlling the Operation of Motor Vehicle Components |
EP1860308A1 (fr) * | 2006-05-23 | 2007-11-28 | Delphi Technologies, Inc. | Procédé de commande d'un injecteur à carburant |
US20090121724A1 (en) * | 2007-10-11 | 2009-05-14 | Perryman Louisa J | Detection of faults in an injector arrangement |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20190286511A1 (en) | 2019-09-19 |
FR3055991B1 (fr) | 2018-09-28 |
US11003520B2 (en) | 2021-05-11 |
BR112019004777A8 (pt) | 2023-01-10 |
CN109716300B (zh) | 2022-07-15 |
FR3055991A1 (fr) | 2018-03-16 |
CN109716300A (zh) | 2019-05-03 |
BR112019004777A2 (pt) | 2019-05-28 |
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