WO2010020186A1 - 基于单播会话密钥的组播密钥分发方法、更新方法及基站 - Google Patents
基于单播会话密钥的组播密钥分发方法、更新方法及基站 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2010020186A1 WO2010020186A1 PCT/CN2009/073368 CN2009073368W WO2010020186A1 WO 2010020186 A1 WO2010020186 A1 WO 2010020186A1 CN 2009073368 W CN2009073368 W CN 2009073368W WO 2010020186 A1 WO2010020186 A1 WO 2010020186A1
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- session key
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
- H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/065—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for group communications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
- H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/047—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] without using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0471—Key exchange
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
- H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
- H04W12/108—Source integrity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/08—Access point devices
Definitions
- Multicast key distribution method based on unicast session key, update method and base station
- the application is submitted to the Chinese Patent Office on August 21, 2008, and the application number is 200810150694.1, and the invention name is "a unicast session key based on The priority of the Chinese Patent Application, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.
- the present invention relates to a multicast key distribution method based on a unicast session key, an update method thereof, and a base station.
- Wired network security issues have received widespread attention in the industry and academia. In contrast, wireless network security issues are far more serious than wired Ethernet.
- IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
- 802.11 and 802.16 series of standards to enhance the security of wireless LANs and wireless metropolitan area networks, providing mobile terminals (MT, Mobile Terminal) to base stations BS, Base. Station's secure access, China also promulgated the WLAN national standard GB15629.il in May 2003, commonly referred to as the Wireless Local Area Network Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) protocol.
- the Broadband Wireless Multimedia (BWM) network combines data communication and broadcast communication. It is a new wireless network architecture that also needs to address security access and secure communication.
- point-to-point unicast communication and point-to-multipoint multicast (or intra-group broadcast). More than just unicast communication, it is necessary to ensure the authenticity of the entities on both sides of the communication and the confidentiality of the communication content. Secure multicast also needs to ensure the legitimacy of the multicast entity and the confidentiality of the multicast message. At the same time, the terminal that receives the multicast also A certain privilege restriction is required to ensure that only authorized terminals can correctly read the multicast message, which requires us to effectively solve the multicast key security distribution problem first. How to effectively manage multicast keys is one of the key issues to solve secure multicast.
- the IEEE802.il standard uses the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol to implement the security of a wireless local area network (WLAN). Its key management is very simple, that is, manual on the mobile terminal and access. Set a shared key between the points. At this time, ⁇ 802.11 has not dealt with multicast key management issues, and does not provide a solution for multicast security. Case.
- WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
- Multicast session key GSK distribution is distributed by the previously established unicast session key USK. That is to say, the base station selects a multicast session key, and then encrypts it with the unicast session key shared by each terminal and sends it to the corresponding terminal one by one.
- each terminal After receiving the encrypted multicast session key message, each terminal can decrypt the multicast session key by using the unicast session key shared by the terminal with the base station.
- the base station can perform secure multicast. If you want to update the multicast session key, you need to repeat the above process.
- the disadvantage of this method is that the efficiency is low, especially when the multicast session key is updated, the base station needs to repeat the above multicast session key distribution process:
- the base station selects a multicast session key and shares it with each terminal by itself.
- the unicast session key is encrypted and sent to the corresponding terminal one by one.
- the wireless metropolitan area network standard proposed by the IEEE in the United States its multicast key management borrows from IEEE802.11i.
- IEEE802.16e a new design concept is proposed for the secure multicast key management problem.
- the multicast key encryption key GKEK is introduced, and the multicast key encryption key GKEK is established.
- Multi-level session key GSK two-level management method.
- the base station encrypts the GKEK one by one by using the unicast session key established with each terminal and sends it to the corresponding terminal; after receiving the message, the terminal decrypts the GKEK by using the unicast session key; then, the base station utilizes GKEK
- the GSK is encrypted as a key and broadcast to all terminals; each terminal with GKEK can get the same GSK.
- the multicast session key process is complete.
- the same procedure is used when performing the multicast session key update:
- the base station uses GKEK as the key to encrypt the GSK and broadcasts to all terminals.
- the IEEE 802.116e multicast key management method also has the following disadvantages: Time synchronization is adopted, and state management is complicated; the activation and deactivation of new keys are dependent on time judgment, and maintaining a synchronous clock in a distributed system is complicated.
- China has proposed a class in the field of wireless metropolitan area networks and broadband wireless multimedia.
- a thought-like multicast session key management method is proposed.
- GKEK is the same for all terminals, it will make it easier for the terminal to leak GKEK to other terminals, and the security is not high;
- IEEE802.16e and the above-mentioned schemes in the field of wireless metropolitan area network and broadband wireless multimedia can improve the efficiency of multicast key management to some extent, the efficiency of multicast session key distribution and update is avoided.
- this solution does not fundamentally solve the above problems of IEEE802.11i and WAPI and IEEE802.16, that is, at least for the distribution of the multicast key encryption key GKEK, the base station also needs to use itself and each one separately.
- the unicast session keys shared by the terminal are encrypted and sent to the corresponding terminals one by one.
- the problem of the multicast key encryption key GKEK update is not processed, and the initial distribution process can only be repeated.
- the invention solves the problem of low efficiency of multicast key distribution based on unicast session key in the prior art, and provides a multicast key distribution method, an update method and a base station based on a unicast session key.
- the technical solution of the present invention is to provide a multicast key distribution method based on a unicast session key, the method comprising the following steps:
- the base station constructs a multicast key distribution packet
- the base station broadcasts a multicast multicast key distribution packet to all securely authenticated terminals
- the method further includes: the base station establishing system parameters, where the system parameters include: setting ((3 ⁇ 4, ⁇ ) to a cyclic group with two orders of p , It is a difficult problem for the prime number and satisfying the tDiffie-Hellman calculation problem; let the generator of ( ⁇ be generated; let e be Let / ⁇ ) be a one-way hash function.
- the method further includes: the base station authenticating each terminal, and performing unicast key negotiation with each terminal, and the base station establishes a shared with each terminal. Unicast session key.
- the manner of authenticating each terminal and performing unicast key negotiation with each terminal includes:
- the shared key method is set based on WAPI or standard 802.1 li.
- the broadcast multicast key distribution packet includes:
- the identity information of the base station BS identifies the serial number SN of the current multicast key distribution, the multicast key data Data and the integrity check key MIC calculated by the base station.
- the calculation process of the data includes:
- Z)a (2 ⁇ ,a,a,v 0 ,...,v preparation_ 2 ,V 0 ,..., _ 2 ,(/Z) 1 ,W 1 ),...,(/ Z) m , WJ);
- the method further includes:
- the terminal performs calculation according to the received multicast key distribution packet to obtain a multicast session key.
- the terminal performs calculation according to the received multicast key distribution packet, and the specificity of obtaining the multicast conference key includes:
- the multicast session integrity check key GSKI and multicast derived by the terminal according to the message multicast session key GSK The session encryption key GSKE, and recalculating the MIC by using the GSKI, and determining whether the multicast message is sent by the base station according to the SN field when determining that the multicast key distribution packet is valid, and if not, the terminal correctly acquires Multicast session key.
- the method further includes:
- Two-way unicast communication is performed between the terminal and the base station, or the base station performs broadcast communication to all terminals.
- the present invention also provides a multicast key update method based on a unicast session key, the method comprising the following steps:
- the base station constructs a multicast key update packet
- the base station broadcasts a multicast key update packet to all terminals.
- the broadcast multicast key update packet includes: identity information of the base station BS, a sequence number SN identifying the current multicast key distribution, a multicast key data Data and an integrity check key MIC calculated by the base station. .
- the method further includes:
- the terminal performs calculation according to the received multicast key update packet to obtain a multicast session key.
- the terminal performs calculation according to the received multicast key update packet, and the specific steps of obtaining the multicast session key include:
- the terminal calculates secret information for each e ; e r according to the configuration set .
- the terminal calculates the message multicast session key GSK according to the secret information as follows:
- the multicast session integrity check key GSKI and multicast derived by the terminal according to the message multicast session key GSK The session encryption key GSKE, and recalculating the MIC by using the GSKI, and determining whether the multicast message is sent by the base station according to the SN field when determining that the multicast key update packet is valid, and if not, the terminal correctly acquires the new multicast. Session key.
- the method further includes:
- Two-way unicast communication is performed between the terminal and the base station, or the base station performs broadcast communication to all terminals.
- an embodiment of the present invention further provides a base station, including:
- a construction unit configured to construct a multicast key distribution packet or a multicast key update packet
- a sending unit configured to broadcast, to all the terminals that are securely authenticated, a multicast key distribution packet or a multicast key update packet constructed by the structural unit.
- the base station further includes:
- a unit configured to establish system parameters before the constructing unit constructs a multicast key distribution packet or a multicast key update packet, where the system parameters include: setting ((3 ⁇ 4, ⁇ ) to two orders
- the cyclic group of p is a prime number and satisfies the tDiffie-Hellman calculation problem as a difficult problem; let P be a generator; let e be ( ⁇ and (a bilinear transformation on 3 ⁇ 4, ie ⁇ ? ⁇ ⁇ ; / ⁇ ) is a one-way hash function.
- the base station further includes:
- An authentication negotiation unit configured to perform authentication on each terminal before performing construction of a multicast key distribution packet or a multicast key update packet, and perform unicast key negotiation with each terminal, the base station and each The terminals establish a shared unicast session key.
- the multicast session key is distributed based on the unicast session key, and can be seamlessly integrated with the unicast session key negotiation protocol;
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a multicast key distribution method based on a unicast session key provided by the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a multicast key update method based on a unicast session key provided in the present invention.
- BS base station
- USKI and USKE X unicast session integrity check key and unicast session encryption key derived by USK X ;
- Nonce one-time random number
- GSK multicast session key
- FIG. 1 it is a flowchart of a method for distributing a multicast key based on a unicast session key according to the present invention. The method specifically includes the following steps:
- the system parameters are: set and ((3 ⁇ 4, ⁇ ) is a cyclic group with two orders of p, p is a prime number, and satisfies (the Diffie-Hellman calculation problem in ⁇ is a difficult problem; Generate the element; let e be a bilinear transformation on ⁇ and G 2 , ie ⁇ ⁇ ? ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ; let / ⁇ ) is a one-way hash function;
- This step is only to establish the system parameters when the first application is established. After the establishment, the step is not necessary in the subsequent repeated application, that is, the step is an optional step;
- the base station performs security authentication for each terminal, and performs a unicast session key USK negotiation with each terminal, and each terminal and the base station share a unicast session key USK, which can derive unicast session integrity.
- the authentication key and the unicast session encryption key may be any method such as WAPI or 802.11i, or may be implemented by manually setting a pre-shared key method;
- the base station constructs a multicast key distribution packet, and the packet includes the following contents: identity information of the base station BS, the serial number SN identifying the current multicast key distribution, the multicast key data Data and integrity check calculated by the base station Key MIC.
- the corresponding fields are as follows:
- BS field identity information of the base station
- SN field A serial number that uniquely identifies the multicast key distribution process
- Data field multicast key data calculated by the base station
- MIC field indicates that the MIC value is obtained for all the fields before the field, where the integrity check key is the multicast session integrity check key GSKI, which is derived by the multicast session key GSK selected by the base station; here, Data
- the calculation process of the field is as follows:
- the base station randomly selects -1 (> greater than or equal to 2) different elements v 0 , v l5 . . . ,
- V View_2 e ⁇ and the elements Q and ⁇ 2 e randomly construct the ⁇ - 1 secret polynomial / W e ⁇ ⁇ [ ⁇ ].
- Z)a (2 ⁇ ,a,a,v 0 ,...,v preparation_ 2 ,V 0 ,..., _ 2 ,(/Z) 1 ,W 1 ),...,(/ Z) M , WJ);
- the base station selects the multicast session key as 0 ⁇ eG 2 ; at this time, the base station randomly selects the integer reZ: and calculates: ⁇ , ⁇ ;, ... ) ⁇ / ⁇ ,/ ⁇ , ⁇ , ⁇ ) 1 ⁇ :), / ⁇ . ,..., ⁇ ;
- the GSK is decrypted as follows: 5.1) First, the terminal uses its own unicast session key USK X to calculate secret data.
- the terminal uses the multicast key to distribute the information of the packet and the constructed set of computations:
- Unicast communication or multicast communication After the above steps are completed, two-way unicast communication can be performed between the terminal and the base station, or the base station can perform broadcast communication to all terminals.
- the security of unicast communication is guaranteed by the unicast session integrity check key and unicast session encryption key derived by USK X ;
- the security of multicast communication The multicast session integrity check key and group derived by GSK Broadcast session encryption key protection.
- This scheme also supports multicast session key update in the same way as multicast session key distribution.
- the key update process only needs to calculate the third and fourth steps, and the first and second steps can also be omitted.
- the base station is distributing the multicast session secret for the newly joined terminal.
- the second step of calculating the Data field only the newly added terminal needs to be calculated to improve the calculation efficiency.
- This group includes the following:
- BS field identity information of the base station
- SN field A serial number that uniquely identifies the multicast key update process
- Data field multicast key data calculated by the base station
- MIC field indicates that the MIC value is obtained for all the fields before the field, where the integrity check key is the multicast session integrity check key GSKI, which is derived by the multicast session key GSK selected by the base station; here, Data
- the calculation process of the field is as follows:
- the terminal uses its own unicast session key USK X to calculate secret data.
- the terminal updates the information of the packet and the constructed set of computations using the multicast key:
- the multicast session integrity check key GSKI and the multicast session encryption key GSKE derived from the multicast session key GSK use GSKI to recalculate the MIC, determine whether the packet is valid, and if invalid, discard it directly; If it is valid, it is determined according to the SN field whether the repeated message sent by the base station, if yes, is directly discarded; otherwise, the terminal correctly acquires the multicast session key.
- Unicast communication or multicast communication After the above steps are completed, two-way unicast communication can be performed between the terminal and the base station, or the base station can perform broadcast communication to all terminals.
- the security of unicast communication is guaranteed by the unicast session integrity check key and unicast session encryption key derived by USK X ;
- the security of multicast communication The multicast session integrity check key and group derived by GSK Broadcast session encryption key protection.
- the method for distributing a multicast key to a newly added terminal based on a unicast session key specifically includes the following steps:
- the base station and the terminal ⁇ perform security authentication and unicast session key USK negotiation, negotiate a unicast session key USK, and the unicast session integrity check key and unicast session encryption can be derived from the key
- the key, the authentication method and the unicast key negotiation method may be any method such as WAPI or 802.11i, or may be implemented by manually setting a pre-shared key method;
- This group includes the following:
- BS field identity information of the base station
- SN field A serial number that uniquely identifies the multicast key distribution process. This field is the same as the SN field selected by the base station when performing multicast key distribution.
- Data field multicast key data calculated by the base station
- MIC field indicates that the MIC value is obtained for all the fields before the field, where the integrity check key is the multicast session integrity check key GSKI, which is derived by the multicast session key GSK selected by the base station;
- the calculation process of the Data field is as follows:
- the terminal uses the multicast key to distribute the information of the packet and the computed ⁇ , construction set:
- the SN field determines whether the repeated message sent by the base station is directly discarded if yes, otherwise, the terminal correctly acquires the multicast session key.
- Unicast communication or multicast communication After the above steps are completed, two-way unicast communication can be performed between the terminal and the base station, or the base station can perform broadcast communication to all terminals. Unicast communication security is guaranteed by the USK-derived unicast session integrity check key and unicast session encryption key; Multicast communication security Multicast session integrity check key and multicast derived by GSK Session encryption key protection.
- the present invention further provides a base station, including: a construction unit and a sending unit, where the construction unit is configured to construct a multicast key distribution packet or a multicast key update packet; and a sending unit is configured to The secure authenticated terminal broadcasts a multicast key distribution packet or a multicast key update packet constructed by the construction unit.
- the base station further includes: an establishing unit, configured to establish system parameters before the constructing unit constructs a multicast key distribution packet or a multicast key update packet, where the system parameters include: And ((3 ⁇ 4, ⁇ ) is a cyclic group with two orders of p, /? is a prime number, and satisfies (the Diffie-Hellman calculation problem in ⁇ is a difficult problem; let / 3 be ( 3 ⁇ 4 of the generator; let e be ( ⁇ and (a bilinear transformation on 3 ⁇ 4, ie ⁇ ⁇ ? ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ; let / ⁇ ) is a one-way hash function.
- the system parameters include: And ((3 ⁇ 4, ⁇ ) is a cyclic group with two orders of p, /? is a prime number, and satisfies (the Diffie-Hellman calculation problem in ⁇ is a difficult problem; let / 3 be ( 3 ⁇ 4 of the generator; let e be ( ⁇ and (a bilinear transformation on
- the base station further includes:
- An authentication negotiation unit configured to perform authentication on each terminal before performing construction of a multicast key distribution packet or a multicast key update packet, and perform unicast key negotiation with each terminal, the base station and each The terminals establish a shared unicast session key.
- the present invention distributes a packet by constructing a multicast key, and performs a broadcast multicast key distribution packet to all securely authenticated terminals, so that after receiving the multicast key distribution packet, the terminal according to the The multicast key distribution packet is calculated to obtain a multicast session key. Therefore, in the present invention, the distribution or update of the multicast session key between the base station and each terminal only needs to be broadcast once; the distribution of the multicast session key is based on the unicast session key, and can be compared with the unicast session.
- the key agreement protocol realizes seamless integration; the invention fully utilizes the broadcast channel and improves system communication efficiency.
- the present invention can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, can also be through hardware, but in many cases, the former is a better implementation. the way.
- the technical solution of the present invention may be embodied in the form of a software product in essence or in the form of a software product, which may be stored in a storage medium such as a ROM/RAM or a disk. , an optical disk, etc., includes instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to perform the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention or portions of the embodiments.
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Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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JP2011523295A JP5314142B2 (ja) | 2008-08-21 | 2009-08-20 | ユニキャストセッションキーに基づくマルチキャストキーの分配方法、更新方法及び基地局 |
US13/060,126 US8588423B2 (en) | 2008-08-21 | 2009-08-20 | Group/multicast key distribution method and update method based upon unicast session key and base station |
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CN200810150694.1 | 2008-08-21 | ||
CN200810150694A CN100581169C (zh) | 2008-08-21 | 2008-08-21 | 一种基于单播会话密钥的组播密钥分发方法及其更新方法 |
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JPWO2010047356A1 (ja) * | 2008-10-22 | 2012-03-22 | ソニー株式会社 | 暗号化装置、鍵処理装置、暗号化方法、鍵処理方法、プログラムおよび鍵共有システム |
US8495363B2 (en) * | 2009-04-03 | 2013-07-23 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Securing messages associated with a multicast communication session within a wireless communications system |
WO2010133036A1 (zh) * | 2009-05-22 | 2010-11-25 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种基站间通信方法、装置及通信系统 |
CN101635710B (zh) * | 2009-08-25 | 2011-08-17 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 | 一种基于预共享密钥的网络安全访问控制方法及其系统 |
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US8588423B2 (en) | 2013-11-19 |
CN101345765A (zh) | 2009-01-14 |
JP5314142B2 (ja) | 2013-10-16 |
CN100581169C (zh) | 2010-01-13 |
JP2012500543A (ja) | 2012-01-05 |
US20110194697A1 (en) | 2011-08-11 |
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