WO2012100552A1 - 一种组播密钥的安全更新方法、系统及设备 - Google Patents

一种组播密钥的安全更新方法、系统及设备 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2012100552A1
WO2012100552A1 PCT/CN2011/079919 CN2011079919W WO2012100552A1 WO 2012100552 A1 WO2012100552 A1 WO 2012100552A1 CN 2011079919 W CN2011079919 W CN 2011079919W WO 2012100552 A1 WO2012100552 A1 WO 2012100552A1
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Prior art keywords
multicast
key
update
onu
olt
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PCT/CN2011/079919
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
铁满霞
李琴
胡亚楠
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西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
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Publication of WO2012100552A1 publication Critical patent/WO2012100552A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/065—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for group communications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04Q—SELECTING
    • H04Q11/00—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems
    • H04Q11/0001—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems using optical switching
    • H04Q11/0062—Network aspects
    • H04Q11/0067—Provisions for optical access or distribution networks, e.g. Gigabit Ethernet Passive Optical Network (GE-PON), ATM-based Passive Optical Network (A-PON), PON-Ring
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
    • H04L2209/601—Broadcast encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04Q—SELECTING
    • H04Q11/00—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems
    • H04Q11/0001—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems using optical switching
    • H04Q11/0062—Network aspects
    • H04Q2011/0088—Signalling aspects

Definitions

  • the present invention belongs to the field of network security, and relates to a method, system and device for securely updating a multicast key.
  • EPON Error Network Passive Optical Network
  • EPON is a medium shared by the medium.
  • the EPON device at the central office is called Optical Network Terminal (OLT); the system at the user end is called Optical Network Unit (ONU).
  • OLT Optical Network Terminal
  • ONU Optical Network Unit
  • the uplink data transmission of the ONU to the OLT is performed according to the principle of time division multiplexing.
  • the data of each frame is scheduled to be transmitted in a specific time slot, and the uplink data does not reach other terminals; but the downlink data transmission from the OLT to the ONU is transmitted. It is broadcast, and the splitter transmits the packet to all ONUs at the same time.
  • any intended end station can receive its downlink transmission information.
  • multicast service data from the OLT to the ONU has a sender and a specific set of receivers.
  • the OLT has two modes for confidential processing of multicast service packets:
  • One is to transmit the multicast service on the broadcast logical link channel.
  • a multicast key corresponding to the multicast service is established between a specific set of receiving ONUs of the multicast service and the OLT.
  • the update of the multicast key is usually the same as the establishment of the multicast key.
  • the OLT uses the unicast-by-announce notification method to update the notification to the ONU.
  • the OLT uses the single between the OLT and the ONU in the notification process of the ONU in each group.
  • the broadcast key encrypts the new multicast key information.
  • the present invention provides a method, system and device for securely updating a multicast key.
  • the present invention provides a method for securely updating a multicast key.
  • the method includes the following steps: 1) The optical line terminal OLT first acquires a multicast update key corresponding to n multicast service groups that need to update the multicast key. List, where n is an integer not less than one;
  • the OLT locally generates n random numbers as the new multicast advertisement master key corresponding to the n multicast service groups, and constructs a multicast key update by using the multicast update key list corresponding to the n multicast service groups.
  • the notification packet is sent to the optical network unit ONU connected to the OLT through the broadcast logical channel;
  • the ONU receives the multicast key update notification packet, obtains the multicast update key corresponding to the multicast service group to which the ONU belongs, and extracts the multicast key update notification packet by using the multicast update key corresponding to the multicast service group.
  • the new multicast advertisement master key corresponding to the multicast service group to which the ONU belongs to the secret advertisement obtains the new multicast key of the corresponding multicast service group.
  • the present invention also provides a security update system for a multicast key corresponding to a method for securely updating a multicast key, the multicast key update system including an optical line terminal OLT and an optical network unit ONU, the optical line
  • the terminal OLT first obtains a multicast update key MEK list corresponding to multiple multicast service groups that need to update the multicast key, and then constructs a multicast key update notification packet, and sends it to all OLTs on the broadcast logical channel.
  • the optical network unit ONU After receiving the multicast key update notification packet, the optical network unit ONU obtains a new multicast key that is secretly advertised in the multicast key update notification packet and is valid for the optical network unit ONU;
  • the present invention also provides an optical line terminal OLT corresponding to a security update method of a multicast key, where the optical line terminal OLT includes: a multicast update key management module, configured to acquire a multicast update key MEK corresponding to a multicast service group that needs to update a multicast key;
  • a multicast key update notification module configured to construct a multicast key update notification packet, and send the broadcast network channel to all optical network units ONU connected to the optical line terminal OLT;
  • the invention also provides an optical network unit corresponding to the security update method of the multicast key
  • the ONU is characterized in that: the optical network unit ONU includes:
  • a multicast update key management module configured to obtain a multicast update key MEK corresponding to the multicast service group
  • a multicast key update response module configured to receive a multicast key update notification packet sent by the optical line terminal OLT, and obtain a new multicast key valid for the optical network unit ONU;
  • the multicast key can be updated for multiple multicast service groups supported by the EPON product, and the multicast update process is used to associate the multicast update process with the multicast distribution process to ensure that only the multicast service group is The ONU can obtain the new multicast key corresponding to the multicast service group.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an EPON network provided by the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a security update process of a multicast key provided by the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a security update method of a multicast key according to the present invention. New system schematic;
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an optical line terminal OLT according to a method for securely updating a multicast key provided by the present invention
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of an ONU of an optical network unit corresponding to a method for securely updating a multicast key according to the present invention.
  • the multicast key is recorded as MSK; the current multicast key is recorded as MSK cur ; the new multicast key is recorded as MSK new ; the multicast update key is recorded as MEK; and the multicast announcement master key is recorded as NMK
  • the ONU in each multicast service group shares the current multicast key MSK cur with the OLT.
  • the multicast service packet sent by the OLT to the ONU in the multicast service group is encrypted and/or integrity protected by the current multicast key MSK cur corresponding to the multicast service group; the ONU in the multicast service group uses the current multicast
  • the multicast service data frame sent by the key MSK eu ⁇ OLT is decrypted and/or the integrity protection is verified to obtain the multicast service packet information.
  • the main process of a method for securely updating a multicast key includes the following specific steps:
  • the OLT first obtains a multicast update key list corresponding to the n multicast service groups that need to update the multicast key;
  • the multicast update key MEK is a key shared between the ONU and the OLT in the multicast service group; the multicast update key list is represented by ⁇ MEK G1 , MEK G2 MEK Gn ⁇ , including n
  • each multicast update key MEK Gi ( GiE ⁇ Gl Gn ⁇ ) corresponds to a multicast service group Gi that the OLT needs to update;
  • the ONU1 and the ONU2 share the first multicast update key MEK with the OLT.
  • the ONU3 in the second multicast service group and the ONU4 share the second multicast update key MEK with the OLT. 2 ;
  • the multicast update key MEK may be equal to the current multicast key MSK cur ;
  • the multicast update key MEK can be calculated by using a one-way hash algorithm f(MSK cur , text), where text is a constant parameter;
  • the multicast update key MEK may be secretly advertised by the OLT to the ONU in the process of establishing the current multicast key MSK lr , and the current multicast key MSK cur ;
  • the multicast update key MEK may be in the process of establishing the current multicast key MSK lr , and the OLT and the ONU are locally calculated by using a one-way hash function for the random number;
  • the OLT locally generates n random numbers as the new multicast advertisement master key corresponding to the n multicast service groups, and constructs a multicast key update by using the multicast update key list corresponding to the n multicast service groups.
  • the notification packet is sent to the ONU connected to the OLT through the broadcast logical channel;
  • step 2 The specific process of step 2) is as follows:
  • the OLT locally generates n random numbers as the new multicast advertisement master key corresponding to the n multicast service groups, and uses the new multicast advertisement master key list ⁇ NMK newG i , NMK newG2 NMK newGn ⁇ ;
  • the new multicast advertisement master key list ⁇ NMK newG1 , NMK newG2 NMK newGn ⁇ includes n multicast advertisement master keys NMK, each multicast advertisement master key ⁇ ⁇ and the multicast service group that the OLT needs to update. Gi corresponds;
  • the OLT constructs a multicast key update notification packet, and sends the multicast key update advertisement packet to the ONU connected to the OLT through the broadcast logical channel;
  • the multicast key update notification packet includes a list of key update information ⁇ Infor, Infor G2
  • the key update information list ⁇ Infor G1 , Infor G2 Infor Gn ⁇ includes n key update information, and InforcM indicates key update information of the multicast service group Gi, including KN Gi , MSID Gi , E ( NMK newGi ), MICl Gi ; among them:
  • KN Gi indicates a key advertisement identifier, which identifies the freshness of the Infor Gi corresponding to the multicast service group Gi;
  • MSID Gi field indicates the multicast service group identifier of the multicast service group Gi;
  • E (NMK newGi ) field indicates the key encryption data of the multicast service group Gi, which is a new corresponding to the multicast service group Gi by the OLT using the multicast update key MEK Gi corresponding to the multicast service group Gi identified by the MSID Gi .
  • MICl Gi field indicates the message authentication code, which is obtained by the OLT using the multicast update key ⁇ ⁇ corresponding to the multicast service group Gi identified by the MSID Gi to perform hash calculation on all fields except the ⁇ ⁇ field in Inforcii;
  • the KN Gi may be initialized to an integer, and the field value is incremented by 1 each time the multicast update notification corresponding to the multicast service group Gi is changed. If the advertised multicast advertisement master key is unchanged, the field value is maintained. constant;
  • ⁇ ⁇ may be a new random number generated locally by the OLT for the multicast service group Gi; if the advertised multicast advertisement master key is unchanged, the field value remains unchanged;
  • the ONU receives the multicast key update notification packet, obtains the multicast update key corresponding to the multicast service group to which the ONU belongs, and extracts the multicast key update notification packet by using the multicast update key corresponding to the multicast service group.
  • step 3 The specific process of step 3) is as follows:
  • the ONU receives the multicast key update notification packet, and extracts key update information valid for the ONU in the key update information list ⁇ Infor G1 , Infor G2 Infor Gn ⁇ according to the multicast service group information to which the ONU belongs; If the ONU has m ( 0 ⁇ m ⁇ n ) key update information, use ⁇ Infor GE1 ,
  • Infor GE2 Infor GEm ⁇ indicates a list of key update information valid for the ONU;
  • the key update information Infold ONU means this ONU is effectively part of the MSID ⁇ Infoi ⁇ multicast service group identifier fields, and in KN Gi Infor Gi value stored previously is not the ONU KN Gi Same
  • the ONU obtains the key update information.
  • the multicast service group identified by the MSID GE j field in Infor GE j
  • the ONU uses the multicast update key MEK GE j to verify the correctness of the MIC 1 GEj field in the key update information Infor GE j. If correct, the Infor Gi insurance certificate passes, 3.2.3); otherwise, Infor GE j fails to pass the verification, discarding the key update information Inform;
  • the ONU decrypts the E (NMK new( ⁇ E j) field in the key update information Inform by using the multicast update key MEK GE j to obtain a new multicast announcement master key NMK new( ⁇ E j; NMK new( ⁇ E j directly acts as a new multicast key MSK new( ⁇ E j, or extends NMK new( ⁇ E j by a one-way hash algorithm to get a new multicast key MSK new( ⁇ E j;
  • step 3 When m is greater than 0, step 3) and step 4) and step 5) are further included:
  • the ONU constructs a multicast key update confirmation packet, which is sent to the OLT through a unicast logical channel; the multicast key update confirmation packet includes a key confirmation information list ⁇ ACKInfor GE1 ,
  • the key confirmation information list ⁇ ACKInfor GE1 , ACKInfor GE2 ACKInfor GEm ⁇ includes m key confirmation information, and ACKInfor GE j represents key confirmation information of the multicast service group GEj, including KN GE MSID GEj ;
  • KN GE j field indicates the key advertisement identifier. If Infor GE j is verified, the value of this field is consistent with the value of KN GE j in Infor GE j in the received multicast key update notification packet; if Infor GE j is verified If not, the value of this field takes a value other than the value of the KN GE j field in Infor GE j;
  • the KN GE j field value is different from the value of the KN GE j field in Infor GE j, and is used to inform the OLT Infor GEj that the verification has not passed;
  • MSID GE j field indicates the multicast service group identifier, and the value of the field is consistent with the value of the MSID GE j field in the Infor GE j in the received multicast key update notification packet;
  • the OLT receives the multicast key update confirmation packet
  • the OLT repeats step 5.2) to verify ACKInfor GEj one by one;
  • the OLT confirms that the key update notification for the ONU is completed.
  • the ACKInfor GE j in the multicast key update confirmation packet in the step 4) further includes a MIC2 GE j field; wherein the MIC2 GE j field indicates a message authentication code, and the ONU uses the multicast update key corresponding to the multicast service group GEj.
  • MEK (j E j to ACKInforcjEj except MIC2 (j E j field all the fields are hashed calculated;
  • the OLT repeats steps 5.2) -5.3) to confirm ACKInfor GE j one by one;
  • the OLT verifies the correctness of the MIC2 GE j field in the ACKInfor GE j by using the multicast update key MEK GE j corresponding to the multicast service group GEj. If not, discard the ACKInfor GEj according to the local policy, and perform step 5.1) Continue to confirm the next one; if correct, continue to verify the next ACKInfor;
  • the OLT confirms that the key update notification for the ONU is completed.
  • the OLT confirms the m key confirmation information in the multicast key update confirmation packet sent by the received ONU.
  • ACKInfor confirms one by one. If the acknowledgment is successful, it indicates that the ONU successfully receives all valid new multicast advertised master keys. If some acknowledgment information ACKInfor is unsuccessful, the OLT fails to confirm these acknowledgments.
  • the key update information Infor corresponding to the key confirmation information ACKInfor, according to the local policy or resending the multicast key update notification packet, or including the key update information Inform in the new multicast key update notification packet; The present invention does not limit the strategy;
  • the OLT After the OLT receives the multicast key update confirmation packet of all ONUs and confirms the completion, the OLT completes the security update process of the multicast key.
  • the key acknowledgment packet may also include only the key acknowledgment information ACKInfor corresponding to the key update information Infor that fails to pass the verification; or only the authentication pass The key confirmation information ACKInfor corresponding to the key update information Infor.
  • the OLT sends the multicast key update notification packet in the broadcast logical channel to all ONUs connected to the OLT in the form of a list, and is implemented in an update process.
  • the OLT advertises the multicast key corresponding to multiple multicast service groups to all ONUs in each multicast service group at the same time; ensures the security update, and effectively reduces the OLT and ONU during the multicast key update process.
  • the OLT splits the optical signal into multiple channels and four ONUs through the optical splitter.
  • ONU1 and ONU2 belong to the first multicast service group
  • ONU3 and ONU4 belong to the second multicast service group.
  • the ONU1, the ONU2, and the OLT in the first multicast service group share the first current multicast key MSK curl ; the ONU3, the ONU4, and the OLT in the second multicast service group share the second current multicast key MSKcur2 .
  • the OLT needs to update the multicast keys of the first multicast service group and the second multicast service group as an example for further explanation:
  • the OLT separately updates the multicast key of the first multicast service group and the second multicast service group; 1) The OLT acquires the multicast update key MEK of the first multicast service group.
  • the OLT locally generates a random number as the multicast announcement master key NMK of the first multicast service group to construct a multicast key update notification packet, and sends the multicast key update notification packet to the ONU 1-4 through the broadcast logical channel; the multicast key update notification packet Inform Info including KN MSID E (NMK newl ), MlC;
  • the ONU receives the multicast key update notification packet sent by the OLT:
  • ONU1 Obtain the multicast update key MEK of the first multicast service group, and use the MEK ⁇ MIC field to be correct; use the MEKi to decrypt the E(NMK newl ) field to obtain NMK newl ; and use NMK newl directly as the first multicast service group.
  • New multicast key MSK newl ;
  • ONU2 Operation such as ONU1;
  • ONU3 does not belong to the first multicast service group, and discards the multicast key update notification packet.
  • ONU4 Operation such as ONU3;
  • the foregoing process is a process in which the OLT updates the multicast key of the first multicast service group, and the process of updating the multicast key of the second multicast service group is the same as the process of updating the multicast key of the first multicast service group.
  • the OLT simultaneously updates the multicast key of the first multicast service group and the second multicast service group
  • the OLT acquires a multicast update key ⁇ ⁇ 2 ⁇ of the first multicast service group and the second multicast service group;
  • the OLT locally generates two random numbers as the multicast multicast master key ⁇ NMK NMK 2 ⁇ of the first multicast service group and the second multicast service group; constructs a multicast key update notification packet, and sends the broadcast packet through the broadcast logical channel.
  • the multicast key update notification packet includes ⁇ Inform Infor 2 ⁇ ; Inforj includes KN MSIDj, E(NMK newl ), MlC; Infor 2 includes KN 2 , MSID 2 , E(NMK new2 ), MIC1 2 ;
  • the ONU receives the multicast key update notification packet sent by the OLT:
  • ONU1 Obtain the multicast update key MEK of the first multicast service group, use the MEK ⁇ MIC field correctness; use the decrypted E(NMK newl ) field to obtain NMK newl ; extend the NMK new ⁇ j new group by the one-way hash algorithm Broadcast key MSK newl ;
  • ONU2 Operation such as ONU1; ONU3: obtaining a second key update multicast service multicast group MEK 2; using MEK 2 field correctness verification MIC1 2; using MEK 2 decrypts E (NMK new2) field, to give NMK to new2; by way hash algorithms extend NMK New2 gets the new multicast key MSK new2 ;
  • ONU4 Operation such as ONU3;
  • the ONU sends a multicast key update confirmation packet to the OLT;
  • the ONU1 constructs a multicast key update confirmation packet to be sent to the OLT; the multicast key update confirmation packet includes ACKInfor ACKInfor including KNi, MSID
  • ONU2 Operation such as ONU1;
  • ONU3 constructing a multicast key update confirmation packet to be sent to the OLT; the multicast key update confirmation packet includes ACKInfor 2 ; ACKInfor 2 includes KN 2 and MSID 2 ;
  • ONU4 Operation such as ONU3;
  • the OLT receives the multicast key update confirmation packet
  • the OLT receives the multicast key update confirmation packet of the ONU1, confirms that the ACKInfor field and the MSIDi field are consistent with the Info tKNi field and the MSIDi field, and confirms that the ONU1 has received the new multicast key;
  • the OLT receives the multicast key update confirmation packet of ONU2, ONU3, and ONU4, and the operation is the same as the multicast key update confirmation packet processing process of the OLT receiving ONU1.
  • the OLT simultaneously updates the multicast key of the first multicast service group and the second multicast service group
  • the OLT obtains the multicast update key of the first multicast service group and the second multicast service group. ⁇ MEK
  • the OLT locally generates two random numbers as the multicast multicast master key of the first multicast service group and the second multicast service group ⁇ NMK ⁇ NMK 2 ⁇ ; constructs a multicast key update notification packet, and broadcasts the logical channel.
  • the multicast key update notification packet includes ⁇ Inform Infor 2 ⁇ ; Infori includes KN MSIDj, E(NMK newl ), MlC; Infor 2 includes KN 2 , MSID 2 , E(NMK new2 ), MIC1 2 ;
  • the ONU receives the multicast key update notification packet sent by the OLT: ONU1: Obtain the multicast update key MEK of the first multicast service group, use the MEK ⁇ MIC field correctness; use the decrypted E(NMK newl ) field to obtain NMK newl ; extend the NMK new ⁇ j new group by the one-way hash algorithm Broadcast key MSK newl ;
  • ONU2 Operation such as ONU1;
  • ONU3 obtaining a second key update multicast service multicast group MEK 2; using MEK 2 field correctness verification MIC1 2; using MEK 2 decrypts E (NMK new2) field, to give NMK to new2; by way hash algorithms extend NMK New2 gets the new multicast key MSK new2 ;
  • ONU4 Operation such as ONU3;
  • the ONU sends a multicast key update confirmation packet to the OLT;
  • the ONU1 constructing a multicast key update confirmation packet is sent to the OLT; the multicast key update confirmation packet includes ACKInfor ACKInfo including KNi, MSID MIC2i;
  • ONU2 Operation such as ONU1;
  • ONU3 constructing a multicast key update confirmation packet to be sent to the OLT; the multicast key update confirmation packet includes ACKInfor 2 ; ACKInfor 2 includes KN 2 , MSID 2 , MIC2 2 ;
  • ONU4 Operation such as ONU3;
  • the OLT receives the multicast key update confirmation packet
  • the OLT receives the multicast key update confirmation packet of the ONU 1, and confirms the KNi field, the MSIDi field and the ⁇ in the ACKInfo.
  • the ⁇ field and the MSID 1 field are the same, and further confirm that the MIC2 1 field is correct, that is, confirm that the ONU1 has received the new multicast key;
  • the OLT receives the multicast key update confirmation packet of ONU2, ONU3, and ONU4, and the operation is the same as the multicast key update confirmation packet processing process of the OLT receiving ONU1.
  • the present invention also provides a security update system for a multicast key corresponding to the foregoing method for securely updating a multicast key.
  • the multicast key update system includes an optical line terminal OLT 301 and an optical network unit.
  • the ONU 302 the optical line terminal OLT 301 first obtains a multicast update key MEK list corresponding to multiple multicast service groups that need to update the multicast key, and then constructs a multicast key update notification packet, and broadcasts the logical channel. And sent to all ONUs 302 connected to the OLT; after receiving the multicast key update notification packet, the optical network unit ONU 302 acquires the secret in the multicast key update notification packet. A new multicast key that is advertised and valid for the ONU.
  • the optical network unit ONU 302 optionally constructs a multicast key update confirmation packet and transmits it to the optical line terminal OLT 301 on the unicast logical channel; the optical line terminal OLT 301 receives the multicast key update confirmation packet, Confirm that the ONU receives the new multicast key.
  • the present invention also provides an optical line terminal corresponding to the foregoing method for securely updating a multicast key.
  • the optical line terminal OLT includes:
  • the multicast update key management module 401 is configured to obtain a multicast update key MEK corresponding to the multicast service group that needs to update the multicast key;
  • the announcement master key generation module 402 is configured to generate an announcement master key NMK corresponding to the multicast service group that needs to update the multicast key;
  • the multicast key update notification module 403 is configured to construct a multicast key update notification packet, and send a secret master key list corresponding to the multicast service group that needs to update the multicast key to all OLTs through the broadcast logical channel. Connected ONU;
  • the optical line terminal OLT further includes a multicast key update confirmation module 404, configured to receive a multicast key update confirmation packet sent by the ONU, and confirm that the ONU has obtained a new multicast key;
  • the present invention further provides an optical network unit ONU corresponding to the foregoing method for securely updating a multicast key.
  • the optical network unit ONU includes:
  • the multicast update key management module 501 is configured to obtain a multicast update key MEK corresponding to the multicast service group;
  • the multicast key update response module 502 is configured to receive a multicast key update notification packet sent by the OLT, extract a key update information list valid for the ONU, and obtain a new multicast key.
  • the multicast key update response module 502 of the optical network unit ONU may also be configured to send a multicast key update confirmation packet to the OLT, to notify the OLT that the optical network unit ONU has received a new multicast key.

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Abstract

一种组播密钥的安全更新方法，该方法包括：OLT获取与需更新组播密钥的n个组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥列表；OLT本地生成n个随机数作为这n个组播业务组对应的新的组播通告主密钥，构造组播密钥更新通告分组，通过广播逻辑通道发送给与OLT相连接的光网络单元ONU；ONU接收组播密钥更新通告分组，提取组播密钥更新通告分组中秘密通告的ONU所属的组播业务组对应的新的组播通告主密钥，得到ONU所属的组播业务组对应的新的组播密钥。该方法解决了组播密钥更新过程的繁琐和占用带宽的缺点。本发明还提供了与组播密钥的安全更新方法相对应的组播密钥的安全更新系统、光线路终端OLT和光网络单元ONU。

Description

一种组播密钥的安全更新方法、 系统及设备 本申请要求于 2011年 1月 25日提交中国专利局、申请号为 201110027390.8 发明名称为"一种组播密钥的安全更新方法、系统及设备"的中国专利申请的优 先权， 其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本发明属于网络安全领域， 涉及一种组播密钥的安全更新方法、 系统及设 备。
背景技术
以太无源光网络 EPON(Ethemet Passive Optical Network)是一种新型的光 纤接入网技术， 它通过一个单一的光纤接入系统， 实现数据、语音及视频的综 合业务接入， 并具有良好的经济性。
EPON是一种媒质共享的网络， 在局端的 EPON设备叫光线路终端 OLT ( Optical Network Terminal ); 在用户端的系统则叫光网络单元 ONU ( Optical Network Unit )。 ONU向 OLT的上行数据传输， 按时分复用原理进行， 每一帧的 数据都会被安排在特定的时隙中传输， 且上行数据不会到达其它终端； 但从 OLT传送到 ONU的下行数据传输是广播进行的，分光器同时将数据包传送给所 有的 ONU。 当 ONU处于混杂模式下， 凡是有意接收的终端站点都能接收其下 行传输信息。
在 EPON网络中， 从 OLT到 ONU的组播业务数据， 有一个发送方和一组特 定的接收方。 为保证组播业务报文的保密和信息隔离， OLT对组播业务报文的 保密处理方式有两种模式：
一种是将组播业务报文拷贝多份， 分别使用与每一个组内 ONU之间的单 播密钥进行保护通过单播逻辑通道进行发送。 这种方式将占用大量的带宽。
一种是将组播业务在广播逻辑链路通道上进行传输，这种方式需要组播业 务特定的一组接收方 ONU与 OLT之间建立共享的对应于该组播业务的组播密 钥， 以确保只有拥有组播密钥的 ONU才能正确接收组播业务包。 这就需要有 一种有效的组播密钥建立和更新机制 , 以实现组播业务的保密和信息隔离。 组播密钥的更新通常和组播密钥的建立一样 , 由 OLT采用单播逐一通告方 式向 ONU进行更新通告， OLT对每一个组内 ONU的通告过程中分别使用 OLT 和 ONU之间的单播密钥加密新的组播密钥信息。 这种单播逐一通告的方式虽 然安全， 但过程繁瑣， 并且当组播业务特定的一组 ONU数量较大时， 将占用 大量的带宽。
发明内容
为了解决背景技术中组播密钥更新过程的繁瑣和占用带宽的缺点 ,本发明 提供一种组播密钥的安全更新方法、 系统及设备。
本发明提供了一种组播密钥的安全更新方法， 该方法包括以下步骤： 1 )光线路终端 OLT首先获取与需要更新组播密钥的 n个组播业务组对应的 组播更新密钥列表， 其中， n为不小于 1的整数；
2 ) OLT本地生成 n个随机数作为这 n个组播业务组对应的新的组播通告主 密钥 , 利用这 n个组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥列表构造组播密钥更新通告 分组 , 通过广播逻辑通道发送给与 OLT相连接的光网络单元 ONU;
3 ) ONU接收组播密钥更新通告分组， 获取该 ONU所属组播业务组对应的 组播更新密钥 ,利用所属组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥提取组播密钥更新通 告分组中秘密通告的 ONU所属的组播业务组对应的新的组播通告主密钥 , 得 到对应的组播业务组的新的组播密钥。
本发明还提供一种与组播密钥的安全更新方法相对应的组播密钥的安全 更新系统， 所述组播密钥更新系统包括光线路终端 OLT以及光网络单元 ONU, 所述光线路终端 OLT首先获取需要更新组播密钥的多个组播业务组对应的组 播更新密钥 MEK列表， 之后构造组播密钥更新通告分组， 并在广播逻辑通道 上发送给所有与 OLT相连接的 ONU; 所述光网络单元 ONU收到组播密钥更新 通告分组后， 获取组播密钥更新通告分组中秘密通告的且对该光网络单元 ONU有效的新的组播密钥；
本发明还提供一种与组播密钥的安全更新方法相对应的光线路终端 OLT, 所述光线路终端 OLT包括： 组播更新密钥管理模块，用于获取需要更新组播密钥的组播业务组对应的 组播更新密钥 MEK;
组播密钥更新通告模块， 用于构造组播密钥更新通告分组，通过广播逻辑 通道发送给所有与光线路终端 OLT相连接的光网络单元 ONU;
本发明还提供一种与组播密钥的安全更新方法相对应的光网络单元
ONU, 其特征在于： 所述光网络单元 ONU包括：
组播更新密钥管理模块， 用于获取组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥 MEK; 组播密钥更新响应模块，用于接收光线路终端 OLT发送的组播密钥更新通 告分组， 获取对所述光网络单元 ONU有效的新的组播密钥；
本发明的优点是：
1、可以为 EPON产品所支持的多个组播业务组更新组播密钥，且利用组播 更新密钥，将组播更新过程与组播的分发过程相关联，确保只有组播业务组内 的 ONU才能获取组播业务组对应的新的组播密钥；
2、 利用列表的形式， 实现了在一次组播密钥更新过程中完成对多个组播 业务组的组播密钥的更新；有效的解决了现有组播密钥更新机制中大量占用带 宽的问题；
3、充分了利用了 EPON的广播逻辑通道，将组播密钥更新通告分组在广播 逻辑通道中传输， 实现了在一次组播密钥更新过程中对所有 ONU的通告， 有 效的解决了现有组播密钥更新机制中大量占用带宽的问题。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例和现有技术的技术方案，下面对实施例和 现有技术中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地， 下面描述中的附图 仅仅是本发明的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性 劳动的前提下， 还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图 1为本发明所提供的 EPON网络示意图；
图 2为本发明所提供的组播密钥的安全更新流程示意图；
图 3为本发明所提供的组播密钥的安全更新方法相应的组播密钥的安全更 新系统示意图；
图 4为本发明所提供的组播密钥的安全更新方法相应的光线路终端 OLT示 意图；
图 5为本发明所提供的组播密钥的安全更新方法相应的光网络单元 ONU 示意图。
具体实施方式
为使本发明的目的、技术方案、及优点更加清楚明白， 以下参照附图并举 实施例， 对本发明进一步详细说明。 显然， 所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部 分实施例， 而不是全部的实施例。基于本发明中的实施例， 本领域普通技术人 员在没有作出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都属于本发明保护 的范围。
下面结合附图和具体实施方式对本发明做进一步描述。
本发明中组播密钥记为 MSK; 当前组播密钥记为 MSKcur; 新的组播密钥 记为 MSKnew； 组播更新密钥记为 MEK; 组播通告主密钥记为 NMK; 每个组播 业务组内的 ONU与 OLT共享当前组播密钥 MSKcur。
OLT发送给组播业务组内的 ONU的组播业务包使用组播业务组对应的当 前组播密钥 MSKcur进行加密和 /或完整性保护； 该组播业务组内的 ONU使用当 前组播密钥 MSKeu^†OLT发送的组播业务数据帧进行解密和 /或对完整性保护 进行校验， 获取组播业务包信息。
如图 2所示， 本发明具体实施例所述一种组播密钥的安全更新方法的主要 过程包括如下具体步骤：
1 ) OLT首先获取与需要更新组播密钥的 n个组播业务组对应的组播更新密 钥列表；
所述组播更新密钥 MEK是组播业务组内 ONU及 OLT之间均共享的一个密 钥； 所述组播更新密钥列表用 {MEKG1、 MEKG2 MEKGn}表示， 包括 n
( n为不小于 1的整数） 个组播更新密钥 MEK , 每个组播更新密钥 MEKGi ( GiE { Gl Gn} ) 与 OLT需要更新的组播业务组 Gi对应； 例如， 图 1所述的第一组播业务组中 ONUl、 ONU2与 OLT共享第一组播更 新密钥 MEK 第二组播业务组中的 ONU3、 ONU4与 OLT共享第二组播更新密 钥 MEK2;
具体实施时， 组播更新密钥 MEK可以等于当前组播密钥 MSKcur;
具体实施时，组播更新密钥 MEK可以通过单向杂凑算法 f(MSKcur，text)计算 得到， 其中 text是一个常数参数；
具体实施时， 组播更新密钥 MEK可以是在当前组播密钥 MSK lr建立过程 中， 和当前组播密钥 MSKcur—起由 OLT秘密通告给 ONU的；
具体实施时， 组播更新密钥 MEK可以是在当前组播密钥 MSK lr建立过程 中， OLT和 ONU均本地通过单向杂凑函数对随机数计算得到的；
2 ) OLT本地生成 n个随机数作为这 n个组播业务组对应的新的组播通告主 密钥 , 利用这 n个组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥列表构造组播密钥更新通告 分组， 通过广播逻辑通道发送给与 OLT相连接的 ONU;
步骤 2 ) 的具体过程如下：
2.1 ) OLT本地生成 n个随机数作为这 n个组播业务组对应的新的组播通告 主密钥，用新的组播通告主密钥列表{ NMKnewGi 、NMKnewG2 NMKnewGn } 表示；
所述新的组播通告主密钥列表{ NMKnewG1 、 NMKnewG2 NMKnewGn } 包括 n个组播通告主密钥 NMK, 每个组播通告主密钥 ΝΜΚω与 OLT需要更新的 组播业务组 Gi对应；
2.2 ) OLT构造组播密钥更新通告分组， 通过广播逻辑通道将组播密钥更 新通告分组发送给与 OLT相连接的 ONU;
组播密钥更新通告分组包括密钥更新信息列表 {Infor 、 InforG2
InforGn};
其中密钥更新信息列表 {InforG1、 InforG2 InforGn}包括 n个密钥更新 信息， InforcM表示组播业务组 Gi的密钥更新信息， 包括 KNGi、 MSIDGi、 E(NMKnewGi)、 MIClGi; 其中：
KNGi: 表示密钥通告标识， 标识对组播业务组 Gi对应的 InforGi的新鲜性；
MSIDGi字段： 表示组播业务组 Gi的组播业务组标识；
E(NMKnewGi)字段：表示组播业务组 Gi的密钥加密数据，是 OLT利用 MSIDGi 所标识组播业务组 Gi对应的组播更新密钥 MEKGi对组播业务组 Gi对应的新的 组播通告主密钥 NMKnew(}i加密后的数据；
MIClGi字段： 表示消息鉴别码， 是 OLT利用 MSIDGi所标识组播业务组 Gi 对应的组播更新密钥 ΜΕΚω对 Inforcii中除 Μΐ ω字段外所有字段进行杂凑计算 得到的；
具体实施时， KNGi可以初始化为一个整数， 在每次组播业务组 Gi对应的 密钥更新通告时该字段值加 1 , 若通告的组播通告主密钥不变， 则该字段值保 持不变；
具体实施时， ΚΝω可以是 OLT为组播业务组 Gi本地生成的一个新的随机 数； 若通告的组播通告主密钥不变， 则该字段值保持不变；
3 ) ONU接收组播密钥更新通告分组， 获取该 ONU所属组播业务组对应的 组播更新密钥 ,利用所属组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥提取组播密钥更新通 告分组中秘密通告的 ONU所属的组播业务组对应的新的组播通告主密钥， 得 到对应的组播业务组的新的组播密钥；
步骤 3 ) 的具体过程如下：
3.1 ) ONU接收组播密钥更新通告分组，根据 ONU所属的组播业务组信息， 提取密钥更新信息列表 {InforG1、 InforG2 InforGn}中对该 ONU有效的密 钥更新信息；若对该 ONU有 m( 0 < m < n )个密钥更新信息有效，则用 { InforGE1、
InforGE2 InforGEm }表示对该 ONU有效的密钥更新信息列表； 其中 GEj
( GEj E { GEl、 GE2 GEm} ) 的取值属于 {Gl、 G2 Gn}范围； 并逐一记录 InforGEj中的 KNGEj字段值， 执行步骤 3.2 );
所述密钥更新信息 Infold对该 ONU有效是指 ONU属于 Infoi^中 MSID^字 段所标识的组播业务组 , 且 InforGi中的 KNGi取值与之前该 ONU保存的 KNGi不 同；
3.2 )若对该 ONU有效的密钥更新信息个数 m=0，则丢弃该分组；否则 ONU 重复执行 m次步骤 3.2.1)至 3.2.3)获取对该 ONU有效的每个密钥更新信息 Inform对应新的组播密钥 MSKneW(iEj；
3.2.1 ) ONU获取密钥更新信息 InforGEj中 MSIDGEj字段所标识的组播业务组
GEj对应的组播更新密钥 MEKGEj; 组播更新密钥 MEKGEj的获取方法与步骤 1 ) 相同；
3.2.2 ) ONU利用组播更新密钥 MEKGEj验证密钥更新信息 InforGEj中 MIC 1 GEj 字段的正确性， 若正确， 则 InforGi险证通过， 执行 3.2.3 ); 否则， InforGEj验证 不通过， 丢弃该密钥更新信息 Inform;
3.2.3 ) ONU利用组播更新密钥 MEKGEj解密密钥更新信息 Inform中的 E(NMKnew(}Ej)字段， 得到新的组播通告主密钥 NMKnew(}Ej; 将 NMKnew(}Ej直接作 为新的组播密钥 MSKnew(}Ej, 或者通过单向杂凑算法扩展 NMKnew(}Ej得到新的组 播密钥 MSKnew(}Ej;
当 m大于 0时， 上述步骤 3 )之后还包括步骤 4 )和步骤 5 ):
4 ) ONU构造组播密钥更新确认分组， 通过单播逻辑通道发送给 OLT; 所述组播密钥更新确认分组包括密钥确认信息列表 {ACKInforGE1、
ACKInforGE2、 、 ACKInforGEm}；
其中密钥确认信息列表 { ACKInforGE1、 ACKInforGE2 ACKInforGEm } 包括 m个密钥确认信息， ACKInforGEj表示组播业务组 GEj的密钥确认信息， 包 括 KNGE MSIDGEj;
其中：
KNGEj字段： 表示密钥通告标识， 若 InforGEj验证通过， 该字段值与收到的 组播密钥更新通告分组中 InforGEj中的 KNGEj字段值一致； 若 InforGEj验证没有通 过， 该字段值取 InforGEj中的 KNGEj字段值以外的值；
KNGEj字段取值不同于 InforGEj中的 KNGEj字段的值， 用于告知 OLT InforGEj 验证没有通过； MSIDGEj字段： 表示组播业务组标识， 该字段值与收到的组播密钥更新通 告分组中 InforGEj中的 MSIDGEj字段值一致；
5 ) OLT接收组播密钥更新确认分组；
5.1 ) OLT收到组播密钥更新确认分组后， 重复执行步骤 5.2 ) m次逐一验 证 ACKInforGEj;
5.2 )验证 ACKInforGEj中的 KNGEj字段、 MSIDGEj字段是否与之前发送的组 播密钥更新通告分组中 InforGEj中的 KNGEj字段、 MSIDGEj字段值一致，若不一致 或不完全一致， 则说明 ONU对 InforcjEj验证不通过， 继续确认下一个 ACKInfor; 若完全一致， 说明 ONU对 InforcjEj验证通过， 则继续验证下一个 ACKInfor;
5.3 ) m次执行后， OLT确认完成此次对该 ONU的密钥更新通告。
所述步骤 4 ) 中组播密钥更新确认分组中的 ACKInforGEj还包括 MIC2GEj字 段； 其中 MIC2GEj字段表示消息鉴别码， 是 ONU利用组播业务组 GEj对应的组 播更新密钥 MEK(jEj对 ACKInforcjEj除 MIC2(jEj字段外所有字段进行杂凑计算得 到的；
对应的步骤 5 )具体过程如下：
5.1 ) OLT收到组播密钥更新确认分组后， 重复执行步骤 5.2 ) -5.3 ) m次逐 一确认 ACKInforGEj;
5.2 )验证 ACKInforGEj中的 KNGEj字段、 MSIDGEj字段是否与之前发送的组 播密钥更新通告分组中 InforGEj中的 KNGEj字段、 MSIDGEj字段值一致，若不一致 或不完全一致， 则说明 ONU对 InforGEj验证不通过， 执行步骤 5.1 )继续确认下 一个 ACKInfor; 若完全一致， 说明 ONU对 InforGEj验证通过， 则执行步骤 5.3 );
5.3 ) OLT利用组播业务组 GEj对应的组播更新密钥 MEKGEj验证 ACKInforGEj中的 MIC2GEj字段的正确性， 若不正确， 则根据本地策略丢弃该 ACKInforGEj , 执行步骤 5.1 ) 继续确认下一个； 若正确， 则继续验证下一个 ACKInfor;
5.4 ) m次—险证完成后， OLT确认完成此次对该 ONU的密钥更新通告。 OLT对收到的 ONU发送的组播密钥更新确认分组中的 m个密钥确认信息 ACKInfor逐一确认， 若都确认成功， 则表示该 ONU成功收到对其所有有效的 新的组播通告主密钥； 若有部分密钥确认信息 ACKInfor确认不成功， 则 OLT 对这些确认不成功的密钥确认信息 ACKInfor对应的密钥更新信息 Infor,根据本 地策略或重发此次的组播密钥更新通告分组，或在新的组播密钥更新通告分组 中包括这些密钥更新信息 Inform; 本发明对该策略不予限定；
当 OLT收到所有 ONU的组播密钥更新确认分组并确认完成后，完成此次组 播密钥的安全更新过程。
具体实施时， OLT—次通告 n个密钥更新信息 Infor; 对一个特定的 ONU有 m个密钥更新信息 Infor有效； ONU在构造密钥更新确认分组时， 若有部分密钥 更新信息 Infor验证不通过，根据本地策略在构造密钥更新确认分组时，还可以 在密钥更新确认分组中只包括验证不通过的密钥更新信息 Infor对应的密钥确 认信息 ACKInfor;或者只包括验证通过的密钥更新信息 Infor对应的密钥确认信 息 ACKInfor。
本发明所提供的一种组播密钥的安全更新方法， OLT以列表的形式通过将 组播密钥更新通告分组在广播逻辑通道中发送给所有与 OLT连接的 ONU,在一 次更新过程中实现了 OLT将多个组播业务组对应的组播密钥对各组播业务组 内所有的 ONU的同时更新通告； 确保安全更新的同时， 有效地减少了组播密 钥更新过程中 OLT和 ONU之间带宽占用的问题。
如图 1所示 EPON网络中， OLT通过分光器将光信号分成多路和四个 ONU 相连接； ONUl、 ONU2属于第一组播业务组， ONU3、 ONU4属于第二组播业 务组。 第一组播业务组内的 ONUl、 ONU2以及 OLT共享第一当前组播密钥 MSKcurl； 第二组播业务组内的 ONU3、 ONU4以及 OLT共享第二当前组播密钥 MSKcur2。
针对图 1所示的 EPON网络，均以 OLT需要更新第一组播业务组和第二组播 业务组的组播密钥为例进行进一步说明：
具体实施例 1 :
OLT分别更新第一组播业务组、 第二组播业务组的组播密钥； 1 ) OLT获取第一组播业务组的组播更新密钥 MEK
2 ) OLT本地生成一随机数作为第一组播业务组的组播通告主密钥 NMK 构造组播密钥更新通告分组， 通过广播逻辑通道发送给 ONU1-4; 该组播密钥 更新通告分组包括 Inform Info 包括 KN MSID E(NMKnewl)、 MlC ;
3 ) ONU接收 OLT发送的组播密钥更新通告分组：
ONU1 :获取第一组播业务组的组播更新密钥 MEK 利用 MEK^ MIC 字段正确性； 利用 MEKi解密 E(NMKnewl)字段， 得到 NMKnewl; 将 NMKnewl直接 作为第一组播业务组的新的组播密钥 MSK newl；
ONU2: 操作如 ONU1 ;
ONU3 : ONU3不属于第一组播业务组， 丢弃组播密钥更新通告分组；
ONU4: 操作如 ONU3;
上述过程是 OLT更新第一组播业务组组播密钥的过程，更新第二组播业务 组组播密钥的过程与更新第一组播业务组组播密钥的过程相同。
具体实施例 2:
OLT同时更新第一组播业务组、 第二组播业务组的组播密钥；
1 ) OLT获取第一组播业务组、 第二组播业务组的组播更新密钥 {ΜΕΚ ΜΕΚ2};
2 ) OLT本地生成两个随机数作为第一组播业务组、 第二组播业务组的组 播通告主密钥 {NMK NMK2} ; 构造组播密钥更新通告分组， 通过广播逻辑 通道发送给 ONU1-4; 该组播密钥更新通告分组包括 {Inform Infor2} ; Inforj 包括 KN MSIDj, E(NMKnewl)、 MlC ; Infor2包括 KN2、 MSID2、 E(NMKnew2)、 MIC12;
3 ) ONU接收 OLT发送的组播密钥更新通告分组：
ONU1 :获取第一组播业务组的组播更新密钥 MEK 利用 MEK^ MIC 字段正确性； 利用 解密 E(NMKnewl)字段， 得到 NMKnewl; 通过单向杂凑 算法扩展 NMKnew ^j新的组播密钥 MSKnewl;
ONU2: 操作如 ONU1 ; ONU3:获取第二组播业务组的组播更新密钥 MEK2;利用 MEK2验证 MIC12 字段正确性； 利用 MEK2解密 E(NMKnew2)字段， 得到 NMKnew2; 通过单向杂凑 算法扩展 NMKnew2得到新的组播密钥 MSKnew2；
ONU4: 操作如 ONU3;
4 ) ONU发送组播密钥更新确认分组给 OLT;
ONU1 : 构造组播密钥更新确认分组发送给 OLT; 所述组播密钥更新确认 分组包括 ACKInfor ACKInfor包括 KNi、 MSID
ONU2: 操作如 ONU1;
ONU3: 构造组播密钥更新确认分组发送给 OLT; 所述组播密钥更新确认 分组包括 ACKInfor2; ACKInfor2包括 KN2、 MSID2;
ONU4: 操作如 ONU3;
5 ) OLT接收组播密钥更新确认分组；
OLT接收 ONU1的组播密钥更新确认分组， 确认 ACKInfor中 字段、 MSIDi字段与 Info tKNi字段、 MSIDi字段都一致， 确认 ONU1已收到新的组 播密钥；
OLT接收 ONU2、 ONU3、 ONU4的组播密钥更新确认分组， 操作和 OLT接 收 ONU1的组播密钥更新确认分组处理过程相同。
具体实施例 3:
OLT同时更新第一组播业务组、 第二组播业务组的组播密钥；
1 ) OLT获取第一组播业务组、 第二组播业务组的组播更新密钥 {MEK
MEK2};
2 ) OLT本地生成两个随机数作为第一组播业务组、 第二组播业务组的组 播通告主密钥 {NMK^ NMK2}; 构造组播密钥更新通告分组， 通过广播逻辑 通道发送给 ONU1-4; 该组播密钥更新通告分组包括 {Inform Infor2}; Infori 包括 KN MSIDj, E(NMKnewl)、 MlC ; Infor2包括 KN2、 MSID2、 E(NMKnew2)、 MIC12;
3 ) ONU接收 OLT发送的组播密钥更新通告分组： ONU1 :获取第一组播业务组的组播更新密钥 MEK 利用 MEK^ MIC 字段正确性； 利用 解密 E(NMKnewl)字段， 得到 NMKnewl; 通过单向杂凑 算法扩展 NMKnew ^j新的组播密钥 MSKnewl;
ONU2: 操作如 ONU1;
ONU3:获取第二组播业务组的组播更新密钥 MEK2;利用 MEK2验证 MIC12 字段正确性； 利用 MEK2解密 E(NMKnew2)字段， 得到 NMKnew2; 通过单向杂凑 算法扩展 NMKnew2得到新的组播密钥 MSKnew2；
ONU4: 操作如 ONU3;
4 ) ONU发送组播密钥更新确认分组给 OLT;
ONU1 : 构造组播密钥更新确认分组发送给 OLT; 所述组播密钥更新确认 分组包括 ACKInfor ACKInfo 包括 KNi、 MSID MIC2i;
ONU2: 操作如 ONU1;
ONU3: 构造组播密钥更新确认分组发送给 OLT; 所述组播密钥更新确认 分组包括 ACKInfor2; ACKInfor2包括 KN2、 MSID2、 MIC22;；
ONU4: 操作如 ONU3;
5 ) OLT接收组播密钥更新确认分组；
OLT接收 ONU 1的组播密钥更新确认分组 , 确认 ACKInfo 中 KNi字段、 MSIDi字段与 ^！^^中 ^字段、 MSID1字段都一致， 进一步确认 MIC21字段的 正确 , 即确认 ONU1已收到新的组播密钥；
OLT接收 ONU2、 ONU3、 ONU4的组播密钥更新确认分组， 操作和 OLT接 收 ONU1的组播密钥更新确认分组处理过程相同。
本发明还提供一种与前述组播密钥的安全更新方法相应的组播密钥的安 全更新系统，参见图 3，所述的组播密钥更新系统包括光线路终端 OLT 301以及 光网络单元 ONU 302， 所述光线路终端 OLT 301首先获取需要更新组播密钥的 多个组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥 MEK列表， 之后构造组播密钥更新通告 分组， 并在广播逻辑通道上发送给所有与 OLT相连接的 ONU 302; 所述光网络 单元 ONU 302收到组播密钥更新通告分组后，获取组播密钥更新通告分组中秘 密通告的且对该 ONU有效的新的组播密钥。所述光网络单元 ONU 302可选地构 造组播密钥更新确认分组， 并在单播逻辑通道上发送给光线路终端 OLT 301; 所述光线路终端 OLT 301接收组播密钥更新确认分组， 确认 ONU收到新的组播 密钥。
本发明还提供一种与前述组播密钥的安全更新方法相应的光线路终端
OLT, 参见图 4， 所述光线路终端 OLT包括：
组播更新密钥管理模块 401， 用于获取需要更新组播密钥的组播业务组对 应的组播更新密钥 MEK;
通告主密钥生成模块 402， 用于生成需要更新组播密钥的组播业务组对应 的通告主密钥 NMK;
组播密钥更新通告模块 403， 用于构造组播密钥更新通告分组， 通过广播 逻辑通道将需要更新组播密钥的组播业务组对应的通告主密钥列表秘密发送 给所有与 OLT相连接的 ONU;
所述光线路终端 OLT还包括组播密钥更新确认模块 404， 用于接收 ONU发 送的组播密钥更新确认分组， 确认 ONU已获得新的组播密钥；
本发明还提供一种与前述组播密钥的安全更新方法相应的光网络单元 ONU, 参见图 5， 所述光网络单元 ONU包括：
组播更新密钥管理模块 501， 用于获取组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥 MEK;
组播密钥更新响应模块 502，用于接收 OLT发送的组播密钥更新通告分组， 提取对所述 ONU有效的密钥更新信息列表， 获取新的组播密钥；
所述光网络单元 ONU的组播密钥更新响应模块 502还可以用于构造组播 密钥更新确认分组发送给 OLT，通知 OLT所述光网络单元 ONU已收到新的组播 密钥。

Claims

权 利 要 求
1、 一种组播密钥的安全更新方法， 其特征在于： 该方法包括以下步骤：
1 )光线路终端 OLT首先获取与需要更新组播密钥的 n个组播业务组对应的 组播更新密钥列表， 其中， n为不小于 1的整数；
2 ) OLT本地生成 n个随机数作为 n个组播业务组对应的新的组播通告主密 钥 , 且利用这 n个组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥列表构造组播密钥更新通告 分组 , 通过广播逻辑通道发送给与 OLT相连接的光网络单元 ONU;
3 ) ONU接收组播密钥更新通告分组， 获取该 ONU所属组播业务组对应的 组播更新密钥 ,利用所属组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥提取组播密钥更新通 告分组中秘密通告的 ONU所属的组播业务组对应的新的组播通告主密钥， 得 到对应的组播业务组新的组播密钥。
2、 根据权利要求 1所述的组播密钥的安全更新方法， 其特征在于： 步骤
1 ) 中， 所述组播更新密钥列表用 {MEKG1、 MEKG2 MEKGn}表示， 包 括 n个组播更新密钥 MEK，每个组播更新密钥 ΜΕΚω与 OLT需要更新的组播 业务组 Gi对应； 所述组播更新密钥 MEK是组播业务组内 ONU及 OLT之间 均共享的一个密钥， 其中， GiE { Gl Gn};
步骤 2 )具体包括：
2.1 ) OLT本地生成 n个随机数作为这 n个组播业务组对应的新的组播通告 主密钥，用新的组播通告主密钥列表{ NMKnewG1 、NMKnewG2 NMKnewGn } 表示；
所述新的组播通告主密钥列表{ NMKnewG1 、 NMKnewG2 NMKnewGn } 包括 n个组播通告主密钥 NMK, 每个组播通告主密钥 ΝΜΚω与 OLT需要更新的 组播业务组 Gi对应；
2.2 ) OLT构造组播密钥更新通告分组， 通过广播逻辑通道将组播密钥更 新通告分组发送给与 OLT相连接的 ONU;
组播密钥更新通告分组包括密钥更新信息列表 {Infor 、 InforG2 InforGn};
密钥更新信息列表 {InforG1、 InforG2 InforGn}包括 n个密钥更新信息，
InforGi表示组播业务组 Gi的密钥更新信息， 包括 KNGi、 MSIDGi、 E(NMKnewGi), MIClGi;
其中：
KNGi: 表示密钥通告标识， 标识对组播业务组 Gi对应的 InforGi的新鲜性；
MSIDGi字段： 表示组播业务组 Gi的组播业务组标识；
E(NMKnewGi)字段：表示组播业务组 Gi的密钥加密数据，是 OLT利用 MSIDGi 所标识组播业务组 Gi对应的组播更新密钥 MEKGi对组播业务组 Gi对应的新的 组播通告主密钥 NMKnew(}i加密后的数据；
MIClGi字段： 表示消息鉴别码， 是 OLT利用 MSIDGi所标识组播业务组 Gi 对应的组播更新密钥 ΜΕΚω对 InforGi中除 Μΐ ω字段外所有字段进行杂凑计算 得到的。
3、根据权利要求 2所述的组播密钥的安全更新方法， 其特征在于： 步骤 3 ) 具体包括：
3.1 ) ONU接收组播密钥更新通告分组，根据 ONU所属的组播业务组信息， 提取密钥更新信息列表 {InforG1、 InforG2 InforGn}中对该 ONU有效的密 钥更新信息； 若对该 ONU有 m个密钥更新信息有效， 其中 0<=m<=n, 则用
{ InforGE1、 InforGE2 InforGEm }表示对该 ONU有效的密钥更新信息列表； 其中， GEj E { GE1、 GE2 GEm}， GEj的取值属于 {Gl、 G2
Gn}范围； 并逐一记录 InforGEj中的 KNGEj字段值， 执行步骤 3.2 );
所述密钥更新信息 InforGi对该 ONU有效是指 ONU属于 InforGi中 MSIDGi字 段所标识的组播业务组， 且 InforGi中的 KNGi取值与之前该 ONU保存的 KNGi不 同；
3.2 )若对该 ONU有效的密钥更新信息个数 m=0 ,则丢弃该分组；否则 ONU 重复执行 m次步骤 3.2.1)至 3.2.3)获取对该 ONU有效的每个密钥更新信息 Info Ej对应的新的组播密钥 MSKnewcHij;
3.2.1 ) ONU获取密钥更新信息 InforGEj中 MSIDGEj字段所标识的组播业务组 GEj对应的组播更新密钥 MEK ；
3.2.2 ) ONU利用组播更新密钥 MEKGEj验证密钥更新信息 InforGEj中 MIC 1 GEj 字段的正确性， 若正确， 则 InforGi险证通过， 执行 3.2.3 ); 否则， InforGEj验证 不通过， 丢弃该密钥更新信息 Inform;
3.2.3 ) ONU利用组播更新密钥 MEKGEj解密密钥更新信息 Inform中的 E(NMKnew(}Ej)字段， 得到新的组播通告主密钥 NMKnew(}Ej; 将 NMKnew(}Ej直接作 为新的组播密钥 MSKnew(}Ej, 或者通过单向杂凑算法扩展 NMKnew(}Ej得到新的组 播密钥 MSKnew(}Ej。
4、根据权利要求 3所述的组播密钥的安全更新方法， 其特征在于： 步骤 3 ) 之后还包括步骤 4 )和步骤 5 ):
4 ) ONU构造组播密钥更新确认分组， 通过单播逻辑通道发送给 OLT;
5 ) OLT接收组播密钥更新确认分组。
5、根据权利要求 4所述的组播密钥的安全更新方法， 其特征在于： 上述步 骤 4 ) 中，
所述组播密钥更新确认分组包括密钥确认信息列表 {ACKInforGE1、
ACKInforGE2、 、 ACKInforGEm}；
其中密钥确认信息列表 { ACKInforGE1、 ACKInforGE2 ACKInforGEm } 包括 m个密钥确认信息， ACKInforGEj表示组播业务组 GEj的密钥确认信息， 包 括 KNGE MSIDGEj;
其中：
KNGEj字段： 表示密钥通告标识， 若 InforGEj验证通过， 该字段值与收到的 组播密钥更新通告分组中 InforGEj中的 KNGEj字段值一致； 若 InforGEj验证没有通 过， 该字段值取 InforGEj中的 KNGEj字段值以外的值；
MSIDGEj字段： 表示组播业务组标识， 该字段值与收到的组播密钥更新通 告分组中 InforGEj中的 MSIDGEj字段值一致；
上述步骤 5 )具体包括：
5.1 ) OLT收到组播密钥更新确认分组后， 重复执行步骤 5.2 ) m次逐一验 证 ACKInforGEj;
5.2 )验证 ACKInforGEj中的 KNGEj字段、 MSIDGEj字段是否与之前发送的组 播密钥更新通告分组中 InforGEj中的 KNGEj字段、 MSIDGEj字段值一致，若不一致 或不完全一致， 则说明 ONU对 InforGEj验证不通过， 继续确认下一个 ACKInfor; 若完全一致， 说明 ONU对 InforGEj验证通过， 则继续验证下一个 ACKInfor;
5.3 ) m次执行后， OLT确认完成此次对该 ONU的密钥更新通告。
6、根据权利要求 5所述的组播密钥的安全更新方法， 其特征在于： 所述步 骤 4 ) 中组播密钥更新确认分组中的 ACKInforGEj还包括 MIC2GEj字段； 其中 MIC2GEj字段表示消息鉴别码， 是 ONU利用组播业务组 GEj对应的组播更新密 钥 MEKGEj对 ACKInforGEj除 MIC2GEj字段外所有字段进行杂凑计算得到的；
则上述步骤 5.2 )具体包括：
5.2.1 )验证 ACKInforGEj中的 KNGEj字段、 MSIDGEj字段是否与之前发送的 组播密钥更新通告分组中 Inform中的 KNGEj字段、 MSIDGEj字段值一致，若不一 致或不完全一致， 则说明 ONU对 InforGEj验证不通过， 执行步骤 5.1 )继续确认 下一个 ACKInfor; 若完全一致， 说明 ONU对 InforGEj验证通过， 则执行步骤 5.2.2 );
5.2.2 ) OLT利用组播业务组 GEj对应的组播更新密钥 MEKGEj验证 ACKInforGEj中的 MIC2GEj字段的正确性， 若不正确， 则根据本地策略丢弃该 ACKInforGEj, 执行步骤 5.1 )继续确认下一个 ACKInfor; 若正确， 则执行步骤 5.1 )继续确认下一个 ACKInfor。
7、根据权利要求 5或 6所述的组播密钥的安全更新方法，其特征在于： OLT 一次通告 n个密钥更新信息 Infor; 对一个特定的 ONU有 m个密钥更新信息 Infor 有效； ONU在构造密钥更新确认分组时， 若有部分密钥更新信息 Infor验证不 通过，根据本地策略在构造密钥更新确认分组时，还可以在密钥更新确认分组 中只包括验证不通过的密钥更新信息 Infor对应的密钥确认信息 ACKInfor;或者 只包括验证通过的密钥更新信息 Infor对应的密钥确认信息 ACKInfor。
8、 一种组播密钥的安全更新系统， 其特征在于： 所述组播密钥更新系统 包括光线路终端 OLT以及光网络单元 ONU,所述 OLT首先获取需要更新组播密 钥的多个组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥 MEK列表， 之后构造组播密钥更新 通告分组， 并在广播逻辑通道上发送给所有与 OLT相连接的 ONU; 所述 ONU 收到组播密钥更新通告分组后，获取组播密钥更新通告分组中秘密通告的且对 该 ONU有效的新的组播密钥；
9、根据权利要求 8所述的组播密钥的安全更新系统， 其特征在于， 所述组 播密钥的安全更新系统还包括所述 ONU构造组播密钥更新确认分组， 并在单 播逻辑通道上发送给 OLT; 所述 OLT接收组播密钥更新确认分组， 确认 ONU收 到新的组播密钥。
10、 一种光线路终端 OLT, 其特征在于： 所述 OLT包括：
组播更新密钥管理模块，用于获取需要更新组播密钥的组播业务组对应的 组播更新密钥 MEK;
通告主密钥生成模块，用于生成需要更新组播密钥的组播业务组对应的通 告主密钥 NMK;
组播密钥更新通告模块，用于构造组播密钥更新通告分组，通过广播逻辑 通道将需要更新组播密钥的组播业务组对应的通告主密钥列表秘密发送给所 有与 OLT相连接的光网络单元 ONU。
11、 根据权利要求 10所述的光线路终端 OLT, 其特征在于， 所述光线路终 端 OLT还包括组播密钥更新确认模块，用于接收 ONU发送的组播密钥更新确认 分组， 确认 ONU已获得新的组播密钥。
12、 一种光网络单元 ONU, 其特征在于： 所述 ONU包括：
组播更新密钥管理模块， 用于获取组播业务组对应的组播更新密钥 MEK; 组播密钥更新响应模块，用于接收光线路终端 OLT发送的组播密钥更新通 告分组， 提取对所述 ONU有效的密钥更新信息列表， 获取新的组播密钥。
13、 根据权利要求 12所述的光网络单元 ONU, 其特征在于： 所述光网络 单元 ONU的组播密钥更新响应模块还用于构造组播密钥更新确认分组发送给 OLT , 通知 OLT所述 ONU已收到新的组播密钥
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