WO2011075976A1 - 用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法及系统 - Google Patents

用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法及系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2011075976A1
WO2011075976A1 PCT/CN2010/073040 CN2010073040W WO2011075976A1 WO 2011075976 A1 WO2011075976 A1 WO 2011075976A1 CN 2010073040 W CN2010073040 W CN 2010073040W WO 2011075976 A1 WO2011075976 A1 WO 2011075976A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
user terminal
inter
station
field
Prior art date
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PCT/CN2010/073040
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
葛莉
曹军
铁满霞
李琴
赖晓龙
Original Assignee
西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Application filed by 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 filed Critical 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
Priority to JP2012543451A priority Critical patent/JP5607749B2/ja
Priority to KR1020127018218A priority patent/KR101492179B1/ko
Priority to EP10838542.8A priority patent/EP2518931B1/en
Priority to US13/516,257 priority patent/US8831227B2/en
Publication of WO2011075976A1 publication Critical patent/WO2011075976A1/zh

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y04INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
    • Y04SSYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
    • Y04S40/00Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
    • Y04S40/20Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of network communication technologies, and in particular, to a method and system for establishing a secure connection between user terminals.
  • Wired LANs are generally broadcast networks. Data sent by one node can be received by other nodes. Each node on the network shares a channel, which brings great security risks to the network. As long as the attacker accesses the network for monitoring, it can capture all the packets on the network and steal critical information.
  • LANs Local area networks
  • LAN control devices such as LAN switching devices
  • devices or resources on the LAN This has no obvious security risks in the early enterprise network wired LAN application environment.
  • users' requirements for information privacy are constantly improving, and it is necessary to realize data privacy at the data link layer.
  • IEEE 802.1AE provides a data encryption protocol for protecting Ethernet and uses hop-by-hop encryption security measures to securely communicate information between network entities.
  • the security measure of hop-by-hop encryption requires the switching device to decrypt each packet that needs to be forwarded, then encrypt and then forward it, which undoubtedly brings a huge computational burden to the switching device in the local area network, which is easy to cause an attacker to exchange.
  • the attack of the device; and the delay of the data packet from the sender to the receiver is also increased, which reduces the efficiency of network transmission.
  • the embodiments of the present invention provide a method and system for establishing a secure connection between user terminals, and two user terminals directly connected by the switching device An inter-station key is established between them to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of user data between user terminals.
  • the embodiment of the invention provides a method for establishing a secure connection between user terminals, and the method includes:
  • the switching device receives the inter-station key request packet sent by the first user terminal
  • the switching device generates an inter-station key, constructs an inter-station key announcement packet and sends it to the second user terminal;
  • the switching device receives the inter-station key notification response packet sent by the second user terminal;
  • the switching device constructs an inter-station key advertisement packet and sends it to the first user terminal;
  • the switching device receives the inter-station key notification response packet sent by the first user terminal.
  • the embodiment of the invention further provides a system for establishing a secure connection between user terminals, the system comprising: sending an inter-station key request packet and an inter-station key notification response packet to the switching device, and receiving the inter-office secret of the switching device a first user terminal that advertises a packet and performs secure communication with the second user terminal; receives an inter-station key request packet and transmits an inter-station key advertisement packet to the second user terminal, and receives an inter-station key transmitted by the second user terminal Notifying the response packet, transmitting the inter-station key advertisement packet to the first user terminal, receiving the exchange device of the inter-station key advertisement response packet sent by the first user terminal, and receiving the inter-station key advertisement packet sent by the switching device and forwarding the packet to the switching device A second user terminal that transmits an inter-station key notification response packet and performs secure communication with the first user terminal.
  • An embodiment of the present invention has the advantages that the method and system for establishing a secure connection between user terminals provided by the embodiments of the present invention are shared by a pre-distribution or other security mechanism between the switching device and the directly connected user terminal.
  • a shared key that is, an inter-station key STAkey
  • STAkey is established between the two directly connected user terminals of the switching device through the switching device, and the key is used for the data communication process between each other, thereby ensuring
  • the data link layer is confidential to the data transfer process directly connected to the user terminal under the same switching device, and enables the switching device to transparently transmit the inter-station communication data under it.
  • the computational burden of the switching device is reduced, and the network transmission efficiency is improved.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a method for establishing an inter-station key according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of establishing a secure connection between user terminals according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the directly connected user terminal under the switching device defined in the embodiment of the present invention refers to the direct connection in the exchange.
  • a user terminal under a port of the device includes a user terminal directly connected to the switching device through a network cable and a user terminal connected to the switching device through a physical layer device such as a hub.
  • a user terminal connected to a switching device through another device does not belong to a directly connected user terminal of the switching device.
  • the first user terminal and the second user terminal respectively establish a secure connection with the switching device, that is, each has a shared unicast key, and the embodiment of the present invention can establish a connection between the first user terminal and the second user terminal by using the switching device.
  • Shared inter-site keys which establish a secure connection between them.
  • the unicast key defined in the embodiment of the present invention includes a protocol data key (PDK, Protocol Data Key) and a user data key (UDD, User Data Key), wherein the PDK is used to protect the protocol data in the device.
  • PDK protocol data key
  • UDD User Data Key
  • PDK protocol data key
  • UDK user data key
  • UDK is used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of user data between devices.
  • the structure of the PDK and UDK may vary depending on the mode in which the block cipher algorithm works.
  • the keys used to protect data confidentiality and integrity may be the same or different.
  • the embodiment of the present invention does not define or limit the mechanism for establishing a unicast key.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a method and system for establishing a secure connection between user terminals. The method is to establish an inter-station key between two directly connected user terminals under the same switching device.
  • a second user terminal STA1 to a first user terminal to establish a switching device SW STA2 STAKey 13 ⁇ 4 1 into 8-butoxy example the setup procedure is requested by a user between a first terminal station STA1 transmits a key to the switching device SW, Then, a random number is generated by the switching device SW as the inter-station key STAkeyu of the first user terminal STA1 and the second user terminal STA2, and the inter-site key STAke yi _ 2 is secretly advertised to the second user terminal STA2 and The first user terminal STA1.
  • the whole process comprises five steps:
  • the first user terminal STA1 sends an inter-station key request to the switching device SW, requesting to establish an inter-station key of the first user terminal STA1 and the second user terminal STA2;
  • the switching device SW is for the second user
  • the terminal STA2 performs inter-station key notification;
  • the second user terminal STA2 performs an inter-station key advertisement response;
  • the switching device SW performs inter-station key notification on the first user terminal STA1 and the first user terminal STA1 performs inter-station key notification response.
  • the notification of the first user terminal STA1 by the switching device SW and the response of the first user terminal STA1 are similar to the notification of the switching device SW to the second user terminal STA2 and the response of the second user terminal STA2, and only the inter-station key is used.
  • the protocol data key PDK is different.
  • the inter-station key advertisement process of the switching device SW to the user terminal STA1 or STA2 may be to notify the user terminal STA1 or STA2 to establish an inter-station key with the user terminal STA2 or STA1, or may notify the user terminal STA1 or STA2 to update and
  • the inter-station key between the user terminal STA2 or STA1 may also be an inter-station key between the user terminal STA1 or STA2: pin and the user terminal STA2 or STA1.
  • the process of establishing, updating, and revoking is the same, and can be distinguished by carrying an identification field in a specific implementation.
  • the first user terminal STA1 When the first user terminal STA1 is to perform secure communication with the second user terminal STA2, if the user terminal STA1 and the user terminal STA2 are directly connected user terminals under the same switching device SW, the first user terminal STA1 first checks whether the local storage is saved. The inter-station key shared by the second user terminal STA2, if any, directly encrypts the data packet using the inter-station key; if not, the first user terminal STA1 constructs the inter-station key request packet and sends it to the switching device SW;
  • the main contents of the inter-station key request packet include:
  • KN1 field indicates the key advertisement identifier of the first user terminal STA1, the value of which is an integer, and the initial value is a certain value, and the field value is incremented by one or increased by a fixed value every time the inter-station key request is made;
  • MIC1 field indicates a message authentication code whose value is the hash of the other fields in the inter-station key request packet by the first user terminal STA1 using the protocol data key PD in the unicast key shared with the switching device SW.
  • the hash value obtained by the function.
  • the switching device SW performs inter-station key notification on the second user terminal STA2:
  • the switching device SW After receiving the inter-station key request packet sent by the first user terminal STA1, the switching device SW performs the following processing:
  • the main contents of the announcement group include:
  • KN2 field indicates a key advertisement identifier of the second user terminal STA2, the value of which is an integer, and the initial value is a certain value, and the field value is incremented by 1 or added by a fixed value every time the inter-station key is advertised;
  • E 2 field represents key encryption data, which is data encrypted by the switching device SW by using the protocol data key PDK 2 in the unicast key shared by the second user terminal STA2 to the station key STAkey ⁇ ;
  • MIC2 field indicates a message authentication code whose value is passed by the switching device SW using the protocol data key PDK 2 in the unicast key shared with the second user terminal STA2 to the other fields in the inter-station key advertisement packet.
  • the hash value calculated by the hash function.
  • the second user terminal STA2 performs an inter-station key notification response:
  • the second user terminal STA2 After the second user terminal STA2 receives the inter-station key advertisement packet sent by the switching device SW, the following processing is performed:
  • step 3.3 verifying whether the MIC2 field is correct by using the protocol data key PDK 2 in the unicast key shared by the switching device SW, if not, discarding the packet; if correct, performing step 3.3);
  • the main contents of the inter-station key notification response packet include:
  • KN2 field indicates a key announcement identifier of the second user terminal STA2, the value of which is the same as the value of the KN2 field in the received inter-station key advertisement packet;
  • MIC3 field indicates a message authentication code, utilized by the second user terminal STA2 and the switching device SW
  • the protocol data key PDK 2 in the shared unicast key is a hash value calculated by the hash function for other fields outside the field in the inter-station key advertisement response packet.
  • the switching device SW performs inter-station key notification on the first user terminal STA1:
  • the switching device SW After receiving the inter-station key notification response packet sent by the second user terminal STA2, the switching device SW performs the following processing:
  • step 4.1 comparing whether the KN2 field is consistent with the KN2 field value in the inter-station key advertisement packet previously sent to the second user terminal STA2, if not, discarding the packet; if they are consistent, performing step 4.2);
  • an inter-station key advertisement packet is constructed and transmitted to the first user terminal STA1.
  • the main contents of the inter-station key announcement group include:
  • KN1 field indicates a key advertisement identifier of the first user terminal STA1, the value of which is the same as the value of the KN1 field in the inter-station key request packet sent by the first user terminal STA1 received before;
  • MIC4 field indicates a message authentication code whose value is the hashing device SW using the protocol data key PD in the unicast key shared with the first user terminal STA1, and the other fields outside the field in the inter-station key advertisement packet are hashed.
  • the hash value obtained by the function.
  • the first user terminal STA1 performs an inter-station key notification response:
  • step 5.1 comparing whether the value of the KN1 field is consistent with the value of the KN1 field in the previously transmitted inter-station key request packet, if not, discarding the packet; if they are consistent, performing step 5.2); 5.2) verifying whether the MIC4 field is correct by using the protocol data key PD in the unicast key shared by the switching device SW, and if not, discarding the packet; if correct, performing step 5.3);
  • the main contents of the inter-station key notification response packet include:
  • KN1 field indicates a key announcement identifier of the first user terminal STA1, the value of which is the same as the value of the KN1 field in the received inter-station key advertisement packet;
  • MIC5 field indicates a message authentication code by which the first user terminal STA1 uses the protocol data key PD in the unicast key shared with the switching device SW to advertise the other fields outside the field in the inter-station key notification response packet through the hash function. Calculated hash value.
  • the switching device SW After receiving the inter-station key notification response packet sent by the first user terminal STA1, the switching device SW performs: ⁇ :
  • step 6.1 comparing whether the KN1 field is consistent with the value of the KN1 field in the inter-station key advertisement packet previously sent to the first user terminal STA1, if not, discarding the packet; if they are consistent, performing step 6.2);
  • Each user terminal STA will maintain a key advertisement identifier KN, which is an integer, and the initial value is a fixed value.
  • KN key advertisement identifier
  • the value is incremented by 1 or a fixed value is used, and each time the correct inter-station key notification packet is received, the identifier is notified according to the key.
  • the value of the KN field is updated for the value; the switching device SW maintains a key notification identifier KN for all the directly connected user terminals, and when it needs to actively announce the inter-station key for a user terminal, the user terminal
  • the key notification identifier KN is incremented by 1 or added after a fixed value, and each time After receiving the correct inter-station key notification response packet, the value is updated according to the value of the key notification identifier KN field therein.
  • the inter-station key advertisement process of the second user terminal STA2 by the switching device SW is an active notification process
  • the inter-site key notification process of the first user terminal STA1 is a passive notification process.
  • the first user terminal STA1 maintains a key announcement identifier KN1
  • the second user terminal STA2 maintains a key advertisement identifier KN2
  • the switching device SW maintains the confidentiality for the first user terminal STA1 and the second user terminal STA2, respectively.
  • the key announcement identifier KN2 of the second user terminal STA2 is incremented or added to a fixed value to actively initiate an inter-station key advertisement packet to the second user terminal STA2, and the second user terminal STA2 receives the correct inter-station key advertisement packet.
  • the switching device SW receives the correct inter-station key notification response packet sent by the second user terminal STA2, according to which The value of the key notification identifier KN2 field updates the value of the key notification identifier KN2 maintained by itself, and the switching device SW uses the key communication in the inter-station key request packet.
  • the identifier KN1 passively initiates an inter-station key advertisement packet to the first user terminal STA1. After receiving the correct inter-station key advertisement packet, the first user terminal STA1 maintains the self-maintained value according to the value of the key advertisement identifier KN1 field therein.
  • the value of the key notification identifier K 1 is updated.
  • the switching device SW receives the correct inter-station key notification response packet sent by the first user terminal STA1, it maintains the confidentiality according to the value of the key notification identifier KN1 field therein.
  • the value of the key notification identifier KN1 is updated.
  • the entire inter-station key establishment process is completed only if the advertisements of the second user terminal STA2 and the first user terminal STA1 are successful.
  • inter-station key request packet which is sent to the switching device SW, requesting to update or revoke the user terminal STA1 and the user terminal.
  • the process of updating the inter-station key or the process of establishing the inter-station key is the same as the process of establishing the inter-station key.
  • an identification field may be added to each of the above-mentioned packets to distinguish the identification by the switching device SW.
  • the advertisement may be re-initiated by the re-announcement mechanism. If the notification to the second user terminal STA2 does not succeed after the set maximum number of re-advertised times is reached, it is considered that the inter-station key cannot be established for the user terminals STA1 and STA2; if the notification to the second user terminal STA2 is successful However, if the advertisement of the first user terminal STA1 does not succeed after reaching the set maximum number of re-advertised times, it is considered that the inter-station key cannot be established for the user terminals STA1 and STA2, and the second user terminal STA2 needs to be revoked.
  • both the user terminals STA1 and STA2 can initiate an inter-station key request.
  • the inter-station key is bidirectional, the user terminal initiated by the medium access control (MAC, Media Access Control) address may be selected as the key used for data confidential transmission between them.
  • the inter-station key is unidirectional, the user terminal STA1 or STA2 transmits the data packet to the user terminal STA2 or STA1, and uses the inter-station key encryption data established by the inter-station key establishment process initiated by the user terminal STA1 or STA2.
  • the data packet is decrypted using the inter-station key established by the inter-station key establishment procedure initiated by the user terminal STA2 or STA1.
  • the user terminals STA1 and STA2 are all directly connected user terminals of the switching device SW. Before the inter-station key is established, it is assumed that the user terminals STA1 and STA2 respectively establish a secure connection with the switching device SW, that is, respectively.
  • the switching device SW shares a unicast key, as shown in Figure 2 (PD, UDKi) and (PDK 2 , UDK 2 ).
  • the user terminals STA1 and STA2 use the switching device SW to establish the inter-station key by performing the inter-station key establishment process, that is, after performing the message 1-5 in FIG. 2, as shown in FIG.
  • the user terminal communication packets between the STA1 and STA2 can directly use the inter-station line STAke yi ⁇ € key encryption and decryption, the switching device SW to these packets transparently transmitted without encryption and decryption, compared with the conventional technique reduces the switching device
  • the processing burden reduces the data transmission delay.
  • the embodiment of the invention further provides a system for establishing a secure connection between user terminals, the system comprising: sending an inter-station key request packet and an inter-station key notification response packet to the switching device SW, and receiving an inter-station exchange device SW
  • the first user terminal STA1 that secretly communicates the packet and performs secure communication with the second user terminal STA2; receives the inter-station key request packet and transmits the inter-station key advertisement packet to the second user terminal STA2, and transmits the second user terminal STA2 to transmit Inter-station key notification response packet, to the first use
  • the subscriber terminal STA1 transmits an inter-station key advertisement packet, a switching device SW that receives the inter-station key advertisement response packet transmitted by the first user terminal STA1, and an inter-station key advertisement packet transmitted by the receiving switching device SW and transmits the station to the switching device SW.
  • the inter-key advertises a response packet and the second user terminal STA2 that performs secure communication with the first user terminal STA1.
  • the method for establishing an inter-station key between two directly connected user terminals under the same switching device can also be adapted to the following situation:
  • a switching device system wherein the switching device system can be A plurality of switching devices are formed. If some of the switching devices belong to the Layer 2 switching device, and some of the switching devices belong to the Layer 3 switching device, the data exchange route between the two user terminals can be established (1) sending the user terminal and sending the route. The first secure connection between the three Layer 3 switching devices, (2) the secure connection between the adjacent Layer 3 switching devices in the routing route, and (3) the last Layer 3 switching device in the routing route and the receiving user terminal. A secure connection between the two to achieve secure communication between the two user terminals.
  • the method for establishing (1) and (3) can be implemented by using the above-mentioned inter-station key establishment method in the embodiment of the present invention, wherein (1) when the secure connection is established, FIG. 1 and FIG. 2
  • the SW device is operated by the switching device directly connected to STA1, and STA2 is responsible for the first Layer 3 switching device in the sending route; (3)
  • STA1 is responsible for the last Layer 3 switching device in the routing.
  • the method for establishing a secure connection between the secure connection (2), that is, the three-layer switching device is not defined or limited in the embodiment of the present invention.

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
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  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
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Abstract

一种用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法及系统,所述方法包括:1)交换设备接收第一用户终端发送的站间密钥请求分组;2)交换设备产生站间密钥,构造站间密钥通告分组并发送给第二用户终端;3)交换设备接收第二用户终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分组;4)交换设备构造站间密钥通告分组并发送给第一用户终端;5)交换设备接收第一用户终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分组。本发明实施例通过交换设备为其直连两个用户终端之间建立站间密钥来保护用户终端之间用户数据的机密性和完整性。

Description

用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法及系统
本申请要求于 2009 年 12 月 21 日提交中国专利局、 申请号为 200910311944.X、发明名称为"用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法及系统"的中 国专利申请的优先权, 其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本发明涉及网络通信技术领域,具体涉及一种用户终端之间安全连接的建 立方法及系统。
背景技术
有线局域网一般为广播型网络,一个节点发出的数据,其他节点都能收到。 网络上的各个节点共享信道, 这给网络带来了极大的安全隐患。 攻击者只要接 入网絡进行监听, 就可以捕获网絡上所有的数据包, 从而窃取关键信息。
现有国家标准定义的局域网 (LAN, Local Area Network ) 并不提供安全 接入及数据保密方法, 只要用户能接入局域网控制设备, 如局域网交换设备, 就可以访问局域网中的设备或资源。这在早期企业网有线 LAN应用环境下并不 存在明显的安全隐患, 但是随着网络的大规模发展, 用户对信息私密性要求的 不断提高, 有必要实现数据链路层的数据保密。
在有线局域网中, IEEE通过对 IEEE 802.3进行安全增强来实现链路层的 安全。 IEEE 802.1AE为保护以太网提供数据加密协议, 并釆用逐跳加密的安 全措施来实现网络实体之间信息的安全传达。但是, 逐跳加密这种安全措施要 求交换设备对每一个需要转发的数据包都进行解密后再加密再转发,无疑给局 域网中的交换设备带来了巨大的计算负担, 容易引发攻击者对交换设备的攻 击;且数据包从发送方传递到接收方的延时也会增大,降低了网络传输的效率。
在有线局域网中, 同一个交换设备 ( SW , SWitch )下直连用户终端( STA, STAtion )之间往往有大量的通信数据, 这些通信数据的保密传输都会经过该 交换设备。 若通过交换设备的数据包要经过解密再加密后再进行转发, 不但会 增加交换设备的计算负担, 增加网络的延时, 也会大大降低网络的传输效率。 发明内容
为了解决上述背景技术中存在的技术问题,本发明实施例提供了一种用户 终端之间安全连接的建立方法及系统,通过交换设备为其直连的两个用户终端 之间建立站间密钥来保证用户终端之间用户数据的机密性和完整性。
本发明实施例提供了一种用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法,所述方法包 括:
1 ) 交换设备接收第一用户终端发送的站间密钥请求分组;
2 ) 交换设备产生站间密钥, 构造站间密钥通告分组并发送给第二用户终 端;
3 ) 交换设备接收第二用户终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分组;
4 ) 交换设备构造站间密钥通告分组并发送给第一用户终端;
5 ) 交换设备接收第一用户终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分组。
本发明实施例还提供了一种用户终端之间安全连接的建立系统,所述系统 包括: 向交换设备发送站间密钥请求分組和站间密钥通告响应分组、接收交换 设备的站间密钥通告分组并和第二用户终端进行保密通信的第一用户终端;接 收站间密钥请求分组并向第二用户终端发送站间密钥通告分组、接收第二用户 终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分组、 向第一用户终端发送站间密钥通告分组、 接收第一用户终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分组的交换设备以及接收交换设 备发送的站间密钥通告分组并向交换设备发送站间密钥通告响应分组并和第 一用户终端进行保密通信的第二用户终端。
本发明实施例的优点是:本发明实施例所提供的用户终端之间安全连接的 建立方法及系统,是在交换设备与直连用户终端之间通过预分发或其他安全机 制已建立共享的单播密钥基 上,通过交换设备为该交换设备下两直连用户终 端之间建立共享密钥, 即站间密钥 STAkey, 并将该密钥用于彼此之间数据的 通信过程,保证了数据链路层同一交换设备下直连用户终端之间数据传递过程 的机密性, 并使得交换设备对其下的站间通信数据实现透传。 相比传统方法, 减轻了交换设备的计算负担, 提高了网络传输效率。
附图说明
图 1为本发明实施例所提供站间密钥建立方法示意图;
图 2为本发明实施例所提供的用户终端间安全连接建立示意图。
具体实施方式
本发明实施例中定义的交换设备下的直连用户终端是指直接连接在交换 设备某个端口下的用户终端,包括通过网线直接连接到交换设备的用户终端及 通过集线器 (hub ) 等物理层设备连接到交换设备的用户终端。 通过其他设备 连接到交换设备的用户终端不属于交换设备的直连用户终端。
第一用户终端和第二用户终端分别与交换设备已建立安全连接,即已分别 具有共享的单播密钥,本发明实施例可以通过交换设备为第一用户终端和第二 用户终端之间建立共享的站间密钥, 即建立它们之间的安全连接。
本发明实施例中定义的单播密钥包含协议数据密钥 (PDK, Protocol Data Key )和用户数据密钥 ( UDK, User Data Key ) 两部分, 其中 PDK用于保护设 备之间协议数据中密钥数据的机密性及协议数据的完整性, UDK用于保护设 备之间用户数据的机密性和完整性。 在实际应用时, PDK和 UDK的结构可以 根据分组密码算法工作的模式不同而有所变化,用于保护数据机密性和完整性 的密钥可相同, 也可不同。 本发明实施例对单播密钥的建立机制不予定义和限 制。
假设, 在网络中, 交换设备与用户终端之间通过预分发或其他安全机制已 经建立了安全连接, 即已具有共享的单播密钥。 参见图 1和图 2, 本发明实施例 提供了一种用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法及系统,该方法为同一交换设备 下直连用户终端两两之间建立站间密钥。
以交换设备 SW下第一用户终端 STA1和第二用户终端 STA2建立站间密钥 8丁入1¾ 1 为例, 其建立过程是由第一用户终端 STA1发送站间密钥请求给交换 设备 SW, 之后由交换设备 SW生成一个随机数, 作为第一用户终端 STA1和第 二用户终端 STA2的站间密钥 STAkeyu, 并将此站间密钥 STAkeyi_2先后秘密通 告给第二用户终端 STA2和第一用户终端 STA1。 整个过程共包含五个步驟: 第 一用户终端 STA1向交换设备 SW发送站间密钥请求, 请求建立第一用户终端 STA1和第二用户终端 STA2的站间密钥; 交换设备 SW对第二用户终端 STA2进 行站间密钥通告; 第二用户终端 STA2进行站间密钥通告响应; 接着交换设备 SW对第一用户终端 STA1进行站间密钥通告以及第一用户终端 STA1进行站间 密钥通告响应。 其中交换设备 SW对第一用户终端 STA1的通告及第一用户终端 STA1的响应与交换设备 SW对第二用户终端 STA2的通告及第二用户终端 STA2 的响应类似, 仅通告站间密钥所使用的协议数据密钥 PDK不同而已。 交换设备 SW对用户终端 STA1或 STA2的站间密钥通告过程可以是通知用 户终端 STA1或 STA2建立与用户终端 STA2或 STA1之间的站间密钥, 也可以是 通知用户终端 STA1或 STA2更新与用户终端 STA2或 STA1之间的站间密钥, 还 可以是通知用户终端 STA1或 STA2 :销与用户终端 STA2或 STA1之间的站间密 钥。 建立、 更新、 撤销的过程是一样的, 在具体实现时可通过携带一个标识字 段进行区分。
站间密钥建立的具体方案如下:
1 )站间密钥请求:
当第一用户终端 STA1要与第二用户终端 STA2进行保密通信时, 若用户终 端 STA1与用户终端 STA2是同一交换设备 SW下的直连用户终端, 第一用户终 端 STA1首先检查本地是否保存有与第二用户终端 STA2共享的站间密钥, 若 有, 则直接使用站间密钥加密数据包; 若没有, 则第一用户终端 STA1构造站 间密钥请求分组, 发送给交换设备 SW;
站间密钥请求分组的主要内容包括:
K 1 MIC1
其中:
KN1字段: 表示第一用户终端 STA1的密钥通告标识, 其值为一个整数, 初始值为一定值, 在每次站间密钥请求时该字段值加 1或增加一个定值使用;
MIC1字段: 表示消息鉴别码, 其值为第一用户终端 STA1利用与交换设备 SW共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 对站间密钥请求分组中本字段外 的其他字段通过杂凑函数计算得到的杂凑值。
2 ) 交换设备 SW对第二用户终端 STA2进行站间密钥通告:
交换设备 SW收到第一用户终端 STA1发来的站间密钥请求分組后, 进行如 下处理:
2.1 )检查 KN1字段是否单调递增, 若不是, 则丟弃该分组; 若是, 则执 行步骤 2.2 );
2.2 ) 利用与第一用户终端 STA1共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 验证站间密钥请求分组中 MIC1字段的正确性, 若正确, 则执行步骤 2.3 ); 若 不正确, 则丟弃该分组; 2.3 )生成一个随机数作为第一用户终端 STA1和第二用户终端 STA2之间的 站间密钥 STAkey^, 构造站间密钥通告分组, 将其发送给第二用户终端 STA2; 站间密钥通告分组的主要内容包括:
KN2 E7 MIC2
其中:
KN2字段: 表示第二用户终端 STA2的密钥通告标识, 其值为一个整数, 初始值为一定值, 在每次站间密钥通告时该字段值加 1或增加一个定值使用;
E2字段: 表示密钥加密数据, 是交换设备 SW利用与第二用户终端 STA2共 享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK2对站间密钥 STAkey^加密后的数据;
MIC2字段: 表示消息鉴别码, 其值为交换设备 SW利用与第二用户终端 STA2共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK2对站间密钥通告分组中本字段 外的其他字段通过杂凑函数计算得到的杂凑值。
3 ) 第二用户终端 STA2进行站间密钥通告响应:
当第二用户终端 STA2收到交换设备 SW发送的站间密钥通告分组后, 进行 如下处理:
3.1 )检查 KN2字段是否单调递增, 若不是, 则丟弃该分组; 若是, 则执 行步骤 3.2 );
3.2 ) 利用与交换设备 SW共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK2验证 MIC2字段是否正确, 若不正确, 则丟弃该分组; 若正确, 则执行步骤 3.3 );
3.3 ) 利用与交换设备 SW共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK2解密 E2 字段即可得到与第一用户终端 STA1之间的站间密钥 STAkeyw;
3.4 )保存此次的密钥通告标识 KN2字段的值, 并构造站间密钥通告响应 分組, 发送给交换设备 SW。
站间密钥通告响应分组主要内容包括:
KN2 MIC3
其中:
KN2字段: 表示第二用户终端 STA2的密钥通告标识, 其值同收到的站间 密钥通告分组中的 KN2字段的值;
MIC3字段: 表示消息鉴别码, 由第二用户终端 STA2利用与交换设备 SW 共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK2对站间密钥通告响应分组中本字段外 的其他字段通过杂凑函数计算得到的杂凑值。
4 ) 交换设备 SW对第一用户终端 STA1进行站间密钥通告:
交换设备 SW收到第二用户终端 STA2发送的站间密钥通告响应分組后进 行如下处理:
4.1 ) 比较 KN2字段与之前发送给第二用户终端 STA2的站间密钥通告分组 中的 KN2字段值是否一致,若不一致,则丢弃该分组;若一致,则执行步骤 4.2 );
4.2 ) 利用与第二用户终端 STA2共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK2 验证 MIC3字段的正确性, 若不正确, 则丢弃该分组; 若正确, 则保存此次的 密钥通告标识 KN2字段的值, 完成将第一用户终端 STA1与第二用户终端 STA2 之间的站间密钥 STAkeyi_2对笫二用户终端 STA2通告的过程, 并执行步骤 4.3 );
4.3 )根据之前通告给第二用户终端 STA2的站间密钥 STAkeyw, 构造站间 密钥通告分组, 将其发送给第一用户终端 STA1。
站间密钥通告分组的主要内容包括:
KN1 Ei MIC4
其中:
KN1字段: 表示第一用户终端 STA1的密钥通告标识, 其值同之前收到的 第一用户终端 STA1发送的站间密钥请求分组中的 KN1字段的值;
字段: 表示密钥加密数据, 是交换设备 SW利用与第一用户终端 STA1共 享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 对站间密钥 STAkeyw加密后的数据, 其 中站间密钥 STAkeyw同通告给第二用户终端 STA2的站间密钥 STAkey
MIC4字段: 表示消息鉴别码, 其值为交换设备 SW利用与第一用户终端 STA1共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 对站间密钥通告分組中本字段 外的其他字段通过杂凑函数计算得到的杂凑值。
5 ) 第一用户终端 STA1进行站间密钥通告响应:
当第一用户终端 STA1收到交换设备 SW发送的站间密钥通告分組后, 进行 如下处理:
5.1 ) 比较 KN1字段值与之前发送的站间密钥请求分组中的 KN1字段值是 否一致, 若不一致, 则丢弃该分组; 若一致, 则执行步骤 5.2 ); 5.2 ) 利用与交换设备 SW共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 验证 MIC4字段是否正确, 若不正确, 则丢弃该分组; 若正确, 则执行步骤 5.3 );
5.3 ) 利用与交换设备 SW共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 解密 字段即可得到与第二用户终端 STA2之间的站间密钥 STAkeyw;
5.4 )保存此次的密钥通告标识 KN1字段的值, 并构造站间密钥通告响应 分组, 发送给交换设备 SW。
站间密钥通告响应分組主要内容包括:
KN1 MIC5
其中:
KN1字段: 表示第一用户终端 STA1的密钥通告标识, 其值同收到的站间 密钥通告分组中的 KN1字段的值;
MIC5字段: 表示消息鉴别码, 由第一用户终端 STA1利用与交换设备 SW 共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 对站间密钥通告响应分组中本字段外 的其他字段通过杂凑函数计算得到的杂凑值。
6 ) 交换设备 SW收到第一用户终端 STA1发送的站间密钥通告响应分组后 进行: ^下处理:
6.1 ) 比较 KN1字段与之前发送给第一用户终端 STA1的站间密钥通告分組 中的 KN1字段值是否一致,若不一致,则丢弃该分组;若一致,则执行步骤 6.2 );
6.2 ) 利用与第一用户终端 STA1共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 验证 MIC5字段的正确性, 若正确, 则保存此次的密钥通告标识 KN1字段的值, 完成将第一用户终端 STA1与第二用户终端 STA2之间的站间密钥 STAkeyw对 第一用户终端 STA1通告的过程; 若不正确, 则丟弃该分组。
在此, 对上述用户终端 STA的密钥通告标识 KN字段的维护和使用补充解 释如下: 每个用户终端 STA将维护一个密钥通告标识 KN, 其取值为一个整数, 初始值为一个定值, 在每次发起站间密钥请求分组时会主动对该值加 1或增加 一个定值后使用,并在每次收到正确的站间密钥通告分组后会根据其中的密钥 通告标识 KN字段的值对该值进行更新;交换设备 SW为其下所有直连用户终端 分别维护一个密钥通告标识 KN, 当其需要为某用户终端主动通告站间密钥时 会对该用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN的值加 1或增加一个定值后使用,并在每次 收到正确的站间密钥通告响应分組后会根据其中的密钥通告标识 KN字段的值 对该值进行更新。 在上述实施例中, 交换设备 SW对第二用户终端 STA2的站间 密钥通告过程即为主动通告过程 , 对第一用户终端 STA1的站间密钥通告过程 则为被动通告过程。 在上述实施例中, 第一用户终端 STA1维护一个密钥通告 标识 KN1 , 第二用户终端 STA2维护一个密钥通告标识 KN2 , 交换设备 SW分别 为第一用户终端 STA1和第二用户终端 STA2维护密钥通告标识 KN1和密钥通告 标识 KN2; 第一用户终端 STA1对自己维护的密钥通告标识 KN1加 1或增加一个 定值后用于发起站间密钥请求分组, 交换设备 SW对维护的第二用户终端 STA2 的密钥通告标识 KN2加 1或增加一个定值后用于主动向第二用户终端 STA2发 起站间密钥通告分组, 第二用户终端 STA2收到正确的站间密钥通告分组后根 据其中的密钥通告标识 KN2字段的值对自己维护的密钥通告标识 KN2的值进 行更新, 交换设备 SW收到正确的第二用户终端 STA2发送的站间密钥通告响应 分组后根据其中的密钥通告标识 KN2字段的值对自己维护的密钥通告标识 KN2的值进行更新, 交换设备 SW使用站间密钥请求分组中的密钥通告标识 KN1被动地向第一用户终端 STA1发起站间密钥通告分組, 第一用户终端 STA1 收到正确的站间密钥通告分组后会根据其中的密钥通告标识 KN1字段的值对 自己维护的密钥通告标识 K 1的值进行更新, 当交换设备 SW收到正确的第一 用户终端 STA1发送的站间密钥通告响应分组后根据其中的密钥通告标识 KN1 字段的值对自己维护的密钥通告标识 KN1的值进行更新。
交换设备 SW根据第一用户终端 STA1的请求为第一用户终端 STA1和第二 用户终端 STA2建立站间密钥过程中, 需要先完成对第二用户终端 STA2的通 告, 再完成对第一用户终端 STA1的通告。 只有对第二用户终端 STA2和第一用 户终端 STA1的通告都成功才完成整个站间密钥建立过程。
若用户终端 STA1或 STA2需要更新或者撤销与用户终端 STA2或 STA1之间 的站间密钥, 也需要构造站间密钥请求分组, 发送给交换设备 SW, 请求更新 或撤销用户终端 STA1和用户终端 STA2之间的站间密钥 STAkeyi_2。 站间密钥的 更新或招 t销过程和站间密钥的建立过程相同, 在具体实现时, 可通过在上述的 每个分组中增加一个标识字段进行区分, 用于标识通过交换设备 SW完成用户 终端 STA1和用户终端 STA2之间站间密钥的建立、 撤销或者更新过程。 实际实现时, 若对用户终端 STA2和 STA1的通告不成功, 可通过重新通告 机制重新发起通告。 若对第二用户终端 STA2的通告在达到设定的最大重新通 告次数后仍没有取得成功, 则认为无法为用户终端 STA1和 STA2建立站间密 钥; 若对第二用户终端 STA2的通告取得成功, 但对第一用户终端 STA1的通告 在达到设定的最大重新通告次数后仍没有取得成功, 则认为无法为用户终端 STA1和 STA2建立站间密钥,此时需要通知第二用户终端 STA2撤销刚建立的与 第一用户终端 STA1之间的站间密钥, 即交换设备 SW构造站间密钥通告分组给 第二用户终端 STA2, 并且分组中需要设置撤销标识。
在用户终端 STA1和 STA2之间需要保密通信时, 用户终端 STA1和 STA2均 可发起站间密钥请求。 根据本地策略, 若站间密钥是双向的, 可选择由媒体接 入控制 (MAC, Media Access Control )地址大的用户终端发起建立的站间密 钥作为它们之间数据保密传输使用的密钥; 若站间密钥是单向的, 则用户终端 STA1或 STA2发送数据包到用户终端 STA2或 STA1时, 使用用户终端 STA1或 STA2发起的站间密钥建立过程建立的站间密钥加密数据包, 用户终端 STA1或 STA2接收来自用户终端 STA2或 STA1的数据包时, 使用用户终端 STA2或 STA1 发起的站间密钥建立过程建立的站间密钥解密数据包。
如图 2所示, 用户终端 STA1和 STA2均为交换设备 SW的直连用户终端, 在 站间密钥建立之前, 假设用户终端 STA1和 STA2均分别与交换设备 SW建立了 安全连接, 即分别和交换设备 SW共享有单播密钥, 见图 2中的(PD 、 UDKi ) 和( PDK2、 UDK2 )。 用户终端 STA1和 STA2利用交换设备 SW通过站间密钥建 立过程,即执行完图 2中的消息 1-5后,建立起站间密钥,见图 2中的( STAkeyw ), 此时, 用户终端 STA1和 STA2之间的通信数据包就直接使用该站间密钥 STAkeyi^€行加密解密, 交换设备 SW对于这些数据包直接透传, 无需加解密 处理, 相比传统技术降低了交换设备的处理负担, 减小了数据传输时延。
本发明实施例还提供一种用户终端之间安全连接的建立系统,所述系统包 括: 向交换设备 SW发送站间密钥请求分组和站间密钥通告响应分组、 接收交 换设备 SW的站间密钥通告分组并和第二用户终端 STA2进行保密通信的第一 用户终端 STA1 ; 接收站间密钥请求分组并向第二用户终端 STA2发送站间密钥 通告分组、 接收第二用户终端 STA2发送的站间密钥通告响应分组、 向第一用 户终端 STA1发送站间密钥通告分组、 接收第一用户终端 STA1发送的站间密钥 通告响应分组的交换设备 SW以及接收交换设备 SW发送的站间密钥通告分組 并向交换设备 SW发送站间密钥通告响应分组并和第一用户终端 STA1进行保 密通信的第二用户终端 STA2。
上述同一交换设备下两直连用户终端之间的站间密钥建立方法还可以适 应于下述情况: 在局域网中, 当两个用户终端通过交换设备系统进行数据通信 时, 其中交换设备系统可由多台交换设备組成, 若这些交换设备中有的属于二 层交换设备, 有的属于三层交换设备, 此时在两个用户终端数据交换路由中, 可建立( 1 )发送用户终端和发送路由中第一个三层交换设备之间的安全连接, ( 2 )发送路由中相邻三层交换设备之间的安全连接, ( 3 )发送路由中最末一 个三层交换设备和接收用户终端之间的安全连接,从而实现两个用户终端之间 的保密通信。 这三种安全连接中, (1 ) 和(3 ) 的建立方法可以采用本发明实 施例中上述的站间密钥建立方法来实现, 其中 (1 ) 中安全连接建立时, 图 1 和图 2中 SW设备由与 STA1直连的交换设备来担当, STA2由发送路由中第 一个三层交换设备来担当; (3 )中安全连接建立时, 图 1和图 2中 SW设备由 与 STA2直连的交换设备来担当, STA1 由发送路由中最末一个三层交换设备 来担当。 对于安全连接 ( 2 ) 即三层交换设备之间的安全连接建立方法本发明 实施例不予定义和限制。

Claims

权 利 要 求
1、 一种用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法, 其特征在于, 所述方法包括:
1 ) 交换设备接收第一用户终端发送的站间密钥请求分组;
2 ) 交换设备产生站间密钥, 构造站间密钥通告分组并发送给第二用户终 端;
3 ) 交换设备接收第二用户终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分组;
4 ) 交换设备构造站间密钥通告分组并发送给第一用户终端;
5 ) 交换设备接收第一用户终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分组。
2、根据权利要求 1所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法,其特征在于, 所述方法还包括:
当第一用户终端要与第二用户终端进行保密通信时,若第一用户终端与第 二用户终端是同一交换设备下的直连用户终端,则第一用户终端首先检查本地 是否保存有与第二用户终端共享的站间密钥, 若有, 则第一用户终端使用此站 间密钥加密数据包; 若没有, 则第一用户终端构造站间密钥请求分组, 发送给 交换设备; 所述站间密钥请求分组包括: 第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1 字段以及消息鉴別码 MIC1字段。
3、根据权利要求 2所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法,其特征在于: 所述第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1的值为一个整数, 初始值为一定 值, 在每次站间密钥请求时该字段值加 1或增加一个定值使用;
所述消息鉴别码 MIC1的值为第一用户终端利用与交换设备共享的单播密 钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 对站间密钥请求分组中本字段外的其他字段通过杂 凑函数计算得到的杂凑值。
4、根据权利要求 3所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法,其特征在于, 所述交换设备产生站间密钥,构造站间密钥通告分組并发送给第二用户终端包 括:
交换设备检查第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段;
如杲所述第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段单调递增,则利用与第一 用户终端共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK^ 证站间密钥请求分组中消 息鉴别码 MIC 1字段的正确性; 如果所述消息鉴别码 MIC1字段正确, 则生成一个随机数作为第一用户终 端和第二用户终端之间的站间密钥 STAkey^,构造站间密钥通告分组并将其发 送给第二用户终端; 所述站间密钥通告分組包括: 第二用户终端 STA2的密钥 通告标识 KN2字段、 密钥加密数据 E2字段以及消息鉴别码 MIC2字段。
5、根据权利要求 4所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法,其特征在于: 所述第二用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN2的值为一个整数, 初始值为一定 值, 在每次站间密钥通告时该字段值加 1或增加一个定值使用;
所述密钥加密数据 E2是交换设备利用与第二用户终端共享的单播密钥中 的协议数据密钥 PDK2对站间密钥 STAkeyi^m密后的数据;
所述消息鉴别码 MIC2的值为交换设备利用与第二用户终端共享的单播密 钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK2对站间密钥通告分組中本字段外的其他字段通过杂 凑函数计算得到的杂凑值。
6、根据权利要求 5所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法,其特征在于, 所述方法还包括:
第二用户终端收到交换设备发送的站间密钥通告分組后,检查所述第二用 户终端的密钥通告标识 KN2字段;
如果所述第二用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN2字段单调递增,则利用与交换 设备共享的单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK2验证消息鉴别码 MIC2字段的正 确性;
如果所述消息鉴别码 MIC2字段正确, 则利用与交换设备共享的单播密钥 中的协议数据密钥 PDK2解密密钥加密数据 E2字段, 得到与第一用户终端之间 的站间密钥 STAkey1-2;
保存此次的第二用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN2字段的值,并构造站间密钥 通告响应分组, 发送给交换设备; 所述站间密钥通告响应分組包括: 所述第二 用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN2字段和消息鉴别码 MIC3字段。
7、根据权利要求 6所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法,其特征在于: 所述站间密钥通告响应分组中的第二用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN2字段 的值与第二用户终端收到的站间密钥通告分组中的第二用户终端的密钥通告 标识 KN2字段的值相同; 所述消息鉴别码 MIC3的值是由第二用户终端利用与交换设备共享的单播 密钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK2对站间密钥通告响应分组中本字段外的其他字段 通过杂凑函数计算得到的杂凑值。
8、根据权利要求 7所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法,其特征在于, 所述交换设备构造站间密钥通告分组并发送给第一用户终端包括:
交换设备收到第二用户终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分组后,比较所述站 间密钥通告响应分组中的第二用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN2字段的值与之前 发送给第二用户终端的站间密钥通告分组中的第二用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN2字段的值;
如果两个密钥通告标识 KN2字段的值一致,则利用与第二用户终端共享的 单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PDK2验证所述消息鉴別码 MIC3字段; 若所述消息 鉴别码 MIC3字段正确, 则保存此次的密钥通告标识 KN2字段的值;
根据之前通告给第二用户终端的站间密钥 STAkeyi_2,构造站间密钥通告分 組, 并将其发送给第一用户终端; 所述站间密钥通告分组包括: 所述第一用户 终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段、 密钥加密数据 字段以及消息鉴别码 MIC4字 段。
9、根据权利要求 8所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法,其特征在于: 所述站间密钥通告分组中第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段的值与 之前收到的第一用户终端 STA1发送的站间密钥请求分组中的第一用户终端的 密钥通告标识 KN1字段的值相同;
所述密钥加密数据 是交换设备利用与第一用户终端共享的单播密钥中 的协议数据密钥 PD 对站间密钥 STAkey^加密后的数据;
所述消息鉴别码 MIC4的值为交换设备利用与第一用户终端共享的单播密 钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 对站间密钥通告分组中本字段外的其他字段通过杂 凑函数计算得到的杂凑值。
10、 根据权利要求 9所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法, 其特征在 于, 所述方法还包括:
当第一用户终端收到交换设备发送的站间密钥通告分组后,比较站间密钥 通告分组中的第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段的值与之前发送的站间 密钥请求分组中的第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段的值; 如果两个密钥通告标识 KN1字段的值一致,则利用与交换设备共享的单播 密钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 验证消息鉴别码 MIC4字段;
若所述消息鉴别码 MIC4字段正确, 则利用与交换设备共享的单播密钥中 的协议数据密钥 PD 解密密钥加密数据 字段, 得到与第二用户终端之间的 站间密钥 STAkey1-2;
保存此次的第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段的值,并构造站间密钥 通告响应分组, 发送给交换设备; 所述站间密钥通告响应分组包括: 第一用户 终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段以及消息鉴别码 MIC5字段。
11、根据权利要求 10所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法, 其特征在 于:
所述站间密钥通告响应分组中的第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段 的值与第一用户终端收到的站间密钥通告分组中的第一用户终端的密钥通告 标识 KN1字段的值相同;
消息鉴别码 MIC5的值为第一用户终端利用与交换设备共享的单播密钥中 的协议数据密钥 PD 对站间密钥通告响应分组中本字段外的其他字段通过杂 凑函数计算得到的杂凑值。
12、根据权利要求 11所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法, 其特征在 于, 所述方法还包括:
当交换设备收到第一用户终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分组后,比较所述 站间密钥通告响应分组中的第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段与之前发 送给第一用户终端的站间密钥通告分组中的第一用户终端的密钥通告标识 KN1字段值;
如果两个密钥通告标识 KN1字段的值一致,则利用与第一用户终端共享的 单播密钥中的协议数据密钥 PD 验证消息鉴别码 MIC5字段;
若所述消息鉴别码 MIC5字段正确 , 则保存此次的密钥通告标识 KN1字段 的值。
13、 根据权利要求 1至 12任一权利要求所述的用户终端之间安全连接的建 立方法, 其特征在于, 所述方法还包括: 当第一用户终端需要更新或者撤销与第二用户终端之间的站间密钥时,构 造站间密钥请求分组, 发送给交换设备, 以请求更新或撤销第一用户终端和第 二用户终端之间的站间密钥 STAkeyw; 或者
当第二用户终端需要更新或者撤销与第一用户终端之间的站间密钥时,构 造站间密钥请求分组, 发送给交换设备, 以请求更新或撤销第一用户终端和第 二用户终端之间的站间密钥 STAkeyi_2
14、 一种用户终端之间安全连接的建立系统, 其特征在于: 所述同一交换 设备下直连用户终端之间安全连接的建立系统包括向交换设备发送站间密钥 请求分组和站间密钥通告响应分组、接收交换设备的站间密钥通告分组并和第 二用户终端进行保密通信的第一用户终端;接收站间密钥请求分组并向第二用 户终端发送站间密钥通告分组、接收第二用户终端发送的站间密钥通告响应分 組、 向第一用户终端发送站间密钥通告分組、接收第一用户终端发送的站间密 钥通告响应分组的交换设备以及接收交换设备发送的站间密钥通告分组并向 交换设备发送站间密钥通告响应分组并和第一用户终端进行保密通信的第二 用户终端。
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