WO2010007216A1

WO2010007216A1 - Communication method and system for route secured control

Info

Publication number: WO2010007216A1
Application number: PCT/FR2008/001025
Authority: WO
Inventors: Armand Pierre Bohe; Patrice Cortial; Regis Degouge; Jean-Luc Halle
Original assignee: Siemens Transportation Systems Sas
Priority date: 2008-07-14
Filing date: 2008-07-14
Publication date: 2010-01-21
Also published as: US20110118902A1; KR20110044202A; EP2300301B1; TW201009760A; CA2730740A1; BRPI0822990B1; HUE033175T2; EP2300301A1; BRPI0822990A2; ES2637798T3; CN102089198A

Abstract

The invention relates to a communication system and method for the secured control of a route followed by a vehicle running in the approach area of a moving area, wherein: the moving area is preceded by a closing signalling provided on the ground and adapted for informing the vehicle to stop; a safety timing is determined by a ground control unit for ensuring that the vehicle stops before entering the moving area; in parallel with the closing signalling, an information request from the ground control unit is transmitted to a control safety unit onboard the vehicle; the onboard control safety unit or an associated evaluation module evaluates the braking capacity of the vehicle and encodes the same (e.g. binary encoding) into an information requested by the ground control unit and then fed back to the ground control unit; depending on the information state, the ground control unit minimises the safety timing or even cancels the same completely.

Description

Method and communication system for secure route control

The present invention relates to a method and a communication system for secure route control according to the preamble of claims 1 and 8.

The so-called secure route control is aimed in particular at public transport vehicles moving there such as a rail transport unit, a metro, a tramway, a trolley, a bus, etc. The invention is also adapted to a type of vehicle whose guidance can be carried out completely independently of a driver in the vehicle. This is the case, for example, of a vehicle managed by an automatic guidance system on a route provided with an automatic (rail) control system for guidance to a signaling such as the standard type CBTC (= "Communication-Based Train"). Control "). By extension however without restriction on this type of vehicle, the term "train" may be commonly used in the rest of the document, without however omitting all types of vehicles listed above.

Conventionally in a railway signaling, a logic of secure command of emergency destruction of route, allows outside the nominal operating modes to destroy a route while preserving the security of the system, a logic of secure control of the so-called destructive train Permitted Route Emergency This logic is based on a static definition of parameters necessary for its proper functioning. These parameters are dimensioned to be compatible with the worst case of trains running on a so-called "maneuver" zone, on which risks of collisions are to be taken into account, of needle maneuvering under the train, therefore to be rendered not circulable. Currently, a method of secure control of the route traveled by a vehicle traveling on an approach zone of a maneuvering area is known, for which: - the maneuvering area is preceded by a closure signal placed on the ground ( stop lamps at the junction of the approach zone and the maneuvering area) and adapted to inform the vehicle of stopping, - a fixed safety delay is sufficiently dimensioned (sufficiently long in terms of duration approach) by a ground control unit to ensure a stop of the vehicle before crossing over the maneuvering area.

The safe delay is chosen so long, so that the worst case (collision, derailment) is avoided regardless of the type or approach characteristics of the vehicle, even if it inevitably would not be able to stop at a threshold limit of the approach area. In other words, this fixed delay is very long, while the safety technology of trains is improved over the years. This causes long train stops and therefore blocks traffic excessively.

The principle of the above-mentioned control logic is thus based on conventional signaling for which the security of a manual "destruction" of the route (maneuvering zone to be destroyed in order to avoid its crossing) is based on the safe timing and possibly on a piece of information. the presence of a train on the approach zone associated with a stop signal (stop lights, power supply circuit breaker, etc.). The route is destroyed in a possible sequence according to which: 1 - upon receipt of a (remote) command to destroy the route from the ground control unit, the ground stop signal is closed;

2 - the safe delay is initialized and 1 'route (maneuvering area) is destroyed after the flow thereof.

The principle of this logic is that when closing the stop signal, the driver or an on-board automatic control approaching this signal, must request the braking system to stop the train and do its best to respect the signal .

At the end of the safe delay, two cases are possible: 1 - the train has succeeded in stopping upstream of the signal and can not cross the signal (respect of the closed signal). The destruction of the route (maneuvering area) can then be done safely. 2 - The train could not stop before the signal but it is then protected from a collision or derailment on the maneuvering area, either by a lock of a needle that locks the latter and prevents any other train traveling in the same maneuvering area, or because the train has completely passed the maneuvering area and is no longer involved in the destruction of the route.

The sizing of the safe delay ensures that a train approaching the signal that closes in front of it will be stopped after the expiration of said time delay. This dimensioning, to guarantee the safety of the function, will take into account the longest downtime of the different types of trains running on this zone at the maximum speed allowed (time depending on the potential energy and maximum kinetics of a approaching train and its braking capacity). For these reasons, an object of the present invention is then to reduce the time required for the emergency destruction of a route in a maneuvering zone while guaranteeing the security character.

An advantageous solution in the form of a method as well as in the form of a system is thus proposed through independent claims 1 and 8.

More precisely, a method of secure control of the route traveled by a vehicle traveling on an approach zone of a maneuvering zone is proposed, for which:

- the maneuvering area is preceded by a closure signal placed on the ground and adapted to inform the vehicle to stop,

- a safe time delay is dimensioned by a ground control unit to ensure a stop of the vehicle before crossing over the maneuvering area,

in parallel with the closing signaling, an information request from the ground control unit is transmitted to a security control unit on board the vehicle,

the onboard safety control unit or an associated evaluation module evaluates the braking capacity of the vehicle on the basis of an energy balance linked to the kinetics of the vehicle and the code (binary for example) in a required information. by the ground control unit and then transmitted back to the ground control unit,

- according to an information state, the ground control unit minimizes the safe delay, or cancels it completely if the state of the information ensures a clear state of permissive of stopping the vehicle outside the maneuvering area.

An embodiment of the invention thus described therefore provides that, following an emergency manual control of the destruction of the route emanating from a closing signaling or from a ground control unit, dynamic parameters of the train are taken into account. , or even transmitted between the train and the ground, in particular the parameters related to the determination of a binary codable physical stopping distance (in the required information) in order to be able to compare it to an acceptable stopping distance or a binary decision module (at the ground control unit). If the binary coded distance is less than the acceptable distance, the safe delay can even be canceled completely.

Linear coding can thus also be envisaged so as to transmit more gradual signals such as metric distances that in any case lead to an evaluation of whether the initial security delay can be reduced or even canceled. This aspect thus makes it possible to refine the adjustment of the security delay in order to reduce it.

The coding can also be secured (for example by means of a redundancy stop distance calculation) and encrypted in order to more securely protect the information exchange between the train and the ground and thus to avoid a reduction in the safe delay. in case the information related to the energy balance was calculated incorrectly or transmitted by mistake or in bad omens.

A set of subclaims also has advantages of the invention.

In order to describe the invention, in particular in its several technical aspects and their advantages, examples of realization and application are provided using the figures described:

Figure 1 Communication system for safe route control.

Figure 2 Communication system for secure route control adapted to a CBTC type automation.

Figure 1 presents a communication system for the secure control of the route traveled by a vehicle A traveling on an approach zone ZA of a maneuvering zone.

ZM for which: - the maneuvering area is preceded by a closing signal D, C, F arranged on the ground and adapted to inform the vehicle to stop,

a USOL ground control unit comprises a safe time delay TS being sized to guarantee a stopping of the vehicle before its crossing over the maneuvering zone,

in parallel with the closing signaling D, C, F, an information request RI coming from the ground control unit is transmitted to a security control unit USEMB embedded in the vehicle, preferably by an air communication means ,

the on-board secure control unit USEMB comprises (or is connected to) an evaluation module ME of the braking capacity of the vehicle on the basis of an energy balance linked to the kinetics of the vehicle, an on-board decoding module of the information request RI controls a module (binary) MCB of the required information IR back by the ground control unit USOL, then transmitted back to the ground control unit USOL, - depending on the (binary) state of the required IR information related to the energy balance, the ground control unit includes a decision module and redefinition of the safe timing, to minimize it or even cancel it.

Structurally, FIG. 1 is an exemplary embodiment adapted to a communication system in the context of a conventional ground signaling comprising a stop light F (visible by a train driver on the approach zone ZA) controlled by the USOL ground control unit via a control signal C. The USOL ground control unit is itself controlled by an operator F who wishes to activate a destruction of route (or movement) possible on the maneuvering zone ZM via a destruction signal D sent to the USOL ground control unit. In this situation, the ground control unit USOL activates the closing of the stop light F, in which case the information request RI is also sent from the ground control unit USOL to the onboard security control unit USEMB. . At this stage, the safe delay TS is still selected by default at its maximum value depending on the type of train / worst-case situation for a required braking. The activation of the sending of the information request RI is carried out after identification of the approach of the train on the approach zone ZA, taking into account a sufficiently high safety distance corresponding to the maximum value of delay safe TS. The driver or an onboard automatism then take immediate steps to stop the train.

The ground control unit USOL is then in standby mode of a feedback (information required RI) following the information request RI previously initiated.

Several cases are then possible: 1 ^st case: train A responds "positively". Upon receipt of the RI information request, a safety calculator linked to the USEMB on-board safety control unit of the train A, from its location evaluates its energy and compares it with its braking capacity. If train A has the ability to stop on approach zone ZA without crossing the ZM maneuvering zone, the safety computer responds positively to the USOL ground control unit by sending the required information IR, that is to say, for example a 0-1 binary type message that can be accompanied by its operating range and whether or not the reduction or cancellation of the safe delay TS.

Upon receipt of the required IR information, the USOL ground control unit checks the 0/1 binary signal, that the driving range corresponds to the route to be destroyed, and that train A ensures compliance with of the stop signal F. Thus according to the invention, the ground control unit USOL then allows the destruction device D route to immediately destroy the route (not taking into account the safe time delay TS).

The operator F is then informed of the destruction of the route via a signal RES issued by the USOL ground control unit.

The exchanges of information request RI and required information IR between the ground control unit USOL and the security unit USEMB onboard control are ideally by air E, for example via radio frequency.

2 ^eaB case train A responds "negatively" to the request or does not respond (failure related to the train or train not equipped with an automatism or security unit of USEMB onboard control adapted):

The route destruction device D waits for the end of the safe timeout TS (default maximum) for physically destroy the route (= travel on the ZM maneuvering area).

The operator F is informed of the destruction of the route via the signal RES.

Figure 2 presents a communication system for secure route control adapted to an H_CBTC type CBTC automation interface between the USOL ground control unit and the USEMB onboard safety control unit.

The exchanges of information request RI and information required IR as in Figure 1 are then performed here between the onboard security unit USEMB and H_CBTC automation that will itself control the unit. USOL ground control system to activate a TS safe delay reduction by means of a DI destruction signal. Conversely, an information request related to a request for the destruction of an operator or of the USOL ground control unit will be directed to the USEMB on-board safety control unit of the train via the H_CBTC operator via the destruction signal D, then an "extended" destruction signal D_CBTC from the ground control unit USOL to the H_CBTC automation itself.

In this example, the H_CBTC automation has the role of a train driver knowing all the dynamic parameters of the train and can also have data from any source of information related to traffic on various areas, to the signaling, etc. This is therefore very advantageous in the case of dynamic management of driverless vehicle traffic, in particular allowing more tightly controlled walking areas. As in Figure 1, the F operator commands a manual route destruction to the USOL ground control unit.

The ground control unit USOL immediately closes the stop signal F associated with the route, activates the manual route destruction device via the destruction signal D (initialization of the safe delay TS at its maximum value) and sends to the ground based H_CBTC automation equipment a current route destruction information via the D_CBTC extended signal to allow the sending of an RI information request to the USEMB secure control unit.

The driver, if present, or the on-board safe unit USEMB immediately take steps to stop the train A. The H_CBTC on the ground then identifies the train A approaching the stop signal F, and by a ground / train link sends the information request RI which includes a request to stop the train A.

The H_CBTC automation equipment on the ground is then placed at-. attempts an IR response to the RI information request:

^1st case: train A responds "positively".

On receipt of the RI information request, the security unit (also compatibly automated according to the CBTC type) of the USEMB on-board control of the train A, from its location evaluates its energy and compares it with its braking capacity. .

If the train A has the capacity to stop, the onboard safety control unit USEMB responds positively to the automation equipment H_CBTC by returning to it the required information IR, that is to say for example a binary type message 0-1 that can be accompanied by its operating range and whether or not the reduction or cancellation of the safe delay TS.

On receipt of the message, the ground automation equipment H__CBTC verifies that the walking area corresponds to the route to be destroyed and that the A train guarantees the respect of the stop signal F.

The H_CBTC automation equipment on the ground informs the ground control unit USOL of the respect (or otherwise) of the signal F by the approaching train A by means of a binary destruction signal DI.

According to the permissive state of the binary destruction signal DI, the ground control unit USOL then authorizes the destruction device D to immediately destroy the route (not taken into account, canceling the safe delay TS ).

The operator F is informed of the destruction of the route by the USOL ground control unit.

2 case the train A responds "negatively" to the request for information RI or does not answer (failure related to the train or train not equipped with an automatism or unit of security on board USEMB adapted).

The USOL ground control unit, in standby mode, waits until the end of the safe TS timer to destroy the route. Thus, there is no risk of reducing the TS security delay "prematurely".

The operator F is then informed of the non-destruction of the route by the USOL ground control unit.

The two communication systems according to FIGS. 1 and 2 thus make it possible to implement the security control method previously proposed in the figures.

In summary :

- depending on the state of the required IR information, the USOL ground control unit cancels the safe timer TS if an ideally binary state of the required information IR ensures a stop of the train A without crossing the ZM maneuvering zone. This is therefore a major advantage in terms of time savings for traffic related to maneuvers or other service actions without a particular public transport function.

according to the state of the required information IR, the on-board safe control unit USEMB retransmits a stop safety command, ideally accompanied by a walking range to the USOL ground control unit. This aerial transmission is thus dynamically performed while remaining safe between the train A and the ground.

- The USOL ground control unit and the USEMB onboard safe control unit can communicate via an H_CBTC ground automation system which at least detects and orders a movement of the vehicle on the approach zone ZA and which communicates by interfacing with signaling equipment (on the ground). This therefore makes the method according to the invention flexibly adaptable to trains equipped with automated means for which the communication and control technologies are increasingly efficient through scalable tools. In contrast, the invention is also suitable for trains not equipped with such automation, which makes it universally applicable for existing traffic networks and destined to be updated or modernized.

- This method is applicable for any type of public transport vehicle equipped with a radio-frequency transmitter / receiver and avoids any physical communication links of the rail or catenary type between the train and the ground. This is permitted because the USUB on-board security unit communicates with USOL, H_CBTC ground equipment by means of an E air link. It is therefore desirable to be able to perform a secure link at all times, whereas a chassis vehicle is guided by no or at least one, two or three rails. the information request RI and the required information IR can be coded binary in order to simplify the exchange of information related to the invention, but also to be compatible with ground activation mechanisms, such as a needle in the maneuvering zone, once the securing on this zone is ensured in accordance with the invention.

Claims

claims

1. Method of secure control of the route traveled by a vehicle (A) traveling on an approach zone (ZA) of a maneuvering zone (ZM), for which:

- the maneuvering area is preceded by a closing signal (D, C, F) arranged on the ground and adapted to inform the vehicle to stop,

- A safe delay (TS) is dimensioned by a ground control unit (USOL) to ensure a stop of the vehicle before its crossing over the maneuvering area, characterized in that

in parallel with the closing signaling (D, C, F) an information request (RI) from the ground control unit is transmitted to a security control unit (USEMB) on board the vehicle,

the onboard safe control unit evaluates the braking capacity of the vehicle on the basis of an energy balance linked to the kinetics of the vehicle and codes it into a required information (IR) by the ground control unit, and then transmitted back to the ground control unit,

- according to a state of the required information related to the energy balance, the ground control unit minimizes the safe delay.

2. Method according to claim 1, wherein according to the state of the information required, the ground control unit cancels the safe delay if this state, ideally binary, ensures a stop of the train without crossing the maneuvering area.

3. Method according to one of claims 1 to 2, for which according to the state of the information required, the unit On-board control safe transmits a stop safety command accompanied by a walking range to the ground control unit.

4. Method according to claim 3, for which the ground control unit and the onboard safety control unit communicate via a ground automation (H_CBTC) which at least detects and orders a movement of the vehicle on the approach zone (ZA) and communicates by interfacing with signaling equipment.

5. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the vehicle is guided by at least one rail.

6. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the onboard security control unit communicates with equipment on the ground by means of an overhead link (E).

7. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the information request (RI) and the required information (IR) are binary coded.

8. A communication system for the secure control of a route traveled by a vehicle traveling on an approach zone (ZA) of a maneuvering zone (ZM) for which:

- A ground control unit (USOL) includes a safe time delay (TS) being dimensioned to ensure a stop of the vehicle before crossing over the maneuvering area, characterized in that

the on-board safety control unit comprises an evaluation module (ME) of the braking capacity of the vehicle on the basis of an energy balance linked to the kinetics of the vehicle, an on-board decoding module of the request for information (RI) which controls a coding module (MCB) of a required information (IR) by the ground control unit, then transmitted back to the ground control unit, - according to a state of the Required information (IR) related to the energy balance, the ground control unit includes a redefinition module of the safe timing, aiming to minimize it or even cancel it.

System according to claim 8, for which the ground control unit and the onboard safety control unit are connected by a ground automation (H_CBTC) which at least detects and orders a movement of the vehicle on the approach zone (ZA ) and which communicates by interfacing with signaling equipment.