WO2006090476A1 - ワイヤレス認証方法及びワイヤレス認証システム - Google Patents
ワイヤレス認証方法及びワイヤレス認証システム Download PDFInfo
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- WO2006090476A1 WO2006090476A1 PCT/JP2005/003212 JP2005003212W WO2006090476A1 WO 2006090476 A1 WO2006090476 A1 WO 2006090476A1 JP 2005003212 W JP2005003212 W JP 2005003212W WO 2006090476 A1 WO2006090476 A1 WO 2006090476A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- communication device
- identification information
- signal
- certificate authority
- authentication
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/2018—Central base unlocks or authorises unlocking
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/25—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using biometry
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/25—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using biometry
- B60R25/252—Fingerprint recognition
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
- G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
- G07C9/26—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition using a biometric sensor integrated in the pass
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0861—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R2325/00—Indexing scheme relating to vehicle anti-theft devices
- B60R2325/20—Communication devices for vehicle anti-theft devices
- B60R2325/205—Mobile phones
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
- G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/30—Compression, e.g. Merkle-Damgard construction
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/84—Vehicles
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a wireless authentication method and a wireless authentication system in which a key side device and a device side device mutually authenticate with a radio signal.
- a mobile communication terminal having a communication function such as a mobile phone is used as an authentication device for personal authentication, and in order to give people peace of mind in the coming ubiquitous society, Communication terminals must be unique.
- a keyless entry such as a car keyless entry as shown in Fig. 1 does not use a key (wireless) using radio waves. It is assumed that the door lock is locked or unlocked.
- the user carries a portable device 2 corresponding to the key of the automobile 1 and uses the portable device 2 to activate the door unlocking control device 10 of the automobile 1 by a wireless signal. Control and operate door lock locking and unlocking.
- the portable device 2 is stored in a predetermined ID memory 2a.
- the radio frequency is modulated by the ID stored in the memory 2a by the radio modulator 2b using the specified modulation method, and the power is amplified by the transmitter 2c before being transmitted.
- An unlocking control device 10 is provided on the side of the automobile 1 that is a controlled device.
- the unlocking control device 10 is also incorporated in the same ID force memory 10a as the same key 2 side.
- the wireless signal is received by the receiver 10b from the portable device 2 and converted into a baseband signal.
- the demodulator 10c demodulates the ID transmitted by the demodulation method corresponding to the modulation method on the key 2 side.
- the comparator 10d determines whether the demodulated ID matches the ID stored in the memory 10a. As a result of the comparison, if the ID matches the ID stored in the memory 10a in the door unlock control device 10, a release command signal is sent to the door unlock control device 10e, and the door lock can be unlocked.
- ID is transmitted wirelessly, authentication verification is performed by the controlled device, and the verification result is verified.
- the wireless authentication system that remotely controls the door unlocking device 10e of the automobile, which is a controlled device, owns the portable device 2 corresponding to the key and regards the person as a legitimate user. It performs security operations.
- Such unauthorized operation by a third party is not limited to automobile door locks, but can be applied to controlled devices such as home door locks, cameras, PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants), personal computers, and mobile phones.
- controlled devices such as home door locks, cameras, PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants), personal computers, and mobile phones.
- portable devices that are remotely monitored and operated need to be prevented. Therefore, security must be ensured in the same way when these devices are remotely monitored and operated wirelessly.
- Patent Document 1 the inventors of the present application, based on the previous application (Patent Document 1), when the user, such as a device, a portable communication terminal, a personal computer, or the like to be operated by the original user is separated by a predetermined distance, The invention of the system which makes use of this apparatus impossible is proposed.
- the invention described in Patent Document 1 employs a wearable key possessed by the user separately from the device to be operated by the user.
- the device to be operated and the wearable key communicate bi-directionally, both have a unique identification ID, and both communicate with each other at regular intervals to confirm each other.
- Identification of both ID encryption technology is used for ID communication, and the encryption is changed every time, and it is extremely difficult to decipher. Therefore, as long as the wearable key is held, the device that the original user should operate can be prevented from being used by others.
- a clone device is another device having the same function as the wireless authentication function (including ID) of a portable device owned by a legitimate user.
- a malicious third party uses this clone device. As a result, it is improperly used as a legitimate user. In this case, since a legitimate user has a legitimate portable device, the clone device cannot be used until it is illegally used, and unauthorized use by the clone device cannot be prevented.
- the inventors of the present application have further disclosed a wireless authentication method and a wireless authentication method capable of preventing unauthorized use by impersonation of a third party or unauthorized use by a clone device in another earlier application.
- Present an invention related to a wireless authentication system Patent Document 2.
- the invention of this earlier application (hereinafter simply referred to as the prior application invention) is characterized in that it comprises a certificate authority 5 as shown in FIG.
- the wireless authentication system shown in Fig. 2 assumes that the device that can remove the use restriction and the use restriction wirelessly with respect to the door unlock control device 10 of the controlled vehicle 1 is a mobile communication terminal. .
- the use restriction for the door unlocking control device 10 and the portable communication terminal 3 capable of releasing the use restriction
- the wearable key unit 4 capable of removing the use restriction and the use restriction for the portable communication terminal 3, and Consists of a certificate authority 5.
- the certificate authority 5 can communicate with the mobile communication terminal 3 and the door unlocking control device 10 arbitrarily using communication methods CSI and CS2, respectively.
- the mobile communication terminal 3 is a mobile phone terminal
- the mobile communication terminal 3 is connected to the certificate authority 5 via the mobile phone line CS1
- the door unlocking control device 10 is also connected to the certificate authority 5 via the communication line CS2 such as PHS. Connecting.
- the door unlock control device 10 is a non-moving device such as a door lock device at home, it can also be connected to the certificate authority 5 by wire.
- the main role of the certificate authority 5 is to associate the mobile communication terminal 3 with the wearable key unit 4, and further associate the door unlock control device 10 with the mobile communication terminal 3 so that they can be used. It is. Furthermore, when the door unlocking control device 10 is in a state where the use restriction is released by the mobile communication terminal 3, communication is performed with the certification authority 5 for confirmation, and the door unlocking control device 10 is released. It also has a role to give authentication of whether or not it is okay.
- Wireless authentication is performed between the wearable key unit 4 and the mobile communication terminal 3,
- the use restriction of the mobile communication terminal 3 is released (step S 1).
- the mobile communication terminal 3 and the door unlocking control device 10 as the controlled device further perform wireless authentication (step S2).
- the authentication result is sent from each of the mobile communication terminal 3 and the door unlocking control device 10 to the certification authority 5 (step S3 , S4).
- the certificate authority D registers the IDs in association with each other. Therefore, the authentication result from the mobile communication terminal 3 and the door unlocking control device 10 is confirmed, and if the ID is linked, the authentication result is judged to be valid. Then, the unlocking control signal is sent to the door unlock control device 10 of the automobile 1 that is the controlled device, and the door unlock control device 10 receives the signal to release the use restriction and unlock the door lock. To do.
- Patent Document 1 Japanese Patent No. 2931276
- Patent Document 2 PCT / JP2004 / 14747
- the authentication method in the previous application is basically mutual authentication between devices, and does not include personal information for operating the devices.
- the invention presented in the previous application is insufficient as a personal authentication system in a strict sense.
- an object of the present invention is to provide personal characteristic information that can uniquely identify an individual as personal information and a wireless authentication system.
- a wireless authentication method that achieves the above-mentioned object is, as a first aspect, a first communication device and a second communication device that perform bidirectional communication with each other over a radio line, and the first communication device.
- a controlled device whose use restriction release is controlled by the communication device, and the first communication device.
- a certificate authority that performs two-way communication with the controlled device via a wireless line, and the certificate authority includes each of the first communication device, the second communication device, and the controlled device.
- the identification ID and personal identification information of the user used by the first communication device are stored corresponding to the identification ID.
- the first communication device determines that the transmission signal level from the second communication device is equal to or higher than a predetermined value, and provides identification information for identifying the second communication device from the second communication device.
- the received identification information is collated with the identification information stored in the internal storage means of the first communication device, a first authentication process is performed for the second communication device, and the first
- the communication device notifies the remote certificate authority of the authentication result including the identification information.
- the identification information included in the authentication result is compared with the identification information stored in the internal storage means of the certificate authority, and a second authentication process is performed on the second communication device, and the certificate authority
- the second authentication process can be used to authenticate the second communication device.
- a release permission signal for releasing the use restriction of the controlled device whose use is restricted by the first communication device is transmitted to the first communication device.
- the communication device requests the personal identification information of the user from the second communication device, sends the fingerprint information sent from the second communication device to the certification authority, and the certification authority sends the personal identification information and the personal identification information to the certification authority.
- the correspondence relationship with the identification information stored in the internal storage means of the certificate authority is collated, and a third authentication process is performed on the second communication device, and the certificate authority performs the third authentication process by performing the third authentication process.
- a confirmation signal is sent to the first communication device indicating that the identity has been confirmed, so that the first communication device based on the release permission signal sends a confirmation signal.
- a wireless authentication method according to the present invention for achieving the above object, in the first aspect, when the certificate authority succeeds in the third authentication process, the certificate authority simultaneously transmits to the controlled device. A confirmation signal is sent to the effect that the identity has been confirmed, and the controlled device receives the identity confirmation notification from the first communication device and the certificate authority, and the controlled device by the first communication device It is characterized by enabling the use restriction cancellation for.
- a wireless authentication method according to the present invention that achieves the above-mentioned object is, as a third aspect, in the first or second aspect, the personal identification information is divided into a first part and a second part.
- the personal identification information held by the first communication device and the second communication device and sent from the second communication device to the first communication device is the second part
- the first communication device combines the second part of the personal identification information sent from the second communication device and the first part of the personal identification information to the certification authority as the personal identification information of the user. It is characterized by sending.
- a wireless authentication method that achieves the above-mentioned object is characterized in that, as a fourth aspect, in the third aspect, the personal identification information is fingerprint information of the user.
- a wireless authentication method that achieves the above-mentioned object is characterized in that, as a fifth aspect, in the fourth aspect, the fingerprint information is registered by hashing the original data. .
- the transmission signal level from the second communication device does not exceed a predetermined value in the first aspect as the sixth aspect.
- the personal identification information is deleted when the distance between the first and second communication devices is maintained for a predetermined time.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an example in which a mobile communication terminal is used as a certifying device for personal authentication. [0034] FIG.
- FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining a wireless authentication system shown in the invention of the prior application.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a configuration example of a wireless authentication system in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 4 is a diagram showing a usage pattern of the authentication system of the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the mobile communication terminal 3.
- FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of wearable key unit 4.
- FIG. 7 is a diagram showing a configuration example of the release unit 20 mounted on the mobile communication terminal 3.
- FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating the configuration of an identification signal.
- FIG. 9 is an explanatory diagram of a pulse compression signal and pulse compression processing.
- FIG. 10 is a diagram showing a detailed configuration example of a match-adding circuit 41c (21c).
- FIG. 11 is a diagram showing a specific example of a realization configuration of wearable key unit 4 and release unit 20.
- FIG. 12 is an explanatory diagram of an identification signal and transmission timing.
- FIG. 13 is an explanatory diagram of a relationship between a detection waveform of a received signal and a confirmation signal.
- FIG. 14 is an explanatory diagram of a received signal level and a level determination section.
- FIG. 15 is an example of an ID management table stored in the certification authority 5.
- phase PH1 is a flowchart (phase PH1) showing an authentication processing procedure of the embodiment shown in FIG. 3 according to the present invention.
- 16B is a flowchart (food PH2) showing the authentication processing procedure of the embodiment shown in FIG. 3 according to the present invention.
- FIG. 17 is a diagram for explaining an example of identification ID and fingerprint information held in the door unlock control device 10, the mobile communication terminal 3, and the wearable key 4 of the automobile 1 that is the controlled device.
- the automobile door unlocking control device will be described as an example of a controlled device that is a security target.
- the present invention is not limited to this.
- the present invention can be applied to all objects capable of monitoring and operating a remote force such as a door lock at home, a camera, a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant), a personal computer, and a mobile phone.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a configuration example of the wireless authentication system in the embodiment of the present invention.
- this embodiment is characterized in that fingerprint information is used as personal characteristic information that can uniquely identify an individual who is a user of the mobile communication terminal 3.
- the mobile communication terminal 3 is connected to the certificate authority 5 via the mobile phone line CS1.
- the door unlocking control device 10 mounted on the controlled vehicle 1 is also connected to the certificate authority 5 through a communication line CS2 such as PHS.
- the role of the certification authority 5 is to associate the portable communication terminal 3 and the wearable key 4, and further associate the portable communication terminal 3 and the door unlocking control device 10 to authenticate the portable communication.
- the terminal 3 controls the door unlock control device 10 so that the unlocking and closing of the door key of the car 1 can be remotely controlled.
- the door unlock control device 10 when the door unlock control device 10 is released from the use restriction state by the mobile communication terminal 3, communication for confirmation from the mobile communication terminal 3 and the door unlock control device 10 is performed, and the door is unlocked. It also has a role of giving authentication as to whether or not the unlocking control device 10 can release the door key.
- the data registered in the certificate authority 5 is biometric information such as a unique mobile communication terminal ID and a user's own fingerprint.
- FIG. 4 showing the usage pattern of the authentication system of the present invention
- a mobile communication terminal 3 for example, a mobile phone terminal
- the wearable key unit 4 having the function is owned by the person who is the user 6 together.
- FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of the mobile communication terminal 3.
- the mobile communication terminal 3 has a transmission unit 40 and a release unit 20.
- the transmission unit 40 is further provided with a transmission system 30B, a reception system 30C, a telephone number input system 30D, and a power supply unit 38.
- the voice is converted into a voice signal by the microphone 33a, then amplified by the voice amplifier circuit 33b, the carrier wave signal is modulated by the modulation circuit 33c, and the modulated signal is further powered by the transmission amplifier 33d. After amplification, it is transmitted from the transmitting / receiving antenna 30x to the central office.
- the transmission amplifier 33d is provided with a call switch 33k. When the call switch 33k is operated, the transmission mode is set.
- the incoming call signal is amplified by the receiving amplifier 3 la, the number is recognized by the number recognition circuit 32a, and then the ring tone is sent from the ring tone generation circuit 32b to the hook switch 31c.
- the voice call is made from the speaker 31d and the call is switched to the voice input mode when the hook switch 31c is switched based on this ringtone.
- the received signal amplified by the receiving amplifier 31a is demodulated as a voice signal by the voice demodulation circuit 3 lb.
- the signal is sent to the speaker 31d through the hook switch 31c and reproduced as sound.
- the circuit is connected so that the operation signal of the key operation disable switch 36b and the signal of the numeric keypad function key 37a and switch 37c are input to the AND gate 36a of the use restriction circuit 30A. It has been. Numeric keypad ⁇ Operates switch 37c by the output of alarm release circuit 37b based on the password entered using function key 37a.
- the phone number input mode is set on condition that the signals from switches 36b and 37c and the use restriction release signal from release unit 20 are established, the phone number entered from numeric keypad function key 37a passes through gate 36a.
- the signal is sent to the number input circuit 35 and transmitted from the transmitting / receiving antenna 30x through the telephone number generating circuit 34 through the modulation circuit 33c and the transmission amplifier 33d.
- the power source 38 is operated by a power switch (not shown) of the mobile communication terminal 3 to supply power to the circuits of the above-mentioned systems.
- the release unit 20 may be used in common, or another separate power source may be provided for the release unit 20. When used in common, the power is always supplied to the release unit 20 even if the power switch of the mobile communication terminal 3 is cut off. The reason will be explained later.
- FIG. 6 shows a block diagram of a configuration example of the wearable key unit 4.
- the wearable unit 4 receives a confirmation signal sent back from a transmitter 45b that transmits an identification signal including a unique code signal set in advance from the transmission antenna 40T and a transmitter of the release unit 20 described later. And a receiver 41a for receiving via the antenna 40R.
- the transmission system that transmits the identification signal sends out the identification signal set in the identification code memory 43b by the command of the transmission / reception control timer 43a, and after FSK modulation (250 MHz) of the carrier wave by the FSK modulation circuit 45a, The transmission signal of the identification signal is transmitted from the transmitter 45b by the transmission antenna 40T.
- the power supply unit 48 closes the switch 48a in response to a signal from the power supply control circuit 44 and supplies power to each unit.
- the following components are connected after the receiver 41a.
- the received confirmation signal 250 MHz
- the coincidence / adder circuit 41c reads out the identification signal stored in the identification code memory 43b in advance, and adds the coincidence point for each bit in order to determine whether the identification signal power S matches the identification signal. To do.
- the added output signal (pulse compressed signal, which will be described later) is output to a threshold value processing unit 41d, and the threshold processing unit 41d receives the output signal in advance as a threshold setting unit. 4 Compared with the threshold value (threshold value) set by Id ', if the output signal exceeds the threshold value, the timing signal is sent to the signal presence / absence determination unit 42b.
- the confirmation signal received by the receiver 41a is also sent to the signal level detection circuit 42a, and a signal indicating the signal level detected by this circuit is sent to the signal presence / absence determination unit 42b.
- the confirmation signal from the above-described FSK demodulator circuit 4 lb and the identification code signal from the identification code memory 43b are also input to the signal presence / absence determination unit 42b.
- the signal presence / absence determining unit 42b determines whether the confirmation signal and the identification code signal match, and receives the timing signal from the threshold processing unit 41d and then receives the confirmation signal within a predetermined time t. Output signal is not generated as long as both of the above two judgments are met, but if the match judgment is met but the signal level is judged to be below a certain value, an alarm is issued. An alarm signal is output to circuit 46.
- FIG. 7 shows a configuration example of the release unit 20 mounted on the mobile communication terminal 3.
- the release unit 20 is basically the same in configuration as the wearable key unit 4 in FIG. 6, but is slightly different in part. To do.
- the signal presence / absence determination unit 22b determines the presence / absence of the signal, and the signal presence / absence determination unit 22b outputs any signal as long as the identification signal is received. This is the same as the wearable key unit 4 except that if there is no output signal, the use restriction release signal generator 26 always generates a use restriction release signal, and if the identification signal is not received, the signal presence / absence judgment unit 22b The difference is that transmission of the release signal from the signal generator 26 is stopped by the output signal.
- the power of the power supply unit 28 is not controlled by the transmission / reception control timer 23a, and is always sent to each component unit. Do not cut off the power supply.
- the cancellation unit 20 when an identification signal is transmitted from the wearable key unit 4, the cancellation unit 20 always receives the transmission signal at any time, and the presence or absence of the identification signal is determined based on the signal. In order for the confirmation signal to be sent back from the transmission system of the release unit 20 at a constant interval by the command of the transmission / reception control timer after the judgment is made, it is a force that the power of the release unit 20 needs to be always turned on.
- the other components are basically the same as the wearable key unit 4 in FIG. 6, and the same components are numbered in the 20s with the same suffix numbers, and the description thereof is omitted.
- the identification signal from the wearable key unit 4 is a signal including a specific code signal set in advance, but as shown in FIG. 8, the identification signal is an M-sequence (Maximum length null sequence) signal followed by a unique code signal of the telephone number of the mobile communication terminal 3 (hereinafter simply referred to as a telephone number).
- M-sequence Maximum length null sequence
- the reason why the M number signal is included in the identification number in addition to the telephone number is that when the identification number is received, it is recognized whether the received signal belongs to the mobile communication terminal. This is to make the signal convenient for specific circuit processing.
- this identification signal is transmitted as an intermittent signal that repeats every arbitrary time interval S seconds (for example, 2000 ms) in units of an M-sequence signal and a telephone number signal. This is to save power and to prevent the battery from being consumed, enabling stable long-time transmission.
- the M series signal may be a CZA code, P code, linear FM signal, or the like.
- the telephone number as the unique code signal may be a signal representing other ID numbers, other owners, and administrator information for devices other than mobile phones.
- the pulse compression signal and the pulse compression signal shown in Fig. 9B which is an explanatory diagram of the pulse compression process, are obtained. In this pulse compression, the M-sequence signal that is the input signal is subjected to 1Z31 signal compression.
- the unique code signal needs to be sold for the number of mobile communication terminals sold, but if the code length is m bits, 2m types are possible. Billion kinds of unique code signals are possible. In this embodiment, the unique code signal is a telephone number, but other ID numbers may be used. If the above M-sequence signal and unique code signal are stored in the identification code memory as identification signals in advance, unauthorized use in the event of misplacement or theft can be effectively prevented.
- the above-described identification signal is transmitted from the wearable key unit 4 and received by the release unit 20, and based on this, the same signal is sent back as a confirmation signal after a predetermined time from the release unit 20, and this is returned as the wearable key unit 4
- FIG. 10 is a detailed configuration example of the matching / adding circuit 41c (21c).
- the received signal power FSK demodulating circuit 41b that has received the confirmation signal demodulates, the first M-sequence signal of the confirmation signal is temporarily stored in the shift register 41s not shown in FIG. Remembered.
- the M-sequence signal written to this shift register 41s is sent to the coincidence and addition circuit 41c, where the M-sequence signal is called out of the stored data stored in the identification code memory 43b in advance.
- the sequence signal is compared for each bit, and the number of matching bits is added.
- the signal subjected to the above-described coincidence / addition process is output as a pulse compression signal.
- the shift register 41 s has a 31-bit storage capability, but the identification code memory 43b stores both the M-sequence signal (31 bits) and the unique code signal (29 bits), so it stores 60 bits. Therefore, when processing both M-sequence signals, the data portion of the M-sequence signal is called up.
- FIG. 11 is a diagram showing a specific implementation configuration example of the wearable key unit 4 and the release unit 20.
- Both the wearable key unit 4 and the release unit 20 are realized by a communication module 100 centering on an MCU (Micro Controller Unit).
- the communication module 100 shown in Fig. 11 is connected to the multitask communication module (Multi Task Communication Module: MTC module).
- MTC module Multi Task Communication Module
- the transmission unit 102 in FIG. 11 corresponds to the transmitter 45b of the wearable key unit 4 in FIG. 6 and the transmitter 25b of the release unit 20 in FIG.
- the receiver 103 in FIG. 11 corresponds to the receiver 41a of the wearable key unit 4 in FIG. 6 and the receiver 21a of the release unit 20 in FIG.
- the cipher generation unit 104 in FIG. 11 performs a process of encrypting the identification codes of the wearable key unit 4 and the release unit 20, respectively.
- the identification code is sent and received in an encrypted state.
- the data storage unit 106 stores necessary information such as an action history that is a communication history between the wearable key unit 4 and the release unit 20 as described later. .
- the external output 107 and the LED display unit 108 in FIG. 11 operate as the alarm circuit 46 in the wearable key unit 4 in FIG.
- the release unit 20 may or may not be used for other purposes.
- the EXT-IF 109 in FIG. 11 is an interface with an external device, and operates as the use restriction release signal generator 26 in the release unit 20 in FIG.
- the MCU 101 in FIG. 11 executes processing performed by each part other than the parts described above in the wearable key unit 4 in FIG. 6 and the release unit 20 in FIG.
- the control timer 43a gives an instruction.
- the identification signal is read from the separate code memory 43b, modulated by the FSK modulation circuit 45a, and then transmitted. Transmission is performed from the transmitter 45b via the transmission antenna 40T.
- the identification signal is transmitted by FSK modulating a 31-bit M-sequence signal followed by a 29-bit unique code signal indicating a unique telephone number.
- the release unit 20 of the mobile communication terminal 3 When the transmission signal of the identification signal from the wearable key unit 4 is received at the release unit 20 of the mobile communication terminal 3 at a predetermined level or higher and the identification signal is recognized as its own, the release unit The same transmission signal as the above identification signal is sent back from 20 and received as a confirmation signal.
- the transmission and reception timings are as shown in Fig. 12 (a)-(c).
- the transmission timing is controlled by the control timer 13a so that the power is turned on at a constant time of, for example, 2000 ms after the first power-on after a predetermined time has elapsed. Even if the signal transmitted from wearable key unit 4 is received by receiver 41a of wearable key unit 4 at the same time, the subsequent processing described later is not performed, so the alarm circuit 46 is alerted based on the received signal. It does not act as an original received signal, such as no signal being sent, and is distinguished from a confirmation signal.
- the M-sequence signal of symbol A shown in (a) of FIG. 9 is pulse-compressed in the confirmation signal, but the signal subjected to the coincidence / addition process is shifted as shown by symbol B.
- the data for each bit partially matches the value of each corresponding bit of the M-sequence signal storage data in the identification code memory. Therefore, the value of the pulse compression signal always fluctuates.
- the number of bits to be matched and added by the match / adder circuit 41c is the total number of bits in the shift register 43s. If all 31 are satisfied, the pulse compression signal becomes 31, and the M-sequence signal is completely coincident, or at least coincides. If M is 24 or more, both M-sequence signals can be regarded as matching.
- the threshold processing unit 41d determines whether the pulse compression processing signal is a threshold (threshold value) preset by the threshold setting unit 41d ′, for example, 24 or more (see FIG. 9 (b)). ), When it is judged that the threshold value is exceeded, the timing signal shown in Fig. 9 (c) is output to the signal presence / absence judgment unit 12b.
- the signal level of the received signal received by the receiver 41a is detected by the signal level detection circuit 42a, and the signal presence / absence determination unit 42b determines whether the signal level is greater than a certain value.
- This signal level is determined by setting a certain voltage threshold for the received signal of the detected waveform shown in Fig. 13 (a) in Fig. 13, which is an explanatory diagram of the relationship between the detected waveform of the received signal and the confirmation signal. If it is level, it is determined that a signal above a certain level has been received.
- Fig. 14 which is an explanatory diagram of the received signal level and the level determination section
- the above determination is performed between the wearable key unit 4 and the release unit 20 when receiving a signal transmitted at a constant strength. This is based on the fact that the received signal level decreases in inverse proportion to the square of the distance as the distance R increases.
- the threshold value is determined according to a predetermined distance (for example, lm) as one of the determination methods. If the received signal level falls below the threshold value, it is possible to detect that the two are separated by a predetermined distance or more.
- Figure 14 is represented on a logarithmic scale.
- the level of the received signal may be known by AZD converting the detected waveform of the received signal and measuring the voltage level of the received signal.
- the determination of the signal level is performed by a fixed time t (not shown in the figure) corresponding to the specific code signal received after the timing signal after threshold processing for the M-sequence signal is sent from the threshold processing unit id.
- t a fixed time corresponding to the specific code signal received after the timing signal after threshold processing for the M-sequence signal is sent from the threshold processing unit id.
- 2.9ms is performed as symmetry. The reason for this is to prevent detection of noise and signal levels from other telephones, because the determination can be performed accurately by setting the fixed time specified by the timing signal as the determination interval. It is.
- the determination in the signal presence / absence determination unit 42b is performed by using the identification code memory to receive the FSK-modulated unique code signal received after the timing signal is input. This is performed even if it matches the unique code signal stored in the memory. Therefore, the signal presence / absence determination unit 42b receives a timing signal, then receives a predetermined level of received signal at a certain time, and the received unique code signal matches its own unique code signal. If it is determined, the wearable key unit 4 force and the release unit 20 exist within a certain distance, and the signal presence / absence determination unit 42b outputs no signal.
- the release unit 20 is separated from the wearable kit 4 by a certain distance or more. In this case, the output signal is output and the alarm circuit 46 is activated.
- the warning by the alarm circuit 46 is not only the above-mentioned method of giving a voice message, but also a beeping sound, or it is placed together with the sound, and it is displayed on the display. Any system can be used as long as the warning is given by some means, and even if a signal other than the confirmation signal of the self-identification code signal is received, any one of the above three conditions can be used. It goes without saying that the signal presence / absence determination unit 42b does not output an output signal and does not affect the reception operation of the transmission unit at all because some or none of them are satisfied.
- the operation of the release unit 20 is as follows. As described above, in this unit 20, power is always supplied from the power supply unit 28 to each component regardless of whether the power switch of the mobile communication terminal 3 is ON, OFF, or misaligned. When four identification signals are transmitted, they are received by the receiver 21a of the release unit 20 almost simultaneously.
- the received identification signal is demodulated by the FSK demodulator circuit 21b, sent to the coincidence / adder circuit 21c, and the timing signal based on the M-sequence signal is sent from the threshold processing unit 21d to the signal presence / absence judgment unit 22b. It is. Further, the signal level of the received signal is detected by the signal level detection circuit 22a, and whether or not the signal level is equal to or higher than a certain level within a certain judgment time t when the timing signal is sent to the signal presence / absence judgment unit 22b. The determination is the same.
- the signal presence / absence determination unit 22b determines whether the transmitted signal matches the own unique code signal stored in advance in the identification code memory 23b during the determination time. Same as unit 4. However, the release unit 20 The signal presence / absence judgment unit 22b does not output any output signal when the above timing signal and the three conditions that the signal level in both judgments is equal to or greater than the specific code signal are met.
- the canceling unit 20 Unless there is an output signal, the canceling unit 20, therefore the mobile communication terminal 3 is used by the owner or the user without leaving the wearable key unit 4, and the use restriction canceling signal is issued from the signal generating unit 26. Is always output. Therefore, the mobile communication terminal 3 is always ready for use.
- the signal from the signal presence / absence determination unit 22b is transmitted and received at that instant.
- the control timer 23a is set, and the same signal as the received identification signal is read from the identification code memory 23b and transmitted through the FSK modulation circuit 25a and the transmitter 25b. This signal is received as a confirmation signal by the wearable key unit 4 as described above.
- the release unit 20 moves away from the wearable key unit 4 together with the mobile communication terminal 3 due to misplacement or theft, the signal level becomes below a certain level in the detection of the signal level, and the signal presence / absence determination unit 22b determines that no identification signal has been received.
- the signal presence / absence determination unit 22b determines that no identification signal has been received.
- an output signal is output from the signal presence / absence determination unit 22b and the use cancellation signal output from the cancellation signal generation unit 26 is stopped, so that the mobile communication terminal 3 cannot be used.
- the use restricting device of this embodiment is an integral one in which the wearable key unit 4 is put in a pocket or the like by the owner or user and the release unit 20 is incorporated in the portable communication terminal 3 at hand. Since the mobile communication terminal 3 is separated from the wearable key unit 4 and the release unit 20 by more than a certain distance, the use of the mobile communication terminal 3 is restricted to prevent unintentional unauthorized use. The user is given a warning by voice or the like so that the user can immediately recognize that the mobile communication terminal 3 has lost its power.
- each wearable key unit 4 is assigned a unique ID and is transmitted and received. Even a simple configuration does not work. That is, the wearable key unit 4 In addition to its own ID, the ID of the release unit 20 is also stored. The release unit 20 also stores the ID of the wearable key unit 4 in addition to its own ID. Wearable unit 4 sends its own ID to release unit 20, and release unit 20 makes a pair of itself by comparing the received ID with the ID of the stored transmission unit. You may decide whether it is a transmission unit!
- the release unit 20 sends its own ID to the wearable key unit 4, and the wearable key unit 4 compares the received ID with the stored ID of the release unit 20. Then, it is determined whether it is a cancellation unit that is a pair of itself.
- the present invention is further characterized in that personal identification information for uniquely identifying the individual user in the mobile communication terminal 3 in the release unit 20, that is, personal biometric information is stored in the identification code memory 23b. Store it.
- Fingerprint information will be described as an example of personal biometrics information.
- the portable communication terminal 3 includes a fingerprint reading mechanism 3a.
- the user reads his / her fingerprint 3b using the fingerprint reading mechanism 3a, and stores a code corresponding to the read fingerprint information in the identification code memory 23b.
- the code corresponding to the fingerprint information stored in the release unit 20 is divided and sent to the wearable key unit 4 so that the wearable key unit 4 and the mobile communication terminal 3 Try to keep them separately.
- the use of personally identifiable information which is a characteristic feature of the present invention, will be further described in the authentication procedure described later.
- FIG. 15 shows an example of an ID management table stored in the certification authority 5.
- Mobile communication terminal ID A
- wearable key ID B
- controlled device ID C
- the information of (D) and fingerprint information (E) is registered with a corresponding relationship!
- fingerprint information (E) By registering fingerprint information (E) by hashing the original data, it is possible to avoid registering personal information with a third party.
- the mobile communication terminal ID (A), the user name (D), and the fingerprint information ( ⁇ ) are stored in the identification code memory 23b of the release unit 20 of the mobile communication terminal 3. .
- the Arabic key ID (B) is stored in the wearable key 4 identification code memory 43b.
- the controlled device ID (C) is stored in the door release control device 10 of the automobile 1.
- Fingerprint information (E) can be divided into two and stored in the mobile communication terminal 3 and the wearable key 4.
- FIGS. 16A and 16B are flowcharts (phase PH1, phase PH2) showing the authentication processing procedure of the embodiment shown in FIG. 3 according to the present invention.
- the processing procedure of FIG. 16A is a wireless authentication in which authentication between the mobile communication terminal 3 and the wearable key 4 and authentication between the mobile communication terminal 3 and the door unlocking control device 10 are performed via the certificate authority 5.
- This is the processing procedure for Phase PH1 and is basically the same as the procedure described in the patented invention (Patent No. 2,931,276) filed earlier by the applicant.
- the processing procedure of FIG. 16B is a personal authentication phase using biometric information as a feature of the present invention and a fingerprint as an example.
- Certificate Authority 5 has ID association information and fingerprint information database as shown in Fig. 15.
- the door unlocking control device 10 of the automobile 1 is 3001
- the identification ID of the mobile communication terminal 3 is 1 001
- the wearable key 4 is 2001
- the door unlocking control device 10 is connected to the self-identifying ID 3001 by mobile communication.
- the terminal 3 holds the identification ID 1001
- the mobile communication terminal 3 holds the self-identification ID 1001 and the identification key 2001 of the wearable key 4
- the wearable key 4 holds the self-identification ID 2001 and the identification ID 1001 of the mobile communication terminal 3. .
- the fingerprint information of the user of the mobile communication terminal 3 is registered in the door unlock control device 10, and the same fingerprint information is further divided and stored in the mobile communication terminal 3 and the wearable key 4.
- the wearable key unit 4 sends a call signal to the release unit 20 of the mobile communication terminal 4 at a predetermined time interval (for example, every 2 seconds).
- M-sequence data (M-sequence signal) is transmitted by radio signal (processing step Pl).
- the comparison unit 20 compares it with the M-sequence data stored in the identification code memory 23b (eg, flash memory). This comparison is performed by the coincidence / adder circuit 41c.
- a numerical value representing the number of matched bits in both M-sequence data is output as a pulse signal.
- a predetermined threshold for example, threshold 24 for 31-bit M-sequence data
- the reception level of M-sequence data is equal to or greater than a predetermined value, that is, wearable key unit 4
- the release unit 20 of the mobile communication terminal 4 stores the confirmation response (ACK) to the call and the identification code memory 43b.
- Identification information (terminal identification information) ID of the mobile communication terminal 3 is transmitted by radio signal (processing step P2).
- the release unit 20 of the mobile communication terminal B does not transmit the ACK signal and the terminal identification information ID.
- the release unit 20 remains restricted to use the mobile communication terminal 3, and the mobile communication terminal 3 cannot be used for the door release control device 10 that is a controlled device.
- the release unit 20 can display that fact on the display unit of the mobile communication terminal 3.
- wearable key unit 4 Upon receiving the ACK signal and the terminal identification information ID, wearable key unit 4 collates the received terminal identification information ID with the terminal identification information ID stored in its own identification code memory 43b (processing step P2a). .
- the wearable queue 4 recognizes that the release unit 20 is a release unit that forms a pair with itself, and A transmission request is transmitted to the mobile communication terminal 3 (processing step P3).
- the mobile communication terminal 3 Upon receiving the encryption key transmission request, the mobile communication terminal 3 generates an encryption key and transmits it to the wearable key 4 (processing step P4).
- wearable key 4 encrypts its own identification ID (KID) using the transmitted encryption key and transmits it to mobile communication terminal 3 (processing step P5).
- the mobile communication terminal 3 decrypts the identification ID (KID) of the encrypted wearable key 4.
- the mobile communication terminal 3 self-ported with the identification ID (KID) of the decrypted wearable key 4.
- the identification ID (KBID) of the band communication terminal 3 is transmitted to the certificate authority 5 (processing step P6).
- the certificate authority 5 refers to the two identification IDs (KID and KBID) sent to the ID management table described earlier with reference to Fig. 15, and identifies the identification ID (KID) of wearable key 4 and the identification ID of own mobile communication terminal 3.
- the presence or absence of matching of (KBID) is confirmed (processing step P6a). If the combination of (KID) and (KBID) is confirmed, the fact is transmitted to the mobile communication terminal 3 (processing step P7).
- the release unit 20 of the mobile communication terminal 3 encrypts the identification ID (KBID) of the mobile communication terminal 3 and wears the wearable key 4 (Process Step P8).
- the wearable key 4 When the wearable key 4 receives the encrypted identification ID (KBID) of the mobile communication terminal 3, the wearable key 4 decrypts the identification ID (KBID), verifies and checks the KBID, and confirms the identification ID (KBID) to the mobile communication terminal 3. An approval notification is sent (process step P9).
- the mobile communication terminal 3 can be used with respect to the door release control device 10 of the automobile 1 which is the controlled device.
- the mobile communication terminal 3 transmits M-sequence data (M-sequence signal) as a radio signal as a call signal to the door release control device 10 of the vehicle 1 at a predetermined time interval (for example, every 2 seconds). (Processing step P10).
- the door release control device 10 also has the same transmission / reception and identification ID recognition functions as the wearable key 4 and the release unit 20 shown in Figs. Therefore, when M-sequence data (M-sequence signal) is received as a call signal from the mobile communication terminal 3, it is recognized and acknowledged (ACK) for call-making and stored in the door release controller 10 Identification information (controlled device identification information) ID is transmitted by radio signal (processing step PI 1).
- the release unit 20 of the mobile communication terminal 3 receives the ACK signal and the terminal identification information ID from the door release control device 10, the terminal identification information ID transmitted and the terminal identification stored in its own identification code memory 23b are received.
- the information ID is checked (processing step Pl la).
- the release unit 20 The key release control device 10 recognizes that it is a controlled device that is paired with itself, and transmits an encryption key transmission request to the door release control device 10 (processing step P12). Upon receiving the encryption key transmission request, the door release control device 10 encrypts the KID, generates an encryption key, and sends the encrypted KBID to the release unit 20 of the mobile communication terminal 3 (processing step P13).
- the release unit 20 encrypts its own identification ID using the sent encryption key and transmits it to the door release control device 10 that is the controlled device (processing step P14).
- the door release control device 10 decrypts the notified identification ID (KBID) of the portable communication terminal 3 and compares it with the identification ID of the portable communication terminal 3 stored in the embodiment device.
- the present invention adds a phase of authenticating and using personal characteristic information, that is, biometric information, for example, fingerprint information, so that true personal authentication can be performed. ing.
- the user's fingerprint information is encoded, and as illustrated in FIG. 17, the door unlock control device 10, the mobile communication terminal 3 and Registered in wearable key 4. Further, as shown in FIG. 15, fingerprint information is also registered in the certificate authority 5 in correspondence with the mobile communication terminal ID, controlled device, and user name.
- FIG. 16B is executed after authentication between the mobile communication terminal 3 and the wearable key 4 and authentication between the mobile communication terminal 3 and the door release control device 10 that is the controlled device are performed in the authentication phase Phi. It is a figure which shows the procedure flow of authentication phase Ph2.
- the wearable key unit 4 and the mobile communication terminal 3 are not within the predetermined range (for example, several meters). If the password continues for a predetermined time, security is further ensured by deleting the registration of fingerprint information.
- a request for fingerprint information is made from the mobile communication terminal 3 to the wearable key 4 (processing step P16). On the other hand, the fingerprint information 2 / 2a divided from the wearable key 4 is transmitted to the mobile communication terminal 3 (processing step P17).
- the portable communication terminal 3 is held in the embodiment device and combines the other part l / 2a of the divided fingerprint information and the fingerprint information 2 / 2a sent from the wearable key 4 before the division.
- the fingerprint information is assembled and sent to the certificate authority 5 (Process Step P18).
- the certificate authority 5 collates the authenticity of the sent fingerprint information with reference to the ID management table in Fig. 15 (processing step P18a). If the collation result is correct, this is notified to the mobile communication terminal 3 (processing step P 19).
- the certificate authority 5 notifies the corresponding door release control device 10 as the controlled device that the fingerprint information collation result is correct from the ID management table (processing step P19a).
- the mobile communication terminal 3 When the mobile communication terminal 3 receives a notification from the certification authority 5 that the verification is correct, that is, the personal authentication is confirmed by the certification authority 5, the mobile communication terminal 3 confirms the personal authentication to the wearable key 3. Is notified (processing step P20). The wearable key 3 returns a confirmation response to this to the mobile communication terminal 3 (processing step P21).
- the mobile communication terminal 3 sends an identity confirmation notification to the door release control device 10 (processing step P22).
- the door release control device 10 is notified from the certification authority 5 that authentication has been obtained by fingerprint verification (processing step P19a).
- the door release control device 10 enables door release based on the notification that both the mobile communication terminal 3 and the certificate authority 5 have obtained authentication.
- the present invention relates to a wireless authentication system that performs personal authentication using radio waves, and can be used as a personal authentication means for devices that require security. it can.
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
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JP2007504607A JP4848360B2 (ja) | 2005-02-25 | 2005-02-25 | ワイヤレス認証方法及びワイヤレス認証システム |
CNA2005800487365A CN101129017A (zh) | 2005-02-25 | 2005-02-25 | 无绳认证方法及无绳认证系统 |
PCT/JP2005/003212 WO2006090476A1 (ja) | 2005-02-25 | 2005-02-25 | ワイヤレス認証方法及びワイヤレス認証システム |
US11/892,647 US7924139B2 (en) | 2005-02-25 | 2007-08-24 | Wireless authentication method and wireless authentication system |
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PCT/JP2005/003212 WO2006090476A1 (ja) | 2005-02-25 | 2005-02-25 | ワイヤレス認証方法及びワイヤレス認証システム |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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CN101129017A (zh) | 2008-02-20 |
JP4848360B2 (ja) | 2011-12-28 |
US20070294746A1 (en) | 2007-12-20 |
JPWO2006090476A1 (ja) | 2008-07-24 |
US7924139B2 (en) | 2011-04-12 |
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