WO2005008502A1 - アクセス方法 - Google Patents
アクセス方法 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2005008502A1 WO2005008502A1 PCT/JP2004/010432 JP2004010432W WO2005008502A1 WO 2005008502 A1 WO2005008502 A1 WO 2005008502A1 JP 2004010432 W JP2004010432 W JP 2004010432W WO 2005008502 A1 WO2005008502 A1 WO 2005008502A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- information
- verification
- area
- command
- access
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
- G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/78—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/357—Cards having a plurality of specified features
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a memory card used by being inserted into a terminal such as a PC or a mobile phone, and a method of accessing a memory card.
- a memory card is inserted into a terminal and the terminal stores the data.
- the following is an example of a conventional memory card (for example, Japanese Patent Application No. 2003-91704).
- the card accepts various commands from the terminal and returns a response to the command (CMD line).
- the card accepts data input and outputs data (DAT line). have.
- the terminal 4602 is a CMD line
- the terminals 4607, 4608, and 4609 are DAT lines, which are DAT 0, DAT 1, and DAT 2, respectively.
- Terminal C2-01 is a CD / DAT3 that doubles for data input / output and card detection (CD).
- CD data input / output and card detection
- the module in the force transmitter / receiver 4701 for command reception and response transmission connected to the CMD line 4602 and data transmission / reception connected to the DAT lines 4607, 4608, 4609 and C2-01 De It consists of an evening transmission / reception means 4702, a storage area 4704, and a storage area access means 4703 which reads and writes data to and from the storage area 4704 in accordance with a received command.
- the output of the default is as follows: It is assumed that the mode is set to use only the DAT 0 terminal 4607, but the DAT1 terminal 4608, DAT2 terminal 4609, DA A mode in which the T3 terminal 4610 is also used may be used.
- the terminal sends a data read command to the CMD line 462 of the card.
- This read command has the format shown in FIG. 7, and is composed of a 6-bit command code 401 and a 32-bit command argument 402.
- the command argument in the data read command is the read start address.
- the processing instruction receiving means 4701 which has received the command from the terminal, refers to the command code 401 and recognizes that it is a data read command.
- the processing instruction receiving means 4701 refers to the command bow I number 402 and determines whether the specified address is correct, that is, is specified in the range corresponding to the force. Check if the address is correct, and if the address is not correct, return a response code indicating that there is an error as a response. If the address is correct, it returns a response code indicating that it is normal.
- the processing instruction receiving means 4701 After returning the response to the terminal, the processing instruction receiving means 4701 issues a read request to the storage area access means 4703 together with the specified address.
- the storage area access means 4703 reads out the data from the specified address of the storage area 4704 and transmits it to the data transmission / reception means 4702.
- the data transmission / reception means 4702 reads out to the terminal via the DAT0 line 4607 and outputs the data.
- the address can be freely specified by specifying the address from the terminal. Can read and write.
- the command argument This includes the access area specification information (such as the address to be accessed) and the verification data for authentication.
- the size of the command bow I number 402 of the data read command is as described above. Since it is fixed at 32 bits, if the size of the verification data for authentication is increased to improve security, the length of the access area designation information is shortened and the accessible area is limited. On the other hand, if the size of the verification data is reduced, the security strength is reduced.
- the access area designation information is sent to the memory card by the memory capacity command that specifies the access area, and then the IC capacity is communicated between the host and the memory card.
- Security information that includes key information shared or pre-shared using flexible authentication processing using password commands and authentication verification data generated using the access area designation information.
- the access method is an access method from a device to a memory device, wherein the device transmits designation information for designating an access area to the memory device; Transmitting together a processing instruction to the access area and verification information relating to the designation information; and the memory A step of receiving the designation information; a step of receiving the processing instruction and the verification information; and a step of verifying the designation information by using the verification information.
- an access method is an access method from a device to a memory device, wherein the device and the memory device are capable of accessing to a memory device.
- a step of referring to the possible area information and transmitting designation information for designating an access area to the memory device; a processing instruction to the access area; and a verification of the designation information Transmitting the information and the information together; the memory device receiving the specified information; receiving the processing instruction and the verification information; and verifying the specified information using the verification information. And executing the processing instruction when the verification is successful.
- an access method is a method of accessing a memory device from a device, wherein the device shares a verification key with the memory device; Transmitting designation information for designating an access area to the memory device; processing instructions for the access area; and verification data obtained by encrypting verification information on the designated information with the verification key. Transmitting, the memory device receiving the specified information, receiving the processing instruction and the verification data, and transmitting the specified information to the verification data and the verification key. Verifying using the command, and executing the processing instruction if the verification is successful.
- an access method is a method for accessing a memory device from a device, the device comprising: a memory device; and a possible area information regarding an accessible area to the memory device. Sharing the verification key corresponding to the accessible area with the memory device; and specifying the access area to the memory device with reference to the accessible area information. Transmitting information; and the accessing Transmitting together a processing instruction to the area, and verification data obtained by encrypting verification information related to the specified information with the verification key; and the memory device receives the specified information. Receiving the processing instruction and the verification data, and verifying the specified information using the verification data and the verification key; and executing the processing instruction if the verification is successful. And the step of performing.
- an access method is a method for accessing a memory device from a device, wherein the device communicates with the memory device using a first processing command. Sharing available area information on an accessible area to the device, and transmitting designation information for designating an access area to the memory device using a second processing command with reference to the available area information Transmitting, together with the processing instruction to the access area, and verification information relating to the designation information, using the second processing system command; and Receiving, receiving the processing instruction and the verification information, and verifying the designated information using the verification information; If successful in the serial verification, with a, and vinegar Tedzupu for executing the processing instructions.
- an access method is a method for accessing a memory device from a device, wherein the device uses a first processing command to communicate with the memory device using a verification key. Sharing the information, specifying the access area to the memory device using a second processing command, and transmitting the access information using the second processing command. Transmitting together a processing instruction to the area and verification data obtained by encrypting verification information on the specified information with the verification key, and a step in which the memory device receives the specified information. Receiving the processing instruction and the verification data, and verifying the specified information using the verification data and the verification key; and the verification succeeds. If so, executing the processing instruction.
- an access method is a method for accessing a memory device from a device, the memory device comprising: a tamper-resistant first region in which access from the device is restricted. A non-tamper-resistant second area in which access from the device is restricted, and a third area accessible from the device, wherein at least a processing instruction to the first area is given.
- the device includes a memory device and a first processing system command.
- an access method is a method for accessing a memory device from a device, the memory device comprising: a tamper-resistant first region in which access from the device is restricted. A non-evenness-resistant second area in which access from the device is restricted, and a third area accessible from the device, and at least a processing instruction to the first area.
- a memory device is a memory device that is read / written from / to an apparatus, receives designation information for designating an area to be accessed, and reads verification information and read / write information based on the designation information.
- a processing command receiving means for receiving a write command together with the specified information; a specified information verifying means for performing a verification process using the verification information; a storage area for storing data; If the management is successful, a storage area access means for reading or writing to the specified area of the storage area in accordance with the processing command; and a data read by the storage area access means to the device.
- a data transmitting unit for transmitting; and a data receiving unit for receiving the written data from the device.
- the information device is an information device that reads and writes a memory device, determines a region to be read or written, and specifies specification information that specifies the region.
- a verification information generating unit that performs a process of generating the verification information from the specification information; a transmission of the specification information; and a processing instruction transmission unit that transmits the verification information and a read or write processing instruction together;
- a data transmission means for transmitting data to the memory device when the processing instruction is write; a data reception means for receiving data from the memory device when the processing instruction is read;
- an access method is a method of accessing a memory device from a device, wherein the device transmits designation information for designating an access area to the memory device. Processing to the access area Sending together a verification command and verification data obtained by encrypting verification information related to the specified information with a verification key; the memory device receiving the specified information; and Receiving the command and the verification data, and verifying the specified information using the verification data and a verification key; and executing the processing command if the verification is successful.
- an access method is a method for accessing a memory device from a device, wherein the device is capable of relating to an accessible area to the memory device using a first processing command. Sharing area information; sharing a verification key corresponding to the accessible area using a first processing command; and using the second processing command to access the memory device. Transmitting designation information for designating an access area; a processing command for the access area using a second processing command; and a verification data obtained by encrypting verification information on the designated information with the verification key.
- a step of transmitting the same together a step of receiving the designation information, a step of receiving the designation information, and a step of Receives, and verifying by using the said designation information the verification data and the previous SL verification key, if successful in the verification has a Sutedzupu to perform pre-Symbol processing instruction, the.
- an access method is a method for accessing a memory device from a device, the memory device comprising: a tamper-resistant first region in which access from the device is restricted. A non-evening-resistant, large-capacity second area in which access from the device is restricted; and a large-capacity third region accessible from the device, and at least the first area. And a second processing system command that is a processing instruction to at least the third area.
- a first processing system command to share available area information relating to an accessible area to the memory device; and Vinegar sharing a verification key that pair j core to the access area Transmitting, using a tape and a second processing command, designation information for specifying an access area to the second area; and a processing instruction to the access area using the second processing command.
- a verification data obtained by encrypting verification information related to the specification information with the verification key, and the memory device further comprising: a step of receiving the specification information; a step of: Receiving the verification data and verifying the specified information using the verification data and the verification key; and executing the processing command if the verification is successful.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a terminal configuration of a conventional memory card
- FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a conventional module configuration in a card.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram showing an internal module configuration of a memory device according to the first embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a diagram showing a terminal configuration of a card according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
- FIG. 5 is a diagram showing an internal configuration of a terminal according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
- FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an outline of processing performed between the card and the terminal according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram showing a sequence of an APDU transmission / reception method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
- FIG. 8 is a diagram showing a sequence of a response APDU transmission process according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 9 is a diagram showing a command format of the memory card according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 10 is a diagram showing an internal configuration of the flash memory according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 11 shows the internal configuration of the security protection area according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 12 is a diagram showing an internal configuration of each application area in the security protection area according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 13 is a diagram showing a session key sharing and accessible area sharing procedure according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 14 is a flowchart for explaining details of the processing in step 93 of FIG. 13 according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 15 is a flowchart for explaining details of the processing in step 905 of FIG. 13 according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 16 is a flowchart according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
- 11 is a flowchart for explaining details of the processing in step 9907 of FIG.
- FIG. 17 is a diagram showing a command sequence for reading a security protected area from the terminal according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 18 is a diagram showing an argument format of an APDU transmission command according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 19 is a diagram showing an argument format of an APDU reception command according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 20 is a diagram showing an input data of an APDU transmission command and an output data format of an APDU reception command according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
- FIG. 21 is a diagram showing an input format of an access area designation command according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 22 is a diagram showing access area designation information according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 23 is a diagram showing verification data for verifying the validity of the terminal according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. Diagram showing a generation method
- FIG. 24 is a diagram showing a generation method based on a verification command for performing terminal validity verification according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- FIG. 25 shows that the terminal according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention writes in the security protection area. Diagram showing a command sequence for writing
- FIG. 26 is a diagram showing an internal module configuration of a memory card according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 27 is a diagram showing the internal configuration of the terminal according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 28 is a flowchart showing processing when the terminal according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention accesses the security protected area of the card
- FIG. 29 is a diagram showing an example of a data portion of an area designation instruction according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 30 is a diagram showing a format of the access area designation information of FIG. 29 according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 31 is a diagram illustrating an example of a method for generating comparison information according to the second embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 32 is a diagram illustrating a case where a verification key sharing unit is provided in the inside according to the second embodiment of the present invention. Diagram showing the card configuration of
- FIG. 33 is a diagram showing a terminal configuration when a verification key sharing unit is provided inside according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 34 is a diagram showing a sequence of a verification key sharing method according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 35 is a diagram for explaining a verification key generation method according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 36 is a diagram showing a comparison information generation method using SHA-1 operation according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 37 is a diagram showing a verification information generating method according to the second embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 38 is a diagram showing a format of an access instruction according to the second embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 39 is a flowchart showing a verification data generation process using numerical information according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 40 shows a comparison information generation method using random numbers according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 41 is a diagram showing a verification information generation method using random numbers according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
- FIG. 42 is a diagram showing an internal module configuration of a memory card according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
- FIG. 43 is a diagram showing the internal configuration of the terminal according to the third embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 44 is a diagram showing the access processing from the terminal according to the third embodiment of the present invention to the security protection area in the card. Flow chart showing a part,
- FIG. 45 is a flowchart showing a part of the access processing subsequent to FIG. 44 according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
- FIG. 46 is a diagram showing an example of an access valid table according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
- Fig. 47 is a diagram showing an example of the access valid table according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- the module configuration in the card according to the present invention will be described with reference to FIG. Although the terminal arrangement of the card 100 is shown in FIG. 4, the terminal configuration is different from that shown in FIG. 1 with reference numerals assigned to the respective terminals, but the configuration is the same. Omitted. ''
- the module in the force consists of the controller 106 and the flash memory 105.
- the controller 106 includes a command receiving unit 101 connected to the CMD line for command reception and response transmission, and a data connected to the DAT line. — Perform encryption / decryption processing with the session key for the data transmitted and received by the evening transmission / reception unit 102 and the data transmission / reception unit 102, and decrypt the data with the flash memory storage key to access the memory access unit 102.
- session between terminal 200 and exchange of security keys for speech / sinusoid and encryption / decryption It is composed of a key sharing unit 110, a session key, and an area for storing a security protection area associated with the session key.
- the terminal 200 includes a command transmission unit 204 that transmits a memory card command to the card 100, a data transmission / reception unit 207 that transmits data to the DAT line of the card 100, The encryption / decryption means 206 for encrypting the data transmitted and received by the data transmission / reception means 207 and the decryption means for decrypting the data received by the decryption means 207, and a security key between the force code 100 Key sharing means 202 for performing the sharing process of the information, the designated information determining means 201 for determining the area to be accessed by the security protected area access command and generating the area designation information, the area designation information and the session key A verification data generation unit 203 that generates a verification data from the server, and a data storage unit 205 that stores the data to be transmitted or the received data.
- An area number assignment process of assigning an area number (area No. X in the figure) of an accessible area from 200 to the memory in the card 100 is executed (step S401).
- Step S404 After performing authentication processing and mutual confirmation of the mutual validity, key sharing processing and area number assignment processing are performed.
- the area No. X Verification and encryption session keys that enable access to the indicated security protection area are stored in association with the area number (area No. X).
- an access area specification command including the area No. x, block address and block length setting data is sent from the terminal 200 to the card 100 to specify the area within the security protection area to be accessed.
- Sent to In the card 100 a process of verifying whether the security protected area can be accessed is executed based on the area No. X extracted from the received access area designation command.
- the terminal 200 uses the area No. x, the block address and the block length, and the verification data shared between the terminal 100 and the verification key 100 in step S401. Is created, and a data transfer (Read) command including the verification data is transmitted to the force 100.
- the card 100 uses the public key of the verification key shared with the terminal 200 from the received data transfer (Read) command to verify the data based on the area No. x, the program address and the program length. Make sure you are creating an evening, step S 402 It is verified whether or not access to the security protection area specified by is possible.
- the data stored in the area No. X corresponding to the card application accessible in the above-described verification processing in the card 100 is shared with the terminal 200.
- the encrypted data is encrypted using the encrypted encryption key, and the encrypted data is transmitted to terminal 200.
- the command format transmitted and received between the terminal 200 and the session key sharing unit 110 conforms to an APDU format used in a general IC card. That is, the session key sharing unit 110 takes the form of an IC card application.
- the command APDU means a command to be executed on the memory card side, which is transmitted from the terminal 200 to the memory card in APDU format, and specifically, a command for the IC card is used.
- terminal 200 creates a command A PDU to be transmitted to session key sharing section 110.
- the terminal 20 ⁇ transmits an APDU transmission command to the CMD line 22 of the card 100 in FIG. 2 (step S501).
- the APDU transmission command has a format shown in FIG. 7 like the conventional data read command, and is composed of a 6-bit command code 401 and a 32-bit command bow I number 402. .
- the command bow 1 in the APDU transmission command is composed of a flag 1401 indicating that the data input to the DAT0 line 27 is a command APDU and 1403 indicating the number of transmission data as shown in Fig. 18. Become. If the total of the flag 1401 and the transmission data 1403 is less than 32 bits, there is an unused field 1402.
- the data input to the DAT 0 line 27 in FIG. 4 is in units of 512 bytes, and the transmission data number 1403 indicates how many times the input in units of 512 bytes is performed.
- the command receiving unit 101 of the card 100 receives the command transmitted from the terminal 200 (step S502), recognizes that the command is an APDU transmission command, and responds to the terminal 200 via the CMD line 22. Is returned (step S503), and the data control unit 103 is notified that the APDU transmission command has been received (step S504).
- the terminal 200 receives a response to the APDU transmission command from the CMD line 22 of the card 100 (step S503), and inputs a command APDU 1602 to the DAT0 line 27 in the format shown in FIG. 20 (step S503). 505).
- the length indicated by 1601 indicates the length of the following APDU 1602.
- the number of transmitted data 1403 of the command argument is set according to the total length of the length field 1601 and the APDU 1602.
- padding 1603 is added so as to be a multiple of 512 bytes.
- the data transmission / reception unit 102 inside the card 100 receives the command APDU input to the DAT 0 line 27 from the terminal 200 (step S505), and receives the command APDU to the data control unit 103. Is notified (step S506).
- the data controller 103 reads the command APDU from the data transmitter / receiver 102 (step S507), and passes the command APDU to the session key sharing unit 110 (IC card application) (step S508).
- session key sharing section 110 performs processing as described in the command APDU (step S509), and sends the data and status information generated as a result of the processing to data control section 103 as a response APDU. Pass (Step S 51 0).
- This status information is a status code defined in ISO 7816, and is a 2-byte value indicating whether the process has been completed normally or abnormally.
- the response APDU means a result of processing the command APDU executed by the card 100 from the card 100 to the terminal 200.
- the terminal 200 transmits an APDU reception command to the CMD line 22 of the card 100 (step S601).
- the APDU reception command has a format similar to that of the conventional data read command shown in FIG. 9 like the APDU transmission command, and is composed of a 6-bit command code 401 and a 32 ⁇ -bit command argument 402. You.
- the command argument 402 in the APDU reception command includes an unused field 1501 and a transmission data number 1502. If the transmission data number 1502 is less than 32 bits, an unused field 1501 exists.
- the data output from the DAT 0 terminal 27 in Fig. 4 is in 512-byte units, similar to the input data in the APDU transmission command, and the transmission data number 1502 is output several times in 512-byte units. Indicates whether to do so.
- the command receiving unit 101 of the force 100 receives the command transmitted from the terminal 200 (step S602), recognizes that it is an APDU reception command, and transmits the command to the terminal 200 via the CMD line 22. (Step S603), and notifies the overnight control unit 103 that the APDU reception command has been received (Step S604).
- Step S605 the data control unit 103 sends a Pass the response APDU received from key sharing unit 110 (Step S605) o
- the terminal 200 receives a response to the APDU reception command from the CMD line 22 of the card 100 (step S.603), and reads a response APDU from the data transmission / reception unit 102 via the DAT0 line 27 (step S.603).
- Step S606 The read response APDU is output in the format shown in FIG. The details of each field are the same as when inputting in the APDU transmission command, and thus the description is omitted.
- the flash memory 105 mounted on the card 100 has, as shown in FIG. 10, a normal area (at least) which can be accessed from the terminal 200 by a memory card command represented by a conventional read command and a conventional write command. It has a non-tamper-resistant memory area 62 and a security protection area (tamper-resistant memory area) .61 that cannot be accessed by the conventional command. As shown in FIG. 10, the card 100 has a tamper resistant module (TRM) 80 that can be accessed by an IC card command. ⁇ The security protection area 61 is normally accessible only from the card application. Conventional command for reading and writing from the terminal 200 cannot be accessed by the command receiving unit 101. Excluded.
- TRM tamper resistant module
- the memory card according to the present invention can have a plurality of card applications installed therein. As shown in FIG. 11, a security protection area 61 is provided for each application in an individual area (AP 1 area 71). ⁇ AP3 area 73) can be assigned.
- the security protection area 61 is encrypted with a storage encryption key (Ks) managed by the data control unit 103.
- This encryption key may be one Ks for the entire security protection area 61, or may be an AP 1 area 71- for each application.
- the storage encryption keys K s-1 to K s-3 may be individually prepared in the area # 3 for AP3. In the present embodiment, storage encryption keys Ks-1 to Ks-3 are prepared for each of the applications # 1 to # 3.
- the area 71 for the card application AP1 is given as an example.
- the inside of the AP1 area 71 is a data management using a hierarchical structure using directories DIH1, DIR2 and files FILE1 to FILE3.
- the card application AP1 moves a directory in the AP1 area 71, and reads and writes files FILE1 to FILE3 on directories DIR1 and DIR2 where target files exist.
- the force application AP1 accesses the file FILE3, it moves to the directory DIR1, then moves to the directory DIR2, and then reads and writes the file: FILE3.
- the directories D IR1 and D IR2 it is possible to create and delete lower directories or files.
- Each of the card application and the terminal 200 holds a pair of a public key and a secret key used in public key cryptography, and holds the other party's public key.
- the command form in the session key sharing procedure uses the above-described APDU.
- the command form is not described, but simply referred to as command APDU and response APDU.
- the terminal 200 selects a force application AP 1 by transmitting a SELE CT command APDU (step 901).
- the SELECT command APDU is a command A that specifies to which application inside the card 100 the following IC card command (command APDU) is sent. This is a PDU, and is transmitted using an APDU transmission command like other command APDUs.
- the card 100 returns a normal completion response APDU if the selection of the specified card application AP1 from the terminal 200 is completed normally, and returns an abnormal completion response APDU if not completed (step 902).
- the process 903 will be briefly described as a process for generating a DAT A 2 that enables access to the selected card application AP 1. Details of the processing 903 will be described with reference to the flowchart in FIG. -The terminal 200 generates a random number Rh (step S9031), and combines the random number Rh with the file name of the file FI LE 3 shown in FIG.
- the public key corresponding to the stored private key Pr i S is encrypted with PubS to generate DATA 1 (step S 9032), and the public key P ub H corresponding to the private key P ri H held by the terminal 200 is indicated.
- the identifier 1111 > 0—? 1111311 and 087781 are combined to generate 08chome2 (step S9033).
- the terminal 200 transmits the REQ-DATA including the DATA2 generated in step S9033.
- the card application AP 1 extracts DATA 1 from the DAT A2, decrypts it with the secret key Pr i S held by the password application AP 1, and obtains a random number and a file name FI LE 3 (step S9051). ).
- a random number: Rs is generated (step S 9053), and the access valid table shown in FIG. 47 is enabled so that the file 200 can be accessed by the security protected area access command from the terminal 200.
- the terminal 200 assigns the area number X to be used when the terminal 200 accesses using the security protected area access command to the file FI LE 3 and, together with the file size SIZE 3, the area / session key management unit 111 (Step S9054).
- the area number refers to information to be included in the access area specification information transmitted by the access area specification command when the terminal 200 performs access by the security protection area access command.
- step S 9055 the random number Rs, the area number X, and the file size SI ZE 3 are combined to generate DAT A3 (step S 9055), and DATA 3 is encrypted with the public key PubH of the terminal 200 and DAT A 4 Is generated (step S9056).
- step S9057 an exclusive-OR operation is performed on the random number Rs and the random number Rh to generate a random number R (step S9057), and a cryptographic session key Kd and a verification session key Km are generated from the random number R (step S9058). .
- the session keys Kd and Km are associated with the area number X and stored in the area / section key management unit 111 (step S9059).
- the card 100 transmits a response APDU including DATA4 to the terminal 200 to the terminal 200 (step 906).
- Terminal 200 that has received the response APDU extracts DATA4 from the response APDU, and executes processing 907. For more information about this process 907, see This will be described with reference to the flowchart in FIG.
- the terminal 200 decrypts the DATA4 using the secret key P: ⁇ iH of the terminal 200 to obtain the DATA3 (step S9907).
- the terminal 200 obtains a random number R s from DATA 3, performs an exclusive OR operation on the random number: R s and the random number R h, and generates a random number R (step S 9 07 2), A cryptographic session key Kd and a verification sesion key Km are generated from the random number R (step S9073).
- the file name transmitted from the terminal 200 to the card 100 in step 904 does not need to directly indicate a file managed by the card application, but indicates which file the card application points to. Any form that can be recognized and recognized is acceptable.
- each card application has a hierarchical structure consisting of directories and files as shown in Fig. 12, and data is managed by directory names and file names.
- the assigned area may be divided into appropriate sizes, and an identifier such as a number may be assigned to each of the divided areas and managed. In that case, as shown in Figure 13 The identifier is used in place of the file name FILE 3 used in the processing procedure described above.
- FIG. 17 the solid line indicates the transfer on the CMD line 22 and the dotted line indicates the transfer on the DATE line 27.
- the terminal 200 transmits an access area designation command, which is a memory card command, to the card 100 (step 1301).
- This access area designation command has the format shown in FIG. 9, and is composed of a 6-bit command code 401 and a 32-bit command argument 402.
- the command argument 4002 in the access area specification command is, as shown in Fig. 18, a flag 14401 indicating that the data input to the DAT0 line 27 is the access area specification information. It consists of 1403, which indicates the number of transmissions. When the total of the flag 101 and the transmission data number 1403 is less than 32 bits, an unused field 1442 exists.
- the data input to the DAT0 line 27 is in units of 512 bytes, and the transmission data number 1443 indicates how many times the input in units of 512 bytes is performed.
- the command receiving unit 101 of the force 100 receives the command transmitted from the terminal 200, recognizes that the command is an access area designation command, and returns a response to the terminal. At the same time, it notifies the data control unit 103 that it has received the access area designation command (step 1302).
- the terminal 200 receives a response to the access area designation command from the CMD line 22 of the card 100, and stores the access area designation information 1 in the format shown in FIG. Enter 702 (step 1303).
- the length indicated by 1701 in FIG. 21 indicates the length of the subsequent access area designation information 1702.
- the number of transmission data 1404 of the command bow number 402 is set.
- the total length is not necessarily a multiple of 512 bytes Since there is no padding, add padding 1703 to be a multiple of 512 bytes.
- the access area designation information 1702 includes an area number 1801 specifying the area number X notified from the card in step 906 of FIG.
- the access start address 1802 that can be selected within the range of the file size SIZE 3 also notified from the card, and 1 or more (file size SIZE 3-access start address 1802) It consists of an access data size 1803 that can be selected within the range.
- the data transmission / reception unit 102 inside the card receives the access area designation information 1702 input from the terminal, and sends the access area designation information 107 to the data overnight control unit 103. Notify that 0 2 has been received.
- the data control unit 103 reads out the access area designation information 1702 from the data transmission / reception unit 102, and the error number 1801 is stored in the step S9504 in FIG. Check that the area number X is assigned to the file, and whether the access start address and access data size are within the file size range of the file corresponding to the area number X. Set the error flag to ON.
- the overnight control section 103 stores the access area designation information 1702 in the parameter overnight storage section 109 shown in FIG. 3 (specifically, the area number 1801 and the access number).
- the start address 1802 and the access data size 1803) are stored.
- the above is the processing for specifying the access area.
- the terminal 200 transmits a security area read command to the card 100 (step 1304).
- the security protection area read command is in the format shown in FIG. 8, and is composed of a 6-bit command code 401 and a 32-bit command bow number 402.
- the command argument 402 in the security protection area read command is determined by checking whether the terminal that transmitted the security protection area read command is the same as the terminal 200 that transmitted the access area designation command, and also through the security key sharing procedure. A verification data for verifying whether the terminal 200 is the same as the terminal 200 confirmed to have the access right to the area indicated by the area number.
- the access area designation command 1702 is a parameter input to the DATE line 27 in the access area designation command.
- the verification key 2101 is the verification session key Km generated in step 907 of FIG. -
- the verification data generation unit 203 inside the terminal 200 is a module that performs cryptographic operations, and generates verification data to be included in the security protected area access (read or write) command.
- a MAC (Message Authentication Code) generation process called DES-MAC is performed.
- the MAC generation process using the DES encryption with the verification key 2101 is used as the input data with 2102, which is the padding data 2170 added to the access area setting information 1702, as input data.
- the MAC data is created as the verification data 210.
- the terminal 200 may transmit the access area designation command to the card 1000 together with the access area designation information 1702,
- the padding data generated based on the padding generation rules agreed between the terminal and the card in advance may be given.
- the verification data is created using DES-MAC, but another algorithm may be used. Furthermore, the verification algorithm may be selectable according to the application.
- the terminal 200 does not need to be authenticated or authenticated, and only wants to confirm the association with the access area designation command, simply use SHA 1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1 or MDo) without using encryption processing. (Message Digest o Dubbing Rhythm May be used as the verification data.
- SHA 1 Secure Hash Algorithm 1 or MDo
- the terminal 200 generates a 32-bit verification data by the above-described verification data generation processing, and uses it as an argument of the security protection area read command.
- the command receiving section 101 of the card 100 0 receives the command transmitted from the terminal 200, recognizes that the command is a security protection area read command, and accesses the access area designation information 170 0 If the error flag for 2 is set to ON, an error is returned as a response. If the error flag relating to the access area specification information 1 ⁇ 02 is not set to ⁇ N, a normal response is returned to the terminal as shown in FIG. Notify the evening control unit 103 that the security protected area read command has been received, and pass the verification data 210 4 given as the command bow I number 402 to the parameter verification unit 108. .
- the terminal 200 receives a response to the security area read command from the CMD line 22 of the card 100, 1 1 0 Rain 2 7 or La Defense Isseki is waiting to be output.
- the parameter overnight verification unit 1108 of the card 100 is provided from the terminal 200 by the access area specifying command from the parameter overnight storage unit 109, and the stored access area specifying information 1 7 0 is read out, and the verification session key K m corresponding to the area number X (1801) included in the access area specification information 1702 and stored in step S9905 in FIG. 15 is used. From the area's section key management unit 111.
- the parameter overnight verification unit 1108 of the card 100 uses the verification session key K m and the access area designation information 1702 to generate the verification data generation process shown in FIG. To generate the verification data 1904.
- the verification data generation processing is the same as the verification data generation processing by the terminal 200 shown in FIG. Detailed description is omitted.
- the parameter verification unit 108 of the card 100 verifies the verification data 1904 generated in the verification data generation processing above and the security protection area read command from the terminal 200.
- the verification data 504 given by the argument is compared, and if they do not match, an error is detected and the process does not proceed to the data reading process. If they match, it notifies the data controller 103 that the process will shift to the next data read processing.
- the data overnight control unit 103 of the card 100 reads the access area designation information 1702 from the parameter overnight storage unit 109, acquires the area number X included therein, Recognize the file FILE 3 corresponding to the area number from the area session key management unit 1 1 1
- the data control unit 103 of the card 100 confirms that the file FILE3 is an area for the application AP1, and acquires the storage encryption key Ks-1.
- the data control unit 103 of the card 100 obtains the access start address 1802 and the access data size 1803 from the access area designation information 1 ⁇ 02, and For the area managed as FILE 3, an access start address 1802 is offset, and an access data size 1803 is read out, and a data read request is made to the memory access unit 104 as a read size.
- the data control unit 103 of the card 100 sends the data read out by the memory access unit 104 to the encryption / decryption unit 107 to store the encryption key K s ⁇ 1. Request to decrypt.
- the data control unit 103 of the card 100 encrypts the data decrypted by the encryption / decryption unit 107 with the encryption / decryption unit 107 using the encryption session key Kd. Request to do so.
- the data control unit 103 of the card 100 transmits the data encrypted by the decryption unit 107 with the encryption session key Kd to the data transmission / reception unit 102 at the terminal. Request transmission to 200.
- the data in the security protection area can be output from the card 100 in a state where it is encrypted by the session key Kd.
- the terminal 200 recognizes that data can be output from the card 100, and as shown in FIG. 17, the terminal 200 is encrypted from the DAT 0 line 27 by the session key Kd.
- the data is obtained (step 1306), and the data is decrypted with the encryption session key K d held by the terminal, and the data of the area specified by the access area specification information 1702 is obtained. .
- Step 2001 Transmission of an access area designation command from the terminal 200 (step 2001), a response to the command from the card 100 (step 2002), and transmission of access area designation information (step 200) 0 3) is the same as the steps 13 01 to 13 03 in the read processing for the security protection area shown in FIG. 17, respectively, and therefore the description is omitted.
- the terminal 200 After performing Steps 2001 to 203, the terminal 200 transmits a security protection area write command to the card 100 (Step 204).
- This security protection area write command is in the format shown in FIG. 8, and is composed of a 6-bit command code 401 and a 32-bit command bow I number 402.
- the command argument 4002 in the security protection area read command is determined based on whether the terminal 200 transmitting the security protection area read command is the same as the terminal 200 transmitting the access area designation command, and the session key sharing. It is composed of verification data 1904 for verifying that it is the same as the terminal 200 that has been confirmed through the procedure to have access authority to the area indicated by the area number X.
- the method of generating the verification data is the same as that of the security protection area read command, and a detailed description thereof will be omitted.
- the terminal 200 generates 32 bits of verification data by the verification data generation process, and uses it as an argument of the security protection area write command.
- the command receiving section 101 of the card 1000 receives the command transmitted from the terminal 200, recognizes that the command is a security protection area write command, and accesses the access area designation information 1700. If the error flag for 2 is set, an error is returned as a response.
- a normal response is returned from the CMD line 222 to the terminal 200 (step 2005), and the The control unit 103 is notified that the security protection area write command has been received, and passes the verification data 504 given as a command argument to the parameter verification unit 108.
- the terminal 200 receives a response to the security protection area write command from the CMD line 22 of the card 100, and inputs data to the DAT0 line 27.
- the data to be input to the DAT0 line 27 is data that has been encrypted with the encryption session key Kd generated in step 907 of FIG.
- the input data size is the same as the access data size specified in the access area specification information 1702.
- the following describes the process of storing data in a secure area by using a card.
- the parameter overnight verification unit 1108 of the card 100 is provided from the terminal 200 by the access area specifying command from the parameter overnight storage unit 109, and the stored access area specifying information 1 7 0 is read out, and the verification session key Km stored in step 9 059 in FIG. 15 corresponding to the area number X (1 8 0 1) included in the access area designation information 1 720 is stored in the area. -Acquired from session key management unit 1 1 1.
- the verification data generation unit 1903 inside the parameter verification unit 108 of the card 100 uses the verification session key Km and the access area designation information 1702 to The verification data generation process shown in FIG. 24 is performed to generate the verification data 1904.
- the verification data generation processing is the same as the verification data generation processing by the terminal shown in FIG. 23, and thus a detailed description is omitted.
- the parameter verification unit 1108 of the card 1001 compares the verification data 1904 generated above with the verification data given by the argument of the security area write command from the terminal 200.
- E21 Compare the two. If they do not match, an error is detected and the processing does not shift to data write processing. If they match, it notifies the data controller 103 that the process will proceed to the next data write process.
- the data storage unit 109 of the card 100 reads the access area designation information 1 102 from the parameter storage unit 109, and acquires the area number X included therein.
- the area 'session key management unit 111 recognizes the file FILE 3 corresponding to the area number.
- the data transmission / reception unit 102 of the card 100 receives the data input from the terminal 200.
- the data control unit 103 of the card 100 stores the file corresponding to the area 71 for the application AP 1. Obtain the encryption key K s — 1 for use.
- the decryption control section 103 of the card 100 decrypts the data received by the decryption transmission / reception section 102 with the encryption / decryption section 100 using the encryption session key Kd.
- the decryption control unit 103 of the card 100 sends the decryption data decrypted by the encryption / decryption unit 107 to the encryption / decryption unit 107 to store the encryption key K s-1 Requires encryption.
- the data control unit 103 of the card 100 obtains the access start address 1802 and the access data size 1803 from the access area designation information 1702, and For the area managed as FILE 3, access start address 1802 is offset and access data size 1803 is written. As a result, a data write request is made to the memory access unit 104.
- the data decrypted with the session key Kd input by the terminal 200 is encrypted with the storage key Ks-1 and stored in the flash memory 105.
- the sharing of the security key and the sharing of the report on the accessible area are performed simultaneously by one command, but they may be performed as separate commands.
- the sharing of the security key and the sharing of the information on the accessible area are simultaneously performed by one command, but may be performed by another command.
- a memory card capable of receiving a command for an IC card and a command for memory access as in the present invention is used by a force application, and is normally accessible only through a force application.
- the terminal can access the security protected area where access from the terminal is restricted by using a memory access command by mutual authentication between the terminal and the card application and setting the card application to be accessible. It is possible.
- the mutual authentication between the terminal application and the terminal for setting the access by the terminal application is not by using the memory access command with limited application but by using the IC card command.
- the mutual authentication method can be flexibly selected according to the security level of the day.
- the command for specifying the access area and the command for accessing the security protection area are separated, and the command for accessing the security protection area is used.
- Including the verification data in the terminal application, the terminal application that specified the access area, the terminal application that issued the security protection area access command, and the terminal application that holds the verification key are the same.
- the card can verify this.
- by performing verification and encryption session key sharing processing for each security protection area access an appropriate value is set as the verification data to be included in the security protection area access, and repeated unauthorized access is performed. Defensiveness can be increased. ⁇
- the module configuration in the card will be described with reference to FIG. Since the terminal configuration of the card 500 in FIG. 26 is the same as that shown in FIG. 4, its illustration and description are omitted.
- the modules in the card 500 are connected to the CMD line, receive processing commands 501 for receiving commands and transmitting responses, a storage area 506 for storing data, and a storage area 500.
- a storage area access means 505 for performing an access process to the storage device 6; and a data transmission means 502 connected to the DAT line and transmitting the data read by the storage area access means 505 to an external device.
- a data receiving means 503 which is also connected to the DAT line and receives data from an external device, and a specified information verifying means 504 which verifies the specified information received by the processing instruction receiving means 501.
- the module in the terminal 600 includes a processing command transmitting unit 604 for transmitting a command to the card 500 and receiving a response, a data transmitting unit 605 for performing a data transmission to the card 550, A data receiving means 6 06 for receiving data overnight from the card 500, a designated information determining means 600 1 for determining an area to be accessed, and Verification information generation means 6002 for generating verification information from the information, and data storage means 603 for storing data received from the card 500 and data transmitted to the card 500. Become.
- the terminal 600 determines the area to be read-accessed or written-accessed by the designated information determining means 6001 (step S2601), and generates access area designation information (step S2602). ).
- the access area designation information is stored in the data storage means 603, and an area designation command is transmitted from the processing command transmission means 604 to the power source 500 (step S603).
- Fig. 29 shows an example of the data part of the area designation command.
- the data input to the DAT line 27 is in units of 512 bytes, and the data portion of the area setting instruction is composed of the length field 2710 of the access area designation information 27 02 and If the total length of the access area specification information field 2702 is less than 512 bytes, padding 2703 is added.
- the length field 270 1 has a length of 2 bytes
- the access area designation information 270 2 has a 1-byte area number 280 as shown in FIG. It consists of an access start address of 28 bytes and a 3-byte access data size of 28 bytes. In other words, the total is 9 bytes, which is less than 5 12 bytes, so padding 2703 of 5103 bytes is added.
- the card 500 receives the area designation command from the designated information verification means 504.
- Verification of specified information Means 504 treats the area designation command as invalid if the designated area is not correct (step S2666). If the specified area is correct, the access area specification information # 2702 is saved, and the access area specification information 2702 and the key shared between the terminal 600 and the terminal 500 are stored. Is used to generate the comparison information (step S2607) o
- Fig. 29 shows an example of a method for generating comparison information.
- the verification data generator 2902 is a module for performing cryptographic operations, and in the present embodiment, performs processing for generating a MAC (Message Authentication Code) called DESS-MAC.
- the input is the data portion 2704 of the area designation command and the verification key 2901 shared by the terminal 6-0.
- the output result of DES-MAC is 64 bits, in the present embodiment, since the verification information transmitted from the terminal 600 to be compared is 32 bits, the output is truncated. Only the first 32 bits, which is 903, are used as the comparison information 2904.
- the verification key 2901 may be an individual and fixed key corresponding to the area number, or may be a single key regardless of the area number.
- a verification key sharing means 700 is provided inside the card 700
- a verification key sharing means 800 is provided inside the terminal 800.
- the verification key may be changed between the card 700 and the terminal 800 every time the security protected area is accessed.
- the same components as those shown in FIGS. 26 and 27 are denoted by the same reference numerals.
- the terminal 800 generates a random number R a in the verification key sharing means 800 1, generates a session key sharing request command APDU including the random number Ra, and sends the processing instruction transmitting means 6.
- the AP DU transmission command is transmitted to the card 700 (step S3201), and the session key sharing request command AP DU is transmitted from the data transmission means 605 to the card 700.
- Yes Step S 3 2 0 2) o
- the card 700 receives the APDU transmission command from the terminal 800 by the processing command receiving means 501, and the session key sharing request command APDU received from the terminal 800 by the overnight receiving means 503 to the verification key sharing means 701. Pass to.
- the verification key sharing means 801 generates a random number Rb, and as shown in FIG. 35, combines the random number Ra received from the terminal 800 and the random number Rb with the terminal 800 in advance. Performs encryption processing (DES-MAC processing) using the master key K, and generates a session key R.
- the card 700 generates a response APDU including the random number Rb.
- the terminal 800 transmits an APDU reception command to the force 700 from the processing command transmission means 604 (step S3203).
- the card 700 receives the APDU reception command from the terminal 800 by the processing instruction receiving means 501, and transmits the response APDU including the random number Rb created earlier to the terminal 800 from the data transmission means 502 (step S3204). ).
- the terminal 800 receives the response APDU from the hardware 700 by the data receiving means 606 and passes it to the verification key sharing means 801.
- the verification key sharing means 8001 previously shares the random number Ra generated by itself and the random number included in the response A PDU with the card 700 in advance.
- the encryption key (DES-MAC processing) is performed using the key K and the session key R is generated.
- the above is the verification key sharing procedure between the terminal 800 and the card 700 when the session key is changed each time the security protected area is accessed.
- DES-MAC is used in this embodiment, other encryption algorithms may be used. If it is not necessary to verify whether the terminal 800 is valid, that is, whether the terminal 800 has the same key, for example, only verify that the access area specification information 2702 of the area specification instruction is what the terminal intends. Do In this case, the cryptographic processing is not used, and the result of the SHA-1 operation or the hash operation or the checksum operation using the MD5 algorithm in the verification data generating unit 3401, as shown in Fig. 36, is used. Can be used as comparison information. Even when these algorithms are used, if the comparison target is 32 bits long, the output result is truncated, and only 32 bits of the output result are set as the comparison information 340 3.
- the terminal 800 shares the access area designation information 2702 with the verification data generation unit and the terminal 800 and the card 700. Verification information is generated from the verification key 290 1 (step S 260 8).
- FIG. 37 shows the generation of this verification information.
- the verification information generation unit 3502 performs the encryption process using the verification key 3501 and the data designation part 2704 of the area designation instruction to generate the verification information 3504.
- the generation method is exactly the same as the generation method of the comparison information 290 4 in the card 700 shown in FIG.
- the terminal 800 puts the generated verification information 3504 in the argument of the access command. (Read), and transmits the access command from the processing command transmitting means 604 ( Step S609).
- the access instruction has the format shown in FIG. 38, and the length of the command code 3601 and the length of the command argument 3652 are 6 bits and 32 bits, respectively.
- the verification information 3504 is stored in the command bow function 3602.
- the force command 700 receives the access command (read) by the processing command receiving means 501 (step S2610), and the designated information verification means 50 Confirm in advance whether or not the area designation instruction has been completed normally (step S2611). If the area designation command has not been received or has not been completed normally because the specified area is incorrect, the terminal 800 is notified of the access command as an error (step S2612). . At this time, the terminal 800 receives the error from the card 700 (step S2612A).
- the designated information verification means 504 The comparison information 2904 created by the card 700 earlier is compared with the verification information 3504 stored in the command argument of the access command (step S2613). As a result of the comparison, if the verification information 3504 is invalid, the access command is notified to the terminal 800 as an error (step S2614). At this time, the terminal 800 receives an error from the input terminal 700 (step S2614A;).
- the designated information verification means 504 4 notifies the storage area access means 505 of the access area designation information 270 2, and the storage area access means 505 is the storage area 5 Data is read out from the area designated by the access area designation information 2 7 0 2 in 0 6, and the data is transmitted from the data transmission means 5 0 2 to the terminal 8 0 0 (step S 2 6 1 Five ) .
- the terminal 800 receives the read data transmitted from the card 700 by the data receiving means 606 (step S2616), and stores the data stored in the data storing means 600. Store in 3.
- the command for specifying the access area and the command for accessing the security protection area are separated and the security protection area access is performed.
- the card can verify that the options are the same.
- the terminal 800 sends a random number acquisition command from the terminal 800 to the card 700 (step S3701), and the card 700 generates a random number T.
- the random number T is stored in the designated information verifying means 504 inside the card 700, and is transmitted from the data transmitting means 502 to the terminal 800 (step S3702).
- the terminal 800 receives the random number transmitted from the card 700 by the overnight receiving means 606 (step S3703).
- the comparison information generation processing at step 700 (step S 2607) and the verification information generation processing at terminal 800 (step S 2 6 0 8) is a combination of the random number ⁇ and the data section 2 704 of the area designation instruction, as shown in Fig. 40 and Fig. 41. 380 4 and verification information 390 are output.
- -As described above by using random number information for generation of verification information, even if verification information is created using the same area designation information and verification key, the verification information that is output because the random number information changes Because security changes, security strength can be further improved.
- the module in the card is connected to the CMD line, and receives processing command receiving means 910 for receiving commands and transmitting responses, storage area 906 for storing data, and storage area 906.
- a storage area access means 905 which performs access processing of the storage area; and a data transmission means 902 which is connected to the DAT line and transmits the data read by the storage area access means 905 to an external device.
- a designated information verifier that verifies the designated information received via the shareable area information sharing unit 907 and the data receiving means 903 with a verification key.
- Step 904 consists of
- the terminal module includes a processing command transmitting unit 1004 for transmitting a command to the card 900 and receiving a response, a data transmitting unit 1005 for performing a data transmission to the card 900, and a data receiving unit for receiving data from the card 900.
- Communication means 1006 specified information determining means 1001 for determining an area to be accessed, a possible area information sharing unit 1007 for sharing information on an area accessible by a security protected area access command, and verification information from the specified information. It comprises: verification information generating means 1002 to be generated; and data storage means 1003 for storing data received from the card 900 and data transmitted to the card 900.
- the terminal 1000 determines the area A where read access or write access is to be performed by the designated information determining means 1001 (step S4201), and the security for the area A is determined by the available area information sharing unit 1007.
- a command requesting that access by the protected area access command be permitted is transmitted from the processing instruction transmitting means 1004 to the card 900 from the processing command transmitting means 1004 to the card 900 (step S4202).
- the card 900 which has received the area release request command decrypts the encrypted data included in the command with the available area information sharing means 907 with the secret key Pr i S of the force 900 (step S 4203).
- the terminal 10 It is checked whether or not 00 is permitted to access the area A (step S4205).
- the data transmission means 902 transmits a message indicating that the area release has failed as the response APDU to the terminal 1000 (step S4206). If the access is permitted, the identifier a of the area A and the area number X assigned to the area A are stored in the designated information verifying means 904, and the access validity table for setting whether or not access by the security protection area access command is permitted. Registered in the table 4400 (see FIG. 46) (step S4207). Next, the verification key R corresponding to the area A is registered in the access valid table 4400 (step S4208).
- the area number X and the size of the area A are encrypted using the public key Pub H of the terminal 1000, and transmitted from the overnight transmitting means 902 to the terminal 1000 as a response APt) U (step S4209).
- the terminal 1000 transmits an APDU reception command from the processing command transmission means 1004 to the card 900, and acquires the response APDU from the card 900 using the overnight reception means 1006 (step S4210).
- the method of acquiring the response APDU is the same as the method described in the first embodiment, and a detailed description thereof will be omitted.
- the possible area information sharing means 1007 of the terminal 1000 decrypts the encrypted data included in the response APDU with the terminal 1000's own secret key P riH (step S4211), and outputs the area number X and the area number X. Obtain the size of the area A indicated by.
- the terminal 1000 registers the session key corresponding to the area A in the verification information generating means 1002.
- the area number X is registered in the designated information determining means 1001 in order to generate access area designation information (step S4212). Thereafter, the flow shifts to the flowchart of FIG.
- the terminal 1000 sends the access area designation information using the area number X registered by the possible area information sharing means 1007 in the designated information decision means 1001. Generate (Step S 4 2 1 3).
- this access area designation information is stored in the data storage section 270 4 (see FIG. 29), and the area designation command is transmitted from the processing command transmission means 100 4 to the card 900 (step S 4 2 1 4). Since the access area designation information in the area designation instruction is the same as in the second embodiment, a detailed description is omitted.
- the designated information verification means 9 ⁇ 4 accesses the area. Check the specified information, and check whether the area number X is registered in the access valid table 4400 or the area based on the access start address 2802 and access data size 2803 shown in Fig. 30. It is determined whether it is within the range of A (step S4216). If the designated area is not correct, the designated information verifying means 904 treats the area designation command as invalid (step S 4217).
- the access area specification information is saved, and the comparison information is generated using the access area specification information and the verification key R corresponding to the area A registered in the access validity table 4400 ( Step S 4 2 1 8).
- the method of generating the comparison information is the same as that of the second embodiment, and a detailed description is omitted.
- the terminal 1000 generates verification information using the access area designation information by the verification information generating means 1002 and the session key R registered by the available area information sharing unit 1007. (Step S 4 219), and transmits the access command from the processing command transmission means 100 1 to the input port 900, with the parameter being included in the argument of the access command (read) (Step S 422). 0).
- the method of generating the verification information and the method of transmitting the access command are the same as those in the second embodiment, and thus a detailed description is omitted.
- the card 900 receives the access command (read) by the processing command receiving means 901 (step S4221), and the designated information verification means 904 preliminarily stores the area. It is checked whether the specified command has been completed normally (step S4222). If the area designation command has not been received or has not been completed normally because the specified area is incorrect, etc., the access command is notified to the terminal 1000 as an error. (Step S 4 2 2 3). At this time, the terminal 1000 receives the error from the force 900 (step S4223A;).
- the designated information verification means 904 compares the comparison information created by the card 900 with the verification information stored in the argument of the access command (step S 4 2 2 4). As a result of the comparison, if the verification information is invalid, the access command is passed to the terminal 1000 as an error (step S4225). At this time, the terminal 1000 receives the error from the card 900 (step S4225A)
- the specified information verification means 904 notifies the storage area access means 905 of the specified information, and the storage area access means 905 selects the data in the storage area 906.
- the data is read from the area designated by the area designation command, and the data is transmitted from the data transmission means 902 to the terminal 100 (step S4226).
- the terminal 1000 receives the read data transmitted from the card 900 by the data receiving means 1006 and stores it in the data storing means 1003 (step S 4 2 2 7)
- the terminal 1000 creates an area invalidation command APDU for invalidating the area number X corresponding to the area A when the security protected area access command to the area A becomes unnecessary. Then, the data is transmitted from the data transmission means 1005 to the card 900 (step S42228).
- the card 900 that has received the area invalidation command APDU searches the access valid table 4400 and finds the area number X, and if it finds the area number X, the area identifier assigned to the area number X in the table. a, The registration of the area number X is deleted together with the session key R, and the access by the security area access command to the area A in which the area number X is designated is invalidated (step S 4229).
- a certain area in the security protection area can be accessed by the security protection area access command only when necessary, by an area release request, and when it becomes unnecessary, the area is disabled by an area invalidation request. Can increase security by disabling access to
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US10/527,820 US7559090B2 (en) | 2003-07-16 | 2004-07-15 | Memory, information apparatus for access to the memory, and method for the information apparatus |
EP04747821.9A EP1560120B1 (en) | 2003-07-16 | 2004-07-15 | Access method |
IL167269A IL167269A (en) | 2003-07-16 | 2005-03-07 | Access method |
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JP2003-275672 | 2003-07-16 | ||
JP2003275672 | 2003-07-16 | ||
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WO2005008502A1 true WO2005008502A1 (ja) | 2005-01-27 |
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US (1) | US7559090B2 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP1560120B1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP4624732B2 (ja) |
KR (2) | KR100976020B1 (ja) |
IL (1) | IL167269A (ja) |
TW (2) | TW200513866A (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2005008502A1 (ja) |
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- 2004-07-15 WO PCT/JP2004/010432 patent/WO2005008502A1/ja active Application Filing
- 2004-07-15 KR KR1020067026371A patent/KR100976020B1/ko active IP Right Grant
- 2004-07-15 US US10/527,820 patent/US7559090B2/en active Active
- 2004-07-15 EP EP04747821.9A patent/EP1560120B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2004-07-15 TW TW096126611A patent/TW200821953A/zh not_active IP Right Cessation
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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US7559090B2 (en) | 2009-07-07 |
JP4624732B2 (ja) | 2011-02-02 |
IL167269A (en) | 2010-02-17 |
KR20070009740A (ko) | 2007-01-18 |
EP1560120B1 (en) | 2019-09-04 |
US20050246546A1 (en) | 2005-11-03 |
KR100723762B1 (ko) | 2007-05-30 |
TWI366104B (ja) | 2012-06-11 |
EP1560120A4 (en) | 2008-10-29 |
TWI354898B (ja) | 2011-12-21 |
KR100976020B1 (ko) | 2010-08-17 |
JP2005050320A (ja) | 2005-02-24 |
EP1560120A1 (en) | 2005-08-03 |
TW200513866A (en) | 2005-04-16 |
KR20060024317A (ko) | 2006-03-16 |
TW200821953A (en) | 2008-05-16 |
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