WO2004021663A1 - Procede et dispositif pour identifier des donnees utiles push de façon specifique aux sources de donnees - Google Patents

Procede et dispositif pour identifier des donnees utiles push de façon specifique aux sources de donnees Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2004021663A1
WO2004021663A1 PCT/DE2003/002535 DE0302535W WO2004021663A1 WO 2004021663 A1 WO2004021663 A1 WO 2004021663A1 DE 0302535 W DE0302535 W DE 0302535W WO 2004021663 A1 WO2004021663 A1 WO 2004021663A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
push
mms
data
pnu
message
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/DE2003/002535
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Andreas Schmidt
Markus Trauberg
Original Assignee
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Aktiengesellschaft filed Critical Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Publication of WO2004021663A1 publication Critical patent/WO2004021663A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/04—Protocols specially adapted for terminals or networks with limited capabilities; specially adapted for terminal portability
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/50—Network services
    • H04L67/55—Push-based network services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
    • H04L69/30—Definitions, standards or architectural aspects of layered protocol stacks
    • H04L69/32—Architecture of open systems interconnection [OSI] 7-layer type protocol stacks, e.g. the interfaces between the data link level and the physical level
    • H04L69/322—Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions
    • H04L69/329—Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions in the application layer [OSI layer 7]

Definitions

  • messages or data can be downloaded to a user's subscriber device from a component of the network in an uncontrollable manner for the user. Even if a notification message arrives at the subscriber device of the respective user that data or messages are held ready for retrieval on the network side, it remains too opaque for the user as to who the sender of this notification and the provider of this data actually is. This makes wrong decisions when downloading data by the respective user possible and there is also a risk of misuse of such notification messages.
  • the invention is based on the object of demonstrating a way in which it can be ensured for the respective user of a subscriber device of a communication network that push data or push messages provided on the network side come from a data source which is trustworthy for the respective user. This object is achieved with the aid of the following method according to the invention:
  • Method for data source-specific identification of push user data in a communication network which is sent from at least one push initiator via at least one push proxy gateway to at least one push client without being requested to do so by using the push initiator or push Proxy gateway part or all of the push user data can be provided with at least one signature using an asymmetrical cryptography method.
  • the data source-specific identification of the respective push message using an asymmetrical cryptography method in the push initiator and / or push proxy gateway largely ensures that only such data or messages are selectively conveyed to the communication unit of the respective user which come from a known, trusted data source.
  • the invention further relates to a communication network with at least one device for data source-specific identification of push messages according to the inventive method.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of a pull mode in the transmission of data between a server and a client
  • Figure 2 is a schematic representation of a push mode in the transmission of data between one
  • WAP Wireless Application Protocol
  • FIG. 4 shows a schematic representation of the functionality of the push proxy gateway according to FIG. 3 in detail
  • FIG. 6 shows an exemplary push message "MMS notification" in textual coding for notifying a communication unit in a communication network of the presence on the network of retrievable data or messages, in particular multimedia data, and
  • FIGs 7, 8 different examples of the push message , MMS Notification "in textual coding according to Figure 6 with a digital signature for data source-specific identification according to the invention.
  • This pull function is designated in FIG. 1 by PLM.
  • This push mode is designated by PSM in FIG. 2.
  • WAP Wireless Access Protocol
  • WAP forum the push procedure for the transmission of data between a server and a client, which is located on a mobile device, in particular a radio communication device.
  • the respective server i.e.
  • the network component that provides the user data to be transmitted and possibly additional control commands is referred to as the so-called push initiator. It sends the user data (possibly including the additional control commands) to a push proxy gateway, which sends the data it sends
  • a gateway takes over an interface function for the transmission connection between the respective server and its associated receiving units receiving push messages.
  • a push proxy gateway also evaluates any existing control commands for the delivery of the user data in push mode and controls the correct execution of the user data transmission between the push proxy gateway and the respectively assigned push client, ie the respective receiving unit of the push messages or push data sent.
  • This push functionality of a push proxy gateway can expediently be integrated into a conventional, "normal" WAP gateway.
  • WAP gateway and push proxy gateway it is also possible to use two separate functional units, namely WAP gateway and push proxy gateway, to be provided with a clear division of tasks in the respective communication network.
  • FIG. 3 schematically illustrates a push architecture in WAP for the distribution of push messages in a radio communication network.
  • a push initiator PI sends push messages PNA, which contain control information in addition to push user data PNU, via at least one transmission path UPI to an assigned push proxy gateway PPG, which further delivers the push user data PNU im
  • WAP PAP Push Access Protocol
  • HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  • OTA Over The Air
  • the interface in the transmission connection UPI between the push initiator PI and the push proxy gateway PPG which is based on the WAP PAP protocol, is designated by SB.
  • the interface for the transmission of the push user data PNU between the push proxy gateway PPG and the push client PC with the aid of the push OTA protocol OTAP is indicated in FIG. 3 by the reference symbol SA.
  • the interface SA in particular also includes an air interface between a base station that sends push useful data and one or more radio communication devices in their radio cell.
  • FIG. 4 schematically illustrates how push user data PNU through a WAP gateway WAPG with an integrated push proxy
  • the push initiator P1 is provided as the sending communication unit of the server SV.
  • the push client PC is preferably part of a radio communication device, in particular a mobile terminal device UE, such as a mobile radio telephone.
  • the push initiator P1 of the server SV makes the push messages PNA to be sent conform to the WAP PAP protocol PAP by transferring them to its lower transmission protocol layers LLB.
  • the push messages PNA transmitted in such a modified manner via the interface SB are evaluated by the lower layers LLB of the WAP-PAP protocol in the WAP gateway WAPG and, with the aid of the gateway WAPG, to the lower layers LLA of the WAP- OTA protocol OTAP adapted to its format.
  • the push client PC in the user equipment UE can use the lower protocol layers LLA and its WAP-OTA protocol OTAP to correctly receive and evaluate the received push user data PNU.
  • MMS Multimedia Messaging Service
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • MMS Multimedia Message Service
  • a multimedia message can accordingly be composed of several multimedia elements of different file types (for example audio or still picture) and / or file formats (for still picture for example GIF or JPEG).
  • FIG. 5 shows the simplified network architecture according to 3GPP for the multimedia messaging service. It includes, for example, two multimedia messaging service relays / servers RSA, RSB of two different multimedia messaging service providers SPA, SPB.
  • the MMS relay / server RSA transmits push user data PNU to the communication units of a multiplicity of subscriber devices, in particular radio communication devices, of the communication network CN, the remaining components of which have been omitted in FIG. 5 for the sake of clarity.
  • FIG. 5 shows the simplified network architecture according to 3GPP for the multimedia messaging service. It includes, for example, two multimedia messaging service relays / servers RSA, RSB of two different multimedia messaging service providers SPA, SPB.
  • the MMS relay / server RSA transmits push user data PNU to the communication units of a multiplicity of subscriber devices, in particular radio communication devices
  • FIG. 5 shows only a single subscriber device UA of this group of subscriber devices, which is coupled to the relay / server RSA via an interface MM1.
  • one or more subscriber devices ÜB in particular radio communication devices, are assigned to the second MMS relay / server RSB of the second provider or service provider SPB with the aid of the interface MM1.
  • the two relay / servers RSA, RSB can communicate via an additional interface MM4, using the so-called SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) in particular in UMTS.
  • a communication unit in the form of a so-called MMS user agent is implemented in the respective subscriber device, such as UA, which is to receive and evaluate the push user data PNU from the MMS relay / server RSA.
  • MMS user agent is understood to be a sequence procedure that implements the multimedia messaging service.
  • This MMS user agent can preferably be provided on a radio communication device, in particular a mobile device, or on an additional device connected to a mobile device, such as a laptop or the like.
  • the communication unit or the push client of the respective push user data PNU receiving subscriber devices such as UA in Figure 5 first of all from the assigned MMS relay / server such as RSA by means of a so-called notification or inquiry message 'MMS Notification' about the arrival of a new multimedia message on the MMS relay / server, which can be downloaded there
  • the assigned MMS relay / server such as RSA
  • a lot of additional information (such as Sender, topic, etc.) for a multimedia message, which can be used by the MMS user agent of the recipient as a decision-making aid for the download.
  • the interface MM1 between the MMS Relay / Server RSA and the MMS User Agent of the subscriber device UA in Figure 5 is particularly by the WAP specifications WAP-205-MMS Architecture Overview; WAP Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) Specification Suite 2.0, WAP-206 MMS Client Transaction; WAP Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) Specification Suite 2.0, WAP-209-MMS Encapsulation; WAP Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) Specification Suite 2.0 defined in more detail.
  • WAP-205-MMS Architecture Overview WAP Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) Specification Suite 2.0, WAP-206 MMS Client Transaction
  • WAP Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) Specification Suite 2.0 defined in more detail.
  • the 'MMS notifications' are sent to the recipient in push mode according to the WAP push protocol (cf. specifications WAP-250, Push Architectural Overview, Version 03-July-2001, WAP-247, Push Access Protocol, Version 29-April-2001, WAP-235, Push Over The Air Protocol, Version 25-April-2001), ie the user data to be transmitted are first sent to a notification message 'MMS Notification' by the respective MMS relay / server as a push initiator, preferably wired to the push Transfer proxy gateway PPG.
  • WAP push protocol cf. specifications WAP-250, Push Architectural Overview, Version 03-July-2001, WAP-247, Push Access Protocol, Version 29-April-2001, WAP-235, Push Over The Air Protocol, Version 25-April-2001
  • the interface MM1 in Figure 5 corresponding to the 3GPP MMS architecture contains the two interfaces SA and SB for the push functionality according to the push architectures of Figures 3, 4.
  • a simple way of transmitting the data of the respective “MMS Notification” notification message about the presence of push messages to the receiving subscriber devices affected by this is that the data to be transmitted of the “MMS Notification” notification message are in a short Message or several short messages of the Short Messaging Service (SMS) are sent to the end device of the respective recipient.
  • SMS Short Messaging Service
  • a 'MMS Notification' formatted according to WAP-209-MMS Encapsulation; WAP Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) Specification Suite 2.0 is used in the case of MMS as a carrier for the push functionality with UDH (User Data Headers) - and WSP (Wellness Session Protocol) - header fields and written in the 140 byte transport container of the SMS (Short Message Service).
  • MMS Multimedia Messaging Service
  • UDH User Data Headers
  • WSP Wellness Session Protocol
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • the data received via SMS could, however, also simply be a correctly formatted data record with which an 'MMS notification' notification message is to be simulated, and which is actually from a sender (push initiator) other than the MMS relay / server actually expected
  • This other sender could use the URI (ie the reference to a storage space which is actually intended for the download of the multimedia message) in a simulated 'MMS Notification' notification message to download unwanted content such as advertising to the mobile terminal of the respective communication network participant.
  • This so-called 'spamming' is particularly annoying for the respective recipient in the case of 'immediate retrieval' in the multimedia messaging service (MMS), because in this mode his terminal automatically resolves the reference in the 'MMS notification' notification message and the download process to download the multimedia message from the assigned MMS relay / server independently, ie without user prompt.
  • MMS multimedia messaging service
  • push-user data is identified in a data source-specific manner by the fact that these push-user data are stored in the multimedia messaging relay / server or be partially or completely provided with at least one signature in the push proxy gateway using an asymmetrical cryptography method.
  • a push message is sent, its push payload data is provided with a unique identifier that allows authentication of the sending relay / server.
  • 'MMS Notification' - Notification messages about content provided by other providers They can thus be recognized and ignored in advance in the respective MMS user agent, which corresponds to filtering out or sorting out unwanted data. This largely avoids downloading unwanted content from the respective server.
  • the sender of a push message is checked by verifying a digital signature.
  • the multimedia messaging relay / server and / or the downstream push proxy gateway signs with a private cryptographic key
  • the signature generated in particular in the form of a so-called hash value, is sent from the relay / server and / or the push proxy gateway to the terminal of the respective receiver 5 in push mode
  • the public, cryptographic key of the asymmetrical cryptography procedure of the MMS provider is used in the terminal device to verify the Usage data supplied signature used.
  • the terminal device it can be checked in the telecommunications terminal of a recipient whether the data received in push mode actually comes from his own MMS provider, ie the terminal now has practically reliable origin filter functionality.
  • the mechanisms of asymmetric cryptography in the multimedia messaging relay / server and / or push proxy gateway are therefore used for reliable checking of push user data on the receiving end, in particular for checking 'MMS notification' messages arriving in push mode. to partially or completely sign the user data to be transmitted in the push mode.
  • the signature of the respective push user data / push message is selected either in the push initiator of the multimedia messaging relay / server or in its assigned push proxy gateway with a private key of the service provider or network operator performed while the verification of the signature in the respective telecommunication terminal with the matching public key of the service provider or • network operator takes place
  • This public key can be external either in an internal memory area of the respective terminal or in a.
  • SIM Subscriber Identity Module
  • UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card
  • There are memory areas on these cards that can only be written or updated by the network operator, and those for which the user also has write and read rights.
  • the service provider or network operator can easily increase the key length in this way in order to be able to meet new security requirements.
  • FIG. 6 shows an example of an 'MMS Notification' message in textual coding in the MMS.
  • MMS Multimedia Messaging Service
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • the data source-specific identification of the "MMS Notification" notification message in the MMS which is sent to the downloadable push messages from the MMS relay / server for downloading to one or more addressed communication units of subscriber devices, can expediently be carried out in the following four different ways:
  • the signature is appended to the URI reference as an extension, which is illustrated, for example, by the MMS notification message MNl * from FIG.
  • an MMS provider such as SPA from FIG. 5, would like to transmit the 'MMS notification' message shown in FIG. 6 to one of its customers, it signs the entry, ie the field value of the header field 'X-MMS content, for security reasons -Location 'http: // siemens .de / sal / mms-id with its private cryptographic key.
  • This signature is, for example, a hash value HW, which is added as an addition or extension to the previous field value (ie the actual URL) of the header field X-MMS-Content-Location at the end.
  • this hash value HW is then separated from the rest of the field value (ie from the actual URI) of the X-MMS content location header field.
  • the signature HW is then verified with the help of the public cryptographic key of the MMS provider in the terminal itself.
  • the public cryptographic key of the MMS provider can be read in, for example, from an external storage unit.
  • the signing of the field value of the header field X-MMS content location generates a hash value HW.
  • HW hash value
  • this is now not appended to the field value of the header value X-MMS-Content-Location, but in a specially defined header field X-MMS-Signature in the MMS notification- Notice message included.
  • MMS notification message MN1 ** provided with the private key from FIG. 8 the header field with the signature is added at the end of the message.
  • the complete push payload data with a signature of an asymmetrical cryptography method.
  • the push useful data was an 'MMS notification' notification message in the MMS
  • the entire 'MMS notification' notification message is thus provided with the private key of an asymmetrical cryptography method as a whole.
  • the signature is expediently carried out in the respective MMS relay / server.
  • To encrypt the entire push user data it is expedient to provide at least one header field for the signature, which is placed in front of the signed push user data.
  • the push payload itself remains unchanged. If the respective push useful data is formed in particular by an 'MMS notification' notification message, a hash value HW is generated as in the first exemplary embodiment.
  • Example 4 Furthermore, it may be expedient to send the respective push message together with control commands from the push initiator of the respective MMS relay / server by means of the WAP PAP to the assigned push proxy gateway for the signature there, ie the signature of the respective one Push user data only takes place in the push proxy gateway.
  • the push useful data itself remain unchanged on the interface side of the PAP, ie in the area of the interface SB in accordance with the architecture of FIGS. 3, 4.
  • the respective push user data are therefore only from the respective push proxy gateway and not from the
  • control commands for the control entity are expediently defined, that is, an XML-coded data record which precedes the actual push user data in the WAP PAP.
  • the signing process with the help of an asymmetrical cryptography process in the respective MMS relay / server e.g. in accordance with the exemplary embodiments 1 to 3, the advantage that there is generally more computing power available than in a gateway and that the push useful data transported via the two interfaces SA, SB of FIG. 4 can also be identified in a data-specific manner without gaps. As a result, security gaps are better avoided compared to embodiment 4. This is because the push user data sent via both interfaces SA, SB are provided with a private key of an asymmetrical cryptography method for both interfaces, i.e. the signature remains unchanged.
  • SIR SIR session initiation request
  • the push client could then use a WSP or HTTP connection between the tel Set up the device and the push initiator.
  • WSP and HTTP connections would also allow a somewhat reliable authentication of the push initiator, they would have the disadvantage, in particular, that a WSP or HTTP is specifically for each transmission of user data in push mode (for example in the form of an MMS notification) -Connection must be established- te. Particularly in the case of roaming, this is usually associated with high additional costs for the recipient and is therefore generally not acceptable in practice.
  • the method according to the invention for data-specific identification of push useful data advantageously enables the respective 'MMS notification' notification message in at least one short message together with the signature, in particular the hash value, without SIR and subsequent WSP or HTTP connection establishment , the asymmetrical cryptography process can be accommodated.

Abstract

Selon l'invention, pour identifier de façon spécifique aux sources de données des données utiles push (PNU) qui sont envoyées à au moins une unité de communication (UA) dans un service de messagerie multimédia d'un réseau de communication (CN) par un initiateur de push (PI) par l'intermédiaire d'une passerelle push proxy (PPG), une partie ou la totalité des données utiles push sont signées respectivement dans l'initiateur de push (PI) et/ou la passerelle push proxy (PPG) à l'aide d'un procédé de cryptographie asymétrique.
PCT/DE2003/002535 2002-08-13 2003-07-28 Procede et dispositif pour identifier des donnees utiles push de façon specifique aux sources de donnees WO2004021663A1 (fr)

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DE10237131.8 2002-08-13
DE10237131A DE10237131A1 (de) 2002-08-13 2002-08-13 Verfahren sowie Vorrichtung zur datenquellenspezifischen Kennzeichnung von Push-Nutzdaten

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WO2006005252A1 (fr) * 2004-07-09 2006-01-19 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Procede de traitement pour notification de retransmission dans un service de messagerie multimedia
WO2007115448A1 (fr) * 2006-03-31 2007-10-18 Zte Corporation Procédé de fourniture de service de signature dans un message multimédia
WO2009138825A1 (fr) * 2008-05-12 2009-11-19 Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications Ab Messages push sécurisés
EP2890074A1 (fr) * 2013-12-31 2015-07-01 Gemalto SA Procédé pour transmettre des messages poussoirs
CN105959279A (zh) * 2016-04-29 2016-09-21 大连理工大学 一种基于加密处理的计算机信息传输系统及方法

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Cited By (10)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2006005252A1 (fr) * 2004-07-09 2006-01-19 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Procede de traitement pour notification de retransmission dans un service de messagerie multimedia
CN100349474C (zh) * 2004-07-09 2007-11-14 华为技术有限公司 一种多媒体消息业务中推送通知的处理方法
US7899476B2 (en) 2004-07-09 2011-03-01 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Method for processing push notification in multimedia message service
WO2007115448A1 (fr) * 2006-03-31 2007-10-18 Zte Corporation Procédé de fourniture de service de signature dans un message multimédia
US8069261B2 (en) 2006-03-31 2011-11-29 Zte Corporation Method for realizing multimedia message signature service
WO2009138825A1 (fr) * 2008-05-12 2009-11-19 Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications Ab Messages push sécurisés
CN102017567A (zh) * 2008-05-12 2011-04-13 索尼爱立信移动通讯有限公司 安全推送消息
EP2890074A1 (fr) * 2013-12-31 2015-07-01 Gemalto SA Procédé pour transmettre des messages poussoirs
WO2015101544A1 (fr) * 2013-12-31 2015-07-09 Gemalto Sa Procédé de transmission de messages de pousser
CN105959279A (zh) * 2016-04-29 2016-09-21 大连理工大学 一种基于加密处理的计算机信息传输系统及方法

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