WO2004021095A1 - Verfahren und vorrichtung zur steuerung von betriebsabläufen, insbesondere in einem fahrzeug________________________________ - Google Patents
Verfahren und vorrichtung zur steuerung von betriebsabläufen, insbesondere in einem fahrzeug________________________________ Download PDFInfo
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- WO2004021095A1 WO2004021095A1 PCT/DE2003/002310 DE0302310W WO2004021095A1 WO 2004021095 A1 WO2004021095 A1 WO 2004021095A1 DE 0302310 W DE0302310 W DE 0302310W WO 2004021095 A1 WO2004021095 A1 WO 2004021095A1
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- Prior art keywords
- unit
- functional unit
- error
- wda
- error signal
- Prior art date
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 31
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 15
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 61
- 230000001276 controlling effect Effects 0.000 claims description 13
- 230000001105 regulatory effect Effects 0.000 claims description 11
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims description 6
- 230000003213 activating effect Effects 0.000 claims 1
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 abstract description 7
- 238000002485 combustion reaction Methods 0.000 description 10
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 6
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000002950 deficient Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000003044 adaptive effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000003321 amplification Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 description 2
- 238000003199 nucleic acid amplification method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000000243 solution Substances 0.000 description 2
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011017 operating method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007420 reactivation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
- G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
- G05B19/418—Total factory control, i.e. centrally controlling a plurality of machines, e.g. direct or distributed numerical control [DNC], flexible manufacturing systems [FMS], integrated manufacturing systems [IMS] or computer integrated manufacturing [CIM]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L12/40006—Architecture of a communication node
- H04L12/40032—Details regarding a bus interface enhancer
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B9/00—Safety arrangements
- G05B9/02—Safety arrangements electric
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L12/407—Bus networks with decentralised control
- H04L12/413—Bus networks with decentralised control with random access, e.g. carrier-sense multiple-access with collision detection [CSMA-CD]
- H04L12/4135—Bus networks with decentralised control with random access, e.g. carrier-sense multiple-access with collision detection [CSMA-CD] using bit-wise arbitration
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
- H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
- H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for controlling and / or regulating operating sequences, in particular in a vehicle.
- a functional unit for sending and receiving information about at least one connection unit with at least one bus system.
- the functional unit is monitored by a monitoring unit, the sending of information from the functional unit via the at least one bus system is prevented by the monitoring unit if an error in the functional unit is detected.
- the invention also relates to a device for controlling and / or regulating operating processes, in particular in a vehicle.
- the device comprises at least one functional unit which is used to send and receive information about at least one
- Connection unit is connected to at least one bus system.
- the device comprises at least one monitoring unit which monitors the functional unit.
- the present invention also relates to a control device for controlling and / or leveling vcn
- the control device comprises a functional unit, which stands for sending and receiving information about at least one connection unit with at least one Buss / sfer ⁇ connection, and a monitoring unit, which monitors the functional unit.
- the monitoring unit prevents the sending of information from the functional unit via the at least one bus system if it detects an error in the functional unit.
- the error detection device is connected to the data line and comprises electrical switching elements in order to be able to disconnect the data line in the event of an error.
- this presupposes that switching elements must be arranged in every data line with which the electronic device is connected and which is to be disconnected in the event of a fault.
- the functional monitoring of the functional unit by the monitoring unit can be activated or deactivated by the functional unit using a switching element.
- the switching element can be implemented, for example, by setting or deleting a bit.
- the monitoring function is activated, the functional unit is separated from the bus system by access.
- the monitoring unit controls a further switching element through which the connection from the functional unit to the
- Bus system is interrupted. Problematic demonstration 1 " ⁇ Also here is that also separate switching elements must be provided in the connection between the functional unit and the bus system to be able to detach the functional unit in case of failure of the bus system.
- Monitoring concepts for functional units are also known from the prior art, in which the monitoring unit issues a peset in the event of an error auslost. As a result of the reset, the functional unit starts up again and then reaches its 3et ⁇ lebsz stand. If the error of the functional unit persists after we, the monitoring unit only recognizes the error again in the operating state and only then triggers a reset of the functional unit.
- the sending of information from the functional unit via the B ⁇ _ss si, e ⁇ > is only briefly prevented during the reset state, since only in this state are the input / output connection positions (so-called ports) of the functional unit inactive. In the known method, a faulty functional unit can therefore send possibly incorrect information via the bus system, although the monitoring unit has detected an error in the functional unit. This can lead to safety-relevant situations when controlling the operational processes.
- the present invention is based on the object of securely and reliably preventing the sending of information from the functional unit via the bus system and in a simple manner.
- the present invention based on the method of the type mentioned at the outset, proposes that the monitoring unit emits an error signal which, depending on whether it detects an error in the functional unit or not, and that the error signal is present of the at least one connection unit and the at least one connection unit is deactivated by the error signal present if an error in the functional unit has been detected.
- the method according to the invention does not trigger a peset in the event of a detected fault in the functional unit, but simply shuts off an erb ⁇ ndungsej.nne ⁇ t which is arranged between the functional unit and the bus system.
- the connection unit is designed, for example, as a signal amplification device, in particular as a bus driver circuit of the bus system (so-called bus driver).
- the bus driver circuit is used in particular to amplify a bus signal generated by a bus controller (so-called bus controller) before it is transmitted via the bus system, and to adapt the signal without feedback. So according to the invention
- Functional unit itself in an operational state and can still generate information. However, this information can no longer be transmitted via the bus system, since the connection unit required for sending information has been deactivated.
- the method according to the invention prevents other functional units which are connected to the faulty functional unit in a simple manner.
- a faulty functional unit can therefore not send potentially incorrect or undesired information about the bus system in the event of a fault.
- intrinsically safe single stones are connected in a network.
- the sending of information by the functional unit without the use of additional switching elements between the functional unit and the bus system or in the bus system itself is secure can be reliably prevented.
- the sending information permanently prevented by the functional unit which has the advantage over a reset function unit that the faulty Fun>'t ⁇ onse ⁇ nne_t no ⁇ can. If the errors of the functional unit allow it, it still works normally, ie it still generates information for the control and / or regulation of the operating processes, although this information can be incorrect. However, this information cannot be transmitted via the bus system. Through the continued operation of the functional unit, it is also possible to continue to monitor the functional unit in the event of an error and the sending of information by the
- the reason for the necessary prevention of the wasting of information by the functional unit in the event of a fault is that a faulty functional unit may no longer have control over itself and over the correct generation of information to be sent, and also because of its own mistake can switch off reliably and safely. Due to a defective functional unit in a network, in which several functional units are connected to one another via a bus system, there is a risk that the other receiving functional units on the bus system will be sent by the faulty transmitter
- Functional unit receive incorrect information and this causes unwanted actions to be carried out. These actions, which are triggered by incorrect information, can also have a safety-related effect on the operating processes to be controlled.
- Motor vehicle control units could, for example, use a control unit for the internal combustion engine in the event of a fault
- the error signal be applied to a reset input of the at least one connection unit.
- the puck set input is also referred to as a reset input.
- the connection unit can be deactivated by the error signal present at the reset input.
- the invention proposes that the functional unit be connected to several bus systems and that the error signal be applied to connecting units of several of the bus systems.
- the advantage of the present invention that the sending of information by a faulty functional unit can be prevented safely and reliably without the use of additional hardware, such as, for example, additional switching elements for interrupting the connection between the faulty functional unit and the bus system, is particularly evident when the faulty function is not only connected to one but to several bus systems, via which information can be sent to other function units.
- the fault signal is the Ubeiw ⁇ L led to the connection units.
- Bus systems that are only used to transfer information from non-safety-related operations do not necessarily have to be switched off in the event of an error in the functional unit.
- the error signal be applied to output stages of components ⁇ / ⁇ rcl whose
- Operating processes are controlled or regulated by the faulty functional unit.
- These components are, for example, output stages of ignition, injection and / or throttle valve of an internal combustion engine.
- the aim of this measure is to bring the internal combustion engine to a safe standstill in the event of a fault in the controlling or regulating functional unit.
- Functional unit is further monitored by the monitoring unit and the at least one connection unit is reactivated if a proper function of the functional unit was detected. This reactivation of the connection units is possible at any time in the present invention. In the prior art, where a reset of the defective functional unit is carried out in the event of an error, it was only possible for the functional unit to function properly after the reset and startup of the
- Functional unit can be recognized. With the present invention it is therefore possible not only to ensure the security of a network which comprises a plurality of functional units which are connected to one another via a bus system, but also the availability of the
- Metzwerkverbundes be improved, since the proper functioning of a functional unit can be recognized particularly quickly.
- the invention proposes that the monitoring unit have means for forming and outputting an error signal which assumes different values depending on whether the monitoring unit has recognized an error in the functional unit or not, and that the error signal is sent to the at least one connection unit is guided and the at least one connection unit can be deactivated by the error signal present if an error in the functional unit has been detected.
- the device corresponds, for example, to a network which comprises a plurality of functional units which are connected to one another via a bus system.
- the error signal be routed to an enable / disable input of the at least one connection unit.
- the error signal be passed to a reset input of the at least one connection unit.
- the device advantageously comprises a plurality of functional units which are connected to one another via a bus system and at least one monitoring unit, the monitoring unit being used to send
- Such a device corresponds to the so-more multi-control device concept that has recently been increasingly used in motor vehicles, in which several control devices are used in parallel with one another to increase the computing power, the individual control device sometimes controlling a specific part of the operating processes.
- an 8-zylmdr_gen Bren V-irafzmasc'nme used a first control device to control four of the cylinders and a second control device to control the remaining four cylinders.
- the two control units are connected to each other via a bus system.
- Information about the operating state of the internal combustion engine or the motor vehicle is only supplied to the first control device, which then forwards the information to the second control device via the bus system. If the monitoring unit of the first control unit detects an error in the control unit, it deactivates the connection unit of the bus system to the second control unit in order to prevent the first control unit from sending incorrect information to the second control unit and the second control unit to send the remaining four
- the monitoring unit have means for forming and outputting an error signal which, depending on the situation, assumes different values as to whether the monitoring unit detects an error in the functional unit has or not, and that the error signal is fed to the at least one connection unit and the at least one connection unit can be deactivated by the applied error signal if an error in the functional unit was detected.
- FIG. 1 shows a control device according to the invention in accordance with a preferred embodiment of FIG.
- FIG. 2 shows a device according to the invention comprising two control devices according to the invention, which are connected to one another via a bus system, and
- a control device SG according to the invention is designated in its entirety by reference number 1.
- the control device 1 is used, for example, to control and / or regulate the operating sequences of a motor vehicle.
- a control device 1 " 1 is used to control 1 g 1
- control devices S ⁇ for example for a transmission control, a driving lanyard control, a traction control system (ASP), and an automatic one
- the bus system 2 is designed, for example, as a CAM (Controller Area Network).
- the control device 1 comprises a function computer FR 3, which is designed, for example, as a microprocessor or as a microcontroller.
- a computer program is executable on the function computer 3, which is used to fill the control and / or regulating function of the control device 1.
- the function computer 3 is connected to the bus system 2 for sending and receiving information via a connection unit 4.
- the connection unit 4 is used as a hardware interface between a controller and an external control device transmission bus with signal amplification direction, in particular as a bus driver circuit, e.g. B. designed as a CAN driver for a CAN bus system.
- the CAN driver 4 is also referred to as a CAM driver.
- Computer programs for fulfilling the control and / or leveling function of the control device 1 are first transmitted via a data bus 5 to a CAN controller 6, which is also referred to as a CAN controller.
- a CAN controller 6 the information generated by the function computer 3 is converted into a Protocol corresponding form georacnt and for cue transmission via the CAM bus system. 2 prepared.
- the signals must be adapted to the electrical properties on the CALL bus. For this, the processed ones
- the independent hardware is assigned to the function computer 3.
- the independent hardware is referred to as the UM 8 monitoring module.
- the monitoring module 8 cyclically asks the function computer 3 various questions which run through extensive control mechanisms in the function computer 3, such as program sequence checks or command tests, and form a result. The result is transmitted back to the monitoring module 8 in response to the question.
- a function computer 3 working without errors returns the correct answer within a predeterminable time window. By evaluating the response, the monitoring module 8 determines whether there is an error in the function computer 3 or not.
- the described monitoring concept of the functional computer 3 by the monitoring module 8 is also used as a question-answer
- Communication means Communication between the monitoring module 8 and the function computer 2 takes place via an SPI (Serial Parallel Interface) interface 9.
- SPI Serial Parallel Interface
- an error signal WDA is generated in the monitoring module, which takes on different values depending on whether an error of the function computer 3 has been detected or not.
- An error payer is preferably incorrect if an error of the function computer 3 was detected.
- the error signal WDA is only output when the error payer has exceeded a threshold value.
- the error signal WDA is applied via a signal line 10 to output stages El to EN of motor vehicle components Kl to r'.n, which are controlled by the control device 1 for controlling and / or regulating the operating processes.
- the control device 1 for controlling and / or regulating the operating processes.
- these are the output stages for ignition, injection and / or throttle valve.
- WDA is used to bring the internal combustion engine to a safe standstill and to avoid safety-relevant situations.
- the error signal WDA is also applied to a reset input RST of the CAM driver 4.
- the CAN driver 4 is deactivated by the applied error signal WDA if an error in the function computer 3 has been detected. As a result, the sending of information by a defective function computer 3 via the CAN
- Bus system 2 is reliably, effectively and, above all, permanently prevented for the entire duration of the fault of the function computer 3. As a result, the possibly faulty information is also sent to others by the faulty function computer 3 via the CAM bus system 2
- the control device 1 thus represents an intrinsically safe own system in a control device group. It fulfills the regulations for control devices in a control device group, namely that each control device 1 bears the responsibility for the information it sends itself.
- Another advantage of the present invention is that a faulty function computer 3 continues to work normally and continues to determine - possibly incorrectly - information for controlling the operational processes.
- the monitoring module 8 can thus, even after the detection of an error of the function computer 3, the functionality of the
- Control unit network can affect. As soon as the monitoring module 8 detects that the function computer 2 is functioning properly, the CAN driver 4 can be reactivated, so that the control unit 1 can work normally again. It is advantageous with the present invention that a proper function of the function computer 3 can be recognized without a long time delay.
- Another advantage of the invention can be seen in the fact that the sending of information by a faulty function computer 3 in a simple manner and without additional hardware, for example without additional switching elements which are introduced into the CAN bus system 2 and are opened in the event of an error to separate the function computer 3 from the CAN bus system 2 can be prevented.
- a two control device concept is shown, in which two control devices SGI, SG2 are used to control certain operating processes.
- the two control units are SGI, SGZ. used to control the operational sequences in a 12-cylinder internal combustion engine BM 11. This controls first control unit SGI the first six cylinders ZiL 12 and the second control unit SG2 the remaining six cylinders Z ⁇ L 13.
- the first control unit SGI receives information S about the driver's request (position of the accelerator pedal) and / or about the operating state of the internal combustion engine 11 and the
- the two control devices SGI and SG2 are connected to one another via a CAM bus system 2.
- the second control unit SG2 receives 2 setpoint values (e.g. the driver's request) from the first control unit SGI via the CAN bus system.
- setpoint values e.g. the driver's request
- the sending of information by the function computer FR1 via the CAN bus system 2 is prevented by the monitoring unit UM1.
- the error signal WDA of the monitoring module UM1 is applied to a reset input RST of the CAN driver 4.
- control unit SG2 can recognize a defect in the SGI and activate corresponding replacement measures or error reactions in the SG2.
- FIGS. 3a to 3f show the courses of various control device states and control device sizes over the 2 t L.
- the status of an error counter of the monitoring module 8 is shown in FIG. 3a. This increases at the beginning from zero to above a threshold value "W. As soon as the error payer exceeds the threshold value SW, an error response ⁇ is triggered at time tj. This means that the error signal WDA assumes a corresponding value. As values of the error signal WDA are particularly HIGH or LOW.
- the m the figures 3b, 3c and 3c! represented course correspond to the state of the art. 3b shows the course of a peset signal which, according to the prior art, is applied by the monitoring module UM 8 to a reset input of the function computer FR 3.
- control unit SG em Before triggering the error reaction at time ti, control unit SG em runs through normal driving program A. Then, after time ti, a fixed status B is connected. Thereafter, the control unit SG goes through an initialization phase C and then changes again to the normal driving program A.
- the monitoring module UM carries out question-answer communication with the function computer FR to be monitored and recognizes at a time t_ that the Function calculator FP error still present.
- the previously described states Reset B, Initialization C and Drive Program A are also included Go through twcrt communication D. 13
- FIGS. 3e and 3f show the signal and state profiles of the control device 1 according to the invention.
- 3e clearly shows that the CAN signal is blocked for the duration of the error immediately after the error reaction at time ti * "F ⁇ - Functional computer 3 is after the error reaction in a normal driving program A, during which a Question-answer communication D is carried out cyclically and the output stages are in the deactivated state via the WDA signal (E) .
- the information determined by the function computer 3 is not transmitted via the CAN bus system 2 because the CAN driver 4 is deactivated and the CAN signal is thus blocked.
- the present invention the
- Functional computer 3 does not take place during the reset B and initialization C states. As a result, the proper functioning of the function computer 3 can be recognized earlier in the present invention than in the prior art.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Manufacturing & Machinery (AREA)
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- Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2004531409A JP5021163B2 (ja) | 2002-08-07 | 2003-07-10 | 特に車両内の,駆動シーケンスを制御する方法および装置 |
US10/523,327 US7418316B2 (en) | 2002-08-07 | 2003-07-10 | Method and device for controlling operational processes, especially in a vehicle |
AU2003254623A AU2003254623A1 (en) | 2002-08-07 | 2003-07-10 | Method and device for controlling operational processes, especially in a vehicle |
EP03790637A EP1529253A1 (de) | 2002-08-07 | 2003-07-10 | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur steuerung von betriebsabläufen insbesondere in einem fahrzeug |
KR1020057002021A KR100984232B1 (ko) | 2002-08-07 | 2003-07-10 | 차량의 구동 프로세스 제어 방법 및 장치 및 차량의 구동 프로세스 제어를 위한 제어 유닛 |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE10236080A DE10236080A1 (de) | 2002-08-07 | 2002-08-07 | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Steuerung von Betriebsabläufen, insbesondere in einem Fahrzeug |
DE10236080.4 | 2002-08-07 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2004021095A1 true WO2004021095A1 (de) | 2004-03-11 |
Family
ID=30469514
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/DE2003/002310 WO2004021095A1 (de) | 2002-08-07 | 2003-07-10 | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur steuerung von betriebsabläufen, insbesondere in einem fahrzeug________________________________ |
Country Status (8)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7418316B2 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1529253A1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP5021163B2 (de) |
KR (1) | KR100984232B1 (de) |
CN (1) | CN100422951C (de) |
AU (1) | AU2003254623A1 (de) |
DE (1) | DE10236080A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2004021095A1 (de) |
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DE112007001564A5 (de) | 2006-08-02 | 2009-05-07 | Autoliv Development Ab | Steuergerät und Verfahen zur Steuerung von Funktionen |
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DE102018101103A1 (de) * | 2018-01-18 | 2019-07-18 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren und Computerprogramme für eine Überwachungsinstanz und eine Kommunikationskomponente, Überwachungsinstanz, Kommunikationskomponente, System und Fahrzeug |
CN109725629B (zh) * | 2018-12-29 | 2020-05-22 | 一汽-大众汽车有限公司 | 一种整车控制器刷新测试系统 |
US11036573B2 (en) | 2019-05-16 | 2021-06-15 | Ford Global Technologies, Llc | Control processor unit (CPU) error detection by another CPU via communication bus |
US10936397B2 (en) | 2019-05-23 | 2021-03-02 | Ford Global Technologies, Llc | Hybrid control module status communication system and method |
WO2020262031A1 (ja) | 2019-06-24 | 2020-12-30 | 日立オートモティブシステムズ株式会社 | 車載制御装置 |
CN115223273B (zh) * | 2021-04-21 | 2024-02-23 | 广州汽车集团股份有限公司 | Tcu数据监控方法、装置、终端设备及存储介质 |
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2002
- 2002-08-07 DE DE10236080A patent/DE10236080A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
2003
- 2003-07-10 AU AU2003254623A patent/AU2003254623A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2003-07-10 EP EP03790637A patent/EP1529253A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 2003-07-10 US US10/523,327 patent/US7418316B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2003-07-10 KR KR1020057002021A patent/KR100984232B1/ko active IP Right Grant
- 2003-07-10 JP JP2004531409A patent/JP5021163B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2003-07-10 CN CNB03813246XA patent/CN100422951C/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2003-07-10 WO PCT/DE2003/002310 patent/WO2004021095A1/de active Application Filing
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US5600782A (en) * | 1993-08-24 | 1997-02-04 | National Semiconductor Corporation | Can interface with enhanced fault confinement |
US6115831A (en) * | 1996-03-26 | 2000-09-05 | Daimlerchrysler Ag | Integrated circuit for coupling a microcontrolled control apparatus to a two-wire bus |
DE19833462A1 (de) * | 1998-07-24 | 2000-01-27 | Mannesmann Vdo Ag | Schaltungsanordnung zur Abkopplung einer elektronischen Einrichtung von einer Datenleitung in einem Kraftfahrzeug |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1659484A (zh) | 2005-08-24 |
US7418316B2 (en) | 2008-08-26 |
US20060112315A1 (en) | 2006-05-25 |
CN100422951C (zh) | 2008-10-01 |
EP1529253A1 (de) | 2005-05-11 |
DE10236080A1 (de) | 2004-02-19 |
AU2003254623A1 (en) | 2004-03-19 |
KR100984232B1 (ko) | 2010-09-28 |
JP2005535054A (ja) | 2005-11-17 |
JP5021163B2 (ja) | 2012-09-05 |
KR20050059053A (ko) | 2005-06-17 |
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