WO2002039390A1 - Verfahren zum versehen von postsendungen mit frankierungsvermerken - Google Patents
Verfahren zum versehen von postsendungen mit frankierungsvermerken Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2002039390A1 WO2002039390A1 PCT/DE2001/004129 DE0104129W WO0239390A1 WO 2002039390 A1 WO2002039390 A1 WO 2002039390A1 DE 0104129 W DE0104129 W DE 0104129W WO 0239390 A1 WO0239390 A1 WO 0239390A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- customer
- franking
- data
- value transfer
- customer system
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
- G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
- G07B17/00024—Physical or organizational aspects of franking systems
- G07B2017/00072—Hybrid mail, i.e. mail delivered using different physical means along the mail delivery path, e.g. email and envelope
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
- G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
- G07B2017/00153—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information
- G07B2017/00169—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information from a franking apparatus, e.g. for verifying accounting
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
- G07B17/00314—Communication within apparatus, personal computer [PC] system, or server, e.g. between printhead and central unit in a franking machine
- G07B2017/00338—Error detection or handling
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
- G07B17/00362—Calculation or computing within apparatus, e.g. calculation of postage value
- G07B2017/00427—Special accounting procedures, e.g. storing special information
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
- G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
- G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
- G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
- G07B2017/00516—Details of printing apparatus
- G07B2017/00556—Ensuring quality of print
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for providing mailings with franking marks, a customer system controlling the printing of franking marks on mailings.
- PC franking called.
- PC franking is not to be understood in any way restrictive, however, since digital data can be generated on any computer and is not limited to personal computers.
- computer is in no way to be understood as limiting. It is any unit suitable for carrying out calculations, for example a workstation, a personal computer, a microcomputer or a circuit suitable for carrying out calculations it is also a personal digital assistant (PDA).
- PDA personal digital assistant
- the PC franking presented contains several steps in to whom a customer loads a postage amount, generates postage indicia from the postage amount and prints it out on a printer.
- the printout takes the form of a PC franking note, which contains a machine-readable, two-dimensional matrix code that can be used to check the validity of the franking note.
- the shipment with the PC franking mark can be delivered to the postal service provider.
- the postal service provider transports the shipment after checking the validity of the franking mark.
- the postage available is reduced as soon as a corresponding print command has been triggered.
- the problem here is that after the print command has been issued, but before the franking note has actually been printed, the print data could be lost. This can occur, for example, in the event of a system crash, a power failure, paper jams or when printing with an empty ink cartridge or empty toner cartridge.
- the invention is based on the object of further developing a generic method in such a way that the user is prevented from being burdened with fee amounts for postage indicia not used for sending postal items.
- this object is achieved in that a file is recorded for which postage indicia generated by a print command do not send a mail item he follows.
- a particularly simple reimbursement of fee amounts is possible if the file is transferred to a fee reimbursement form.
- the method is expediently carried out in such a way that the file and / or the fee reimbursement form are transmitted to a reimbursement agency.
- the transmission is advantageous for the transmission to be carried out to a server and for the customer system to transmit identification data about the mail items which are not to be sent to the server, and for the server to forward the identification data to at least one checking point.
- the server is preferably a logical node of a communication network, but another one equipped with interfaces can also be used
- Computers, or another calculation unit, can be used as a server.
- Checkpoints which are advantageously arranged in letter centers, but which are also grouped outside the letter centers, for example at one or more central points, can be a consignment that has been delivered, although the one used to generate it
- the system can also allow manual entry of shipment data, since misuse of this manual input option can be avoided.
- the user of the customer system can manually enter data about shipments that have not been sent. Such a manual entry can optionally be excluded or permitted, for example by introducing encryption. In the event that manual data entry is permitted, the user of the customer system can, for example, remove a letterhead marked with a franking note before sending it, for example if he subsequently decided not to send the letterhead marked with the franking note.
- a further increase in data security is possible in that a fee is only reimbursed if the form for the franking notes to be reimbursed is accompanied by evidence of non-shipping or non-printing.
- the dispatch is preferably carried out electronically, for example by a message in a communication system, an e-mail or by input into a web page.
- FIG. 1 shows a customer system for generating postage indicia
- Fig. 2 shows an overall system from a customer system and an external server and
- FIG. 3 shows a screen mask which contains information about the shipment which has not been sent.
- the customer system shown in FIG. 1 comprises, for example, a personal computer 1 with a screen 2, a keyboard 3, a mouse 4 and a connected printer 5.
- the customer system is not dependent on the hardware shown, but can have a variety of material forms, for example, it can be in one Memory module, for example a chip card, can be stored.
- the customer system is in contact with an external server.
- the external server is advantageously formed by a loading center (value transfer center).
- the server can be any computer.
- the term server has no restrictiveity
- One of the interfaces is preferably provided by the customer system.
- This interface which is referred to below as the customer interface, allows data to be entered via electronically generated franking marks which are not used for sending postage stamps.
- the customer system preferably contains a security module which enables counterfeit-proof generation of postage indicia.
- the customer system is preferably part of an overall system which contains checking and security mechanisms in all its components.
- Another component of the overall system is, for example, a value transfer center.
- Value transfer centers that prevent unauthorized loading of settlement amounts are not shown, since the customer system is secured with any such Value transfer center can be connected.
- a basic security architecture is provided for PC franking, which combines the advantages of different existing approaches and offers a higher level of security with simple means.
- the security architecture preferably essentially comprises three units, which are shown in a preferred arrangement in FIG. 2:
- a value transfer center in which the identity of the customer and his customer system is known.
- a security module that ensures the security in the customer system as hardware / software that cannot be manipulated by the customer (e.g. dongle or chip card for offline solutions or equivalent servers for online solutions).
- a letter center in which the validity of the
- Postage indicia checked, or tampering with the value and postage indications are recognized.
- a random number is generated and buffered within the security module, which the customer is not aware of.
- the random number is combined and encrypted together with a unique identification number (security module ID) of the customer system, or of the security module, in such a way that only the value transfer center is able to perform decryption.
- security module ID unique identification number
- the random number is encrypted together with a session key previously issued by the value transfer center and the user data of the communication (requesting the establishment of a settlement amount) with the public key of the value transfer center and digitally signed with the private key of the security module. This avoids that the request has the same shape every time a billing amount is loaded and can be used to improperly load billing amounts (replay attack).
- the cryptographically treated information from the customer system is transmitted to the value transfer center as part of loading a settlement amount. Neither the customer nor third parties can access this information decrypt.
- the random number that can be assigned to the identification number of the security module (security module ID) is decrypted in the value transfer center.
- the security module ID is assigned to a customer of Deutsche Post.
- a charging process identification number is formed in the value transfer center, which contains parts of the security module ID, the amount of a settlement amount, etc.
- the decrypted random number is encrypted together with the load identification number in such a way that only the BriefZentrum is able to decrypt it. However, the customer is unable to decrypt this information.
- the loading process identification number is also encrypted in a form that can be decrypted by the customer system).
- encryption is carried out with a symmetrical key according to TDES, the is only available in the value transfer center and in the letter centers. The use of symmetric encryption at this point is due to the requirement for fast decryption processes by the production.
- the encrypted random number and the encrypted load identification number are transmitted to the customer system. Neither the customer nor third parties can decrypt this information.
- the key can be exchanged at any time and key lengths can be changed if necessary. As a result, a high
- the charging process identification number is also made available to the customer in non-encrypted form.
- the customer records the shipment-specific information or shipment data (e.g. postage, shipment type, etc.) that are transferred to the security module.
- shipment-specific information or shipment data e.g. postage, shipment type, etc.
- a hash value is formed, among other things, from the following information within the security module
- the cached random number (which was generated in the context of loading a settlement amount) • and, if applicable, the
- the mailing data is first checked in the letter center. If the consignment data entered in the postage indicium does not match the consignment, then there is either incorrect postage, a phantasy mark or a smear mark. The consignment is to be paid for.
- Settlement amount was transmitted. Accordingly, it is both a real, valid billing amount and shipment data that have been announced to the security module (validity check).
- the decryption, the formation of a hash value and the comparison of two hash values theoretically correspond to that of a signature check. However, due to the • symmetrical decryption, there is a time advantage over the signature check.
- the basic security architecture shown does not include the separately secured management of the settlement amounts (exchange function), the securing of the communication between the customer system and the
- the length of the random number is therefore as large as possible and is preferably at least 12 bytes (96 bits).
- the security architecture used is superior to the known methods due to the possibility of using customer-specific keys without it being necessary to have keys ready for decryption, in particular letter centers.
- This advantageous embodiment is a significant difference from the known systems based on the Information-Based Indicia Program (IBIP).
- IBIP Information-Based Indicia Program
- the following features distinguish the described security architecture from the well-known IBIP model of the US Postal Services of the USA: • The actual security is in the systems of the Liebe Post (value transfer center, letter center, payment assurance system) guarantees and thus reads entirely within the sphere of influence of Irish Post.
- the postage indicium does not use any signatures, but technically equivalent and equally secure (symmetrically) encrypted data and hash values are used. In the simplest case, only a symmetrical key is used for this, which alone lies within the sphere of influence of Deutsche Post and is therefore easily interchangeable. • There is a review of everyone in the mail center
- the security concept is based on a simple, self-contained test cycle that is in line with a background system adapted to it.
- Mailing service providers such as "letter national” (including additional services) and "direct marketing national” are cleared in accordance with a previous determination by the mailing service provider.
- Value transfer center can be loaded is set to an appropriate amount.
- the amount can vary depending on the customer's requirements and the security needs of the customer
- Postal service providers While a fee amount of a maximum of several hundred DM is particularly expedient for use in the private customer area, much higher fee amounts are provided for use with large customers.
- An amount of around DM 500 is suitable for demanding private households as well as for freelancers and smaller companies.
- the value stored in the exchange should preferably not exceed twice the amount in terms of system technology.
- the return to a central point of the shipping service provider for example the Deutsche Post, enables a high level of security against charges by comparing the data with billing amounts and knowing the most common reasons for sending. This may exist the possibility of readjustment by changing the implementation requirements with the aim of reducing the return rate.
- the postage indicia can have any form in which the information they contain can be reproduced. However, it is advisable to design the postage indicia so that they at least
- Delivery options also via mailbox, can be posted.
- the compliance with the security measures shown is further increased.
- IPMAR International Postage Meter Approval Reguirements
- IPMAR International Postage Meter Approval Requirements
- Digital Postage Marks Applications, Security & Design Basically, the regulations of the current version of the document Digital Postage Marks: Applications, Security & Design (UPU: Technical Standards Manual) apply as well as all norms and standards to which this document refers. Compliance with the "normative" content as well as the greatest possible attention to the "informative" content of this document makes sense for the customer system.
- the system-technical interoperability refers to the functionality of the interfaces of the customer system, or to the compliance with the in the
- Interface billing amount communication path protocols Communication via the interface billing amount is preferably carried out via the public Internet on the basis of the protocols TCP / IP and HTTP.
- the data exchange can optionally be encrypted via HTTP over SSL (https). The target process of a required transfer is shown here.
- the data exchange is preferably carried out, if possible, via HTML and XML encoded files.
- the textual and graphic content of the HTML pages are to be displayed in the customer system.
- the certificate of the security module and an action indicator A are transmitted unencrypted and unsigned.
- the response from the value transfer center contains the value transfer center's own certificate, an encrypted session key and the digital signature of the encrypted session key.
- the security module sends the newly encrypted session key, the encrypted random number and the encrypted data record with user data (amount of a preloaded billing amount, residual value of the current billing amount, ascending register of all billing amounts, the last one
- Loading process identification number - (all encrypted asymmetrically with the public key of the value transfer center).
- the security module sends the digital signature of this encrypted data.
- the customer system can send further, non-encrypted and unsigned usage protocols or usage profiles to the value transfer center. It is expedient that the usage data are entered in a usage log and that the usage log and / or the entries noted therein are digitally signed.
- the value transmission center transmits the symmetrically encrypted random number and the symmetrically encrypted one
- the value transfer center also transmits the one created with the public key of the security module
- the security module transmits the new session key, the new loading process identification number together with user data to confirm successful communication, all in encrypted and digitally signed form to the value transfer center.
- the customer must be able to uninstall the customer system.
- the detailed, technical description of the billing amount interface is based on the concept of the post office's own value transfer center.
- Postage indicia to generate a log entry that must contain all the details of the respective postage indicia - provided with a digital signature of the security module. Furthermore, every error status of the security module must be recorded in the log in such a way that the manual deletion of this entry is noticed during the check.
- the usage profile contains a prepared summary of the usage data since the last communication with the value transfer center.
- a customer system is divided into a component located at the customer and a central component (e.g. on the Internet), the usage profile must be managed in the central component.
- the customer system must be able to generate PC postage indicia that exactly meet the requirements of the
- PC franking marks preferably consist of the following three elements:
- the shipping service provider for example the
- the postage indicium is advantageously left-justified in the address field above the address on the shipment.
- the address field is specified in the currently valid version of the standards of the shipping service provider.
- the following frankings are made possible in particular:
- the barcode from the Type Data Matrix is used first, the individual pixels of which should have an edge length of at least 0.5 millimeters.
- a 2D barcode in the form of the data matrix with a minimum pixel size of 0.5 mm should preferably be used.
- a possibly appropriate option is to reduce the pixel size to 0.3 mm.
- the edge length of the entire bar code is approximately 18 to 20 mm if all data is received as described. If it succeeds, barcodes with a pixel size of 0.3 mm in the
- the edge length can be reduced to approx. 13 mm.
- a subsequent extension of the specifications to use a different barcode (eg Aztec) with the same data content is possible.
- Postage indicium is shown below in FIG. 5 as an example.
- the "most critical" size is the height of the window of a window envelope with a size of 45 mm x 90 mm.
- a DataMatrix code with an edge length of approx. 13 mm is shown, which when using the proposed data fields only with a pixel resolution of 0.3 mm is possible
- a code with an edge length of 24 mm does not leave enough space for information about the address regarding the available height.
- the manufacturer of the customer system as part of the approval process and the customer in later operation are responsible for the correct printing of the postage indicium.
- the customer is to be advised by means of suitable information in a user manual and a help system.
- the machine readability of postage indicia depends on the print resolution used and the contrast. Should other colors be used instead of black Are used, a lower reading rate can be expected. It can be assumed that the required read rate can be guaranteed with a resolution of 300 dpi ("dots per inch") used in the printer with a high print contrast; this corresponds to approximately 120 pixels per centimeter.
- the customer system must be able to produce postage indicia that are valid in form and size
- Postage indicia correspond, but are not intended for dispatch, but are used for control printouts and fine-tuning of the printer.
- the customer system is preferably designed in such a way that the test prints differ from actual postage indicia in a manner recognizable to the mailing company.
- the inscription "SAMPLE - do not send" is affixed in the middle of the postage indicium. At least two thirds of the barcode should be made unrecognizable by the inscription or otherwise.
- no zero prints may be made apart from specially marked test prints.
- the basic system serves as a link between the other components of PC franking, namely the value transfer center, the security module and the printer and the customer. It consists of one or more computer systems, for example PCs, which may also be connected to one another by a network.
- the invention makes it possible to interrupt the further process of calculating a fee amount in various steps of generating postage indicia.
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- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (7)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AU2002220513A AU2002220513B2 (en) | 2000-11-07 | 2001-11-06 | Method for providing postal deliveries with franking stamps |
AU2051302A AU2051302A (en) | 2000-11-07 | 2001-11-06 | Method for providing postal deliveries with franking stamps |
US10/416,052 US20050278265A1 (en) | 2000-11-07 | 2001-11-06 | Method for providing postal deliveries with franking stamps |
JP2002541634A JP4057909B2 (ja) | 2000-11-07 | 2001-11-06 | 郵便料金前納検印を備える郵便送付物を用意する方法 |
NZ525504A NZ525504A (en) | 2000-11-07 | 2001-11-06 | Method for providing postal deliveries with franking stamps |
CA002428298A CA2428298A1 (en) | 2000-11-07 | 2001-11-06 | Method for providing postal deliveries with franking stamps |
EP01993909.9A EP1340197B1 (de) | 2000-11-07 | 2001-11-06 | Verfahren zum versehen von postsendungen mit frankierungsvermerken |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE10055145.9 | 2000-11-07 | ||
DE10055145A DE10055145B4 (de) | 2000-11-07 | 2000-11-07 | Verfahren zum Versehen von Postsendungen mit Frankierungsvermerken |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2002039390A1 true WO2002039390A1 (de) | 2002-05-16 |
Family
ID=7662433
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/DE2001/004129 WO2002039390A1 (de) | 2000-11-07 | 2001-11-06 | Verfahren zum versehen von postsendungen mit frankierungsvermerken |
Country Status (8)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20050278265A1 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1340197B1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP4057909B2 (de) |
AU (2) | AU2002220513B2 (de) |
CA (1) | CA2428298A1 (de) |
DE (1) | DE10055145B4 (de) |
NZ (1) | NZ525504A (de) |
WO (1) | WO2002039390A1 (de) |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1513073A2 (de) * | 2003-08-18 | 2005-03-09 | Microsoft Corporation | System und Verfahren zur Validation hierarchisch organisierter Nachrichten |
US8056003B2 (en) * | 2004-12-28 | 2011-11-08 | Neopost Technologies | Apparatus for designing and a machine for franking a personalized mail template |
Families Citing this family (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE10131254A1 (de) * | 2001-07-01 | 2003-01-23 | Deutsche Post Ag | Verfahren zum Überprüfen der Gültigkeit von digitalen Freimachungsvermerken |
DE10345056A1 (de) * | 2003-09-26 | 2005-04-28 | Deutsche Post Ag | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Erstellen einer Postsendung |
DE102004032323A1 (de) * | 2004-07-02 | 2006-01-26 | Francotyp-Postalia Ag & Co. Kg | Verfahren und Anordnung zum Erstatten von Porto |
DE102015121318B4 (de) * | 2015-12-08 | 2024-06-06 | Francotyp-Postalia Gmbh | Frankiersystem mit Funktionen für Refund und Reprint |
US12039809B2 (en) | 2017-12-11 | 2024-07-16 | Hallmark Cards, Incorporated | Activatable postage |
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US5319562A (en) * | 1991-08-22 | 1994-06-07 | Whitehouse Harry T | System and method for purchase and application of postage using personal computer |
EP0741374A2 (de) | 1995-05-02 | 1996-11-06 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System zur kontrollierten Annahme der Bezahlung und des Nachweises von Postgebühren |
EP1047025A2 (de) * | 1999-04-23 | 2000-10-25 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Feststellen des Missbrauchs von Postwertzeichen |
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US4802218A (en) * | 1986-11-26 | 1989-01-31 | Wright Technologies, L.P. | Automated transaction system |
US5768132A (en) * | 1996-06-17 | 1998-06-16 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Controlled acceptance mail system securely enabling reuse of digital token initially generated for a mailpiece on a subsequently prepared different mailpiece to authenticate payment of postage |
US6005945A (en) * | 1997-03-20 | 1999-12-21 | Psi Systems, Inc. | System and method for dispensing postage based on telephonic or web milli-transactions |
US5978781A (en) * | 1997-05-08 | 1999-11-02 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Digital printing, metering, and recording of other post services on the face of a mail piece |
DE19737232A1 (de) * | 1997-08-27 | 1999-03-04 | Matthias Oberlaender | Elektronisches Verfahren zum Freimachen von Postsendungen |
EP1021799A4 (de) * | 1997-10-06 | 2000-11-15 | Escher Group Ltd | System und verfahren zum verteilen, drucken und beglaubigen von postwertzeichen über ein netzwerk |
DE19812903A1 (de) * | 1998-03-18 | 1999-09-23 | Francotyp Postalia Gmbh | Frankiereinrichtung und ein Verfahren zur Erzeugung gültiger Daten für Frankierabdrucke |
US6941286B1 (en) * | 1999-12-29 | 2005-09-06 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing refunds in a postage metering system |
US20030024988A1 (en) * | 2000-04-24 | 2003-02-06 | David Stanard | System for providing evidence of payment |
-
2000
- 2000-11-07 DE DE10055145A patent/DE10055145B4/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
-
2001
- 2001-11-06 AU AU2002220513A patent/AU2002220513B2/en not_active Ceased
- 2001-11-06 CA CA002428298A patent/CA2428298A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2001-11-06 AU AU2051302A patent/AU2051302A/xx active Pending
- 2001-11-06 US US10/416,052 patent/US20050278265A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2001-11-06 EP EP01993909.9A patent/EP1340197B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2001-11-06 NZ NZ525504A patent/NZ525504A/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2001-11-06 WO PCT/DE2001/004129 patent/WO2002039390A1/de active Application Filing
- 2001-11-06 JP JP2002541634A patent/JP4057909B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5319562A (en) * | 1991-08-22 | 1994-06-07 | Whitehouse Harry T | System and method for purchase and application of postage using personal computer |
EP0741374A2 (de) | 1995-05-02 | 1996-11-06 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System zur kontrollierten Annahme der Bezahlung und des Nachweises von Postgebühren |
EP1047025A2 (de) * | 1999-04-23 | 2000-10-25 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Feststellen des Missbrauchs von Postwertzeichen |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1513073A2 (de) * | 2003-08-18 | 2005-03-09 | Microsoft Corporation | System und Verfahren zur Validation hierarchisch organisierter Nachrichten |
EP1513073A3 (de) * | 2003-08-18 | 2008-01-09 | Microsoft Corporation | System und Verfahren zur Validation hierarchisch organisierter Nachrichten |
US7464331B2 (en) | 2003-08-18 | 2008-12-09 | Microsoft Corporation | System and method for validating hierarchically-organized messages |
US8056003B2 (en) * | 2004-12-28 | 2011-11-08 | Neopost Technologies | Apparatus for designing and a machine for franking a personalized mail template |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE10055145A1 (de) | 2002-05-16 |
AU2051302A (en) | 2002-05-21 |
JP4057909B2 (ja) | 2008-03-05 |
EP1340197B1 (de) | 2013-07-24 |
JP2004513465A (ja) | 2004-04-30 |
AU2002220513B2 (en) | 2006-12-07 |
CA2428298A1 (en) | 2002-05-16 |
US20050278265A1 (en) | 2005-12-15 |
DE10055145B4 (de) | 2004-09-23 |
EP1340197A1 (de) | 2003-09-03 |
NZ525504A (en) | 2006-01-27 |
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