WO2001035432A1 - Systeme de commutation redondant insensible aux defaillances pour dispositif critique - Google Patents

Systeme de commutation redondant insensible aux defaillances pour dispositif critique Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2001035432A1
WO2001035432A1 PCT/US2000/030799 US0030799W WO0135432A1 WO 2001035432 A1 WO2001035432 A1 WO 2001035432A1 US 0030799 W US0030799 W US 0030799W WO 0135432 A1 WO0135432 A1 WO 0135432A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
switching
fault
fail
safe
switch
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2000/030799
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Martin Batten
Peter Desany
Thomas Harmon
Original Assignee
Raytheon Company
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Raytheon Company filed Critical Raytheon Company
Priority to AU15920/01A priority Critical patent/AU1592001A/en
Priority to CA002391472A priority patent/CA2391472A1/fr
Priority to EP00978459A priority patent/EP1228520A1/fr
Publication of WO2001035432A1 publication Critical patent/WO2001035432A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01H—ELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
    • H01H47/00—Circuit arrangements not adapted to a particular application of the relay and designed to obtain desired operating characteristics or to provide energising current
    • H01H47/22—Circuit arrangements not adapted to a particular application of the relay and designed to obtain desired operating characteristics or to provide energising current for supplying energising current for relay coil
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B9/00—Safety arrangements
    • G05B9/02—Safety arrangements electric
    • G05B9/03—Safety arrangements electric with multiple-channel loop, i.e. redundant control systems
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60T—VEHICLE BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF; BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF, IN GENERAL; ARRANGEMENT OF BRAKING ELEMENTS ON VEHICLES IN GENERAL; PORTABLE DEVICES FOR PREVENTING UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES; VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS TO FACILITATE COOLING OF BRAKES
    • B60T8/00—Arrangements for adjusting wheel-braking force to meet varying vehicular or ground-surface conditions, e.g. limiting or varying distribution of braking force
    • B60T8/17—Using electrical or electronic regulation means to control braking
    • B60T8/1701—Braking or traction control means specially adapted for particular types of vehicles
    • B60T8/1705—Braking or traction control means specially adapted for particular types of vehicles for rail vehicles
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60T—VEHICLE BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF; BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF, IN GENERAL; ARRANGEMENT OF BRAKING ELEMENTS ON VEHICLES IN GENERAL; PORTABLE DEVICES FOR PREVENTING UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES; VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS TO FACILITATE COOLING OF BRAKES
    • B60T8/00—Arrangements for adjusting wheel-braking force to meet varying vehicular or ground-surface conditions, e.g. limiting or varying distribution of braking force
    • B60T8/32—Arrangements for adjusting wheel-braking force to meet varying vehicular or ground-surface conditions, e.g. limiting or varying distribution of braking force responsive to a speed condition, e.g. acceleration or deceleration
    • B60T8/88—Arrangements for adjusting wheel-braking force to meet varying vehicular or ground-surface conditions, e.g. limiting or varying distribution of braking force responsive to a speed condition, e.g. acceleration or deceleration with failure responsive means, i.e. means for detecting and indicating faulty operation of the speed responsive control means
    • B60T8/885—Arrangements for adjusting wheel-braking force to meet varying vehicular or ground-surface conditions, e.g. limiting or varying distribution of braking force responsive to a speed condition, e.g. acceleration or deceleration with failure responsive means, i.e. means for detecting and indicating faulty operation of the speed responsive control means using electrical circuitry
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01H—ELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
    • H01H47/00—Circuit arrangements not adapted to a particular application of the relay and designed to obtain desired operating characteristics or to provide energising current
    • H01H47/002—Monitoring or fail-safe circuits
    • H01H47/004—Monitoring or fail-safe circuits using plural redundant serial connected relay operated contacts in controlled circuit
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60T—VEHICLE BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF; BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF, IN GENERAL; ARRANGEMENT OF BRAKING ELEMENTS ON VEHICLES IN GENERAL; PORTABLE DEVICES FOR PREVENTING UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES; VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS TO FACILITATE COOLING OF BRAKES
    • B60T2270/00—Further aspects of brake control systems not otherwise provided for
    • B60T2270/40—Failsafe aspects of brake control systems
    • B60T2270/406—Test-mode; Self-diagnosis
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60T—VEHICLE BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF; BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF, IN GENERAL; ARRANGEMENT OF BRAKING ELEMENTS ON VEHICLES IN GENERAL; PORTABLE DEVICES FOR PREVENTING UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES; VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS TO FACILITATE COOLING OF BRAKES
    • B60T2270/00—Further aspects of brake control systems not otherwise provided for
    • B60T2270/40—Failsafe aspects of brake control systems
    • B60T2270/415—Short-circuit, open circuit failure

Definitions

  • This invention relates to a fail-safe, fault-tolerant switching system for a critical device.
  • Fail-safe devices are used where risk of personal injury or damage to property can occur.
  • air brakes on large trucks are released by force of air pressure against strong actuators. Any failure of the air pressure system releases the springs to apply the brakes so the system "fails safe”.
  • a "vital relay” is used to monitor the presence of a vehicle to control separation between trains. When less than the required separation is sensed the power to the relay is cut off and "fail safe" gravity force is relied upon to close contacts and provide a warning signal.
  • PRT personal rapid transit
  • PRT systems are driverless, automated, small, passenger vehicles that operate on guideways.
  • fault-tolerant operation to permit continued operation of partially disabled but still safe vehicles is an important consideration.
  • PRTs for example must always be operated fail-safe but need some fault tolerance so that faulty vehicles are not simply stopped, interfering with operation of other vehicles when the fault can be tolerated to at least move the vehicle from the guideway to a maintenance area.
  • PRT is but one instance where fail-safe, fault-tolerant systems are needed. This gave rise to switching circuits with a number of switches to provide fail-safe operation: one switch is generally not enough because a switch, be it mechanical or semiconductor, can fail in either the closed or open mode. Thus the outcome is not predictable and failure to a safe state is not assured. Two or more switches connected in series will increase reliability and are safe if a defective switch can be detected. Two or more switches in parallel provide redundancy but do not improve reliability.
  • This invention results from the realization that a truly fail-safe, fault-tolerant switching system for a critical device can be achieved using two parallel networks each including a fuse device and two switch devices in series with the critical device connected between the networks at the junction of a switch device and fuse device in each network so that the system is entirely fail-safe and fault-tolerant through its inherent operation supplemented by automatic monitoring and control of the switching devices.
  • This invention features a fail-safe, fault-tolerant switching system for a critical device including a first pair of terminals for connection to a power source, a first network including a first fuse device, first switching device and third switching device connected in series between the first pair of terminals and a second network in
  • first and second switching devices are open and the third and fourth switching devices
  • the first, second, third and fourth switching devices are open, the first and second fuse devices are open and the first and second switching devices are open and the third and fourth switching devices are closed and the first and second fuse devices are intact
  • the first switching device has failed ON and the second switching device is open and the third and fourth switching devices are closed and fuse 1 is caused to open due to short circuit path through the first and third switching device and the second fuse device is intact
  • the first switching device is open and the second switching device has failed ON and the third and fourth switching devices are closed and fuse 1 is intact and fuse 2 is caused to open due to a short circuit path through the second and fourth switching device
  • the first, second, third and fourth switching devices are open, the fault
  • the unidirectional current flow circuit may include a diode bridge.
  • Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a fail-safe, fault-tolerant H switch according to this invention
  • Fig. 2 is a view similar to Fig. 1 including monitoring devices and a controller for monitoring and controlling the operation of the individual switches;
  • Fig. 2A is a view, similar to Fig. 2, in which a diode bridge is connected across a polarized load;
  • Figs. 3-7 are flow charts explaining the operation of the controllers and monitors.
  • Fig. 8 is a diagram depicting the desired behavior of the H switch according to this invention.
  • a basic H switch 10 including four switches: switch 1 12, switch 2 14, switch 3 16, and switch 4 18, and two fuses, fuse 1 20, and fuse 2 22.
  • the switch is arranged in an "H" shape with the critical load 24 in the middle.
  • the switches may be conventional switches, relays, or semiconductor devices.
  • a first network 26 including fuse 1 20, switch 1 12 and switch 3 16, is connected between a pair of terminals 28 and 30 which in this embodiment are connected to a positive power supply and ground, respectively.
  • the second network 32 including fuse 2 22, switch 2 14 and switch 4 18, is connected in parallel with network 26 between terminals 28 and 30.
  • a critical device 24 is connected between terminal 34 which is located between switch 1 12 and switch 3 16, and terminal 36 which is located between switch 2 14 and switch 4 18.
  • This basic configuration of four switches has sixteen combinations. Two of them allow the device to be energized. This relies on the fact that the device can be driven with current flowing either left to right or in a right to left fashion through the critical device 24. Four combinations turn on only one switch and may be used in a self-test circuit; three combinations are safe states; and the seven other combinations blow a fuse and revert to one of the others. The following contains this information in more detail. Note that the two energized modes are complementary. This protects against common mode failures and thus decreases probability of failing in an unsafe state.
  • the two states which actually allow the brakes to be released are (1) Switch 1 and Switch 4 on and Switch 2 and Switch 3 off; and (2) Switch 2 and Switch 3 on and Switch 1 and Switch 4 off.
  • External circuitry functions to control the H switch 10 in the following manner.
  • the external circuits in a deenergized mode disable all switches and monitor them to see if either switch 1 or 2 is shorted. If they are not, switches 3 and 4 are turned on. This is a safe state. If a request in the deenergized state is made, a self-test is performed on the switches. This self-test runs through a check to see if each of the switches can be turned on and off. It then makes a determination as to whether the H switch can be energized safely and if so, in which energized mode. This will be understood more readily by the explanation which follows.
  • fuses give for illegal combinations of the four signals, they also allow the controller to change the failure of the top two switches from failed closed to failed open. This is accomplished by closing the switch in the same leg intentionally. Failed open is much easier to deal with than failed closed for a fault-tolerant system.
  • the four switches are monitored by four monitors, Fig. 2: monitor 1 40, monitor 2 42, monitor 3 44, and monitor 4 46.
  • each of the monitors is implemented as shown with respect to monitor 1 40, by an opto-isolator 48 and resistor 50.
  • opto-isolators allows controller 52 to be electrically isolated from the critical load. This electrical isolation can be made complete if the actual switches are implemented by solid state relays.
  • Controller 52 may be a microprocessor such as a Motorola 68040 programmed to function as described with respect to the following discussion and Figs. 3-7.
  • H switch 10 can have any switch fail open or closed and still operate in the fail-safe manner.
  • One procedure that controller 52 can implement is the following. At the time that controller 52 is required to disengage the brakes, a self-test is run that checks each switch's ability to turn on and off. If switch 1 has failed open the H switch will turn on switches 2 and 3 and switches 1 and 4 will turn off and the critical device will be engaged. If switch 1 had failed closed, the H switch would turn on switches 2 and 3 and switches 1 and 4 would turn off. This would blow fuse 1 in line with switch 1 and the critical device would be engaged. The similar procedure could be made for switch 2 failure modes. If switch 3 fails open, then the system will turn on switch 1 and switch 4 and turn off switches 2 and 3 so that the critical device will be engaged.
  • switch 3 fails closed, operation is still possible by turning on switches 2 and 3 and turning off switches 1 and 4 whereupon the critical device will again be engaged.
  • a similar procedure can be made for switch 4 failure modes. If multiple failures are found then all four switches can be turned off and the critical device can be disengaged.
  • switches 1 and 2 are turned off and switches 3 and 4 are turned on. If for any reason it detects a second fault in either switch 1 or 2, such that they stay on when they should not, then all four switches are opened.
  • Critical device 24a may include a polarized load requiring unidirectional current flow.
  • Diode bridge 25 includes ac terminals 35 and 37 connected to terminals 34 and 36, respectively.
  • Critical device 24a is connected to polarized terminals 39, which is positive, and 41, which is negative, of diode bridge 25.
  • polarized critical load 24a will always have a positive potential on its positive terminal and a negative potential on its negative terminal. In this way, diode bridge 25 does not compromise the fail safe aspect of the circuit to reliably remove current from polarized critical device 24a, while maintaining unidirectional current through the load.
  • the following describes the use of the switch and monitoring function to perform highly reliable control of a brake system on a PRT vehicle.
  • the brake is applied when no current flows through the brake actuator and this is the safe state for the system.
  • the function removes the brakes when a request- ON is made so that the vehicle is permitted to move and reliably applies the brakes when a request-OFF is made.
  • the application also tolerates a hardware failure, by reconfiguring automatically on detecting a fault to permit the brakes to be removed and the vehicle moved, and provides the same level of reliability in being able to re-apply the brakes when commanded.
  • the switch monitor and control functions collectively provide a highly reliable Control Function.
  • the Control Function can be commanded two states: ON or OFF. In this application OFF applies the brakes, ON releases them.
  • the control Function will go to one of four states in consequence of the external states being applied.
  • Off State applies indefinitely in response to the external command maintaining an OFF state.
  • State 2 Self-Test, Transition to On, occurs in response to the external command transitioning from an OFF state to an ON state.
  • This state is transient, and of short duration compared to the system responsiveness. During this state the output is effectively off. The outcome determines which one of the two different hardware internal ON states will be selected based on health of the hardware elements, or a permanent OFF state if it is determined that an excessive number of hardware failures exist.
  • State 3 ON State, applies indefinitely following a successful Self-Test, in response to the external command maintaining an ON state.
  • State 4 Self-Test, Transition to OFF, occurs in response to the external command transitioning from an ON state to an OFF state. This state is transient and of short duration compared to the system responsiveness. During this state the output is effectively off. The outcome determines which one of the two different hardware internal OFF states will be selected, based on health of the hardware elements.
  • the following description of states refers to the flow diagrams in Figs. 3-7.
  • the point of entry for the process is arbitrarily defined as State 1 , the OFF state.
  • Switches 1, 2, 3 and 4 are referred to as SI, S2, S3, S4, Monitors 1, 2, 3 and 4 as
  • State 1 is predominantly satisfied by having switches SI and S2 deactivated, and switches S3 and S4 activated. This applies a short-circuit via ground to the two ends of the load (Brake actuator) to insure it is de-energized. Alternately, and only as a consequence of determining a fault condition via prior testing, all four switches, SI, S2, S3 and S4 will be deactivated to reduce the probability of inadvertently setting up a path of conduction.
  • SI is activated, which will cause Ml to be OFF. If Ml remains ON, then a fault has occurred, which is assumed to be that SI has failed open-circuit. The outcome of this test is logged for switch SI, functional (OK), or failed open- circuit (OC).
  • S2 is activated, which will cause M2 to be OFF. If M2 remains ON, then a fault has occurred, which is assumed to be that S2 has failed open-circuit.
  • One of two states is logged for switch S2, functional (OK) or failed open-circuit (OC).
  • S3 is activated, which will cause M3 to be OFF. If M remains ON, then a fault has occurred, which is assumed to be that S3 has failed open-circuit.
  • One of two states is logged for switch S3, functional (OK), or failed open-circuit
  • S3 is deactivated. All switches are now in a deactivated state. 10) S4 is activated, which will cause M4 to be OFF. If M4 remains ON, then a fault has occurred, which is assumed to be that S4 has failed open-circuit.
  • One of two states is logged for switch S4, functional (OK), or failed open-circuit (OC).
  • Monitors Ml through M4 are next checked to verify they are all ON, signifying the correct bias across the switches SI through S4, when deenergized, which is the expected state. If any monitor, Ml through M3 is off, then a fault has occurred. The fault is assumed to be a short-circuit in the associated switch, SI through S4. It is most likely that the monitoring circuit for SI or S2 has failed if either of these switches is reported as being short-circuit, as the prior tests would have blown the affected fuse on a shorted switch, which consequently removes the short-circuit.
  • the predominant case is to energize switches SI and S4, which is applicable to fully-functional hardware, or hardware with a specific set of deduced faults. This activates the load.
  • the outcome is that the load is predominantly energized for the duration that the system is in state 3. There is a probability that a fault may occur that causes the load to be de-activated. The system should be aware that this has happened.
  • the event of having the brakes re-applied would cause the vehicle to stop and proceed through a set of diagnostics. These diagnostics included removing the command to release the brakes (ON to OFF) and re-applying the command to release the brakes (OFF to ON). The process re-invoked the Self-Test Transition to ON, at which point a different outcome to the appropriate switch configuration may be arrived at.
  • H switch 10 The operation of H switch 10 is depicted in summary in Fig. 8 where it can be seen that the desired behavior is off with the brake applied and then on when the brakes are removed and motion is permitted, as indicated by path 60, Fig. 8. There it can be seen that during the four states of the switch process the brakes are off in state 1 62, the off state, and in state 4 64, the self-test sequence transition to off, the brakes transition to on in state 2 66, and in state 3 68, they are in the on state.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Transportation (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Valves And Accessory Devices For Braking Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Système de commutation redondant insensible aux défaillances conçu pour un dispositif critique et comprenant une première paire de bornes se branchant sur une source de courant, un premier réseau comportant un premier fusible, un premier commutateur et un troisième commutateur branchés en série entre la première paire de bornes, un deuxième réseau parallèle au premier réseau comportant un deuxième fusible, un deuxième commutateur et un quatrième commutateur branchés en série entre la première paire de bornes, ainsi qu'une deuxième paire de bornes dont l'une est placée entre le premier et le troisième commutateurs et l'autre entre le deuxième et le quatrième commutateurs afin d'être raccordées au dispositif critique, de manière à en extraire le courant redondant quand le premier et le deuxième commutateurs sont ouverts et le troisième et le quatrième commutateurs fermés. Lorsque le premier, le deuxième, le troisième et le quatrième commutateurs sont ouverts, le fonctionnement insensible aux défaillances s'effectue à travers le premier fusible, le premier commutateur et le quatrième commutateur ou le deuxième fusible, le deuxième commutateur et le troisième commutateur.
PCT/US2000/030799 1999-11-11 2000-11-10 Systeme de commutation redondant insensible aux defaillances pour dispositif critique WO2001035432A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU15920/01A AU1592001A (en) 1999-11-11 2000-11-10 Fail-safe, fault-tolerant switching system for a critical device
CA002391472A CA2391472A1 (fr) 1999-11-11 2000-11-10 Systeme de commutation redondant insensible aux defaillances pour dispositif critique
EP00978459A EP1228520A1 (fr) 1999-11-11 2000-11-10 Systeme de commutation redondant insensible aux defaillances pour dispositif critique

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US43819599A 1999-11-11 1999-11-11
US09/438,195 1999-11-11

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2001035432A1 true WO2001035432A1 (fr) 2001-05-17

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ID=23739642

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2000/030799 WO2001035432A1 (fr) 1999-11-11 2000-11-10 Systeme de commutation redondant insensible aux defaillances pour dispositif critique

Country Status (5)

Country Link
EP (1) EP1228520A1 (fr)
KR (1) KR100497116B1 (fr)
AU (1) AU1592001A (fr)
CA (1) CA2391472A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2001035432A1 (fr)

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2007006141A1 (fr) * 2005-07-07 2007-01-18 Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. Procédé et dispositif pour fournir une stratégie de redressement à un circuit électrique
WO2009003987A1 (fr) * 2007-07-02 2009-01-08 Continental Automotive Gmbh Commande d'un actionneur de frein de véhicule automobile
US8390972B2 (en) * 2007-04-17 2013-03-05 Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation Secondary protection approach for power switching applications
WO2013131664A1 (fr) * 2012-03-08 2013-09-12 Maschinenfabrik Reinhausen Gmbh Commutateur à prises de réglage
EP3196913A1 (fr) * 2016-01-20 2017-07-26 Schneider Electric Industries SAS Circuit a relais et procede pour effectuer un autotest d'un circuit a relais
JP2017164411A (ja) * 2016-03-18 2017-09-21 リンナイ株式会社 食器洗浄乾燥機

Families Citing this family (1)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102016117821A1 (de) * 2016-09-21 2018-03-22 Pilz Gmbh & Co. Kg Sicherheitsschaltung zum fehlersicheren Abschalten einer gefahrbringenden technischen Anlage

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US4433357A (en) * 1980-10-13 1984-02-21 Matsushita Electric Works Ltd. Drive circuit for a latching relay
DE3737791A1 (de) * 1987-09-25 1989-04-13 Pepperl & Fuchs Fehlersichere schalteinrichtung
US5587661A (en) * 1993-12-14 1996-12-24 Robert Bosch Gmbh Device for indicating errors in a control line of an electric control units
EP0789378A1 (fr) * 1996-02-07 1997-08-13 Asea Brown Boveri Ab Equipement de contacteur
WO1999031696A1 (fr) * 1997-12-17 1999-06-24 Siemens Electromechanical Components, Inc. Circuit de commande electronique pour relais a verrouillage

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4433357A (en) * 1980-10-13 1984-02-21 Matsushita Electric Works Ltd. Drive circuit for a latching relay
DE3737791A1 (de) * 1987-09-25 1989-04-13 Pepperl & Fuchs Fehlersichere schalteinrichtung
US5587661A (en) * 1993-12-14 1996-12-24 Robert Bosch Gmbh Device for indicating errors in a control line of an electric control units
EP0789378A1 (fr) * 1996-02-07 1997-08-13 Asea Brown Boveri Ab Equipement de contacteur
WO1999031696A1 (fr) * 1997-12-17 1999-06-24 Siemens Electromechanical Components, Inc. Circuit de commande electronique pour relais a verrouillage

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Title
"DEVICE FOR CHECKING THE FUNCTION OF BREAKERS USED TO CONTROL AN ELECTRICAL APPARATUS", RESEARCH DISCLOSURE,GB,INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES LTD. HAVANT, NR. 405, PAGE(S) 23, ISSN: 0374-4353, XP000772352 *

Cited By (13)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7352544B2 (en) 2005-07-07 2008-04-01 Pratt + Whitney Canada Corp. Method and apparatus for providing a remedial strategy for an electrical circuit
WO2007006141A1 (fr) * 2005-07-07 2007-01-18 Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. Procédé et dispositif pour fournir une stratégie de redressement à un circuit électrique
US8390972B2 (en) * 2007-04-17 2013-03-05 Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation Secondary protection approach for power switching applications
US8515642B2 (en) 2007-07-02 2013-08-20 Continental Automotive Gmbh Control of an actuator of a brake of a motor vehicle
US20100256886A1 (en) * 2007-07-02 2010-10-07 Michael Irsigler Control of an actuator of a brake of a motor vehicle
JP2010531771A (ja) * 2007-07-02 2010-09-30 コンチネンタル オートモーティヴ ゲゼルシャフト ミット ベシュレンクテル ハフツング 自動車の制動装置のアクチュエータの制御
WO2009003987A1 (fr) * 2007-07-02 2009-01-08 Continental Automotive Gmbh Commande d'un actionneur de frein de véhicule automobile
CN101687499B (zh) * 2007-07-02 2014-03-05 大陆汽车有限公司 汽车的制动器的执行器的控制
WO2013131664A1 (fr) * 2012-03-08 2013-09-12 Maschinenfabrik Reinhausen Gmbh Commutateur à prises de réglage
US9269508B2 (en) 2012-03-08 2016-02-23 Maschinenfabrik Reinhausen Gmbh Tap switch
EP3196913A1 (fr) * 2016-01-20 2017-07-26 Schneider Electric Industries SAS Circuit a relais et procede pour effectuer un autotest d'un circuit a relais
US10395869B2 (en) 2016-01-20 2019-08-27 Schneider Electric Industries Sas Relay circuit and method for performing self-test of relay circuit
JP2017164411A (ja) * 2016-03-18 2017-09-21 リンナイ株式会社 食器洗浄乾燥機

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP1228520A1 (fr) 2002-08-07
AU1592001A (en) 2001-06-06
KR20020048432A (ko) 2002-06-22
CA2391472A1 (fr) 2001-05-17
KR100497116B1 (ko) 2005-06-28

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