US6264108B1 - Protection of sensitive information contained in integrated circuit cards - Google Patents
Protection of sensitive information contained in integrated circuit cards Download PDFInfo
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- US6264108B1 US6264108B1 US09/327,067 US32706799A US6264108B1 US 6264108 B1 US6264108 B1 US 6264108B1 US 32706799 A US32706799 A US 32706799A US 6264108 B1 US6264108 B1 US 6264108B1
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- integrated circuit
- circuit card
- contents
- memory
- power
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
- H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
- H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
- H01L23/57—Protection from inspection, reverse engineering or tampering
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
- G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
- G06K19/07372—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers by detecting tampering with the circuit
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
- H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
- H01L2924/00—Indexing scheme for arrangements or methods for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies as covered by H01L24/00
- H01L2924/0001—Technical content checked by a classifier
- H01L2924/0002—Not covered by any one of groups H01L24/00, H01L24/00 and H01L2224/00
Definitions
- the present invention relates to integrated circuit cards, such as smartcards, in general, and a scheme for the intrusion protection of such cards in particular.
- ICCs Integrated circuit cards
- smartcards are small credit card size carriers containing electronics.
- the smartcard concept began in Europe prior to 1985, and is today being used in telephone systems, toll roads, game parlors, and personal computers, just to mention some applications.
- integrated circuit card will be used, because ISO uses the term to encompass all those devices where an integrated circuit is contained within a card-size piece of plastic, or the like.
- ICCs have only been used in one of two ways. Either, the ICCs provide simple, more or less tamper-proof storage for small amounts of data, or they execute simple security-related operations like data signature, or encryption-based authentication, e.g., employing a challenge-response protocol. Some applications like pre-paid telephone or cinema cards, as well as health care cards storing personal data make use of the first property. ICCs in the second domain are used as secure tokens executing authentication procedures for example during computer system logon, or when opening appropriately equipped doors for access to a restricted area.
- Typical ICCs supporting the above two modes of operation comprise a microprocessor (central processing unit, CPU), a read-only memory (ROM), a random-access memory (RAM), and some type of non-volatile, programmable memory, such as an EEPROM (electrically erasable programmable read only memory).
- an ICC usually comprises some kind of a bus (such as a serial bus) and I/O ports for interconnection to a card terminal and for communication with the outside world.
- a card terminal provides the necessary power, electric signaling at the hardware level, as well as the basic communication protocols at the software level to interact with the ICC.
- Two types of card terminals are available. The more expensive model physically locks the ICC as a whole. Alternatively, and in order to reduce cost of card terminals, it is also very common to only provide a slot into which the user can insert and from which he can retract the ICC at will.
- ICCs comprise components in the form of integrated circuits which are molded together on a flexible card (e.g., PVC or ABS).
- the dimension of these integrated circuits (ICs) is at most 25 mm 2 (silicon die size).
- a typical ICC has a size of 85.6 mm ⁇ 53.98 mm ⁇ 0.76 mm. It is to be expected that the ICCs' integrated circuits shrink in size and that these ICCs become more and more powerful, taking advantage of advanced semiconductor technology.
- the contents of the ROM type of memory is fixed and may not be intended to be changed once manufactured. This is a low cost memory, in that it occupies minimum space on the substrate.
- a ROM is disadvantageous in that it cannot be changed and it takes several months to be produced.
- an EEPROM is erasable by the user and can be rewritten many times. ROMs and EEPROMs are non-volatile. In other words, when the power is removed they still retain their contents.
- a RAM is a volatile memory and as soon as the power is removed, the data content is lost.
- a RAM however, has the advantage that it is much faster than ROMs and EEPROMs. On the other hand, a RAM is more expensive in terms of die size.
- ICCs come in two forms: contact and contactless.
- the former is easy to identify because of its gold connector I/O ports.
- ISO Standard (7816-2) defined eight contacts, only six are actually used to communicate with the outside world.
- the contactless card may contain its own battery, particularly in the case of a “Super Smart Card” which has an integrated keyboard and LCD display.
- the operating power is supplied to the contactless card electronics by an inductive loop using low frequency electronic magnetic radiation.
- the communications signals may be transmitted in a similar way or can use capacitive coupling or even an optical connection.
- An integrated circuit card comprises a shield for detecting an intrusion, a protection unit for controlling the erasure or destruction of sensitive information, and power interrupt circuitry which maintains the power if no external power is supplied.
- the shield informs the protection unit if an intrusion is detected and the protection unit controls the erasure or destruction of said sensitive information.
- the power interrupt circuitry maintains power for erasure or destruction of information if no external power is supplied.
- a card terminal may optionally report an intrusion.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic view of a first exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 2A is a flowchart diagram used to illustrate the process steps which are carried out in a system, according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, if an intrusion occurs.
- FIG. 2B is a flowchart diagram used to illustrate the process steps which are carried out in a system, according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention if an ICC is used, e.g., after an intrusion.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic top view of a second exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- sensitive information is herein used to describe any kind of proprietary, confidential, or critical information contained in or processed by an ICC. Examples are: medical information about the card holder; cryptographic keys, e.g., for the coding/encoding of communication between the ICC and a host computer; financial data; PIN (personal identifier number) codes or PIN-coded related information as used to access bank services and the like.
- intrusion is herein used to describe any manipulation, encroachment, infringement, interference, interruption, invasion, trespass, or violation of an ICC.
- an intruder tries to get access to sensitive information contained in, or processed by an ICC. This is, for example, done by means of electrodes that are positioned such that information contained in a chip, or transmitted via an ICC internal bus are made accessible from outside the card.
- the word “erase” means to delete or discard information
- the word “destroy” is herein used to describe a process of intentionally altering information such that it cannot be reconstructed any more by an unauthorized person, or such that it can only be reconstructed if a suitable key is available.
- FIG. 1 A first exemplary embodiment of the present invention is illustrated in FIG. 1 .
- an integrated circuit card (ICC) 10 is shown.
- This card carries a processor (e.g., CPU) 12 , a static memory (such as a ROM) 11 , a persistent memory (such as an EEPROM) 13 , and a volatile memory (such as a RAM or register) 14 .
- Each of these memories include contents. Contents includes, for example, data used or generated by the processor, or instructions which effect operation of the processor (or a portion thereof).
- the ICC 10 furthermore comprises an internal bus 19 , which allows exchange of information and signaling between the ICC's components. This internal bus 19 is not connected to the input/output (I/O) ports which are shown as contact pads. To prevent manipulation of ICCs, usually only very limited access to data streams is provided.
- the processor 12 communicates via the I/O ports with the card terminal (not shown in FIG. 1 ). This communication may be encrypted.
- the ICC 10 is a contact card.
- the I/O ports connect to corresponding means of a card terminal. As indicated in FIG. 1, power is supplied via port 17 (ground, GND) and port 18 (positive voltage, V cc ). The voltage between these two ports 17 and 18 is applied to the components 11 , 12 , 13 and 14 of the ICC 10 . Since there is no battery integrated into card 10 , these components desirably rely on the external power supply.
- the ICC is capable of detecting an intrusion.
- a shield 23 (a membrane configuration that covers at least part of the ICC) might serve this purpose.
- Such a shield 23 can be designed such that any mechanical violation triggers a signal, for example.
- a pressure sensitive membrane configuration that triggers a signal if somebody touches the ICC with a pressure above a certain threshold, e.g., by using a needle or other tool.
- the shield 23 might cover at least those portions of the ICC 10 that carry sensitive information, or that need to be protected for other reasons.
- Such a shield might comprise a laminar configuration of a flexible cover membrane, an actuator membrane and a switch contact membrane, similar to configurations used in connection with touch sensitive displays, for example.
- the actuator membrane and switch contact membrane are electrically isolated by an air gap or other means.
- the shield's sensitivity is usually defined by the flexibility of the cover membrane. The less flexible the cover membrane is, the more pressure is to be applied before a signal is triggered.
- Such a membrane configuration can be designed such that the shield reacts if somebody tries to destroy or penetrate the shield.
- touch sensitive shields and other kinds of shields are to described in IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin, “Shielding and Vandal Protection for Touch Sensitive Panel”, Vol. 04-73, pp. 3575-3576; IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin, “Identification and Verification of Signatures”, Vol. 39, no. 6, 06-96, pp. 93-98; and U.S. Pat. No. 5,717,321, “Drive Current Calibration for an Analog Resistive Touch Screen”, which is incorporated by reference.
- Suitable is a shield (which might be similar or comparable to a so-called analog resistive touch panel) that consists of a base layer with Indium Tin Oxide (ITO) coating covered by a top sheet of conductive mylar foil.
- ITO Indium Tin Oxide
- the mylar top sheet does not touch the base layer under normal circumstances, only when somebody tries to destroy the shield, there is a small contact area at the respective location.
- the top sheet might serve as “signal pick-up”.
- the shield might either be energized by a current or a voltage.
- the layers (membranes) of the shield serve like a switch if a certain pressure is applied. If the membranes touch each other, the switch is closed and an intrusion is signaled.
- the ICC comprises power interrupt circuitry 15 maintaining power for a short period of time if no external power is supplied.
- a special capacitor 15 is employed in the present example. This capacitor 15 is placed such that the voltage between the GND line 20 and Vcc line 21 can be maintained for a short period of time. On a subsequent power-up, capacitor 15 is automatically recharged. It is recommended to place shield 23 such that capacitor 15 and its circuit lines are protected.
- capacitor 15 It is difficult to implement the above described capacitor 15 in an ICC 10 , because the real estate for circuitry is limited, the cards have to be thin, flexible, low cost and very reliable. In addition, capacitor 15 has to be able to keep sufficient energy (high capacitance) for voltage maintenance during a predetermined period of time.
- the standard capacitor discharge model can be used to estimate the capacitance required to provide sufficient energy while information is erased or destroyed.
- the discharge model is based on a resistor R discharging a capacitor C.
- Capacitors suited for usage in connection with the present invention should have an extremely high capacitance in the order of several Farads per cm 2 .
- HiCap capacitors or super capacitors (SuperCap) are employed.
- a SuperCap is a high capacitance value multi-layer ceramic capacitor (also referred to as MLC) which comprises a stack of several ceramic layers found using ceramic tapes which are a few microns thick.
- capacitors can be used in an ICC environment if designed appropriately, as demonstrated and reported by M. G. Sullivan et al. in “An Electrochemical Capacitor Using Modified Glassy Carbon Electrodes”, Electrochemical Capacitors II, Proceedings Vol. 96-25, pp. 192-201, The Electrochemical Society, Inc., 10 South Main Street, Pennington, N.J., 1997.
- processor 12 comprises an information protection unit that controls the erasure or destruction of sensitive information.
- the information protection unit may be located either physically in or external to the other components which comprise processor 12 .
- the information protection unit comprises a software component, referred to as software information protection handler (not shown), which controls the erasure or destruction of sensitive information, or which performs the actual erasure or destruction of such information.
- This software information protection handler is part of the information protection unit and might be implemented as fixed handler in a ROM causing processor 12 to execute the steps shown in FIG. 2 A.
- the information protection handler might also cause the processor to execute certain steps each time before an ICC is used, or after an ICC was lost and found. Exemplary steps are illustrated in FIG. 2 B.
- Shield 23 detects an intrusion and signals (intrusion detected) via line 22 to the information protection unit that an intrusion has been detected.
- the software information protection handler initiates a short sequence of steps for the erasure or destruction in case no power is available such that the whole process works even if the external power supply is interrupted.
- a custom information protection circuitry might be provided to handle the erasure or destruction in case of an intrusion.
- Such a custom information protection circuitry is illustrated in connection with the second embodiment (see FIG. 3 ).
- FIG. 2A the steps are addressed which are carried out by an ICC 10 .
- an intrusion is sensed by an appropriate detector, e.g., shield 23 , as illustrated in step 30 .
- the sensitive information contained in the ICC e.g., in persistent memory 13 , is erased or destroyed to protect it against unauthorized access.
- the fact that an intrusion occurred might be signaled to the card terminal, as indicated in step 32 (please note that this step is optional).
- the card terminal then might notify a server.
- the respective ICC might be put on a watch list in the server, or the access rights, credit limits and so forth might be changed so that the ICC cannot be used to do any harm (e.g., by transferring money or accessing a restricted area).
- the ICC does not comprise any sensitive information anymore, or the sensitive information has been altered (destroyed) such that an unauthorized person cannot use it anymore (see step 33 ). If the power was interrupted prior to the intrusion or during the intrusion, the necessary power is provided by the power interrupt circuitry.
- the information protection means might be designed such that the processor goes into a suspend mode and terminates certain processes or shuts down components within the ICC that consume power before the power interrupt circuitry runs out of energy.
- Future ICCs e.g., JavaCards
- an application program will then be loaded into the changeable memory (i.e., by downloading it from a computer).
- the application program in an ICC may be changed by an authorized party.
- the software component constituting the software part of the information protection means might also be loaded into the ICC, but the hardware—according to the present invention—needs to be present.
- a few steps might be carried out so that the ICC can resume operation as if no intrusion had occurred. This process can either be carried out anytime an ICC is used, or only if there are certain indications that an intrusion took place, or if there is a certain likelihood that an is intrusion might have occurred. A typical example is the situation where a card was lost or stolen and the legitimate owner gets it back after a while.
- step 40 external power is applied (step 40 ) and an optional check might be performed to determine whether an intrusion occurred (see step 41 ). This can be done by checking whether the sensitive information (e.g., an encryption key) can be verified as being present or uncorrupted on the ICC. If the sensitive information cannot be verified as being present on the ICC, or if the sensitive information is corrupted, then an intrusion has to be inferred. It is now possible for the ICC to refuse to resume normal operation, as indicated in step 42 . If no intrusion occurred, then the ICC can resume normal operation (step 44 ). Before normal operation is resumed, one might also check the server to find out whether any intrusion was signaled by the respective ICC to the system. Should this be the case, normal operation might be refused.
- the sensitive information e.g., an encryption key
- the ICC state might be reestablished after an intrusion by loading the missing or destroyed information through the card terminal.
- the card holder might also be prompted to send the ICC to the company who issued it allowing them to withdraw or reestablish it.
- ICC applications can be improved by defining how an application is supposed to react if an intrusion is detected and information is automatically erased or destroyed. It might be advisable to protect certain transactions or to terminate them in case of an intrusion to prevent unauthorized access to the card terminal and/or server.
- Certain ICCs require an external clock signal to be provided by the card terminal. If somebody tries to manipulate such an ICC, the clock signal might be interrupted such that no clock signal is available to the ICC anymore. This could lead to problems, such as a undefined state, if the ICC comprises circuitry which cannot be driven without a clock signal. To avoid such a situation, the ICC might comprise special means that provide a clock signal.
- ICC 50 comprises typical power coupling means 52 , which are arranged as defined by the ISO standard 7816. External power is applied to ICC 50 by means of the contact pads 57 (GND) and 58 (V cc ) and thus to power lines 20 and 21 . These power lines are coupled to volatile memory 14 and other components to provide a normal and/or standby voltage.
- ICC 50 comprises a capacitor 15 (likewise several capacitors might be arranged in parallel) serving as power interrupt circuitry, and a clock generator (not shown).
- Inventive ICC 50 furthermore comprises a custom information protection circuitry 16 . As shown in FIG. 3, this information protection circuitry 16 might be connected to processor 12 . In addition, it might be connected to internal bus 19 so that it can communicate with certain components of ICC 50 .
- shield 53 serves as means for the detection of an intrusion. It is to be noted that shield 53 , as employed on ICC 50 , is designed to protect only CPU 12 , persistent memory 13 , volatile memory 14 , information protection circuitry 16 and capacitor 15 . Shield 53 signals to information protection circuitry 16 that an intrusion occurred. For this purpose, information protection circuitry 16 and shield 53 are interconnected by signaling line 54 . ICC 50 behaves similar as ICC 10 , except that the steps illustrated in FIGS. 2A (and possibly 2 B) are carried out, or are controlled by information protection circuitry 16 .
- the intrusion detector and the information protectionunit there are different ways to realize the intrusion detector and the information protectionunit, according to the present invention.
- ASICs application specific integrated circuits
- ASICs application specific integrated circuits
- the scheme for the protection of sensitive information can provide a significant competitive edge over a conventional ICC since it allows information to be processed and carried in an ICC which would otherwise not be adequately protected.
- Card Terminals can be improved by adding features that allow the reporting of an intrusion event to another system, such as a remote control station or operator console.
- the event reporting feature might be used to track down problems, to monitor events, and for record keeping purposes.
- An improved card terminal might comprise event reporting means that receives input from the ICC if an intrusion was detected by the ICC. This can, for instance, be realized in that the respective signal (intrusion detection) is made available at one of the ICC ports.
- the card terminal can either report an intrusion using standard event reporting methods or by specially designed means.
- ICCs described in connection with the present invention, as well as other ICCs improved by adding the inventive components, might be used for any different purposes and in connection with various applications and solutions.
- the present invention allows conventional ICCs to be modified by simply integrating the essential components either as hardware, or as a combination of hardware and software.
- the inventive approach facilitates the protection of sensitive information contained in an ICC. It is an advantage of the present invention that it works autonomously even in case that no external power is supplied to the ICC.
- the implementation of the invention is not expensive and is well suited for mass-fabrication.
- the invention can be easily implemented in current and future ICCs.
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Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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EP98110425A EP0964361A1 (fr) | 1998-06-08 | 1998-06-08 | Protection d'information sensible contenue dans les cartes à puce |
EP98110425 | 1998-06-08 |
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US6264108B1 true US6264108B1 (en) | 2001-07-24 |
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Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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US09/327,067 Expired - Fee Related US6264108B1 (en) | 1998-06-08 | 1999-06-07 | Protection of sensitive information contained in integrated circuit cards |
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Cited By (45)
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EP1136942A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-22 | 2001-09-26 | Infineon Technologies AG | Circuit pour protection d'un circuit contre l'analyse et la manipulation |
FR2823887B1 (fr) * | 2001-04-24 | 2008-07-25 | Gemplus Card Int | Dispositif electronique, notamment carte a circuit(s) integre(s) muni d'une protection contre les intrusions |
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KR100528477B1 (ko) * | 2003-07-22 | 2005-11-15 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 스마트카드의 해킹검지회로 |
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