US20230415798A1 - System for verifying the integrity of a convoy, particularly a railway convoy - Google Patents

System for verifying the integrity of a convoy, particularly a railway convoy Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20230415798A1
US20230415798A1 US18/252,182 US202118252182A US2023415798A1 US 20230415798 A1 US20230415798 A1 US 20230415798A1 US 202118252182 A US202118252182 A US 202118252182A US 2023415798 A1 US2023415798 A1 US 2023415798A1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
controller
convoy
integrity
vehicle
verifying
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
US18/252,182
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Angelo Grasso
Matteo FREA
Roberto Tione
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Faiveley Transport Italia SpA
Original Assignee
Faiveley Transport Italia SpA
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Faiveley Transport Italia SpA filed Critical Faiveley Transport Italia SpA
Assigned to FAIVELEY TRANSPORT ITALIA S.P.A. reassignment FAIVELEY TRANSPORT ITALIA S.P.A. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: TIONE, ROBERTO, GRASSO, ANGELO, FREA, Matteo
Publication of US20230415798A1 publication Critical patent/US20230415798A1/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0054—Train integrity supervision, e.g. end-of-train [EOT] devices
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0036—Conductor-based, e.g. using CAN-Bus, train-line or optical fibres
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
    • B61L25/028—Determination of vehicle position and orientation within a train consist, e.g. serialisation
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0072—On-board train data handling

Definitions

  • the present invention relates, in general, to the field of the convoys of vehicles.
  • the invention relates to a system for verifying the integrity of a convoy, particularly a railway convoy, including at least two vehicles (at least two railway vehicles in the case of a railway convoy).
  • Verifying the integrity of the convoy means verifying that the vehicles RV that make up the convoy T have not disconnected from each other.
  • An example of a convoy T whose integrity is not compromised is shown in FIG. 2 .
  • the convoy illustrated is a railway convoy.
  • a first section S 1 of the convoy including a leading vehicle H, could in any case remain safely under the manual control of the driver or of any automatic control systems.
  • the leading vehicle and the tail vehicle may be defined as a function of the travelling direction D of the convoy, e.g. the leading vehicle may be the first vehicle according to the travelling direction D and the tail vehicle may be the last vehicle according to the travelling direction D.
  • a second section S 2 of the convoy disconnected from said first section S 1 of the convoy, could be prevented from receiving commands from the driver or from any automatic control systems.
  • the second section of the convoy may continue its travel in an uncontrolled manner, generating a considerable safety risk.
  • a braking system of a railway convoy comprises a pneumatic line P, also called “brake pipe”, which crosses all the railway vehicles of the railway convoy and which, when said railway convoy is not braked, has a pressure of about 5 bar.
  • P pneumatic line
  • a more or less marked depression may be created in the brake pipe, so as to achieve a gradual braking of the railway convoy.
  • the brake pipe At the moment of detachment of the railway vehicles of the railway convoy, the brake pipe will be interrupted, thus generating a loss of pressure inside it.
  • the pressure drop in the line will cause the various braking systems (whose braking force is a function of the pressure in the pipe) of the railway vehicles to apply the greatest possible braking force.
  • the integrity of the railway convoy is verified at the start of the mission by means of an exhaust brake test of the brake pipe.
  • the integrity of the convoy is verified both by the driver and by systems positioned on the side of the rail R which interact with the signaling system.
  • An example of such known systems is the axle counting system 100 .
  • An axle counting system is based on the principle of counting the axles A of the railway vehicles engaging a block section.
  • a special electromagnetic device 102 may be provided which allows the number of axles A of railway vehicles, including locomotives, which pass on rail R to be counted. If the count is not correct with respect to a number of axles expected for such railway convoy, this clearly means that the integrity of the railway convoy is compromised.
  • axle count is illustrated by way of example in FIG. 1 .
  • An object of the present invention is therefore to provide a system for verifying the integrity of a convoy which is highly configurable, which may be implemented directly on board the convoy, which reduces its installation and maintenance costs.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a generic example of an axle counting system according to the prior art
  • FIG. 2 illustrates a situation in which a convoy, for example a railway convoy, is in a condition of non-compromised integrity
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a situation in which a convoy, for example a railway convoy, is in a condition of compromised integrity
  • FIG. 4 illustrates a diagram of a system for verifying the integrity of a convoy according to an embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 5 illustrates an embodiment in which the first controller and the second controller are included in respective braking control units
  • FIG. 6 illustrates an exemplary communication network
  • FIG. 7 illustrates a further embodiment of a system for verifying the integrity of a convoy.
  • the convoy may be a railway convoy.
  • such convoy comprises at least a first vehicle RV 1 and a second vehicle RV 2 .
  • a convoy may also include more than two vehicles.
  • the railway convoy may include four vehicles.
  • the convoy illustrated is a railway convoy.
  • the system for verifying the integrity of a convoy includes a first controller 402 arranged to be coupled to the first vehicle RV 1 , and a second controller 404 arranged to be coupled to the second vehicle RV 2 .
  • the first vehicle RV 1 may be any vehicle among the four vehicles which make up the convoy and the second vehicle RV 2 may be any other vehicle among the three remaining vehicles which make up the convoy.
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may each be or include at least one of at least one controller, at least one processor, at least one microprocessor, at least one microcontroller, at least one PLC, and the like.
  • system for verifying the integrity of a convoy also includes at least one communication means N arranged to allow communication between the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 .
  • the first controller 402 is arranged to determine that the integrity of the convoy T is compromised, when the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 are no longer able to communicate with each other through said at least one communication means N.
  • the second controller 404 is arranged to determine that the integrity of the convoy T is compromised, when the first controller 402 and said second controller 404 are no longer able to communicate with each other through said at least one communication means N.
  • the fact that the communication between the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 is interrupted is a clear signal that the communication means has been damaged due to the compromise of the integrity of the convoy, or due to the fact that the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 are not arranged with respect to each other within a distance sufficient to ensure that the communication means allows communication between the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 .
  • the distance between the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may increase due to the compromise of the integrity of the convoy.
  • the first controller 402 may be arranged to be coupled to a leading vehicle H of the convoy and the second controller 404 may be arranged to be coupled to a tail vehicle TA of the convoy.
  • the second controller 404 may be arranged to be coupled to a leading vehicle H of the convoy and the first controller 402 may be arranged to be coupled to a tail vehicle TA of the convoy.
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may be arranged to determine the vehicle of the convoy on which they are respectively installed.
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may be arranged to determine the vehicle of the convoy on which they are respectively installed according to a safety integrity level greater than a predetermined minimum safety integrity level.
  • the method that the first controller and the second controller may use to determine the vehicle of the convoy on which they are respectively installed may be any known automatic/autonomous determination method of the position in the convoy.
  • first controller 402 and the second controller 404 it will not be necessary for the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 to be pre-configured or pre-programmed in order to receive or contain information regarding the vehicle during the installation on board the convoy on which they are installed.
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may be pre-configured or pre-programmed to receive or contain information regarding the vehicle on which they are installed.
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 will in this case be able to determine the vehicle on which they are respectively installed on the basis of this information.
  • This solution may be used for example for convoys that rarely or do not modify their vehicle composition.
  • the first controller may be arranged to determine that the integrity of the convoy is compromised when it does not receive, via the at least one means of communication N, the response message transmitted by the second controller on the at least one communication means N within a predetermined time interval from when the first controller has sent the interrogation message.
  • the first controller may be arranged to determine that the integrity of the convoy is compromised when it receives, through the at least one communication means N, the response message transmitted by the second controller but such received response message differs from an expected response message.
  • the second controller may be set up to determine that the integrity of the convoy is compromised when it does not receive, via the at least one communication means N, the interrogation message transmitted by the first communication means on the at least one communication means N for more than a waiting interval.
  • the second controller may be arranged to determine that the integrity of the convoy is compromised when it receives, through the at least one communication means N, the interrogation message transmitted by the first controller but such received interrogation message differs from an expected interrogation message.
  • the waiting time may be a predetermined time.
  • the content of the response message may be determined as a function of the content of the interrogation message.
  • the response message may be determined on the basis of a generation algorithm known to the first controller and to the second controller.
  • the first controller will be able to determine its own expected response message through this algorithm and verify that the response message received in response from the second controller has actually been generated by the second controller through this algorithm, as it matches the expected one.
  • the same logic may be applied analogously to the interrogation message as well.
  • the convoy may further comprise at least a third vehicle RV 3 .
  • the system for verifying the integrity of a convoy may include at least a third controller 403 arranged to be coupled to said third vehicle RV 3 .
  • FIG. 4 The elements of FIG. 4 which are again present in FIG. 7 have the same reference signs used for FIG. 4 .
  • the third controller 403 may be or include at least one of at least one controller, at least one processor, at least one microprocessor, at least one microcontroller, at least one PLC, and the like.
  • the third controller 403 may be arranged to determine the vehicle of the convoy on which it is installed. Preferably, the third controller 403 may be arranged to determine the vehicle of the convoy on which it is installed according to a safety integrity level greater than the predetermined minimum safety integrity level.
  • the method that the third controller may use to determine the vehicle of the convoy on which it is installed may be any known automatic/autonomous determination method of the position in the convoy.
  • this controller 403 it is pre-configured or pre-programmed so as to receive or contain information regarding the vehicle on which it is installed.
  • the third controller 403 may be pre-configured or pre-programmed to receive or contain information regarding the vehicle on which it is installed. The third controller 403 will then be able to determine the vehicle on which it is installed on the basis of this information.
  • the one or more controller installed on the respective intermediate railway vehicles should be “passing” and should not respond to the interrogation message by generating their own response message to be provided to the first controller which generated the interrogation message. If a controller of one of the intermediate railway vehicles responds to the interrogation message it received from the first controller by generating its own response message, i.e. “replacing” the second controller, there would be the risk of undue confirmation of the integrity of the vehicle without real confirmation that the vehicle on which the second controller is installed is still connected to the convoy. Only if the response message is received and it is the expected one is it possible to infer the integrity of the convoy. Any response messages generated by the controller of the intermediate vehicles would be recognized as unexpected messages by the first controller.
  • intermediate vehicle I it is possible to mean any vehicle which in the convoy is installed between the leading vehicle and the tail vehicle.
  • the second vehicle and the third vehicle RV 3 are each an intermediate vehicle I of the convoy.
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may each be implemented according to a safety integrity level greater than a predetermined minimum safety integrity level.
  • the third controller 403 may also be implemented according to a safety integrity level greater than a predetermined minimum safety integrity level.
  • the first controller 402 , the second controller 404 and the third controller 403 may be implemented according to a minimum safety integrity level (SIL), so as to ensure that any lack of communication may not be attributed to their malfunctions or breakdowns.
  • SIL minimum safety integrity level
  • standard EN50126 defines the methodologies for assigning the SIL0/1/2/3/4 safety levels (with safety integrity level SIL4 indicating the maximum safety integrity level) to the subsystems making up the system in question, based on the results of the Safety Analysis, and standards EN50128 and EN50129 define the design criteria to be applied to the Software and Hardware components, respectively, based on the SIL levels assigned based on said Safety Analysis results.
  • the at least one communication means may be arranged to allow a communication according to a predetermined safety protocol.
  • a predetermined safety protocol may be a protocol commonly referred to as the “black channel” type.
  • the communication means may be two or more and may be arranged to be connected together by means of a communication unit.
  • the communication means may also be created in accordance with the methodologies specified by standard EN 50159, guaranteeing a high safety integrity level (SIL).
  • SIL high safety integrity level
  • the first controller 402 , the second controller 404 and the third controller 403 may be controller already usually included on board a vehicle and made according to a high safety integrity level SIL.
  • the first controller 402 may be included in a braking control unit or braking control module 500
  • the second controller 404 may be included in a braking control unit or braking control module 500
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may each be included in respective braking control units or braking control module 500 .
  • the third controller 403 may also be included in a braking control unit or braking control module.
  • the first controller 402 and/or the second controller 404 and/or the third controller 403 may each be a controller already on board respective braking control units or modules. In this way, the same controller may be used both to manage the braking of the vehicle and to verify the integrity of the convoy.
  • controller and the braking control units or modules are already made according to high integrity safety levels, therefore, they are also suitable to be used for verifying the integrity of the convoy according to the present invention.
  • a braking control unit or module may generally be a controller installed on board a vehicle which is responsible for managing the braking means 502 of one or more railway vehicles of the convoy.
  • the braking means may be braking devices of one or more braking systems.
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may be arranged to determine the vehicle of the convoy on which they are respectively installed by means of a physical or hardware coding implemented by optical technology means.
  • the third controller 403 may be arranged to determine the vehicle of the convoy on which it is respectively installed by means of a physical or hardware coding implemented by optical technology means.
  • further controller may also be provided, which, when they determine to be installed on an intermediate vehicle, may similarly perform the message forwarding function performed by the third controller.
  • the controller arranged on the intermediate vehicles may forward the messages received to each other, until the messages transmitted by the first controller reach the second controller, and vice versa.
  • the messages may be forwarded between the various controller according to an order defined according to the position along the convoy of the vehicle on which they are respectively installed. For example, if the first controller is installed in the leading vehicle, the interrogation message may be transmitted, via the communication means, to the controller installed on the second vehicle in running order.
  • the controller installed on the second vehicle in running order once the interrogation message has been received, will be able to forward it, via the communication means, to the controller installed on the third vehicle in running order.
  • the forwarding may proceed in the same way for the further controller until the interrogation message has reached the second controller.
  • the response message may follow the reverse path until it reaches the first controller.
  • the forwarding order may be a predetermined order.
  • the communication means may include at least two redundant communication channels, and at least one of such communication channels may be a communication network 600 .
  • These communication channels may be wired or wireless.
  • first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may be arranged to determine the vehicle of the convoy on which they are respectively installed by means of a software coding implemented by means of a process of sequential recognition of nodes of said communication means.
  • the third controller 403 may be arranged to determine the vehicle of the convoy on which it is respectively installed by means of a software coding implemented by means of a process of sequential recognition of nodes 602 of the at least one communication means N.
  • the communication means form the communication network 600 and this communication network may include one or more network nodes 602 .
  • the first controller 402 may be arranged to transmit, through the at least one communication means N, the interrogation message according to a first predetermined periodicity.
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may be arranged to transmit, through said at least one communication means, the respective communication messages used for the integrity verification according to a predetermined periodicity.
  • the first controller 402 may be arranged to update, according to a second periodicity, the interrogation message, and said second controller 404 is arranged to update, according to a third periodicity, the response message.
  • the first, second and third periodicities may be different or equal to each other.
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may be arranged to update, according to a specific second periodicity, the communication messages used for the integrity verification.
  • a safety check has been carried out which ensures that the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 , even if blocked in a fault condition, continue to transmit a previous message, thus nullifying the integrity verification of the convoy.
  • the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 may each be arranged to perform at least one predetermined safety action.
  • the at least one predetermined safety action may include the actuation of at least braking means of the first vehicle RV 1 or of the second vehicle RV 2 , to which the first controller 402 and the second controller 404 are respectively associated.
  • the braking means may be of any type, for example pneumatic, electromechanical, electronic, mechanical, mechatronic, friction, etc.
  • the first controller 402 may be arranged to send an alarm message to the third controller 403 .
  • the second controller 404 may be arranged to send an alarm message to the third controller 403 .
  • the third controller 403 may therefore be arranged to perform at least one predetermined safety action when it receives an alarm message from the first controller and/or from the second controller.
  • the at least one predetermined safety action may include the actuation of at least braking means of the third vehicle RV 3 , with which the third controller 403 is associated.
  • the braking means may be of any type, for example pneumatic, electromechanical, electronic, mechanical, mechatronic, friction, etc.
  • the advantage achieved is that of having implemented a system for verifying the integrity of a convoy which is highly configurable, which may be implemented directly on board the convoy, which reduces its installation and maintenance costs.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Traffic Control Systems (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
  • Valves And Accessory Devices For Braking Systems (AREA)
  • Regulating Braking Force (AREA)
US18/252,182 2020-11-12 2021-11-12 System for verifying the integrity of a convoy, particularly a railway convoy Pending US20230415798A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
IT102020000027089A IT202000027089A1 (it) 2020-11-12 2020-11-12 Sistema per la verifica di integrità di un convoglio ferroviario
IT102020000027089 2020-11-12
PCT/IB2021/060501 WO2022101842A1 (en) 2020-11-12 2021-11-12 System for verifying the integrity of a convoy, particularly a railway convoy

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20230415798A1 true US20230415798A1 (en) 2023-12-28

Family

ID=74556987

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US18/252,182 Pending US20230415798A1 (en) 2020-11-12 2021-11-12 System for verifying the integrity of a convoy, particularly a railway convoy

Country Status (7)

Country Link
US (1) US20230415798A1 (it)
EP (1) EP4244116A1 (it)
JP (1) JP2023551392A (it)
KR (1) KR20230128265A (it)
CN (1) CN116648397A (it)
IT (1) IT202000027089A1 (it)
WO (1) WO2022101842A1 (it)

Family Cites Families (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE69727106T2 (de) * 1996-09-13 2004-11-18 New York Air Brake Corp. Automatische Wagenreihungsbestimmung für Zug mit Orientierung eines Waggons
US9917773B2 (en) * 2008-08-04 2018-03-13 General Electric Company Data communication system and method
US6972670B2 (en) * 2003-12-04 2005-12-06 New York Air Brake Corporation WDP setup determination method
IT201700040680A1 (it) * 2017-04-12 2018-10-12 Faiveley Transport Italia Spa Sistema di controllo elettronico della frenatura di emergenza e di servizio, per un veicolo ferroviario.
FR3075144A1 (fr) * 2017-12-20 2019-06-21 Alstom Transport Technologies Vehicule ferroviaire, systeme ferroviaire et procede de composition de vehicule ferroviaire associes
WO2020058858A1 (en) * 2018-09-18 2020-03-26 Faiveley Transport Italia S.P.A. Recognition system of the position along a train of a braking control mechatronic device associated with a railway vehicle
GB2580925B (en) * 2019-01-30 2021-06-30 Hitachi Ltd Train protection system

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN116648397A (zh) 2023-08-25
KR20230128265A (ko) 2023-09-04
JP2023551392A (ja) 2023-12-08
EP4244116A1 (en) 2023-09-20
WO2022101842A1 (en) 2022-05-19
IT202000027089A1 (it) 2022-05-12

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN102616257B (zh) 分布式列车控制
US10752270B2 (en) Method and device for ascertaining a movement authority for a track-bound vehicle
KR102124927B1 (ko) 열차자율주행환경에서의 자원 관리 방법 및 가상 연결을 위한 자원 관리 방법
CN107867269B (zh) 列车紧急制动方法及装置
US10457300B2 (en) Method and device for automatically influencing track-bound vehicles
US20150225003A1 (en) Control of a rail vehicle
CN113562036B (zh) 编组列车解编方法及系统
CN111806484A (zh) 列车门及站台门故障隔离控制方法、装置及系统
JPWO2017195315A1 (ja) 車上装置および地上システム
EA024596B1 (ru) Способ и устройство для внутренней ретрансляции сообщений в системе связи для состава транспортных средств
CN110803196A (zh) 一种列车的虚拟联挂系统和方法
RU186187U1 (ru) Устройство управления для транспортного средства
CN112061141A (zh) 用于cbtc系统的列车编组方法及装置
CN113997986B (zh) 列车自主调度的车载列车自动监督系统及自主调度方法
CN105658497A (zh) 列车编组中的气动制动系统冗余
US20230415798A1 (en) System for verifying the integrity of a convoy, particularly a railway convoy
KR20020018771A (ko) 무선통신을 이용한 열차자동정지장치 및 그 제어방법
AU2019283832A1 (en) Rail transport system
CN114074696B (zh) 虚拟编组多车的折返控制方法及控制系统
RU2783559C1 (ru) Устройство для передачи управляющих команд автоматической локомотивной сигнализации в рельсовые цепи централизованной системы автоблокировки
CN115973233B (zh) 一种车车通信的列控系统及链接建立、拆除方法及装置
CN116009439A (zh) 电笛控制设备及方法
CN114407978B (zh) 连挂列车折返方法、装置、电子设备及计算机程序产品
KR200234233Y1 (ko) 무선통신을 이용한 열차자동정지장치
US20240067244A1 (en) Traffic network and method for operating rail vehicles in a traffic network

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: FAIVELEY TRANSPORT ITALIA S.P.A., ITALY

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:GRASSO, ANGELO;FREA, MATTEO;TIONE, ROBERTO;SIGNING DATES FROM 20230712 TO 20230718;REEL/FRAME:064513/0416

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: DOCKETED NEW CASE - READY FOR EXAMINATION