RU2634659C1 - Maneuvering method for high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle in possible coverage area of anti-missile and air defense means - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: aviation.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to a maneuvering method for a high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle (HSUAV) in coverage area of anti-missile and air defense. To implement the method, the trajectory of mandatory maneuvering is set, consisting of a sequence of individual sections corresponding to a certain duration, certain distance and direction of HSUAV escape from the lesion, calculated in a certain way.

EFFECT: poor predictability and low vulnerability of the trajectories of a high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle in the area of their possible damage by anti-missile and air defense means is ensured.

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Description

The invention relates to the field of assigning trajectories of high-speed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The well-known "Adaptive Route Control Aircraft" (LA) (patent RU No. 2568161) to reduce the likelihood of aircraft damage in a priori known areas of possible damage by anti-aircraft missile defense systems (AED) due to their bypass.

The disadvantage of this method is that bypassing the air defense zones increases, as a rule, the time and range due to several necessary bypass maneuvers. In addition, the location of the air defense zones can change, including during the flight of the aircraft (especially in relation to mobile air defense systems).

Known methods for reducing the effectiveness of air defense systems by using maneuvers of aircraft to disrupt the guidance mode and increase miss missile defense guided missiles (SAM). So, one of such methods is the method of using the horizontal maneuver of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with the aim of disrupting the stability of homing and increasing the miss of a guided weapon (USP) (missiles) on an aircraft for given conditions for the approach of these objects (“A way of evading an aircraft from guided weapons ". Application for invention No. 2002124531/11 dated 09.16.2002. B64C 13/18, F44B 15/01, G05D 1/08, G05D 1/10).

The disadvantage of this method is that its implementation on the application is difficult due to the need for rapid detection of the launch of missiles, identifying its type, as well as the target, which is being fired at the moment, and calculating the evasion parameters. In addition, the requirements for maneuvering missiles from missiles in these conditions for acceleration and its duration can not always be met by aircraft, especially manned aircraft.

Also known is the "Method of reducing the likelihood of an aircraft being damaged by air defense systems" (Application for invention No. 95101418/02 of 01/25/1995. F41H 13/00) by implementing a special maneuver that excludes the possibility of extrapolating the parameters of the aircraft trajectory. The proposed maneuver is a trajectory combining a set of eights mutually moving in nodes of eight, while the aircraft flies along spiral turns in a plane perpendicular to the direction of flight. The transition from one eight to another is carried out randomly.

The disadvantage of this method is the limitation of the direction of the spiral turns by a plane perpendicular to the direction of flight, which practically does not reduce the accuracy of extrapolation of the flight path. Another drawback is the lack of requirements for the quality parameters of the turns, which, if the turn radius is too large, can make it possible to ensure the accuracy of the aircraft’s trajectory extrapolation for the aircraft trajectory, which is sufficient to aim the appropriate means of destruction on the aircraft, and if the turn radius is too small, such a maneuver may not interfere with the means indirect defeat.

There is also a comprehensive way to reduce the vulnerability of UAVs. He, like the method according to patent RU No. 2568161, suggests reducing the likelihood of UAV damage by bypassing the a priori known zones of destruction of anti-aircraft missile defense systems and (or) anti-missile defense (hereinafter - missile defense). Inside the ABM defense zones, if it is not possible to plan their bypass completely, maneuvering is proposed in the form of one of several standard maneuvers, including in accordance with application No. 95101418/02, which, presumably, should not allow target designation of a missile defense (PR ) to UAV or USP PR exit to homing mode to UAV.

The disadvantages of this method are, firstly, the disadvantages associated with bypassing the missile defense zones, namely, the increase in time and range due to maneuvers bypass, the unpredictability of the coordinates of the missile defense zones in relation to their mobile systems. Secondly, these are the disadvantages associated with maneuvering aircraft in the anti-aircraft missile defense zone, namely: the lack of quality requirements for maneuvering parameters (start and end maneuvering times, the number of individual maneuvers and the requirements for maneuvers for overloads and duration), which does not allow generally (qualitatively) to determine the possibility of reducing the vulnerability of the UAV due to such actions. The parameters of possible maneuvers are not related to the parameters of the missile defense and air defense systems for targeting the target.

To ensure reliable overcoming of missile defense air defense zones, it is necessary to connect the time and distance (span value) UAV maneuvering parameters with the time capabilities of the radar systems of missile defense and air defense systems to aim at a maneuvering target and with the ability to compensate for the USP span value.

The technical result of the proposed method is the assignment of difficult-to-predict and low-vulnerability UAV trajectories in the area of their possible defeat by missile defense systems.

This goal is achieved by the fact that when specifying a separate maneuver of the UAV, the proposed new parameters of the individual maneuver are observed, namely:

1) Critical maneuver time (KVM), T _KVM , which is understood as the maximum permissible time between individual maneuvers, under which the missile defense-air defense system and USP are not able to perform (prepare, calculate) target designation (TsU) for UAVs with sufficient to defeat UAVs accuracy.

The KVM should be, accordingly, less than the minimum target designation time for the UAV from the radar of the anti-aircraft defense systems and the homing system USP.

2) The critical distance of departure (KRU) from the KVM is the minimum “drift” of the UAV (the distance between the line of the speed vector of the UAV at the beginning of the maneuver and the point of location of the UAV at the end of the maneuver), which can no longer compensate (“choose”) the USP in the case of homing UAV.

The switchgear should be, respectively, greater than the maximum “span” of the USP (ie, more than the maximum distance between the line of the velocity vector of the USP and the point of location of the UAV at the start of homing of the USP), which the USP can compensate for (“choose”).

The KVM value should be determined based on the best at the time of the use of the UAV characteristics of the PRO-air defense system for target designation on the UAV:

where T _{TsU radar} , T _{TsU USP} - the minimum target designation time for UAVs from radar systems PRO-air defense and homing system USP. The value of switchgear during the KVM:

where In _{comp. USP} is the value of the USP span, which it is able to compensate (“choose”) with a maneuver duration T _M equal to KVM.

This goal is also achieved by the fact that when defining the UAV trajectories, a new approach to trajectory planning is observed - the KVRM approach (critical time-maneuvering distance), the essence of which is as follows:

1. The exact location of the radar system of the PRO-air defense system for defining the UAV trajectories is not important, the region of their possible location relative to the target is important in order to set the mandatory maneuvering zones (ZOM) for the UAV.

2. The time between individual maneuvers should be no more than a KVM, and the number of maneuvers is determined by the length of the ZOM and the speed of the UAV.

3. The “departure” of the UAV during the next maneuver from the original direction should be at least the switchgear, which determines the requirement for the curvature of the maneuver trajectory and, accordingly, for the overload of the UAV during maneuver.

4. The direction of the next maneuver should be stochastic (within certain spatial boundaries).

The KVM requirement makes the UAV trajectory difficult to predict and less vulnerable.

The requirement for switchgear allows us to achieve aircraft invulnerability in the case when, by the time a separate maneuver began, the guided missile defense system of the anti-aircraft defense system, launched into the zone of the possible location of UAVs in the absence of sufficiently accurate target designation, was able to switch to homing mode with respect to UAVs.

With the KVRM approach, there is no need to expend energy on bypassing the missile defense zones, enough quasistochastic changes in the trajectory, making it impossible to target and compensate for the USP span when homing in aircraft.

The trajectories implementing the KVRM approach are KVRM trajectories.

The method is illustrated using the drawing.

In FIG. Figure 1 shows a section of a separate maneuver of the KVRM trajectory of the UAV in the maneuvering section.

The claimed method is implemented as follows.

When defining the UAV trajectories in the maneuvering area, the exact location of the radar of the PRO-air defense system is not important, the area of their location is taken into account, in which the ZOM of the UAV is set. The frequency of maneuvering in the ZOM is determined by the length of the ZOM and the parameters of an individual maneuver - the velocity and acceleration vectors of the UAV, KVM and KRU. The time interval between individual maneuvers is not more than KVM. At the start point of a separate maneuver, N _{OM, the} direction of the next maneuver is stochastically selected (in certain spatial boundaries, which are determined by the required time to achieve the target and the reserve of the characteristic speed of the UAV). The UAV motion parameters should ensure that the switchgear is behind the KVM to the end point of a separate maneuver K _OM .

Thus, when using the claimed method, the hardly predictable and low-vulnerability of the UAV trajectories in the zone of their possible defeat is achieved, i.e., practically, the UAV invariance to the effects of missile defense systems.

Claims (1)

A method for maneuvering a high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle in the zone of the possible action of anti-ballistic and anti-aircraft defense means, which consists in setting a mandatory maneuvering trajectory in this zone, including a sequence of individual maneuvering sections, the duration of each of which should not exceed the critical maneuver time equal to the maximum allowable time a maneuver in which targeting to a high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle is impossible from radar stations of anti-ballistic and (or) air defense systems and homing systems of a guided weapon of destruction for these systems, and the distance between the speed vector line of the high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle at the beginning of the maneuver and its location at the end of the maneuver should be no less than the critical departure distance of the high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle equal to the minimum distance that a controlled weapon cannot compensate in the event of homing and a high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle during a critical maneuver time of a high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle, the direction of individual maneuvers is chosen stochastically in spatial boundaries, which are determined by the required time to reach the target and the characteristic speed reserve of a high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle.

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