JPH0434395A - Failure prevention equipment of reactor container - Google Patents
Failure prevention equipment of reactor containerInfo
- Publication number
- JPH0434395A JPH0434395A JP2139758A JP13975890A JPH0434395A JP H0434395 A JPH0434395 A JP H0434395A JP 2139758 A JP2139758 A JP 2139758A JP 13975890 A JP13975890 A JP 13975890A JP H0434395 A JPH0434395 A JP H0434395A
- Authority
- JP
- Japan
- Prior art keywords
- pcv
- hydrogen
- released
- loca
- metal
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 title claims description 11
- UFHFLCQGNIYNRP-UHFFFAOYSA-N Hydrogen Chemical compound [H][H] UFHFLCQGNIYNRP-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 claims abstract description 24
- 239000001257 hydrogen Substances 0.000 claims abstract description 21
- 229910052739 hydrogen Inorganic materials 0.000 claims abstract description 21
- 230000006378 damage Effects 0.000 claims description 12
- 238000001179 sorption measurement Methods 0.000 claims description 6
- 229910045601 alloy Inorganic materials 0.000 claims description 2
- 239000000956 alloy Substances 0.000 claims description 2
- 229910052751 metal Inorganic materials 0.000 abstract description 14
- 239000002184 metal Substances 0.000 abstract description 14
- 238000004880 explosion Methods 0.000 abstract description 9
- 230000001629 suppression Effects 0.000 abstract description 4
- 239000002826 coolant Substances 0.000 abstract description 3
- 239000006096 absorbing agent Substances 0.000 abstract 2
- 230000001066 destructive effect Effects 0.000 abstract 1
- KDLHZDBZIXYQEI-UHFFFAOYSA-N Palladium Chemical compound [Pd] KDLHZDBZIXYQEI-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 12
- XLYOFNOQVPJJNP-UHFFFAOYSA-N water Substances O XLYOFNOQVPJJNP-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 7
- 239000000446 fuel Substances 0.000 description 5
- 239000000203 mixture Substances 0.000 description 5
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 4
- 229910052763 palladium Inorganic materials 0.000 description 4
- 238000010521 absorption reaction Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 239000007789 gas Substances 0.000 description 3
- IJGRMHOSHXDMSA-UHFFFAOYSA-N Atomic nitrogen Chemical compound N#N IJGRMHOSHXDMSA-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 2
- OKTJSMMVPCPJKN-UHFFFAOYSA-N Carbon Chemical compound [C] OKTJSMMVPCPJKN-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 2
- 229910000990 Ni alloy Inorganic materials 0.000 description 2
- 238000005253 cladding Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000002360 explosive Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000020169 heat generation Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000000463 material Substances 0.000 description 2
- 239000000843 powder Substances 0.000 description 2
- RYGMFSIKBFXOCR-UHFFFAOYSA-N Copper Chemical compound [Cu] RYGMFSIKBFXOCR-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- MYMOFIZGZYHOMD-UHFFFAOYSA-N Dioxygen Chemical compound O=O MYMOFIZGZYHOMD-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 229910001030 Iron–nickel alloy Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 229910001069 Ti alloy Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 230000004931 aggregating effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 229910052802 copper Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 239000010949 copper Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000007423 decrease Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
- 229910001873 dinitrogen Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 229910001882 dioxygen Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000004992 fission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000005484 gravity Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010438 heat treatment Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000007689 inspection Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000005865 ionizing radiation Effects 0.000 description 1
- IXQWNVPHFNLUGD-UHFFFAOYSA-N iron titanium Chemical compound [Ti].[Fe] IXQWNVPHFNLUGD-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- DOARWPHSJVUWFT-UHFFFAOYSA-N lanthanum nickel Chemical compound [Ni].[La] DOARWPHSJVUWFT-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- ATTFYOXEMHAYAX-UHFFFAOYSA-N magnesium nickel Chemical compound [Mg].[Ni] ATTFYOXEMHAYAX-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 230000007257 malfunction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001404 mediated effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 229910000510 noble metal Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- RVTZCBVAJQQJTK-UHFFFAOYSA-N oxygen(2-);zirconium(4+) Chemical compound [O-2].[O-2].[Zr+4] RVTZCBVAJQQJTK-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 230000000737 periodic effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000005258 radioactive decay Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005215 recombination Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000006798 recombination Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008929 regeneration Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011069 regeneration method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002441 reversible effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- VSZWPYCFIRKVQL-UHFFFAOYSA-N selanylidenegallium;selenium Chemical compound [Se].[Se]=[Ga].[Se]=[Ga] VSZWPYCFIRKVQL-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 229910001928 zirconium oxide Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
Landscapes
- Structure Of Emergency Protection For Nuclear Reactors (AREA)
Abstract
Description
【発明の詳細な説明】
〔発明の目的〕
（産業上の利用分野）
本発明は原子炉格納容器（以下、ＰＣｖと記す）内に放
出された水素ガス（以下、Ｈ２と記す）の爆発によって
ＰＣｖが破壊されることを防止したＰＣｖの破壊防止装
置に関する。[Detailed Description of the Invention] [Objective of the Invention] (Industrial Application Field) The present invention is directed to a nuclear reactor containment vessel (hereinafter referred to as PCv) due to an explosion of hydrogen gas (hereinafter referred to as H2) released inside the reactor containment vessel (hereinafter referred to as PCv). The present invention relates to a PCv destruction prevention device that prevents a PCv from being destroyed.
（従来の技術）
原子炉冷却材喪失事故（以下ＬＯＣＡと記す）時にＲＰ
Ｖ内で発生するＨ２がＰＣｖ内に放出された場合、この
日２を迅速に吸収してＰＣｖ内のＨ８濃度を希釈してＨ
２による爆発の可能性を未然に防止する必要がある。(Conventional technology) RP in the event of a loss of reactor coolant accident (hereinafter referred to as LOCA)
If H2 generated in V is released into PCv, it will quickly absorb H2 on this day and dilute the H8 concentration in PCv, resulting in H2 being released into PCv.
It is necessary to prevent the possibility of explosion due to 2.
Ｈ２は次の原因で発生する。H2 occurs due to the following reasons.
核分裂または放射性崩壊に伴う強い電離性放射線により
水（）１２０）が分解してＨ２および酸素ガス（以下０
□と記す）を生ずる。これはＬＯＧＡにかかわらず常に
生じているが、ＬＯＧＡ時でない場合にはＲＰＶ内で発
生した後、主蒸気管、タービンを経て復水器に入り排ガ
ス処理装置で水に再結合させられて取除かれる。しかし
、 ＬＯＧＡ時には破断した配管からＨ２がＰＣｖ内に
放出される。Strong ionizing radiation associated with nuclear fission or radioactive decay decomposes water ()120) into H2 and oxygen gas (hereinafter referred to as 0
(denoted as □) occurs. This always occurs regardless of LOGA, but if it is not LOGA, it occurs in the RPV, passes through the main steam pipe and turbine, enters the condenser, is recombined with water in the exhaust gas treatment equipment, and is removed. It will be destroyed. However, during LOGA, H2 is released into the PCv from the broken pipe.
他方、大口径破断によるＬＯＧＡ時には燃料が一時的に
冷却材に囲まれなくなり露出することになって除熱量が
急減すると燃料被覆管の温度が急上昇する。この場合、
被覆管の主成分であるジルコニウム（Ｚｒ）が高温下で
は水を分解し酸化ジルコニウムとＨ２を発生する。これ
も破断配管からＰＣｖ内に放出される。On the other hand, in the case of LOGA caused by a large-diameter fracture, the fuel is temporarily not surrounded by the coolant and is exposed, and the amount of heat removed rapidly decreases, causing the temperature of the fuel cladding to rise rapidly. in this case,
Zirconium (Zr), the main component of the cladding, decomposes water at high temperatures and generates zirconium oxide and H2. This is also released into the PCv from the broken pipe.
このようにＬＯＧＡ時にはＨ２がＰＣｖ内に蓄積してい
くことになる。In this way, H2 will accumulate in PCv during LOGA.
１１０万ＫＷｅ級ＢＷＲの標準的な解析ではＬＯＣＡ発
生の数分後にはＰＣｖドライウェル内のＨ２濃度は２ｖ
１０（ボリュームバセント）程度に達して徐々に増加し
最大３ｖ１０を超えることになる。一方、ｏ２濃度はＬ
ＯＣＡ発生の数分後にはＰＣｖ内はＬＯＣＡ以前から管
理方法にも依るが４ｖ１０程度を超え最大５Ｖ１０程ま
で上昇する。ＰＣｖ内はＬＯＣＡ以前から管理方法にも
依るが４ｖ７０程度の０２は存在している。In a standard analysis of a 1.1 million KWe class BWR, the H2 concentration in the PCv dry well is 2v several minutes after the LOCA occurs.
It reaches about 10 (volume basis) and gradually increases to a maximum of 3v10. On the other hand, the o2 concentration is L
Several minutes after the occurrence of OCA, the internal temperature of PCv rises to more than 4v10 and reaches a maximum of 5v10, depending on the management method, even before LOCA. In PCv, 02 of about 4v70 has existed since before LOCA, depending on the management method.
Ｈｌの爆発限界は０２．５ｖ１０以上の存在下では４ｖ
１０以上であり、ＬＯＣＡ解析上ではＬＯＣＡ発生後３
．５時間後に可燃性ガス濃度制御装置（以下ＦＣ５と記
す）の起動により爆発限界に達しないことになっている
。The explosive limit of Hl is 4v in the presence of 02.5v10 or more.
10 or more, and according to LOCA analysis, 3 after LOCA occurs.
．． After 5 hours, the combustible gas concentration control device (hereinafter referred to as FC5) is activated to ensure that the explosion limit is not reached.
従来の技術でこのＨ２濃度を下げるためにＦｅ２を用い
ている。Conventional technology uses Fe2 to reduce this H2 concentration.
Ｆｅ２はｐｃｖからＨｌ、０□および窒素ガス（Ｎ２）
の混合気を導く導管、ブロワ−１予熱器、再結合器、冷
却器および弁、計装、電源から成る機器グループの総称
でありＰＣｖ外に置かれる。Fe2 is converted from pcv to Hl, 0□ and nitrogen gas (N2)
It is a general term for a group of equipment that is located outside the PCv and consists of conduits that guide the air-fuel mixture, blower 1 preheater, recombiner, cooler and valves, instrumentation, and power supply.
Ｆｅ２の機能を第３図を参照しながら説明する。The function of Fe2 will be explained with reference to FIG.
ｐｃｖドライウェル１内の）Ｉ、、 ０２． Ｎ２混合
気は導管２によりブロワ−３に吸込まれる。ブロワ−３
から吐き出された混合気は予熱器４に入る。予熱器４は
混合気の温度を上げＨｌと０２が化合し易くする。予熱
器４の加温には電気ヒーター８などが使われ温度を正確
にコントロールする予熱された混合気は次いで再結合器
５に入り、この再結合器５内で２Ｈｌ＋Ｏ□→２Ｈ２０
＋反応熱という反応で水蒸気ができ減容化される。水蒸
気は冷却器６に入り反応熱を吸収すると共に水蒸気を凝
縮されたのち、導管１０によってＰＣｖサプレッション
チャンバー７に戻される。冷却器６内での除熱は標準的
なりＷＲではＬＯＣＡですでに起動している原子炉残留
熱除去（ＲＨＲ）系の一次水９を用いている。)I in pcv dry well 1, 02. The N2 mixture is drawn into the blower 3 via conduit 2. Blower 3
The air-fuel mixture discharged from the preheater 4 enters the preheater 4. The preheater 4 raises the temperature of the air-fuel mixture and makes it easier for Hl and 02 to combine. An electric heater 8 or the like is used to heat the preheater 4, and the temperature is accurately controlled.The preheated mixture then enters the recombiner 5, where it is converted to 2Hl+O□→2H20.
Water vapor is produced by the reaction called +reaction heat and the volume is reduced. The water vapor enters the cooler 6 and absorbs the heat of reaction and is condensed before being returned to the PCv suppression chamber 7 via a conduit 10. Heat removal in the cooler 6 is standard, and in the WR, primary water 9 of the reactor residual heat removal (RHR) system, which has already been activated in the LOCA, is used.
ＦＣＳシステムとしては、この設備の信頼性を確保する
ため、１００％容量を２基持っている。The FCS system has two units with 100% capacity to ensure the reliability of this equipment.
ＦＣＳシステムはＬＯＣＡが発生したのち、約３０分間
程度で操作員がプラントの状況を判断して手動始動させ
る。始動信号が入ると予熱器４の加温が開始され約３時
間後（ＬＯＣＡ後３．５時間）で再結合機能が発揮でき
るようになる。この間、ＰＣｖドライウェル内はＨｌ、
０□が蓄積し続けるが、爆発限界に至らないことが解析
上水されている。After a LOCA occurs, the FCS system takes about 30 minutes for the operator to assess the plant situation and manually start the system. When the start signal is input, heating of the preheater 4 is started, and the recombination function becomes available after about 3 hours (3.5 hours after LOCA). During this time, Hl inside the PCv dry well,
Analysis shows that 0□ continues to accumulate, but does not reach the explosive limit.
（発明が解決しようとする課題）
前述したようにＬＯＣＡ時にはＨｌ、０□が発生しＰＣ
ｖ内に蓄積され、ＬＯＣＡ発生後３．５時間経過してか
らＨｌ （同時に１／２体積の０□）を処理する様にな
るが、これ等の課題には次のようなものがある。(Problem to be solved by the invention) As mentioned above, at the time of LOCA, Hl and 0□ occur and the PC
3.5 hours after the occurrence of LOCA, Hl (at the same time 1/2 volume of 0□) is processed, but these problems include the following.
Ｑ）Ｆｅ２には回転体および可動部を持つ。Q) Fe2 has a rotating body and a moving part.
・・・故障の可能性がある。...There is a possibility of a malfunction.
■ＦＣ５作動には電源を必要とする。■Power supply is required for FC5 operation.
・・・停電の可能性がある。...There is a possibility of a power outage.
■ｐｃｖ外に配管を持つ。■Have piping outside the PCV.
・・・ＬＯＣＡ時と同様に配管破断の可能性がある。...There is a possibility of pipe breakage as in the case of LOCA.
（６）ＦＣ５機能発揮までに時間を要する。(6) It takes time to demonstrate the FC5 function.
・・・即応性がない。...There is no immediate response.
■操作員の判断で始動させる。■Start at the discretion of the operator.
・・・ＬＯＣＡ時に始動されない可能性がある。...There is a possibility that it will not be started at the time of LOCA.
上記■〜■のためＦＣＳシステムでは１００％容量を２
基備えている。また、設備の信頼度も可能な限り高めて
はある。しかし、に）では即応性がなく、事故想定を単
一でないと仮定すると危険度が大きくなる。■は設計思
想によっては自動起動にもできる。Due to the above ■~■, the FCS system has 100% capacity 2
It is equipped with basics. Additionally, the reliability of the equipment has been made as high as possible. However, there is no immediate response in (2), and assuming that the accident scenario is not unique, the risk increases. ■ can also be started automatically depending on the design philosophy.
本発明は上記課題を解決するためになされたもので、
ＬＯＣＡ時にＰＣｖ内に放出されるＨｌを速やかに吸収
してＨｌによる爆発を未然に防止し、もってＰＣｖの破
壊を防止することができるＰＣｖの破壊防止装置を提供
することにある。The present invention was made to solve the above problems,
To provide a PCv destruction prevention device capable of quickly absorbing Hl released into a PCv at the time of LOCA, preventing explosion due to Hl, and thereby preventing destruction of the PCv.
（課題を解決するための手段）
本発明は原子炉格納容器内に水素ガスを吸着する水素吸
蔵合金を収容した水素吸着装置が設置されてなることを
特徴とする。(Means for Solving the Problems) The present invention is characterized in that a hydrogen adsorption device containing a hydrogen storage alloy that adsorbs hydrogen gas is installed in a reactor containment vessel.
（作 用）
水素吸蔵金属を収容した水素吸着装置をＰＣＶ内ドラド
ライウェルびサプレッションチャンバなどに設置すると
、ＬＯＣＡ時に放出されたＨｌを該金属が速やかに吸収
し、ＰＣｖ内のＨ２濃度を低い状態に保ち、Ｈｌによる
爆発を未然に防止する。(Function) When a hydrogen adsorption device containing a hydrogen storage metal is installed in the Doradry well or suppression chamber in the PCV, the metal quickly absorbs Hl released during LOCA, reducing the H2 concentration in the PCV to a low state. to prevent explosions caused by Hl.
また、水素吸着装置のエレメントを■２の吸収効率が高
くなるように形成しかつ配列すれば基本的に可動部を必
要としないため信頼度を極めて高く保つことができる。Furthermore, if the elements of the hydrogen adsorption device are formed and arranged so as to increase the absorption efficiency (2), the reliability can be maintained extremely high since no moving parts are basically required.
（実施例）
第１図および第２図を参照しながら本発明に係る原子炉
格納容器の破壊防止装置の一実施例を説明する。(Example) An example of the destruction prevention device for a reactor containment vessel according to the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS. 1 and 2.
第１図中、符号１１は粉末状水素吸蔵金属を示しており
、この金属１が多孔質金属円筒１２内に充填されてエレ
メント１３が形成されている。In FIG. 1, reference numeral 11 indicates a powdered hydrogen storage metal, and this metal 1 is filled into a porous metal cylinder 12 to form an element 13.
このエレメント１３が第２図に示したように箱形状枠体
１４内に格納されて破壊防止装置ｉ１５が構成される。As shown in FIG. 2, this element 13 is housed within a box-shaped frame 14 to constitute a destruction prevention device i15.
水素吸蔵金属１１としてはパラジウム黒、パラジウム、
鉄−チタン合金、ランタン−ニッケル合金、マグネシウ
ム−ニッケル、鉄−ニッケル合金などＨ２を吸収すると
発熱とともに形態が変化し、吸収したＨ２は加熱すれば
吐出するものを使用する。このため１選択される金属は
水素放出温度の高いものが望ましい。As the hydrogen storage metal 11, palladium black, palladium,
We use materials such as iron-titanium alloys, lanthanum-nickel alloys, magnesium-nickel alloys, and iron-nickel alloys, which change their shape with heat generation when they absorb H2, and which discharge the absorbed H2 when heated. For this reason, it is desirable that the metal selected has a high hydrogen release temperature.
水素吸蔵金属１１はＨ２との接触面積を大きくし、かつ
Ｈ２を吸蔵した時の変化を吸収するためには活性炭状の
微粉末またはコークス状のものを選択することが望まし
い。For the hydrogen storage metal 11, in order to increase the contact area with H2 and to absorb changes when H2 is stored, it is desirable to select a fine powder in the form of activated carbon or a coke-like material.
また、水素吸蔵金属１１を充填する多孔質金属円筒１２
はＨ２を透過させるとともにある程度の重さを支え、か
つ吸収時の変形にも耐えることが必要である。そのため
には発熱を迅速に逃がすための銅製焼結フィルタを使用
することが望ましい。Also, a porous metal cylinder 12 filled with hydrogen storage metal 11
must be able to transmit H2, support a certain amount of weight, and withstand deformation during absorption. For this purpose, it is desirable to use a copper sintered filter to quickly release heat.
しかして、第１図に示したエレメント１３を複数個集合
して第２図に示した枠体１４に格納して構成した破壊防
止装置１５は第３図に示したようにＰＣＶドライウェル
１およびＰＣｖサプレッションチャンバ７内の壁面に取
り付けられる。Therefore, the destruction prevention device 15, which is constructed by assembling a plurality of elements 13 shown in FIG. 1 and storing them in the frame 14 shown in FIG. It is attached to the wall inside the PCv suppression chamber 7.
この破壊防止装置！１１５のエレメント１３はプラント
の定期点検毎に一部をサンプリングし、水素吸蔵の有無
を調へ、常時Ｈ２を吸蔵し得る状態にあることを確認す
る。水素吸蔵−吐出は熱の介在する可逆反応であり、再
生は極めて容易である。This anti-destruction device! A portion of the element 13 of 115 is sampled at each periodic inspection of the plant to check whether it stores hydrogen or not, and to confirm that it is always in a state where it can store H2. Hydrogen storage and discharge is a reversible reaction mediated by heat, and regeneration is extremely easy.
上述したように、ＬＯＣＡ時の水素吸収は可能であるが
、設備の能力を１００％確保するには二次的にエレメン
トエ３を冷却できる補助設備を設けるとより効率が上昇
する。逆に付帯設備の信頼度のため。As described above, hydrogen absorption during LOCA is possible, but in order to ensure 100% capacity of the equipment, efficiency will be further improved if auxiliary equipment that can cool the element 3 secondarily is provided. On the contrary, it is because of the reliability of the incidental equipment.
必要以上の効率上昇は信頼度が低下するので好ましくな
い。Increasing efficiency more than necessary is undesirable because it lowers reliability.
上記実施例において水素吸蔵金属１１にパラジウムを使
用した場合、パラジウム黒粉末は自らの体積の９００倍
の体積のＨ２を吸蔵する。パラジウム（比重１２、原子
量２０６）黒の能力を身近な例で比較すると、パラジウ
ム黒７０ｋｇでＨ２を約４５０ｋｇ吸着できる。これは
７０ｋｇ程度の７Ｎｒｒｉの気体を１５０気圧で貯蔵す
るボンベの重さであるが、７Ｎｒｒｉの）１２の重さは
約６００ｇであるからほぼＨ２ボンベ級の吸蔵能力を有
し、十分ボンベに代り得る能力を持っている６ＬＯＣＡ
時、１１０万ＫＷｅ級プラントでのＨ２の放出量は約３
０ｋｇ程度（３５ＯＮｒｎ’）と推定される。パラジウ
ム必要量に換算すると約５トン程度である。パラジウム
は貴金属であり、この量は高価であるが、吸蔵能力を多
少犠牲にして安価な金属とした場合でも、それ程多量に
はならない。In the above embodiment, when palladium is used as the hydrogen storage metal 11, the palladium black powder stores H2 in a volume 900 times its own volume. Comparing the ability of palladium black (specific gravity 12, atomic weight 206) using a familiar example, 70 kg of palladium black can adsorb approximately 450 kg of H2. This is the weight of a cylinder that stores about 70 kg of 7Nrri gas at 150 atmospheres, but since the weight of 7Nrri) 12 is about 600g, it has almost the same storage capacity as an H2 cylinder, and is enough to replace a cylinder. 6LOCA that has the ability to obtain
At the same time, the amount of H2 released in a 1.1 million KWe class plant is approximately 3
It is estimated to be around 0kg (35ONrn'). The required amount of palladium is approximately 5 tons. Palladium is a noble metal, and this amount is expensive, but even if some storage capacity is sacrificed for a cheaper metal, the amount will not be that large.
上記実施例によればＰＣＶ内に放出される殆んどの１２
を破壊防止装置で速やかに吸収できるため。According to the above example, most of the 12
can be quickly absorbed by the anti-destruction device.
破壊防止装置をＰＣＶ内に広く、ところどころに分配配
置することによってその能力を十分発揮ささせることが
できる。By widely distributing and arranging the destruction prevention device in various places within the PCV, its ability can be fully demonstrated.
本発明によればＬＯＣＡ時にＰＣＶ内に放出される！（
、を速やかに吸収してＨ２爆発の可能性を遮断しＰＣＶ
の破滅的な破壊を防止することができる。According to the present invention, it is released into the PCV during LOCA! (
, to quickly absorb the H2 explosion and block the possibility of H2 explosion.
can prevent catastrophic destruction of
また、本発明では可動部分がないため、故障する恐れが
なく信頼性が向上する。Furthermore, since there are no moving parts in the present invention, there is no risk of failure and reliability is improved.
さらしこ本発明はＨ２を吸着するものであり、 Ｆｅ２
のように結合させて水とするものではないからＦｅ５と
併用することにより長時間にわたりＨ２の挙動に対応で
きる。The present invention adsorbs H2, Fe2
Since it does not combine to form water as in the case of the above method, it is possible to cope with the behavior of H2 over a long period of time by using it together with Fe5.
第１図は本発明に係る原子炉格納容器の破壊防止装置の
一実施例における水素吸着エレメントを示す斜視図、第
２図は第１図の水素吸着エレメントを集合して形成した
破壊防止装置を一部切欠して示す斜視図、第３図は従来
の原子炉格納容器の破壊防止装置を示す系統図である。
１・・・ＰＣＶドライウェル ２・・・導管３・・・
ブロワ−４・・・予熱器FIG. 1 is a perspective view showing a hydrogen adsorption element in an embodiment of the destruction prevention device for a reactor containment vessel according to the present invention, and FIG. 2 shows a destruction prevention device formed by aggregating the hydrogen adsorption elements shown in FIG. FIG. 3 is a partially cutaway perspective view and a system diagram showing a conventional destruction prevention device for a reactor containment vessel. 1...PCV dry well 2...Conduit 3...
Blower 4...Preheater
Claims (1)
収容した水素吸着装置が設置されてなることを特徴とす
る原子炉格納容器の破壊防止装置。A destruction prevention device for a reactor containment vessel, characterized in that a hydrogen adsorption device containing a hydrogen storage alloy that adsorbs hydrogen gas is installed in the reactor containment vessel.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP2139758A JPH0434395A (en) | 1990-05-31 | 1990-05-31 | Failure prevention equipment of reactor container |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP2139758A JPH0434395A (en) | 1990-05-31 | 1990-05-31 | Failure prevention equipment of reactor container |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| JPH0434395A true JPH0434395A (en) | 1992-02-05 |
Family
ID=15252705
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP2139758A Pending JPH0434395A (en) | 1990-05-31 | 1990-05-31 | Failure prevention equipment of reactor container |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| JP (1) | JPH0434395A (en) |
Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPH11166996A (en) * | 1997-12-04 | 1999-06-22 | Toshiba Corp | Hydrogen removing device of reactor containment |
| JP2013185968A (en) * | 2012-03-08 | 2013-09-19 | Mitsubishi Heavy Ind Ltd | Hydrogen removal device |
| WO2015016090A1 (en) * | 2013-08-01 | 2015-02-05 | 国立大学法人北海道大学 | Non-electric hydrogen collecting device |
-
1990
- 1990-05-31 JP JP2139758A patent/JPH0434395A/en active Pending
Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPH11166996A (en) * | 1997-12-04 | 1999-06-22 | Toshiba Corp | Hydrogen removing device of reactor containment |
| JP2013185968A (en) * | 2012-03-08 | 2013-09-19 | Mitsubishi Heavy Ind Ltd | Hydrogen removal device |
| WO2015016090A1 (en) * | 2013-08-01 | 2015-02-05 | 国立大学法人北海道大学 | Non-electric hydrogen collecting device |
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