JP2006340880A - Game stand - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a game stand capable of accurately finding the fraudulence such as shooting at a jackpot by the fraudulent operation of an operation switch at specific timing. <P>SOLUTION: When a start lever is pushed down as a game is started, a light shading part 261, by which a first start lever sensor 241 is turned off, is moved upward to turn the first start lever sensor 241 on. The period from when the first start lever sensor 241 is turned on till when a second start lever sensor 242 is turned off by the light shading part 261 is measured as the operation time t, and the operation time t is stored one after another as the history of operation. The average of the operation time equivalent to 30 rounds of the game including the current round is computed as the reference operation time X, and the number B of abnormal operation in the history of operation in which the operation time t included in the range of reference operation time with the tolerance ±A added to the reference operation time X is computed. If the number B of abnormal operation in the history of operation reaches a fraudulent determining reference number C, it is determined that fraudulent operation such as fraudulent operation of a solenoid is performed. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2007,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to a gaming machine represented by a slot machine (pachislot machine) and a pachinko machine, and more particularly to a technique useful for preventing an illegal act on an operation switch operated for the progress of the game.

  A gaming machine such as a slot machine is controlled so that a player performs a lottery based on a game operation in which an operation of an operation switch or the like is performed for the progress of the game, and a game result corresponding to the lottery result is obtained. Although various game operations can be set as a trigger for the lottery, generally slot machines are often triggered by a game start operation, that is, an operation of a start lever that is one of the operation switches. .

  In addition, since the operation switch is frequently operated during a game, a non-contact type sensor such as a photo interrupter is generally used for operation detection in consideration of durability and stability. For example, two states, whether the detected part that fluctuates due to the operation of the operation part of the operation switch is within the detection range of the sensor or out of the detection range of the sensor, correspond to when the operation switch is not operated and when it is operated Thus, the detection state (signal output) of the sensor changes according to the non-operation state (normal state) and the operation state of the operation switch. Therefore, the control unit of the gaming table can determine that the operation switch has been operated based on the change that has occurred in the detection state of the sensor, and with this determination, the control unit performs lottery and controls the progress of the game. It is.

  However, in recent years, fraudulent acts (so-called solenoid goths) have been carried out in which a big hit is made by operating an operation switch of a game stand at a specific timing and a game medium is paid out. This is an unauthorized use of the fact that the random numbers used in the lottery have periodicity. By operating the solenoid in accordance with the timing at which the random number value to be determined for the big hit is extracted, Then push down (or push up) the shaft of the start lever (operating part of the operating switch) connected to the solenoid plunger to change the operating switch to the ON state with extremely high precision, and this will be a big hit judgment target. This is an act of extracting random values with high probability. According to such solenoid goto, since it is possible to increase the number of obtained medals without altering the internal equipment of the game table, etc., there are no fraudulent traces and it is difficult for the game store to crack down, There is also the possibility of considerable damage.

  Therefore, in order to prevent fraud such as solenoid goto, the start lever shaft is covered with an annular member so that the start lever cannot be pushed down by the solenoid, and the solenoid plunger and the start lever shaft are pulled. There has been proposed an operation switch fraud prevention tool that cannot be connected by a member and that makes the solenoid goto virtually impossible (see, for example, Patent Document 1).

JP 2004-298551 A

  However, in the invention described in Patent Document 1, a case where a person who performs an illegal action sets an operation part corresponding to the operation switch fraud prevention tool is sufficiently conceivable. For example, if a dedicated member is bonded to the operation part (generally spherical) of the operation switch, and the dedicated member is pulled by the solenoid and the start lever is pushed down (or pushed up), the random number extraction timing by the solenoid Can be adjusted freely. Therefore, it is difficult to say that the operation switch fraud prevention device having such a structure is sufficient as a measure for preventing solenoid goto.

  In view of the problems as described above, the present invention aims to provide a gaming table that can accurately detect that an illegal act of aiming at a big hit has been performed by operating an operation switch at a specific timing. To do.

  In order to solve the above-mentioned problems, the invention according to claim 1 is directed to an operating means operated to advance a game, a detecting means that changes a detection state by operating the operating means, and the detection Control means for controlling the progress of the game based on a change in the detection state of the means, wherein the control means times the operation time of the operation means based on the change in the detection state of the detection means Timekeeping means, storage means for storing operation time information based on the operation time measured by the timekeeping means as an operation history corresponding to the operation of the operation means, and operation time information stored in the storage means are predetermined. Processing means for determining whether there is an unauthorized operation based on whether or not the unauthorized operation condition is satisfied, and performing a predetermined error action when it is determined that there is an unauthorized operation. To.

  According to a second aspect of the present invention, in the gaming machine according to the first aspect, the storage unit stores the operation time measured by the time measuring unit as operation time information, and the processing unit includes the storage unit. If the number of times of operation histories satisfying a predetermined approximation condition among the operation histories stored for a predetermined number of consecutive times is equal to or greater than a predetermined number of fraud determination criteria, It is characterized in that it is determined.

  The invention according to claim 3 is the gaming machine according to claim 2, wherein the processing means operates within a reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the operation time in the current operation history. Is the approximate condition, the fraud determination criterion number is 2, and the operation time in the current operation history and the operation time in the previous operation history satisfy the approximate condition, the illegal operation condition is satisfied. It is characterized in that it is determined.

  According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, in the gaming machine according to the second aspect, the processing means operates within a reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the operation time in the current operation history. Is an approximation condition, the number of fraud determination criteria is 2 or more, and the number of operation histories satisfying the approximation condition is greater than or equal to the number of fraud determination criteria among three or more operations that satisfy a predetermined determination target condition. In some cases, it is determined that an illegal operation condition is satisfied.

  According to a fifth aspect of the present invention, in the gaming machine according to the first aspect, the storage unit stores the operation time measured by the time measuring unit and the presence / absence of an abnormality determination flag as operation time information, and the process The means uses three or more operations satisfying a predetermined determination target condition as an approximation condition that the operation time is within a reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the operation time in the current operation history. In the history, when the number of operation histories satisfying the approximation condition is equal to or greater than a predetermined abnormality determination reference number, an abnormality determination flag is stored in the operation time information in the current operation history, and a plurality of conditions satisfying the determination target condition are stored. When the number of operation histories in which the abnormality determination flag is stored is greater than or equal to a predetermined number of fraud determinations, it is determined that the fraudulent operation condition is satisfied. And butterflies.

  According to a sixth aspect of the present invention, in the gaming machine according to the first aspect, the storage means stores an operation time measured by the time measuring means as operation time information, and the processing means is the storage means. Among the operation histories stored in the table, an average value of operation times is obtained from a plurality of operation histories satisfying a predetermined reference calculation target condition, and is set as a reference operation time, which is determined by adding an allowable error range to the reference operation time. When the operation time in the current operation history that is the determination target is within the reference operation time range, it is determined that the illegal operation condition is satisfied.

  According to a seventh aspect of the present invention, in the gaming machine according to the first aspect, the storage means stores the operation time measured by the time measuring means as operation time information, and the processing means is the storage means. Among the operation histories stored in the table, an average value of operation times is obtained from a plurality of operation histories satisfying a predetermined reference calculation target condition, and is set as a reference operation time, which is determined by adding an allowable error range to the reference operation time. In addition, when the number of operation histories within the operation time within the reference operation time range reaches a predetermined fraud determination reference number, it is determined that the fraudulent operation condition is satisfied.

  The invention according to claim 8 is the gaming machine according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the operation means includes a detected part whose state changes between non-operation and operation. The detecting means includes a plurality of detecting sections capable of detecting at least two states in a range in which the detected section of the operating means changes, and the timing means in the control means includes two selected from the detecting means. The operation time is measured using the detection state change of the detection unit as the timing start timing and timing end timing, respectively.

  The invention according to claim 9 is the gaming table according to any one of claims 1 to 8, further comprising a notification means capable of audible notification and / or visual notification, wherein the control means The processing means is characterized in that an error operation for notifying the occurrence of an illegal operation is performed by the notification means based on the fraud determination.

  The invention according to claim 10 is the gaming machine according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein a plurality of reels on which a plurality of types of patterns are applied, and rotation of the reels is started. And a stop button provided corresponding to each of the reels for individually stopping rotation of the reel, and using the start lever and / or the stop button as an operation means, the control The means is a case where a random number is extracted based on the timing when the detecting means detects the operation state of the operating means, the internal winning of the winning combination is determined based on the extracted random number, whether or not the internal winning of the predetermined winning combination is determined When the combination of the patterns displayed by the reels at the time of the stop is a predetermined combination of the patterns corresponding to the internal winning winning combination, the winning combination And performing game progress by.

  According to the gaming machine according to claim 1, since the operation time information based on the operation time timed by the time measuring means determines whether or not there is an unauthorized operation based on whether or not a predetermined unauthorized operation condition is satisfied, so-called As in the case of a solenoid got, an unauthorized operation performed by controlling the operation of the operation means with high accuracy can be accurately determined.

  Further, according to the gaming machine according to claim 2, the storage means stores the operation time measured by the time measuring means as operation time information, and the processing means is continuously stored in the storage means. In the operation history for a predetermined number of times, when the number of operation histories satisfying the predetermined approximate condition for the operation time is equal to or greater than the predetermined number of fraud determination criteria, the fraudulent operation condition is determined. Even if the player properly operates the operation means, even if the operation time happens to be close enough to satisfy the unauthorized operation condition, it may be erroneously determined as an unauthorized operation immediately. Can be suppressed.

  According to the gaming machine according to claim 3, the processing means uses the operation time within the reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the operation time in the current operation history as an approximate condition. Since the fraud determination criterion number is 2, and when the operation time in the current operation history and the operation time in the previous operation history satisfy the approximate condition, it is determined that the unauthorized operation condition is satisfied. Even when a solenoid gotten is performed to bring the speed at which the means is operated close to the speed at which the operation means is operated by a general player, this can be accurately determined from the current and previous two operation histories. .

  In addition, according to the gaming machine according to claim 4, the processing means approximates that the operation time is within a reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the operation time in the current operation history. If the number of fraud determination criteria is two or more and the number of operation histories satisfying the approximation condition is greater than or equal to the number of fraud determination criteria among three or more operations that satisfy a predetermined determination target condition, Even if the player has operated the operation means properly, it may happen that the two operation times happen to be within the determination operation time. The possibility of erroneously determining this as an unauthorized operation immediately can be suppressed.

  According to the gaming machine of claim 5, the storage means stores the operation time measured by the time measuring means and the presence / absence of an abnormality determination flag as operation time information, and the processing means stores the current operation history. The approximate condition is that the operation time is within a reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the operation time in the above, and the approximate condition among three or more operation histories satisfying a predetermined determination target condition When the number of operation histories satisfying the condition is equal to or greater than a predetermined abnormality determination reference number, an abnormality determination flag is stored in the operation time information in the current operation history, and an abnormality determination among a plurality of operation histories satisfying the determination target condition When the number of operation histories in which the flag is stored is equal to or greater than a predetermined number of fraud determinations, it is determined that the fraudulent operation condition is satisfied. By operating the operation means so out of the time, even when the fraud such as the difficulty of detection of the solenoid Goto has been performed, it is possible to determine this accurately.

  According to the gaming machine according to claim 6, the storage means stores the operation time counted by the timing means as operation time information, and the processing means includes the operation history stored in the storage means. An average operation time is obtained from a plurality of operation histories satisfying a predetermined standard calculation target condition, and is determined as a standard operation time, which is determined by adding an allowable error range to the standard operation time. When the operation time in the current operation history, which is the target, is determined to satisfy the unauthorized operation condition, the player intentionally operates the operation means to keep the operation time constant. Even in such a case, it is possible to accurately determine a solenoid got whose operation time is so approximate that it cannot be achieved.

  According to the gaming machine according to claim 7, the storage means stores the operation time counted by the timing means as operation time information, and the processing means includes the operation history stored in the storage means. , An average operation time from a plurality of operation histories satisfying a predetermined reference calculation target condition is used as a reference operation time, and an operation time deviating from a reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the reference operation time When the number of operation histories reaches the predetermined number of fraud determination criteria, it is determined that the fraudulent operation condition is satisfied, so that the player operates the operation means intentionally to keep the operation time constant. Even in this case, it is possible to accurately determine the solenoid gots whose operation time is so approximate that they cannot be achieved.

  According to the gaming table of claim 8, the operating means includes a detected part whose state changes between non-operating and operating, and the detecting means changes the state of the detected part of the operating means. A plurality of detectors capable of detecting at least two states in the range, wherein the time measuring means in the control means operates with the detection state changes of the two detection parts selected from the detection means as time start timing and time end timing, respectively. Therefore, in the range where the non-operation part of the operation means changes from non-operation time to operation time, the operation time can be started and stopped, and there is an error factor when the operation means is operated by a solenoid. As a result, the certainty of fraud determination can be increased.

  According to the gaming table according to claim 9, the information processing device includes notification means capable of auditory notification and / or visual notification, and the processing means in the control means generates an unauthorized operation by the notification means based on fraud determination. Since the error operation to notify is performed, it is possible for the amusement shop to quickly respond to illegal acts such as solenoid goto.

  According to the gaming machine according to claim 10, a plurality of reels provided with a plurality of types of patterns, a start lever for starting rotation of the reels, and the reels are provided corresponding to the reels. A stop button for individually stopping the rotation of the motor, and using the start lever and / or the stop button as an operation means. The control means is based on the timing when the detection means detects the operation state of the operation means. A random number is extracted, and whether or not the internal winning of the predetermined winning combination is determined based on the extracted random number, and when the winning combination is won internally, the combination of the patterns displayed by the reels at the time of the stop is the internal winning In the case of a combination of a predetermined pattern corresponding to the winning combination, the game proceeds as if the winning combination has been won, so a random number to be internally won by the winning combination Operation means in accordance with the extraction timing becomes higher deterrent gaming table to the solenoid Goto actuating a solenoid or the like.

  Embodiments of the present invention will be described below in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. First, the specific structure of the game machine according to the present invention will be described.

<Overall configuration>
FIG. 1 is a perspective view showing an appearance of a slot machine 100 according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1, inside the center of the slot machine 100, plural kinds of patterns (characters and symbols such as “7”, “Bar”, “Bell”, “Replay”, etc .: not shown) are arranged on the outer peripheral surface. The three cylindrical reels (left reel 110, middle reel 111, and right reel 112) are accommodated and can be rotated inside the main body 101b.

  The front door 101a is provided with a reel display window 113. When the reels 110 to 112 are viewed from the front, three patterns applied thereto can be seen from the reel display window 113 in the vertical direction. That is, when all the reels 110 to 112 are stopped, the player can see a total of nine patterns of 3 × 3. When these reels 110 to 112 are rotated and stopped, various combinations of patterns are displayed on the reel display window 113. In the present embodiment, three reels are provided, but the number of reels and the installation position of the reels are not limited to this.

  On the back side of each of the reels 110 to 112, a backlight (not shown) for illuminating each picture displayed on the reel display window 113 is disposed. The backlight is capable of emitting light of, for example, seven colors (a mixed color including three primary colors of red, green, and bluish purple and white), and includes an LED corresponding to each primary color. Is done.

  The winning line display lamp 120 is a lamp indicating a winning line 114 that is valid for each game. The effective pay line 114 changes depending on the number of game media (in this embodiment, medals are assumed) inserted into the slot machine 100. For example, as shown in FIG. 1, in the case of having five winning lines 114, when one medal is inserted, the middle horizontal winning line, when two medals are inserted, the upper horizontal winning line and the lower horizontal winning line are shown. When 3 sheets are added, 3 lines are added, and 5 lines including 2 diagonal lines are valid, and the winning combination is judged by the combination of the patterns on the effective line 114. It becomes. Of course, the number of winning lines is not limited to five.

  The start lamp 121 is a lamp that informs the player that the reels 110 to 112 are in a state of being able to rotate. When the replay lamp 122 wins a replay which is a winning combination (for example, when a combination of replay-replay-replay replay patterns is arranged on the winning line 114), the next game is replayed to the player. It is a lamp that informs that it is. In the case of a re-game, the medal that is a game medium is exempted in the next game.

  The notification lamp 123 is a lamp for notifying the player that a special winning combination (for example, a big bonus (BB) or a regular bonus (RB)) has been won internally. The medal insertion lamp 124 is a lamp for notifying the player that it is necessary to insert a medal at the start of the game.

  The medal insertion number display lamp 125 is a lamp for displaying the number of medals inserted by the player. In the present embodiment, since up to three medals can be inserted in one game, the number of medals inserted is displayed using three vertically arranged lamps. Of course, in addition to displaying with a lamp, the number of inserted medals may be directly displayed on a 7-segment display or the like.

  The payout number display unit 126 is a display unit that displays the number of medals to be paid out to the player when winning a winning combination with a medal payout. The game number display 127 is a display for displaying the number of general games in the big bonus game. The stored number display 128 is a display that displays the number of medals stored electronically (credited). The effect lamp 129 is a lamp used for an effect for enhancing the interest of the game.

  The medal insertion buttons 131 and 132 are insertion buttons for electronically inserting the stored medals into the slot machine 100, and are so-called bet buttons. In the present embodiment, a three-medal insertion button 131 (a so-called max bet button that can insert the maximum number of medals) and a one-medal insertion button 132 that inserts one medal each time it is pressed are provided. When one of these buttons is pressed, 1 to 3 medals necessary for the game are electronically inserted into the slot machine 100. When inserting two medals, the one-medal insertion button 131 is pressed twice. The number of inserted medals is subtracted from the current stored number, and the remaining number is displayed on the stored number display 128.

  The medal slot block 133 has an opening through which a player directly inserts medals when starting a game. When a medal is directly inserted and a medal is clogged in a medal selector unit (not shown) immediately below the medal insertion slot, the medal cancel switch 133a is operated to eliminate the clogging of the medal. The start lever 135 is a lever-type switch that starts the rotation of the reels 110 to 112 as a game start operation.

  The stop button unit 136 is provided with three stop buttons (a left stop button 136a, a middle stop button 136b, and a right stop button 136c). Each stop button is a button type switch that stops the corresponding reels 110 to 112 when pressed. Specifically, the left reel 110 is stopped by operating the left stop button 136a, the middle reel 111 is stopped by operating the middle stop button 136b, and the right reel 112 is stopped by operating the right stop button 136c.

  Each stop button is provided with a lamp (not shown). After the start lever 135 is operated, all the lamps are turned on when the reels 110 to 112 can be stopped. Notify that the stop operation has become possible. Each stop button lamp is turned off each time the stop button is pressed. Of course, it is also possible to change the light emission color of the lamp between the stop operation enabled state and other states.

  The settlement button 138 is a button that is pressed when performing a settlement process in which the medals acquired by the player are settled and discharged. The checkout button 138 is used to switch whether or not to store up to a predetermined number (for example, three) of medals inserted by the player from the medal slot block 133 or up to 50 medals acquired by winning. For example, when the checkout button 138 is pressed once and the checkout process is performed, the non-storage mode is set, and when the checkout button 138 is pressed again, the storage mode is set. Here, storing medals means temporarily storing the number of medals temporarily in a control unit (to be described later) without directly paying out medals.

  The key hole 139 is a hole into which a door opening / closing key is inserted. When the key is inserted and turned clockwise, the lock is released and the front door 101a of the slot machine 100 can be opened. The medal discharge port 165 is an opening for discharging medals, and medals paid out at the time of winning a prize are discharged from here. The discharged medals are accumulated in the tray 160.

  The upper lamp 190, the side lamps 151 and 152, the center lamps 153 and 154, the waist lamps 155 and 156, and the lower lamps 157 and 158 are effects lamps for exciting the game, and are turned on / off / Flashes. Further, the title panel 140 is illuminated by a title panel lamp 146 (not shown). In the present embodiment, the tray 160 is made of a translucent material, and is configured to exhibit the same effect as the lamp for production described above by making the lamp light incident from the tray mounting surface. In addition, the tray 160 is provided with an ashtray unit 170 configured to be detachable.

  Also, in the center of the upper part of the slot machine (above the reel display window 113), various information related to the game (game screen for displaying characters and the like to make the game live, errors in the event of an abnormality in the slot machine) An LCD 180 capable of displaying an error screen for displaying the contents is provided, and various switches (for example, a three-medal insertion button 131, a single-medal insertion button 132, and a start lever 135 are used by using the LCD 180. , Stop buttons 136a to 136c, checkout button 138, etc.) are also notified of information regarding malfunctions.

<Configuration of start lever unit>
Next, the detailed structure of the start lever unit 200 constituting the start lever 135 operated by the player will be described with reference to FIGS. FIG. 2 is an external perspective view of the start lever unit 200, and FIG. 3 is an exploded perspective view of the start lever unit 200. The start lever unit 200 is a unit that integrates functions as “operation means operated to advance the game” and “detection means whose detection state changes when the operation means is operated”. It is.

  The appearance of the start lever unit 200 is detachably accommodated in the substantially cylindrical middle frame 230 in a state where the movable shaft 211 protruding from the substantially spherical grasping portion 210 is inserted from the front opening of the front frame 220. The rear frame 240 is detachably attached to the rear end of the middle frame 230. In addition, a plate-like flange portion 231 that extends outward is formed at an appropriate position on the peripheral surface of the middle frame 230, and a unit fixing member 233 such as a screw is inserted through a boss portion 232 that is appropriately provided on the flange portion 231; The game table 100 is fixed to an appropriate position on the back side of the front door 101a. Further, for example, the first start lever sensor 241 is sandwiched in the rear frame 240, and the second start lever sensor 242 is positioned above and the third start lever sensor 243 is positioned below the first frame. The first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243 are fixed by the sensor fixing member 244.

  In the movable shaft 211 projecting from the grasping part 210, a spacer 212 made of a flexible elastic material is cylindrically fitted to the base part 211a on the grasping part 210 side, and a central shaft part connected to the rear side of the base part 211a. The swing member 213 is inserted through 211b. The middle shaft portion 211b has a smaller diameter than the base portion 211a, and the swing member 213 is positioned in contact with the rear end of the base portion 211a and the rear end of the spacer 212. The movable shaft 211 is moved from the front opening edge of the front frame 220. When inserted, the swing shaft portions 213a provided on both sides of the swing member 213 are supported by the movable shaft support portions provided in the front frame 220 so as to be swingable in the vertical direction.

  The cylindrical portion 251a of the return member 251 is loosely fitted to the middle shaft portion 221b of the movable shaft 211, and a coil is provided on the back side of the bias receiving portion 251b that bulges from the outer periphery of the cylindrical portion 251a at the front end of the return member 251. A front end portion of a return urging member 252 made of a spring or the like is brought into contact, and a rear end portion of the return urging member 252 is brought into contact with a front surface of a ring-like urging receiving member 253. A fixed member 254 prevents the movable shaft 211 from coming off from the middle shaft portion 211b.

  Then, the swinging shaft portion 213a of the swinging member 213 is swingably supported in the front frame 220, and the front portion of the biasing receiving portion 251b of the return member 251 is in contact with the rear wall rear surface of the movable shaft support portion. , The return biasing member 252 is compressed between the biasing receiving portion 251b and the biasing receiving member 253 of the return member 251, that is, the biasing receiving portion 251b and the biasing receiving member 253 of the return member 251 are separated from each other. The urging force is maintained in the direction of the movement. Thus, the movable shaft 211 when not operated is held in a substantially horizontal state perpendicular to the rear wall of the movable shaft support portion (the state where the bias receiving portion 251b of the return member 251 and the bias receiving member 253 are most separated). The

  On the other hand, when the grasping portion 210 is pushed down or pushed up, the rear end of the movable shaft 210 moves upward or downward, and the interval between the bias receiving portion 251b of the return member 251 and the bias receiving member 253 is narrowed. Since the urging force of the return urging member 251 acts in the direction in which the angle is expanded again, the movable shaft 210 automatically returns to a substantially horizontal state (non-operating state). In order to smooth the swinging of the movable shaft 210, the front side of the urging receiving portion 251b of the return member 251 that is in sliding contact with the back surface of the rear wall of the movable shaft support member 221 has a gentle curved surface to reduce sliding resistance. .

  Further, the range in which the grasping part 210 can be pushed down or pushed up is the range in which the spacer 12 fitted on the outer periphery of the base part 211a of the movable shaft 211 hits the upper or lower inner surface of the movable shaft support part of the front frame 220. Even when the grasping portion 210 is pushed up or pushed down with a relatively strong force, it is effective that the movable shaft 211 or the movable shaft support portion in the front frame 220 is damaged by the buffering action of the spacer 212 made of an elastic soft material. Can be prevented. Note that the range in which the grasping part 210 can be pushed down or pushed up can also be regulated by the inner surface shape of the movable shaft support part. Further, the urging force of the return urging member 251 is appropriately determined so that a remarkably strong force is not required to oscillate the movable shaft 210 within this oscillating range.

  As described above, the detection member 260 is attached to the rear end portion 211c of the movable shaft 210 supported to be swingable on the front frame 220 with the detection portion biasing member 255 such as a coil spring interposed therebetween. The detection member 260 has a thin light-shielding portion 261 protruding rearward, and is loosely fitted to the rear end portion 211 c of the movable shaft 211 on the front side of the sliding portion 262 that supports the first light-shielding portion 261. A substantially cylindrical shaft insertion portion 263 is provided.

  The middle frame 230 is provided with a pair of detection member guide walls 234 spaced apart so as to form a vertical slit through which the light shielding portion 261 of the detection member 260 can be inserted, and the light shielding portion 261 of the detection member 260. When the front frame 220 is attached to the middle frame 230 so as to extend rearward from the slit between the detection member guide walls 234 and 234, the sliding portion 262 of the detection member 260 is moved to the sliding guide portion of the detection member guide wall 234. The detection member biasing member 255 is compressed between the front portion of the sliding portion 263 and the rear portion of the fixing member 254, that is, the sliding portion 262 of the detection member 260 and the fixing member 254 are separated from each other. The urging force is maintained in the direction of the movement. Note that the sliding guide portion of the detection member guide wall 234 has an arc shape in which the separation distance from the swing shaft portion 213a of the swing member 213 that is swingably held in the front frame 220 is substantially equal.

  In this case, the state in which the sliding surface, which is the rear surface of the sliding portion 262 in the detection member 260, is urged in the direction pressed against the sliding guide portion of the detection member guide wall 234 is maintained. Even when the swinging shaft portion 213a of the swinging member 213 moves back and forth slightly when the movable shaft 210 swings by being pushed down or pushed up, the sliding surface of the sliding portion 263 in the detection member 260 is the detection member guide wall. The light shielding portion 261 of the detection member 260 can maintain a stable and constant rotation trajectory because it slides in contact with the sliding guide portion 234 and moves upward or downward.

  When the rear frame 240 is attached to the rear part of the middle frame 230 in a state where the light shielding part 261 extends from the rear, the light shielding part 261 moves up and down in the vertical plane where the detection sites of the first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243 exist. Positioned to be movable. Specifically, in the same manner as the first start lever sensor 241 that detects a state where the optical axis from the light emitting element provided on the light projecting arm 241a to the light receiving element provided on the light receiving arm 241b is shielded and not shielded. A second start lever sensor 242 that detects a state where the optical axis from the light emitting element provided on the light projecting arm 242a to the light receiving element provided on the light receiving arm 242b is shielded, and the light projecting arm 243a. A third start lever sensor 243 for detecting a state where the optical axis from the light emitting element provided on the light receiving element to the light receiving element provided on the light receiving arm portion 243b is shielded and a state where the optical axis is not shielded, and the light projecting arm portions 241a to 243a The light receiving arm portions 241b to 243b are arranged so as to overlap each other, and the light shielding portion 261 detects between the light projecting arm portions 241a to 243a and the light receiving arm portions 241b to 243b. Becomes the arrangement as may shield the optical axis.

  In the start lever unit 200 of this configuration example, when the player is not operating the grasping unit 210 (when the movable shaft 211 is in a substantially horizontal state), the light shielding unit 261 serving as the detected unit is The detection state of the first start lever sensor 241 serving as the detection means (position where the optical axis for detection exists) is set to OFF, and the detection units of the second and third start lever sensors 242 and 243 are light shielding portions. Since the light is not shielded by H.261, the detection state is turned ON.

  That is, when the player is not operating the grip portion 210, the light shielding portion 261 is projected by the first start lever sensor 241 as shown in FIG. 4A, which shows a simplified configuration of the start lever unit 200. The OFF state extending between the light arm portion 241a and the light receiving arm portion 241b is held, and the second and third start lever sensors 242 and 243 both hold the ON state.

  On the other hand, when the player operates the grip portion 210 to push it down, the light shielding portion 261 extends between the light projecting arm portion 242a and the light receiving arm portion 242b of the second start lever sensor 242 as shown in FIG. The first and third start lever sensors 241 and 243 are both turned on. When the player operates and pushes up the grip portion 210, the light shielding portion 261 changes to the OFF state extending between the light projecting arm portion 243a and the light receiving arm portion 243b of the third start lever sensor 243, and The first and second start lever sensors 241 and 242 are both turned on.

  As described above, if three sensors (first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243) are used as “detection means whose detection state changes when the operation means is operated”, the three changes depending on the operation. The player's operation (pushing up or pushing down the start lever) can be determined based on the detection state of the sensor.

  In the start lever unit 200 of this configuration example, a general-purpose non-contact type optical sensor (photo interrupter) is used as the first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243 in order to detect the presence or absence of the light shielding portion 261. Although the detection means provided in the start lever unit 200 is not limited to the optical sensor, the movable shaft 211 based on the operation of the grasping unit 210 using, for example, a contact type micro switch as the start lever sensor can be used. The detection member may be provided with a switch action portion that turns on / off the microswitch in response to the swinging of the sensor so that detection outputs according to operation and non-operation can be obtained from each sensor.

  Thus, in the start lever unit 200 that performs the game start operation by pushing up or down the grip portion 210, the second start lever sensor 242 or the third start lever after the first start lever sensor 241 changes to ON. Until the sensor 243 changes to OFF, the angle at which the movable shaft 211 moves upward or downward with the swinging shaft portion 213a as the rotation center is substantially constant, and is added when the grip portion 210 is pushed up or down. If the force is constant, the time from when the first start lever sensor 241 changes to ON until the second start lever sensor 242 or the third start lever sensor 243 changes to OFF is substantially constant.

  Therefore, when a driving force such as a solenoid is used for the upward movement or the downward movement of the movable shaft 211 of the start lever unit 200, the second start lever sensor 242 or the second start lever sensor 241 is turned on after the first start lever sensor 241 is turned ON. 3 The time (operation time) until the start lever sensor 243 changes to OFF is a very approximate value, and the operation time is within a very small error range, but the gripping part 210 is artificially pushed down or up. In such a case, even if the player is highly skilled, the error that occurs in the operation time becomes a discrete value to a certain extent. Therefore, comparing the history of operation time measured at the start of the game with each other is artificial. It is possible to discriminate between an operation and a mechanical operation with a constant driving force.

  Although the operation time cannot be changed directly only from the configuration of the start lever unit 200, as shown in FIG. 4C, the position of the center of gravity of the grip portion 210 from the rotation center of the swing shaft portion 213a. If the ratio of the distance A to the distance A ′ from the rotation center of the swinging shaft portion 213a to the rear end of the detection member 261 is changed, even if the swinging angle of the movable shaft 211 is constant, Since the downward movement distance (or upward movement distance) B can be changed, the operation time can be relatively shortened or lengthened as a result. Further, by changing the separation distance B ′ of the second start lever sensor 242 (or the third start lever sensor 243) with respect to the first start lever sensor 241, the swing angle of the movable shaft 211 is changed, and By changing the downward movement distance (or upward movement distance) B, the operation time can be relatively shortened or lengthened.

<Control block>
Next, each control unit functioning as control means in the slot machine 100 will be described in detail. FIG. 5 shows details of the main control unit 300, and FIG. 6 shows details of the sub-control unit 400.

<Configuration of main control unit>
First, the main control unit 300 of the slot machine 100 will be described with reference to FIG. The main control unit 300 includes a CPU 310 that is an arithmetic processing unit for controlling the entire main control unit 300, a data bus and an address bus for the CPU 310 to transmit and receive signals to and from each IC and each circuit, It has the structure described below.

  The clock correction circuit 314 is a circuit that divides the clock oscillated from the crystal oscillator 311 and supplies it to the CPU 310. For example, when the frequency of the crystal oscillator 311 is 12 MHz, the divided clock is 6 MHz. The CPU 310 operates by receiving the clock divided by the clock circuit 314 as a system clock.

  The CPU 310 is connected to a timer circuit 315 for setting a monitoring cycle for constantly monitoring the states of sensors and switches, which will be described later, and a transmission cycle of motor drive pulses, via a bus. When the power is turned on, the CPU 310 transmits the frequency dividing data stored in the predetermined area of the ROM 312 to the timer circuit 315 via the data bus.

  The timer circuit 315 determines an interrupt time based on the received frequency division data, and transmits an interrupt request to the CPU 310 at each interrupt time. In response to this interrupt request, the CPU 310 executes monitoring of each sensor and transmission of drive pulses. For example, when the system clock of the CPU 310 is set to 6 MHz, the frequency division value of the timer circuit 315 is set to 1/256, and the data for frequency division of the ROM 312 is set to 44, the reference time for this interrupt is 256 × 44 ÷ 6 MHz = 1. 877 ms.

  Connected to the CPU 310 are a ROM 312 for storing programs for controlling each IC, lottery data used for internal winning lottery, reel stop positions, and a RAM 313 for storing temporary data. Has been. Other storage means may be used for these ROM 312 and RAM 313, and this is the same in the sub-control unit 400 described later.

  The CPU 310 is connected to an input interface 360 for receiving an external signal. The medal acceptance sensor 321, the first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243, and the stop are input via the input interface 360 every interrupt time. The state of the button sensor 322, the MAX bet button sensor 323, the ONE bet button sensor 324, the settlement button sensor 325, the reset switch 326, and the medal payout sensor 327 is detected, and each sensor is monitored.

  Two medal acceptance sensors 321 are installed in the medal passage connected to the medal insertion slot of the medal insertion block 133, and detect whether or not the medal has passed. The first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243 are provided in the above-described start lever unit 200 and detect a start operation by the player. The stop button sensor 322 is installed in each of the stop buttons 136a to 136c, and detects the operation of the stop button by the player.

  The MAX bet button sensor 323 detects that the MAX bet button 131 has been operated, the ONE bet button sensor 322 detects that the ONE bet button 132 has been operated, and each detection output is stored electronically in the RAM 313. This is used to identify the number of medals that have been used as gaming medals. For example, when the ONE bet button sensor 324 corresponding to the ONE bet button 132 becomes H level, the CPU 310 electronically inserts one stored medal and the MAX bet button sensor 323 corresponding to the MAX bet button 131 When the H level is reached, three stored medals are electronically inserted. When the MAX bet button 131 is pressed, two coins are inserted when the number of stored medals is two, and one coin is inserted when the number is one.

  The settlement button switch 325 detects that the settlement button 138 has been operated, and the CPU 310 that receives this operation drives the hopper motor to pay out the stored medals from the medal payout device (hopper). The reset switch 326 clears a specific area of the RAM 313 and returns to a normal operation state when operated after recovery from an error or the like. The medal payout sensor 327 is for detecting a medal paid out by the medal payout device and performing an appropriate number of payout controls. Each of the above sensors may be a non-contact type sensor or a contact type sensor.

  Further, an input interface 361 and output interfaces 370 and 371 are connected to the CPU 310 via the address decoding circuit 350 to the address bus. The CPU 310 exchanges signals with external devices via these interfaces.

  An index sensor 328 is connected to the input interface 361. Specifically, the index sensor 328 is installed at a predetermined position of the mounting base of each of the reels 110 to 112, and becomes H level each time the light shielding piece provided on the reel passes through the index sensor 328. When detecting this signal, the CPU 310 determines that the reel has made one rotation, and resets the rotational position information of the reel to zero.

  The output interface 370 drives a reel motor driving unit 330 for driving a reel and a hopper motor of a medal payout device (a device for paying out a medal accumulated in a bucket from a medal payout outlet 165, not shown). A hopper motor driving unit 331, a game lamp 340 (specifically, a winning line display lamp 120, an effect lamp 129, etc.), a payout number display 126, a game number display 127, and a stored number display 128 is connected.

  A random number generation circuit 317 is connected to the CPU 310 via a data bus. The random number generation circuit 317 is an increment counter capable of incrementing a value within a certain range based on the clocks oscillated from the crystal oscillator 311 and the crystal oscillator 316 and outputting the count value to the CPU 310. It is used for various lottery processes including the internal lottery.

  Further, an output interface 371 for transmitting a command to the sub-control unit 400 is connected to the data bus of the CPU 310.

<Configuration of sub-control unit>
Next, the sub control unit 400 of the slot machine 100 will be described with reference to FIG. The sub-control unit 400 is an arithmetic processing unit that controls the entire sub-control unit 400 based on a main control command or the like transmitted from the main control unit 300, and the CPU 410 transmits and receives signals to and from each IC and each circuit. It has a data bus and an address bus for performing, and has a configuration described below.

  The clock correction circuit 414 is a circuit that corrects the clock oscillated from the crystal oscillator 411 and supplies the corrected clock to the CPU 410 as a system clock.

  Further, a timer circuit 415 is connected to the CPU 410 via a bus. The CPU 410 transmits the frequency dividing data stored in the predetermined area of the ROM 412 to the timer circuit 415 via the data bus at a predetermined timing. The timer circuit 415 determines an interrupt time based on the received frequency division data, and transmits an interrupt request to the CPU 410 at each interrupt time. The CPU 410 controls each IC and each circuit based on the interrupt request timing.

  In addition, the CPU 410 temporarily stores a ROM 412 in which commands and data for controlling the entire sub-control unit 400, backlight lighting patterns and data for controlling various displays, and the like are stored. The RAM 413 is connected via each bus.

  The CPU 410 is connected to an input / output interface 460 for transmitting and receiving external signals. The input / output interface 460 includes a backlight 420 and a RAM 413 for illuminating the patterns of the reels 110 to 112 from the back. A reset switch 421 for clearing the data is connected.

  An input interface 461 for receiving a main control command from the main control unit 300 is connected to the CPU 410 via a data bus, and an effect process that excites the entire game based on the command received via the input interface 461. Etc. are executed.

  A sound source IC 480 is connected to the data bus and address bus of the CPU 410. The sound source IC 480 controls sound according to a command from the CPU 410. The sound source IC 480 is connected to a ROM 481 that stores sound data. The sound source IC 480 amplifies the sound data acquired from the ROM 481 by the amplifier 482 and outputs the sound data from the speaker 483.

  Similarly to the main controller 300, the CPU 410 is connected to an address decoding circuit 450 for selecting an external IC, and the address decoding circuit 450 has an output interface for outputting signals to various effect lamps. 470, an input interface 461 for receiving a command from the main control unit 300, an input interface 471 for inputting a signal from the liquid crystal screen control unit 500, a clock IC 424, and a signal to the 7-segment display 440 are output. The output interface 472 is connected.

  With the clock IC 424 connected, the CPU 410 can acquire the current time. The 7-segment display 440 is provided inside the slot machine 100 so that a store clerk or the like can check predetermined information set in the sub-control unit 400, for example.

  Further, a demultiplexer 419 is connected to the output interface 470. The demultiplexer 419 distributes the signal transmitted from the output interface 470 to each display unit and the like. In other words, the demultiplexer 419 performs upper lamp 190, side lamps 151, 152, waist lamps 155, 156, lower lamps 157, 158, reel panel lamp 145, title panel lamp 146, payout strobe in accordance with data received from CPU 410. 147. Control the pan lamp 148.

  The title panel lamp 146 is a lamp that illuminates the title panel 140. The payout strobe 147 is a strobe type lamp installed inside the medal discharge port 165. The saucer lamp 148 is a lamp that illuminates the medal saucer 160 made of a translucent material from the saucer mounting surface.

  Note that the CPU 410 performs signal transmission to the liquid crystal screen control unit 500 via the demultiplexer 419. Conversely, the CPU 410 receives a signal from the liquid crystal screen control unit 500 via the input interface 471. That is, the CPU 410 performs bidirectional communication with the liquid crystal screen control unit 500 via the demultiplexer 419 and the input interface 471. The liquid crystal screen control unit 500 is a device that performs display control on the LCD 180.

  The main control unit 300 of the game control function described above functions as a control unit that controls the progress of the game based on a change in the detection state of the first to third start levers 241 to 243 that are detection units. , “Time measuring means for measuring the operation time of the operation means based on a change in the detection state of the detection means” and “operation history information corresponding to the operation of the operation means based on the operation time measured by the time measurement means” And the storage means for storing as "when the operation time information stored in the storage means determines whether or not there is an unauthorized operation based on whether or not a predetermined unauthorized operation condition is satisfied, and it is determined that there is an unauthorized operation" Has a function as a “processing means for performing a predetermined error operation”, and can accurately determine the presence or absence of an unauthorized operation such as solenoid goto.

<Illegal judgment method of start lever operation>
Here, an example of the unauthorized operation determination method performed by the main control unit 300 described above will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 7A shows a method for acquiring the operation time as data for determining whether or not the operation is an unauthorized start lever 135. FIG. 7B shows how the operation time is obtained from the acquired operation time. This shows how to perform fraud determination.

  First, based on FIG. 7A, detection state change and operation time acquisition when the start lever 135 is pushed down will be described. When the start lever 135 is not operated, the light shielding portion 261 is positioned between the light projecting arm portion 241a and the light receiving arm portion 241b of the first start lever sensor 241, so that the first start lever sensor 241 is in the OFF state, the second The start lever sensor 242 is in the ON state, but when the start lever 135 is pushed down and the light shielding portion 261 moves upward, the optical axis from the light projecting arm portion 241a to the light receiving arm portion 241b of the first start lever sensor 241. Reaches a position where light is not shielded, and the first start lever sensor 241 changes its state from OFF to ON. The operation time t starts to be measured from this state change.

  When the start lever 135 is further pushed down, the light blocking portion 261 reaches a position where the light axis between the light projecting arm portion 242a and the light receiving arm portion 242b of the second start lever sensor 242 is blocked, and the second start lever sensor 242 is reached. Changes from ON to OFF. Due to this state change, the operation time t is stopped. Further, at the timing when the state of the second start lever sensor 242 changes from ON to OFF, a random number used for the game is fetched, and a lottery such as winning a prize is performed using the fetched random number, and the game progresses.

  Note that the random number capture timing is not limited to the timing at which the state of the second start lever sensor 242 or the third start lever sensor 243 changes from ON to OFF, but the second start lever sensor 242 or the third start lever sensor 243. For example, a random number may be extracted at the timing when the lever sensor 243 returns from ON to OFF. For example, the operation time t may be set in response to a change in the state of the first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243. It is also necessary to change the timing period to be set according to the random number fetch timing.

  As described above, in the slot machine 100 according to the present embodiment, since the random number value acquired at the timing when the second start lever sensor 242 changes state from ON to OFF is used for the internal lottery determination, the random number corresponding to the jackpot When the start lever 135 is operated so that the second start lever sensor 242 changes its state from ON to OFF at the timing when the random number generation circuit 317 generates, an illegal act that intentionally generates a big hit, so-called solenoid goto is possible. .

  However, by operating a drive source such as a solenoid in synchronization with the random number generation cycle, when performing an illegal operation to operate the start lever 135, the solenoid is operated by keeping the solenoid drive force constant. Since the time until the second start lever sensor 242 changes from ON to OFF needs to be substantially constant, the second start lever sensor 242 changes after the first start lever sensor 241 changes from OFF to ON. The operation time t, which is the time until the state changes from ON to OFF, is a very approximate value, and this approximate tendency is when the player intentionally operates the start lever 135 to keep the operation time t constant. It is much more accurate than.

  Therefore, if the operation time t acquired when the start lever 135 is operated along with the start of the game is compared with the past operation history (operation time by the past start lever operation), the approximate tendency of the operation time t is It is possible to determine with an extremely high probability whether the operation is properly performed by the player or the unauthorized operation by the solenoid goto.

  The operation history used for the fraud determination may be only the latest operation (current operation) and the previous operation (previous operation). However, in order to increase the certainty of determination, operation history of three or more times is used. It is desirable to use it. Therefore, in the determination of the unauthorized operation shown in FIG. 7B, the operation history for 30 times including the latest operation (current operation) is used.

  As the operation history, for example, operation times t1 to t30 as operation time information are stored as operation history 01 to operation history 30 in order from the oldest in the acquisition time storage unit provided in the RAM 313 of the main control unit 300, respectively. As the acquisition time storage unit, one having a large storage capacity capable of continuously storing the operation history for the number of times of game execution per day may be employed. However, in this embodiment, the rings with indexes 0 to 29 are used. By using the buffer, only the operation history for 30 games is left, and the old operation history exceeding this is overwritten by the latest operation history.

  In order to perform fraud determination using the operation time information stored for each operation history as described above, first, a reference operation time X that is an average value of operation times for 30 games is obtained. In calculating the reference operation time X, the total value (t1 + t2 + t3 +... + T29 + t30) of the operation times t1 to t30 from the operation histories 01 to 30 is divided by the total number (30) of operation histories. You may make it extract the operation history used in order to calculate reference | standard operation time from the operation history memorize | stored in the acquisition time memory | storage part. For example, if the operation history storage time is stored together with the operation time t as the operation time information, the time interval at which the operation history is stored can be determined. Therefore, a game different from the player who performed the current operation By excluding those that can be considered as a history of operations by the user from the calculation target of the standard operation time, it is possible to calculate a more appropriate standard operation time.

  The reference calculation target condition for extracting the operation history for obtaining the reference operation time may be determined as appropriate. However, when there is one operation history that satisfies the reference calculation target condition (a plurality of operation histories are extracted). If it is not, it is desirable to cancel the unauthorized operation determination process because appropriate unauthorized operation determination cannot be performed. For example, if the time difference between the operation history storage time for storing the current operation history and the operation history storage time for storing the previous operation history is several minutes or several tens of minutes, a new player can play the slot machine 100. Since it is assumed that the game has been played for the first time, the reference operation time X calculated from the operation times t1 to t29, which is the previous operation history, and the operation time t30, which is the current operation history, is started by a new player. This is because it cannot be said that the information for determining the appropriateness of the lever operation is appropriate.

  Next, a reference operation time range (lower limit is X−A and upper limit is X + A) is determined by adding an allowable error range ± A to the calculated reference operation time X. Even if the start lever 135 is operated with a constant driving force like a solenoid got, there is a possibility that the operation time t may be blurred due to a slight change in sliding resistance, etc. Considering the fluctuation range of the average value as an allowable error range, it is possible to suppress oversight of unauthorized operations.

  Based on whether or not the operation times t1 to t30 of the operation histories 01 to 30 for which the reference operation time is calculated are within the reference operation time range (X−A to X + A), Determine whether or not. For example, if the number of operation histories (abnormal operation histories) in which the operation time satisfying “X−A ≦ operation time t ≦ X + A” is B, the operation time outside the reference operation time range is stored. The number of operation histories is 30-B.

  Note that how to define the allowable error range is not particularly limited, and the upper limit range and the lower limit range with respect to the reference operation time X are made different (for example, the upper limit of the reference operation time range = X + A1, the lower limit = X−A2). , A1 ≠ A2). Further, in the main control unit 300 of the slot machine 100 according to the present embodiment, the detection state change of the first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243 cannot be detected instantaneously, and a predetermined interrupt cycle (1. 877 msec) at the time of reading port data, there is a delay with the upper limit of the time period of this interrupt cycle, and it can be considered that the operation times t1 to t30 already include an allowable error. When the error that occurs during the operation time of the illegal operation due to the error is extremely small and falls within the delay range of the interrupt cycle (when the error is about 1 msec), the allowable error A = 0 and the operation time t = X or the operation It may be determined whether or not there is an abnormal operation history at time t ≠ X.

  When the number B of operation histories determined as abnormal operations as described above reaches the predetermined fraud determination reference number C (B ≧ C), it is determined that the fraudulent operation condition is satisfied. In other words, when there are many operation histories with similar operation times that cannot be realized by artificial lever operation, the start lever 135 is operated using a constant output drive source such as a solenoid. The number of operation histories determined as abnormal operation histories is set if a reasonable number that cannot be realized by appropriate human manipulation is set as the fraud determination reference number C. From B, the presence or absence of fraud can be accurately determined.

  The fraud determination reference number C is not limited to a fixed value, and different numerical values may be used depending on the number of operation histories extracted in calculating the reference operation time. The determination of whether or not the operation is unauthorized is not limited to the determination of the unauthorized determination reference number C, and an upper limit number of times that an operation time within the reference operation time range can be achieved by an artificial start lever operation is set. The proper operation upper limit number C ′ is set, and when the number B of operation histories determined as abnormal operations exceeds the proper operation upper limit number C ′ (B> C ′), it is determined that the illegal operation condition is satisfied. Anyway.

  If it is determined that there is an unauthorized operation as described above, a predetermined error operation is performed. The content of the error operation is not particularly limited, but in order to prompt a game shop to respond quickly to unauthorized operations, a speaker that can make an audible notification, an LCD 180 that can make a visual notification, and the like are used as notification means. It is good also as an error operation to act | operate an alerting | reporting means and to notify a game store clerk etc. of generation | occurrence | production of an unauthorized operation.

  In addition, if notification by error operation is to be terminated after a lapse of a predetermined time, even if the start lever operation is performed properly, the operation accidentally meets the fraud criterion, Since there is almost no possibility that it will be further determined as an unauthorized operation in the continued game after that, the notification ends after a predetermined time, whereas the game due to the unauthorized operation continues even after the unauthorized operation is performed and the notification is started. In this case, the notification is not ended because it is determined again as an unauthorized operation before the lapse of the predetermined time, and the notification continues after the lapse of the predetermined time. Therefore, based on whether the notification is continuous or not. Thus, it is possible to clearly discriminate whether an accidental fraud determination or an intentional fraud determination is made.

  As another error operation, the slot machine 100 may not be able to be played, and the normal operation cannot be restored unless the internal reset switch is pressed. By performing such an error operation, it is possible to quickly prevent an illegal act of acquiring many medals by an unauthorized device such as a solenoid, and to minimize the disadvantage of the game shop. Alternatively, the game may be continued in the slot machine 100 as usual by stopping the count of the number of illegal operations detected as an error operation.

<Game execution processing>
Next, a series of processing operations for performing the above-described unauthorized operation determination will be described. FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing the game execution process of the slot machine 100.

  First, a medal is received from the medal insertion slot block 133 or by the operation of the three-medal insertion button 131 or the one-medal insertion button 132. When a medal is received, a medal insertion command is transmitted to the sub-control unit 400. The medal acceptance process is performed (step S101). When the medal is properly received, the operation of the start lever 135 can be accepted, and the player receives each detection signal from the first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243 by appropriately operating the start lever 135. In the event that the operation is an unauthorized operation, a start lever reception process is also performed (step S102).

  Next, when the operation of the start lever 135 is received in step S102 and a random number is acquired from the random number generator 311, an internal lottery process for performing an internal lottery for each winning combination is performed based on the acquired random number (step S103). A reel stop preparation process is performed so that the reel can be stopped according to the lottery result (step S104). Subsequently, an effect lottery process for determining an effect to be performed in the game is performed (step S1058).

  Next, a reel rotation start process for starting rotation of the left reel 110, the middle reel 111, and the right reel 112 is performed (step S106). In this reel rotation process, when all the reels 110 to 112 are rotated at a constant speed and the stop buttons 136 a to 136 c can be received, a stop operation permission command is transmitted to the sub-control unit 400. Subsequently, any one of the stop buttons 136a to 136c is operated to perform a stop button receiving process for receiving detection signals from the stop button sensors 341 to 343 (step S107). In the stop button reception process, stop button reception commands (first to third stop commands) corresponding to the operated stop buttons 136a to 136c are transmitted to the sub-control unit 400.

  Then, a stop position information command indicating stop position information corresponding to the stop button for which the operation has been received in step S108 is transmitted to the sub-control unit 400 to perform a reel stop process for stopping the reels (step S108). It is determined whether or not the stop process for .about.112 has been completed (step S109). If there are still spinning reels, the processes of steps S107 and S108 are performed.

  As described above, when all the reels 110 to 112 in the game are stopped, a predetermined symbol corresponding to the winning combination won in S103 is displayed on the activated winning line 114 on the reel display window 113. It is determined whether or not the combination is stopped, and if it is determined that a winning is achieved, a winning determination process is performed for transmitting a winning determination command to the sub-control unit 400 (step S110), and the winning determination process is performed. If it is determined that a predetermined number of medals corresponding to the winning combination is paid out to the tray 160 from the medal payout outlet 165, a medal payout process is performed to send a payout number command to the sub-control unit 400 (step S111), a winning effect process for transmitting a winning effect command for performing a winning effect by display operation or voice output according to the winning to the sub-control unit 400. Was carried out (step S112), performs a game state update processing of transmitting the game state command to the sub-control unit 400 according to the win determination results (step S113).

  By executing the above-described series of processing steps, one game is completed, and thereafter the same procedure is repeated.

<Start lever reception processing>
FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the start lever reception process performed in step S102 of the game execution process. In this start lever reception process, the detection levels of the first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243 are read from the port data of the input port in an interrupt process executed at regular intervals (step S201), and the first start lever sensor It is determined whether or not 241 is ON (step S202).

  Here, when it is determined that the first start lever sensor 241 is not ON (OFF), the light shielding portion 261 of the start lever unit 200 is connected to the light projecting arm portion 241a and the light receiving arm portion of the first start lever sensor 241. Since the non-operation state is located between 241b, the process returns to step S201, and the input port port data is read in the next interrupt process. Note that the detection levels of the first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243 when the start lever 135 is not operated are in the state shown in ST1 of FIG.

  On the other hand, if it is determined in step S202 that the first start lever sensor 241 has been turned ON (see ST2 in FIG. 10), it is determined whether the measurement by the operation time timer has been started. When the determination is made (step S203) and the measurement by the operation time timer has not been performed, the operation time measurement setting in step S204 is performed, and the operation time measurement by the operation time timer is started.

  Subsequently, it is determined whether or not the second start lever sensor 242 is OFF (step S205). If it is determined that the second start lever sensor 242 is not OFF (the start lever sensor 242 is ON), It is determined whether or not the start lever sensor 243 is OFF (step S206). If it is determined that the third start lever sensor 243 is not OFF (the third start lever sensor 243 is ON), steps S201 to S203 are performed again. And waits until the detection state of either the second start lever sensor 242 or the start lever sensor 243 changes to OFF.

  That is, when the detection state of the second start lever sensor 242 changes to OFF after the detection state of the first start lever sensor 241 changes to ON (see ST3 in FIG. 10), an operation to push down the start lever 135 is executed. Thus, when the detection state of the third start lever sensor 243 changes to OFF after the detection state of the first start lever sensor 241 changes to ON, an operation to push up the start lever 135 has been executed. Therefore, when it is determined in step S205 or step S206 that the sensor has changed from ON to OFF, a random number value for winning combination lottery is acquired from the random number generation circuit 317 of the main control unit 300 (step S207). The operation time (time from ST2 to ST3) measured by the time timer Save as a new operation history (operating history 30) (step S208), performs a manipulation determination process (step S209).

  Since the operated start lever 135 returns to the non-operating state again, the detection state of the second start lever sensor 242 (or the third start lever sensor 243) is changed from OFF to ON, as indicated by ST3 'in FIG. Then, as shown in ST4 of FIG. 10, the detection state of the first start lever sensor 241 changes from ON to OFF, and thereafter, ST1 that is in a non-operation state until the next game operation is performed. Will be maintained. Therefore, ST2, ST3, ST3 ′, and ST4, which are timings for changing the detection states of the first to third start lever sensors 241 to 243, may be arbitrarily applied as triggers for starting and ending the measurement of the operation time t. However, when measuring the operation time for determining an illegal operation (solenoid goat) aiming at the extraction timing of the big hit random number, setting ST3 as the random number extraction timing as the operation end measurement end timing can improve the determination accuracy. It is effective in.

  In addition, as the detection state of the second start lever sensor 242 or the third start lever sensor 243 changes to OFF, the operation time is unconditionally saved as the latest operation history in step S208. It may be determined whether or not a predetermined history storage condition is satisfied, and the operation time may be stored as an operation history only when the condition is satisfied.

  For example, in order to avoid revealing fraudulent acts due to fraudulent operation determination using the approximation of the operation time as in the present invention, the person who performs the fraudulent action appropriately imparts randomness to the operation time by manual operation etc. Can happen. As a countermeasure, for example, when the operation time exceeds a certain time (for example, 100 msec), the calculation of the reference operation time for fraud determination can be improved by excluding the lever operation from the operation history storage target. Can be increased.

  Further, in a solenoid got that is arranged with a solenoid so as to pull the start lever 135 in one direction, the operation time of the manual operation is made reverse to the pulling direction by the solenoid so that the operation time is random. For the fraud determination avoidance measures, for example, the operation time measured when the second start lever sensor 242 detects the light shielding part 261 and the operation measured when the third start lever sensor 243 detects the light shielding part 261 are used. The operation direction information indicating whether the operation is the push-up operation or the push-down operation is stored as one of the operation time information, and the operation time information is calculated from the calculation of the reference operation time. If a series of processing up to the judgment is performed separately for the operation history of the push-up operation and the operation history of the push-down operation, It is possible to perform clear fraud from pulling direction of the operation history by the de.

  Furthermore, when the operation time is so short that it cannot be achieved by human operation, this may be processed as an illegal operation. For example, when an illegal act that directly changes the detection state of the sensor, such as infrared goto, is performed, the detection state of the sensor changes much faster than when the start lever 135 is physically moved. It is possible to make it. Accordingly, whether or not the acquired operation time t is within a predetermined abnormal operation time (for example, 5 msec) is set as a fraud determination condition. Such an error operation may be performed.

  In addition, although the above-described unauthorized operation determination method was used to determine the presence or absence of fraudulent activity from the proximity of operation times in a plurality of operation histories, the operation time in the latest operation history is compared with the abnormal operation time. The technique for performing fraud determination is useful in that immediacy determination can be expected immediately because it does not require past operation history and can determine the presence or absence of fraudulent activity using only the latest operation history. Therefore, it would be even more preferable to perform unauthorized operation determination by comparing the operation time in the latest operation history with the abnormal operation time while determining unauthorized operation from a plurality of operation histories including past operation histories. Operation determination can be realized.

<Unauthorized operation determination processing>
FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing the unauthorized operation determination process performed in step S209 of the start lever reception process. In this unauthorized operation determination process, first, it is determined whether or not there is a storage area that can be stored in the acquisition time storage unit of the RAM 313, that is, whether or not the stored operation history has reached 30 games. If the operation history has not reached 30 games (step S301), the unauthorized operation determination process is terminated. In this way, it is determined whether or not the operation history for 30 games is stored in the acquisition time storage unit by using the operation history several times, such as immediately after the start of business at the amusement store. This is for avoiding erroneous determination. In addition, as a reference | standard which complete | finishes a process, without performing unauthorized operation determination, not only the operation history for 30 games is memorize | stored but a larger operation history number may be sufficient, and a smaller operation history number may be sufficient. .

  In step S301, when it is determined that the operation history is stored in all the storage areas provided in the acquisition time storage unit, the determination target operation history (operation history satisfying a predetermined reference calculation target condition) is determined. Each operation time is acquired (step S302), a reference operation time is calculated as an average value of the acquired operation times (step S303), and a reference error time range is added to the calculated reference operation time by adding an allowable error range. Is set (step S304), and an error setting process using the set reference operation time range is performed (step S305).

  In step S302, the reference calculation target condition that is a condition for extracting the operation history for acquiring the operation time is not particularly limited, but for example, stored as operation time information of the operation history 01 to 30. If a predetermined number (for example, five times) is excluded from the determination target and the remaining operation history is set as the determination target condition as a reference calculation target condition, a person who performs an illegal act However, it is possible to calculate a reference operation time that can determine an appropriate unauthorized operation by excluding a slow lever operation intentionally performed to give randomness to the operation time.

<Standard operation time calculation process>
FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing the reference operation time calculation process performed in step S303 of the unauthorized operation determination process. First, the operation time t of all the operation histories to be determined is added (step S401), and the total value is divided by the number of operation histories to be determined to obtain a reference operation time (step S402). For example, when all the operation histories 01 to 30 are set as determination targets by setting the storage of the operation time as a reference calculation target condition, the added value of the operation times t1 to t30 is divided by 30. The reference operation time X can be obtained. If the number of operation histories satisfying the reference calculation target condition is 25, the reference operation time X can be obtained by dividing the added value of these operation times t by 25. .

  The reference operation time range set using the reference operation time X obtained as described above is not particularly limited. For example, the allowable error is 1 interrupt cycle M (1.877 msec), and the reference A range of 3.754 msec centered on the operation time X was set as the reference operation time range. By setting the reference operation time range in this way, it is possible to cover an error range sufficient for the determination of the operation time obtained by high-precision start lever operation using a solenoid that operates stably, and to occur by artificial start lever operation. It is sufficient to prevent misjudgment due to approximation of the obtained operation time.

<Error setting process>
FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing the error setting process performed in step S305 of the unauthorized operation determination process. First, the number of operation histories to be determined is set as the number of times of abnormality determination (step S501), and the count value of the abnormal operation counter is cleared (step S502).

  Next, the operation time t is acquired from the operation history to be determined in a predetermined determination order (for example, from the oldest history) (step S503), and whether or not the operation time is within the reference operation time range. It is determined (whether or not the approximate condition is satisfied) (step S504), and if it is within the reference operation time range, an abnormal operation counter (a counter that counts the operation history storing the operation time satisfying the approximate condition) ) Is incremented by adding “1” (step S505).

  Subsequently, “1” is subtracted from the number of times of abnormality determination as the abnormality determination of the acquired operation time t ends (step S507), and it is determined whether or not the number of times of abnormality determination has returned (step S507). If the number of times of abnormality determination still remains, the processes in steps S503 to S506 are repeated again. When the determination for all operation histories to be determined is completed, the number of abnormality determinations set in step S501 is 0, so that the number of abnormality determinations is determined to be 0 in step S507.

  When the abnormality determination of the operation time t acquired from all the operation histories to be determined is completed as described above, whether the abnormal operation count number that is the count value of the abnormal operation counter is equal to or greater than a predetermined fraud determination reference number If the abnormal operation count is less than the fraud determination reference number, the error setting process is terminated as it is, but the abnormal operation count is equal to or greater than the fraud determination reference number. Sets an error flag (step S509). By setting this error flag, for example, a predetermined error operation is executed in the subsequent timer interrupt processing.

  As described above, in the slot machine 100 according to the present embodiment, the measured operation time is stored in the RAM 313 as storage means as operation time information, and the operation history stored in the storage means is determined in advance. The average operation time is obtained from a plurality of operation histories satisfying the reference calculation target condition and set as the reference operation time, and the operation time within the reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the reference operation time. When the number of operation histories has reached a predetermined number of fraud determination criteria, it is determined that the fraudulent operation condition is satisfied, so the player intentionally operates the operation means to keep the operation time constant. Even in such a case, it is possible to accurately determine a solenoid that approximates an operation time that cannot be achieved.

  The determination method of the unauthorized operation is not limited to the above-described embodiment, and various determination methods can be adopted by appropriately setting the unauthorized operation condition. For example, a reference operation time range is set based on the reference operation time X calculated as an average value of operation times t in a plurality of operation histories to be determined, and the current operation history to be determined is within the reference operation time range. When the operation time t in (the latest operation history) is within, it may be determined that the unauthorized operation condition is satisfied, and an error flag may be set.

  Alternatively, the acquisition time storage unit of the RAM 313 serving as the storage unit can store “operation time” and “presence / absence of abnormality determination flag” as operation time information stored for each operation history, and satisfy a predetermined determination target condition. Among the three or more operation histories, when the number of operation histories satisfying the approximate condition (the operation time is within the reference operation time range) is equal to or greater than a predetermined abnormality determination reference number, the current operation history (the latest operation history) When an abnormality determination flag is stored in the operation time information in (History), and the number of operation histories in which the abnormality determination flag is stored among a plurality of operation histories satisfying the determination target condition is greater than or equal to a predetermined number of fraud determinations Alternatively, it may be determined that the illegal operation condition is satisfied, and an error flag may be set.

  In the above-described various unauthorized operation determination methods, only the operation history that satisfies the determination target condition is set as the determination target, so that the determination accuracy of the abnormal operation is improved. However, the operation history is extracted according to the determination target condition. A continuous operation history may be extracted as a determination target so that a processing load is not applied to the process. For example, if the operation history storing the operation time within a predetermined time (several minutes) from the current time when the latest operation history is stored is extracted, it is obvious that the lever operation performed by another player There is also an advantage that the operation history stored in the operation time can be excluded and the accuracy of the unauthorized operation determination can be improved.

<Unauthorized operation determination process 2>
In the various unauthorized operation determination methods described above, the reference operation time is calculated as an average value of operation times in a plurality of operation histories, and the reference operation time range used for determining the approximate condition is set. The time range may be set only from the latest operation history. FIG. 14 shows a flowchart of an unauthorized operation determination process for determining an unauthorized operation by setting a reference operation time range from the latest operation history.

  First, it is determined whether or not there is a storage area that can be stored in the acquisition time storage unit of the RAM 313, that is, whether or not the stored operation history has reached 30 games (step S601). If the game has not reached 30 games, the unauthorized operation determination process is terminated. In step S601, when it is determined that the operation history is stored in all of the storage areas provided in the acquisition time storage unit, the operation time t30 is acquired from the latest operation history (operation history 30). The reference operation time X is set (step S602). Next, a reference operation time range is set by adding an allowable error range ± A to the reference operation time X (step S603), and an error setting process using the set reference operation time range is performed (step S604). Details of the error setting process are as shown in FIG.

  As described above, when the operation time is within the reference operation time range determined by adding the allowable error range to the operation time in the current operation history (operation history 30), the current operation history It is natural that the operation time is within the standard operation time range, so when the fraud determination reference number is set to 2 or more, the operation history group that satisfies the determination target condition except the current operation history is included in the operation history group If there is at least one operation history in which the operation time within the reference operation time range is recorded, it can be determined that the unauthorized operation condition is satisfied.

  When the continuous operation history is limited to the determination target and the operation history satisfying the determination target is limited to two, the current operation history (operation history 30) and the previous operation history (operation history 29) Since it is only necessary to determine the approximate condition, there is a high possibility that a case where the operation time when the player normally operates the start lever 135 accidentally continuously becomes almost the same will be erroneously determined as an unauthorized operation. There is an advantage that the judgment process is simplified and a quick judgment operation at a low load can be expected. When determining the approximate condition between the operation time of the previous operation and the operation time of the current operation, the reference operation time range may be set based on the current operation time, or the reference operation time based on the previous operation time A range may be set.

<Illegal judgment method for pushbutton switches>
In the fraud determination method described above, the variation of the light shielding unit 261 that moves in accordance with the operation of the operation unit, such as the start lever 135, is detected by a plurality of sensors. It is possible to determine an unauthorized operation even for a configuration for detecting a state. Accordingly, an example of an unauthorized operation determination method for determining unauthorized operation on the push button type start button switch 600 by the main control unit 300 will be described with reference to FIG.

  The start button switch 600 stores a pressing member 610 that is pressed downward by a player's finger in the storage member 620, and a detected piece that extends in the pressing direction (downward) from the bottom surface of the pressing member 610 when not operated. The biasing means 640 such as a coil spring is urged so that 611 is positioned at an appropriate position above the start button sensor 630.

  When the pressing member 610 is pressed against the urging force of the urging means 640, the detected piece 611 of the pressing member 610 is interposed between the light projecting arm portion 631 and the light receiving arm portion 632 of the start button sensor 630. When it enters and the detected piece 611 blocks the light beam from the light projecting arm 631 to the light receiving arm 632, the detection state of the start button sensor 630 changes from ON to OFF. In response to this state change, the operation time t is started to be measured.

  When the pressing member 610 is further pressed, the bottom surface of the pressing member 610 comes into contact with the pressing member contact surface 621 formed on the storage member 620, and further pressing becomes impossible. Therefore, when the player releases his / her finger from the pressing member 610, the pressing member 610 is pushed upward by the biasing force of the biasing means 640 so as to return to the non-operating state, and the detected piece 611 of the pressing member 610 starts. When the light beam reaches the light receiving arm 632 from the light projecting arm 631 by retreating from between the light projecting arm 631 and the light receiving arm 632 of the button sensor 630, the detection state of the start button sensor 630 is as follows. Change from OFF to ON. The timing of the operation time t ends with this state change as a trigger. In addition, a random number for determining a winning combination is taken in response to this state change.

  In other words, when an illegal operation for operating the start button switch 600 is performed by operating a driving source such as a solenoid in synchronization with the random number generation cycle, the solenoid is operated by keeping the driving force of the solenoid constant. It is necessary to make the operation time t, which is the time from when the start button sensor 630 changes state from ON to OFF until the start button sensor 630 changes state from OFF to ON, to a very approximate value. Since this approximate tendency is much higher accuracy than when the player intentionally operates the start button switch 600 to keep the operation time t constant, the start button switch is started with the start of the game. The operation time t acquired when 600 is operated is represented by the past operation history (according to the past start lever operation). In comparison with the operation time), from the approximate trend of the operation time t, whether the operation the player went to a proper, it can determine whether an illegal operation by the solenoid Goto at a very high probability. Therefore, as the method for determining the approximate condition of the operation time acquired in this way, various methods exemplified for the start lever 135 can be applied as they are.

  In the start button switch 600, the distance at which the detected piece 611 acts on the start button sensor 630 to change the detection state to OFF with respect to the stroke L for pressing the pressing member 610 until it makes contact with the pressing member contact surface 621. If L ′ is shortened, the operation time t can be relatively shortened, and conversely, if L ′ is lengthened, the operation time t can be relatively lengthened. Therefore, a suitable distance L ′ is appropriately set for determination of unauthorized operation. Just do it.

  For example, when an illegal operation such as an infrared ray that directly changes the detection state by irradiating the start button sensor 630 with electromagnetic waves, the state change of the start button sensor 630 occurs instantaneously. If the distance L ′ for changing the detection state to OFF by 611 acting on the start button sensor 630 is set to be long, the detection state of the start button sensor 630 is changed by physically moving the pressing member 610. If an operation time t shorter than the shortest time expected is detected, this can be immediately determined as an unauthorized operation.

<Start button reception processing>
FIG. 16 shows a start button reception process when the start button switch 600 is used for a game start operation. This start button reception process is performed in place of the start lever reception process in step S102 of the game execution process.

  In the start button reception process, the detection level of the start button sensor 630 is read from the port data of the input port in the interrupt process executed at regular intervals (step S701), and whether or not the detection state of the start button sensor 630 has changed. (Step S702), if there is no change in the detection level of the start button sensor 630, the process returns to step S701, and the input port port data is read in the next interrupt process.

  On the other hand, if it is determined in step S702 that the detection state of the start button sensor 630 has changed, it is determined whether or not the change state is a change state from ON to OFF (step S703). Here, when the pressing member 610 is pressed and the detected piece 611 reaches a position where the light beam from the light projecting arm portion 631 to the light receiving arm portion 632 of the start button sensor 630 is blocked, the detection state of the start button sensor 630 is detected. Is changed from ON to OFF (see ST1 in FIG. 17), it is determined in step S703 that the change in the detection state is from ON to OFF, and the operation time t is measured and set (step S709). .

  Thereafter, processing in steps S701 to S703 is performed, and the detected piece 611 blocks the light beam from the light projecting arm portion 631 to the light receiving arm portion 632 of the start button sensor 630 as the pressing member 610 returns to the non-operating state. If the detection state of the start button sensor 630 changes from OFF to ON (see ST2 in FIG. 17), it is determined in step S703 that the change in detection state is from ON to OFF. The random number value for winning combination lottery is acquired from the random number generation circuit 317 of the main control unit 300 (step S705), and the measured operation time t (time from ST1 to ST2 in FIG. 17) is updated to the latest operation history ( Operation history 30) is stored (step S706), and an unauthorized operation determination process is performed (step S707).

  As mentioned above, although embodiment of this invention was explained in full detail based on the accompanying drawing, the inclusion range of this invention is not limited only to these structures. For example, the operation switch that is the target of the unauthorized operation is not limited to the start lever or start button that gives an instruction to start the game, and may be applied to an unauthorized determination for an operation of a stop button that stops a rotating reel, for example.

It is a perspective view showing the appearance of a slot machine which is an example of a game table. It is an external appearance perspective view of a start lever unit. It is a disassembled perspective view of a start lever unit. It is operation | movement explanatory drawing of a start lever unit. It is a functional block diagram of the main control part in a slot machine. It is a functional block diagram of a sub-control unit in the slot machine. It is explanatory drawing of the unauthorized operation determination method by the detection state change of a start lever unit. It is a flowchart which shows a game execution process. It is a flowchart which shows a start lever reception process. It is a wave form diagram which shows the detection state change of the 1st-3rd start lever sensor accompanying a start lever operation. It is a flowchart which shows an unauthorized operation determination process. It is a flowchart which shows a reference | standard operation time calculation process. It is a flowchart which shows an error setting process. It is a flowchart which shows the other example of an unauthorized operation determination process. It is explanatory drawing of the unauthorized operation determination method by the detection state change of a start button switch. It is a flowchart which shows a start button reception process. It is a wave form diagram which shows the detection state change of the start button sensor accompanying a start button operation.

Explanation of symbols

100 slot machine 135 start lever 200 start lever unit 210 grasping part 211 movable shaft 241 first start lever sensor 242 second start lever sensor 243 third start lever sensor 261 light shielding part 300 main control part

Claims (10)

Operation means operated to advance the game, detection means for changing the detection state by operating the operation means, and control means for controlling the progress of the game based on the change of the detection state of the detection means In a game machine having
The control means includes
Clocking means for timing the operation time of the operating means based on a change in the detection state of the detecting means;
Storage means for storing operation time information based on the operation time measured by the time measuring means as an operation history corresponding to the operation of the operation means;
The presence / absence of an unauthorized operation is determined based on whether or not the operation time information stored in the storage means satisfies a predetermined unauthorized operation condition. If it is determined that there is an unauthorized operation, a predetermined error operation is performed. Processing means
A game table characterized by comprising: The storage means stores the operation time measured by the time measuring means as operation time information,
The processing means has a case in which the number of operation histories satisfying a predetermined approximate condition among the operation histories for a predetermined number of times stored in the storage means is equal to or greater than a predetermined fraud determination reference number. 2. The game table according to claim 1, wherein it is determined that an illegal operation condition is satisfied.   The processing means uses an approximate condition that the operation time is within a reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the operation time in the current operation history, sets the fraud determination reference number to 2, 3. The gaming table according to claim 2, wherein when the operation time in the operation history and the operation time in the previous operation history satisfy the approximate condition, it is determined that the illegal operation condition is satisfied.   The processing means uses an approximate condition that the operation time is within a reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the operation time in the current operation history, sets the fraud determination reference number to 2 or more, Among the three or more operations satisfying the determined determination target condition, when the number of operation histories satisfying the approximate condition is greater than or equal to the number of fraud determination criteria, it is determined that the fraudulent operation condition is satisfied. The game table according to claim 2. The storage means stores the operation time measured by the time measuring means and the presence / absence of an abnormality determination flag as operation time information,
The processing means uses the operation time within the reference operation time range determined by adding an allowable error range to the operation time in the current operation history as an approximation condition, and satisfies three or more conditions that satisfy a predetermined determination target condition. When the number of operation histories satisfying the approximation condition is equal to or greater than a predetermined abnormality determination reference number, an abnormality determination flag is stored in the operation time information in the current operation history, and the determination target condition is The number of operation histories in which an abnormality determination flag is stored among a plurality of operation histories satisfying is equal to or greater than a predetermined number of fraud determinations. The game table according to 1. The storage means stores the operation time measured by the time measuring means as operation time information,
The processing means obtains an average value of operation times from a plurality of operation histories satisfying a predetermined reference calculation target condition among operation histories stored in the storage means, and sets the reference operation time as the reference operation time. It is characterized in that it is determined that the unauthorized operation condition is satisfied when the operation time in the current operation history that is the determination target is within the reference operation time range determined in consideration of the allowable error range. The game table according to claim 1. The storage means stores the operation time measured by the time measuring means as operation time information,
The processing means obtains an average value of operation times from a plurality of operation histories satisfying a predetermined reference calculation target condition among operation histories stored in the storage means, and sets the reference operation time as the reference operation time. When the number of operation histories for the operation time that falls within the reference operation time range determined taking into account the allowable error range has reached the predetermined fraud determination reference number, it is determined that the fraudulent operation condition is satisfied. The game table according to claim 1, wherein The operation means includes a detected portion whose state changes between non-operation and operation,
The detection unit includes a plurality of detection units capable of detecting at least two states in a range in which the detected unit of the operation unit changes state,
8. The time measuring means in the control means time-measures the operation time by using the detection state changes of the two detection units selected from the detecting means as the timing start timing and timing end timing, respectively. The game table according to any one of the preceding claims. Provided with a notification means capable of audible and / or visual notification;
The processing means in the control means is configured to perform an error operation that notifies the occurrence of an unauthorized operation by the notification means based on fraud determination. Amusement stand. Multiple reels with multiple types of patterns,
A start lever for starting rotation of the reel;
A stop button provided for each of the reels, for individually stopping the rotation of the reels;
With
Using the start lever and / or stop button as operating means,
The control means extracts a random number based on the timing at which the operation means detects the operation state of the operation means, determines whether or not the internal winning of the predetermined winning combination is determined by the extracted random number, and when the winning combination is won internally If the combination of the patterns displayed by the reels at the time of stoppage is a combination of patterns predetermined corresponding to the internal winning winning combination, the game proceeds as if the winning combination has been won. The game table according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein

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