EP4494366A1 - Authentifizierungssystem zur authentifizierung eines schlüssels gegenüber dem fahrzeug sowie zugehöriges verfahren - Google Patents
Authentifizierungssystem zur authentifizierung eines schlüssels gegenüber dem fahrzeug sowie zugehöriges verfahrenInfo
- Publication number
- EP4494366A1 EP4494366A1 EP23751626.5A EP23751626A EP4494366A1 EP 4494366 A1 EP4494366 A1 EP 4494366A1 EP 23751626 A EP23751626 A EP 23751626A EP 4494366 A1 EP4494366 A1 EP 4494366A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- uwb
- transceiver
- ble
- communication
- key
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
Definitions
- the invention relates to an authentication system with which an authentication of a particularly portable, but alternatively also stationary key can be carried out with respect to the vehicle in order to enable vehicle functions for an operator who, for example, carries the key with him, operates it or approaches it.
- the invention further relates to a method for operating such an authentication system of a vehicle for authenticating a particularly portable key.
- a standard widely used in the automotive industry envisages determining distance using both UWB communication and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) communication, using a mobile phone as an ID transmitter.
- BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
- an authentication system of a vehicle for authenticating a particularly portable key to the vehicle for releasing vehicle functions for an operator who in particular carries the key with him is therefore proposed.
- the key has a first UWB transceiver for UWB communication with the vehicle and a first BLE transceiver for BLE communication with the vehicle.
- the vehicle also has a second UWB transceiver for UWB communication with the key and a second BLE transceiver for BLE communication with the key.
- the first BLE transceiver is designed to exclusively take on an advertising role in BLE communication, so that it does not have to take on the energy-consuming scanner role.
- the second BLE transceiver is designed to take on a scanning role in BLE communication.
- the energy consumption in or on the key can be reduced, so that the battery life of a battery that provides the energy in or on the key is increased.
- the invention further provides that the first UWB transceiver is designed
- the goal is to generate UWB frames as messages for UWB communication, which are in particular poll, response, final and/or final data messages that are optimized for this, especially when sending but also when receiving on the first UWB transceivers use as little energy as possible.
- the UWB frames are designed to consume minimal energy during UWB communication, i.e. when sending and receiving UWB signals at the first UWB transceiver, through a minimal message length and/or through a minimal signal amplitude.
- the UWB frames or frame types to be sent as part of the messages have been determined.
- the frame types are in particular Pre-Poll, Poll, Response Final and Finaldata. These frame types in turn contain sometimes different sections or data sections, which lead to different frame structures.
- the UWB signals themselves or the UWB communication can initially be optimized or the energy consumption minimized by completely eliminating the UWB frame pre-poll as part of the UWB communication.
- the data sections can in particular be the STS (Scrambled Timestamp Sequence) and PHY header (can also be referred to as PHR or physical layer header) sections.
- STS Scmbled Timestamp Sequence
- PHY header can also be referred to as PHR or physical layer header
- the UWB frames Poll, Response and Final can contain a shorter STS. Furthermore, the PHY header in Finaldata can be omitted.
- first UWB transceiver and the first BLE transceiver and/or the second UWB transceiver and the second BLE transceiver are designed for synchronization and time-offset or time-parallel communication, so that the BLE communication and the UWB communication can be carried out or are carried out with a time offset from one another and not overlapping in time or in parallel with one another .
- This training can be implemented, for example, by a corresponding method but also by software and/or hardware locks.
- the ID transmitter designed as a key is preferably not a mobile phone or the like, but rather a device designed for the specific application. Accordingly, the key can be a “smart key” or a “smart fob”. Alternatively, the key can also be integrated, for example, into a charging station or another stationary structure, such as a garage.
- the key is integrated into a charging station, it can be used to enable a charging function.
- the key can be characterized by the fact that it has an internal energy source, such as a battery or an accumulator, but at least no plug-in charging port for charging the energy source via a physical connection.
- an internal energy source such as a battery or an accumulator
- the second UWB transceiver and the second BLE transceiver are integrated into or connected to a module of the vehicle for determining a distance of the key from the vehicle.
- the module is designed here from the UWB Communication transmitted UWB signals to determine the distance of the key from the vehicle. Information transmitted via BLE communication can also be used to determine the distance.
- the module or a control device integrated therein can be designed to control the second UWB transceiver and/or the second BLE transceiver.
- the module or the arrangement consisting of the module, the second UWB transceiver and the second BLE transceiver can also be referred to as an authentication arrangement.
- the distance is determined in particular by calculating the signal transit time of the UWB signal transmitted between the first and the second UWB transceiver as part of the UWB communication.
- the use of the signal transit time to determine the distance is also known as the “time-of-flight” method, for which the module is designed accordingly.
- the vehicle can also have a large number of second UWB transceivers, which can communicate one after the other with the first UWB transceiver.
- the second UWB transceivers can be provided at different positions on the vehicle, whereby they can communicate with the second BLE transceiver, for example via the control unit of the vehicle, so that information exchanged or requested via BLE communication can be sent to each of the UWB transceivers and, for example can be provided indirectly via the control unit.
- a further aspect according to the invention relates to a method for operating an authentication system according to the invention.
- the method includes at least the following steps, in particular in the order mentioned: ge:
- steps A to E may correspond to the actual order of the steps of the method, each of the steps B) to D) can also optionally be skipped or carried out in a different order.
- step E can follow directly.
- the steps could also be carried out in the order A), C), E).
- step E) is repeated several times. Each time step E) is carried out, a different one can occur second UWB transceiver and / or a mutually different combination of second UWB transceivers can be controlled to set up or initiate UWB communication.
- first UWB transceiver, the first BLE transceiver, the second UWB transceiver and the second BLE transceiver communicate with a time offset from one another and that the UWB communication and the BLE communication are carried out with a time offset and do not overlap in time, which leads to energy savings, since in particular the key-side, i.e. first, transceivers neither have to receive signals at the same time nor have to receive and process signals at the same time.
- the information for determining the distance is a processing time of a UWB signal in the key and/or settings of the first UWB transceiver and/or information about the first UWB transceiver relevant to determining the distance.
- the BLE time slot (connection interval), i.e. the time slot in which BLE data is sent, can be optimized by matching the BLE time slot to the ranging cycle, i.e. to a cycle to which the distance is determined should, can be chosen.
- a BLE time slot of between 300 and 400 ms and preferably approximately 360 ms is preferably used here.
- Fig. 1 shows an authentication system
- Fig. 2 shows a process flow during the operation of the authentication system.
- the key 10 has a first UWB transceiver 11 for UWB communication with the vehicle 20 and a first BLE transceiver 12 for BLE communication with the vehicle 20.
- the vehicle 20 has a second UWB transceiver 21 for UWB communication with the key 10 or more precisely for UWB communication with the first UWB transceiver 11 of the key 10 and a second BLE transceiver 22 for BLE communication with the key 10 or more precisely for BLE communication with the first BLE transceiver 12 of the key 10.
- At least one, but preferably several, complementary measures are provided.
- the first BLE transceiver 12 is designed to exclusively take on an advertising role in BLE communication and not a scanning role, since the advertising role, i.e. sending advertising messages, has a lower energy consumption than the constant or . frequent scanning for advertising messages in the scanning role. Accordingly, the second BLE transceiver 22 must be designed to take on a scanning role in BLE communication.
- Such an authentication system 1 is intended to determine in particular the distance of the key 10 from the vehicle 20 in order to be able to exclude relay station attacks.
- the time-of-flight method is used for this, in which the signal transit times of UWB signals that are sent as part of UWB communication are determined.
- the second UWB transceiver 21 and the second BLE transceiver 22 are integrated into a module 24 of the vehicle 20 for determining the distance.
- the distance determination module 24 can have additional control means or control units, which control the second UWB transceiver 21 and the second BLE transceiver 22 to carry out the method and determine the distance between the key 10 and the vehicle 20 based on the UWB communication and the BLE communication can.
- control units such as the control unit 23 shown, can also be provided outside the module 24.
- the second UWB transceiver 21, the second BLE transceiver 22 and the control unit 23 do not have to be arranged in a module 24, but can be integrated into different systems of the vehicle 20 and only coupled to one another in terms of signaling.
- 2 shows in particular the course of communication according to its time course t between the various components of the authentication system 1, the first UWB transceiver 11 and the first BLE transceiver 12 of the key 10 being shown together, whereas the UWB transceiver 21 , the BLE transceiver 22 and the vehicle-side control unit 23 of the vehicle 20 that controls the method are shown separately from one another.
- the process can essentially be divided into at least four phases I to IV, which can also be viewed independently of one another, so that the individual phases could possibly be preceded or followed by other or different phases.
- signals or commands are transmitted, which can also be referred to as messages, with the signals between the key 10 and the second UWB transceiver 21 always being UWB signals and between the key 10 and the second BLE transceiver.
- Transceiver 22 always deals with BLE signals. The signals or
- Commands between the components of the vehicle 20 are preferably se wired and transmitted between them in particular via CAN bus. These are shown as examples to show the BLE connection intervals.
- UWB transceiver 21 instead of a single UWB transceiver 21, several UWB transceivers 21 can be provided on or in the vehicle 20, which can also be connected together to form a UWB module.
- the transmitted signals or commands are the following: a “SYNC” signal for the temporal synchronization of control unit 23, second BLE transceiver 22 and second UWB transceiver 21; b “FUP” signal for time synchronization of control unit 23, second BLE transceiver 22 and second UWB transceiver 21; c requesting the information required by the key 10 to determine the distance (Ranging Definition Request); d Request the information required by the key 10 to determine the distance (Ranging Definition Request); e confirmation that information was requested; f internal provision of the information (transfer ranging settings), which corresponds in particular to IEEE 802.15.4z HRP, taking into account the deviations according to the invention; g transmission of information (Ranging Definition Response); h Transmission of information with a time stamp (Ranging Definition Response including Time Stamp); i Transmission of information to establish UWB communication (ranging keys); j confirmation; k Request or announce UWB communication (Setup and
- Time stamp is transmitted at which the UWB communication should take place on the part of the key 10; n Request for UWB communication (Setup and Start), whereby the time stamp is transmitted at which the UWB communication should take place on the part of the key 10; o Confirmation (Ranging Start Response); p Confirmation (Ranging Start Response including Time Stamp); q UWB communication, consisting of the messages or UWB frames according to their chronological order: Poll, Response, Final, Final Data.
- the UWB communication can take place several times and one after the other with several second UWB transceivers 21, so that the key-side first UWB transceiver 11 communicates one after the other with different second UWB transceivers; r transmission of the signal transit times between the first and second UWB transceivers 11, 21 and/or the distance between key 10 and vehicle 20.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| DE102022124412.1A DE102022124412A1 (de) | 2022-09-22 | 2022-09-22 | Authentifizierungssystem zur Authentifizierung eines Schlüssels gegenüber dem Fahrzeug sowie zugehöriges Verfahren |
| PCT/EP2023/071403 WO2024061521A1 (de) | 2022-09-22 | 2023-08-02 | Authentifizierungssystem zur authentifizierung eines schlüssels gegenüber dem fahrzeug sowie zugehöriges verfahren |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP4494366A1 true EP4494366A1 (de) | 2025-01-22 |
Family
ID=87561026
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP23751626.5A Pending EP4494366A1 (de) | 2022-09-22 | 2023-08-02 | Authentifizierungssystem zur authentifizierung eines schlüssels gegenüber dem fahrzeug sowie zugehöriges verfahren |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP4494366A1 (de) |
| CN (1) | CN119301973A (de) |
| DE (1) | DE102022124412A1 (de) |
| WO (1) | WO2024061521A1 (de) |
Family Cites Families (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US10328898B2 (en) * | 2016-10-12 | 2019-06-25 | Denso International America, Inc. | Passive entry / passive start systems and methods for vehicles |
| DE102017109293A1 (de) | 2017-04-28 | 2018-10-31 | Huf Hülsbeck & Fürst Gmbh & Co. Kg | Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Authentifizierungssystems und Authentifizierungssystem |
| US10486646B2 (en) * | 2017-09-29 | 2019-11-26 | Apple Inc. | Mobile device for communicating and ranging with access control system for automatic functionality |
| US11427157B2 (en) * | 2019-06-07 | 2022-08-30 | Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. | Low frequency or ultra wide band control by BLE in identification device |
| DE102020214381A1 (de) * | 2020-11-16 | 2022-05-19 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Kraftfahrzeug, Elektronischer Fahrzeugfunkschlüssel und System zum passiven Zugang zu einem Kraftfahrzeug und Verfahren hierfür |
| DE202022102125U1 (de) * | 2022-04-21 | 2022-05-23 | Marquardt Gmbh | System aus Fahrzeug und Mobilgerät zum Entsperren des Fahrzeugs und/oder Freigabe einer Funktion des Fahrzeugs |
-
2022
- 2022-09-22 DE DE102022124412.1A patent/DE102022124412A1/de active Pending
-
2023
- 2023-08-02 EP EP23751626.5A patent/EP4494366A1/de active Pending
- 2023-08-02 CN CN202380037509.0A patent/CN119301973A/zh active Pending
- 2023-08-02 WO PCT/EP2023/071403 patent/WO2024061521A1/de not_active Ceased
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN119301973A (zh) | 2025-01-10 |
| DE102022124412A1 (de) | 2024-03-28 |
| WO2024061521A1 (de) | 2024-03-28 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| DE60226097T2 (de) | Passives Zugangssystem mit Antidiebstahlsfunktion | |
| DE102020214381A1 (de) | Kraftfahrzeug, Elektronischer Fahrzeugfunkschlüssel und System zum passiven Zugang zu einem Kraftfahrzeug und Verfahren hierfür | |
| EP3411853A1 (de) | Verfahren und vorrichtungen zum entriegeln eines kraftfahrzeugs mit einem motorstart- und/oder fahrzeugzugangssystem | |
| EP3207537B1 (de) | Verfahren zum aufbau und betrieb eines drahtlosen fahrzeug-netzwerks | |
| DE102017206381A1 (de) | Verfahren und Vorrichtungen betreffend insbesondere ein Kraftfahrzeugzugangs-und/oder-Start-System | |
| EP2197714B1 (de) | Flexible schlüsselortung für passive zugangs- und fahrberechtigungssysteme | |
| EP3580731A1 (de) | Verfahren zum betreiben eines authentifizierungssystems und authentifizierungssystem | |
| DE102017117751A1 (de) | Annäherungsbestätigung passives Zugangssystem für Fahrzeuge | |
| DE102012220799A1 (de) | Fahrzeugkommunikationen und -Zugriff | |
| DE102008039156A1 (de) | Verfahren, Vorrichtung und System zur Erfassung einer Berechtigung für ein Fahrzeug | |
| DE102007051892A1 (de) | Reifendrucküberwachungs- und Fernsteuerungstüröffnersystem für Fahrzeuge | |
| DE102009031353A1 (de) | Drahtloses Nachrichtenübertragungssystem mit variabler Stärke | |
| DE102011088917A1 (de) | Zugangsanordnung im Verfahren zum Betreiben einer derartigen Zugangsanordnung | |
| DE102008008089A1 (de) | Anordnung und Verfahren zur Detektion eines Transponders | |
| EP3580938A1 (de) | Verfahren zur positionsbestimmung eines mobilen ble-geräts relativ zu einem fahrzeug | |
| DE102019211792B4 (de) | Zugangsanordnung für ein Fahrzeug | |
| DE602005000913T2 (de) | Schlüssellose Zugangsvorrichtung | |
| DE102017217978A1 (de) | Zugangssystem und Verfahren zur Zugangsverifizierung | |
| EP3580942B1 (de) | Verfahren zur erfassung von signalstärken für eine signalstärkenbasierte positionsbestimmung eines mobilen ble-geräts | |
| EP1849665A2 (de) | Systemarchitektur für ein Keyless-Go-System | |
| EP3883825A1 (de) | Zugangsvorrichtung für ein fahrzeug | |
| WO2024061521A1 (de) | Authentifizierungssystem zur authentifizierung eines schlüssels gegenüber dem fahrzeug sowie zugehöriges verfahren | |
| DE102007006714B4 (de) | Verfahren zum Anlernen eines Funk-Schlüssels an ein Fahrzeug sowie entsprechender Funk-Schlüssel und entsprechendes Fahrzeug | |
| DE102008007842B3 (de) | Synchronisation der Kommunikation zwischen Identifikationsgeber und Fahrzeugstation einer Zugangsvorrichtung | |
| DE102007011498A1 (de) | Verfahren zum Öffnen einer Kraftfahrzeugtür mit schlüssellosem Zugangssystem |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: UNKNOWN |
|
| STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION HAS BEEN MADE |
|
| PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
| STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION WAS MADE |
|
| 17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20241014 |
|
| AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC ME MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR |
|
| RIN1 | Information on inventor provided before grant (corrected) |
Inventor name: KOCH, ANDREAS Inventor name: FURTWAENGLER, FABIAN Inventor name: BACLE, ANTOINE Inventor name: FISCHER, JOERG Inventor name: BAER, BERND |
|
| DAV | Request for validation of the european patent (deleted) | ||
| DAX | Request for extension of the european patent (deleted) |