EP2995529A1 - Device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a rail vehicle and associated rail vehicle - Google Patents
Device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a rail vehicle and associated rail vehicle Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP2995529A1 EP2995529A1 EP15183690.5A EP15183690A EP2995529A1 EP 2995529 A1 EP2995529 A1 EP 2995529A1 EP 15183690 A EP15183690 A EP 15183690A EP 2995529 A1 EP2995529 A1 EP 2995529A1
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- Prior art keywords
- beacon
- signal
- communication medium
- extracted
- integrity
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- 230000008878 coupling Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 18
- 238000010168 coupling process Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 18
- 238000005859 coupling reaction Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 18
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 67
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims description 14
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 claims description 8
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 20
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 14
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 10
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000001902 propagating effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000010365 information processing Effects 0.000 description 2
- 125000004122 cyclic group Chemical group 0.000 description 1
- 238000002955 isolation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008054 signal transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L23/00—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
- B61L23/34—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains for indicating the distance between vehicles or trains by the transmission of signals therebetween
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61G—COUPLINGS; DRAUGHT AND BUFFING APPLIANCES
- B61G7/00—Details or accessories
- B61G7/14—Safety devices
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
- B61L15/0054—Train integrity supervision, e.g. end-of-train [EOT] devices
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
- B61L15/0081—On-board diagnosis or maintenance
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
- B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
- B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
- B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
- B61L15/0036—Conductor-based, e.g. using CAN-Bus, train-line or optical fibres
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a device for confirming the integrity of a hitch of a railway train comprising at least a first car and a second car, the device comprising a communication medium extending between the first car and the second car, a first beacon embedded in one of the cars and connected to the communication medium, a second beacon embedded on board the other cars and connected to the communication medium.
- the invention applies to the field of railway safety, in particular to the confirmation of integrity of a railway train.
- the term "confirmation of integrity” means the detection of the non-rupture of a coupling of the railway train, that is to say the non-breaking of the mechanical connection between two wagons or two cars of a railway train, whether it is "screw", automatic or any other type of coupling.
- a transmitter to generate a signal at a first car of a train convoy, located at the tail of the convoy, and to apply this signal, successively over time and in the form of a signal. acoustic wave, to a pressure line of the railway convoy.
- a receiver placed on board a second car of the train convoy, located at the head of the convoy, is adapted to receive the acoustic wave generated by the transmitter and propagating in the pressure line.
- the acoustic wave can not propagate between the transmitter and the receiver along the pressure line.
- the receiver no longer receiving the acoustic wave generated by the transmitter, then detects a coupling failure within the railway train.
- the acoustic wave emitted by the transmitter attenuates during its propagation along the pressure line. Because of the length of railway convoys, the power of the acoustic wave reaching the receiver is likely to be at a level similar to that of the random noise present in the pressure line and which is also detected by the detector. It is then not possible to state with a sufficient level of reliability that the signal detected by the detector is the acoustic wave that has been emitted by the onboard transmitter aboard the first car. This means that it is not possible to say, with a sufficient level of reliability, that the railway convoy is always intact.
- An object of the invention is therefore to propose a device that makes it possible to confirm the integrity of a railway train with better reliability.
- the subject of the invention is a railway train comprising a device for confirming the integrity of a hitch as defined above, to confirm the integrity of a hitch of said railway train.
- a railway train 2 comprising a device 4 for confirming integrity according to the invention is represented on the figure 1 .
- the railway train 2 comprises a plurality of cars 6, including a head car 6A and a car 6B tail.
- the cars 6 are connected two by two together by a hitch (not shown).
- the detection device 4 comprises a communication medium 8, a control beacon 10 and a transmitting beacon 12.
- the communication support 8 extends along the railway train 2. In particular, the communication support 8 extends between the head car 6A and the tail car 6B.
- the control beacon 10 is aboard the leading car 6A, and the transmitting beacon 12 is on board the car 6B tail. Each of the control and transmitting beacons 12 is connected to the communication medium 8.
- the communication support 8 is able to break in case of rupture of the coupling between the cars 6A, 6B.
- the communication medium 8 is for example a general pressure line of the railway train 2, intended to pneumatically control a braking system of the railway train 2.
- the communication support 8 is an electric cable of the railway train 2.
- control beacon 10 comprises an information processing unit 14 connected to a receiver 16.
- the processing unit 14 comprises a memory 18 and a processor 20.
- the memory 18 stores a reception software 22 and a comparison software 24.
- the memory 18 further comprises a first storage area 28 of a predetermined code, for example a 256-bit code.
- the processor 20 is capable of executing the software 22, 24 stored in the memory 18.
- the receiver 16 is able to pick up signals propagating along the communication medium 8. In the case of a pressure line forming the communication medium 8, the receiver 16 is able to receive acoustic waves. In the case of an electrical cable forming the communication medium 8, the receiver 16 is able to receive electrical signals.
- the receiving software 22 is able to process the signals picked up by the receiver 16 to extract a code.
- the comparison software 24 is able to compare each code extracted by the receiving software 22 with the predetermined code.
- the transmitting beacon 12 includes an information processing unit 32, connected to a transmitter 34.
- the processing unit 32 includes a memory 36 and a processor 38.
- the memory 36 stores transmission software 40.
- the memory 36 further comprises a second storage area 42 of the predetermined code.
- the transmitter 34 is able to apply signals to the communication medium 8.
- the emitter 34 is suitable for applying acoustic waves.
- the transmitter 34 is able to apply electrical signals.
- the transmission software 40 is able to generate a signal modulated by the predetermined code.
- the transmission software 40 is further adapted to transmit the signal generated to the transmitter 34.
- the transmission software 40 of the transmitting beacon 12 generates a signal modulated by the predetermined code which is stored in the second storage area 42.
- the predetermined code then forms coding data.
- the transmitter 34 of the transmitting beacon 12 applies the signal to the communication medium 8.
- the transmitting beacon 12 transmits the signal successively over time at a repetition rate greater than 0.1 Hz, preferably greater than 1 Hz, for example greater than 5 Hz.
- the receiving software 22 of the control beacon 10 processes said signal to extract a code. Then the comparison software 24 compares the received code with the predetermined code which is stored in the first storage area 28. If the code received is identical to the predetermined code, then the railway train 2 is considered to be intact and the control beacon 10 transmits a signal confirming the integrity of the railway train, for example for an operator or a rail network monitoring system.
- the control beacon 10 does not receive a signal comprising a code identical to the predetermined code, then the control beacon 10 does not emit a signal confirming the integrity of the railway vehicle.
- control beacon 10 and the transmitting beacon 12 are further adapted to implement at least one transmission error detection algorithm.
- control and transmitter beacons 12 are adapted to implement a conventionally known CRC (for "cyclic redundancy check”) transmission error detection algorithm.
- CRC for "cyclic redundancy check”
- the algorithm implements a predetermined generator polynomial.
- the predetermined generator polynomial is adapted to allow detection, with a reliability greater than a predetermined reliability threshold, of possible transmission errors between the control beacon 10 and the transmitting beacon 12.
- the memory 18 of the processing unit 14 of the control beacon 10 also stores a calculation software 44.
- the memory 18 further comprises a third storage area 46 of the generator polynomial.
- the control beacon 10 illustrated by the figure 4 has no first storage area of the predetermined code.
- the memory 36 of the processing unit 32 of the transmitting beacon 12 also stores a calculation software 48.
- the memory 36 further comprises a fourth storage area 50 of the generator polynomial.
- the calculation software 44 is suitable for applying the detection algorithm implementing the generator polynomial stored in the third zone of storage 46, respectively the fourth storage area 50, to a code.
- the calculation software 48 of the transmitting beacon 12 is suitable for applying the detection algorithm to the predetermined code stored in the second storage area 42.
- the calculation software 44 of the control beacon 10 is clean. applying the detection algorithm to a code provided by the receiving software 22.
- the calculation software 48 of the transmitting beacon 12 calculates a control key relating to the predetermined code. Then the transmission software 40 of the transmitting beacon 12 transmits to the transmitter 34 a signal modulated by the predetermined code and the corresponding control key. The control key then forms the encoding data. The transmitter 34 applies said signal to the communication medium 8.
- the receiver 16 of the control beacon 10 receives a signal conveyed by the communication medium 8
- the reception software 22 of the control beacon 10 processes said signal to extract a code and a corresponding key.
- the calculation software 44 calculates a control key relating to the code extracted by the reception software 22, by means of the generator polynomial stored in the third storage area 46.
- the comparison software 24 compares the key extracted by the software of 22 and the key calculated by the calculation software 44. If the calculated key is identical to the extracted key, then the railway train 2 is considered to be intact and the control beacon 10 emits a signal confirming the integrity of the train convoy for example to an operator or a monitoring system of the rail network.
- the control beacon 10 does not receive a signal comprising a code identical to the predetermined code, then the beacon of control 10 does not emit a signal confirming the integrity of the railway vehicle.
- control beacon 10 is aboard the car 6B, and the transmitting beacon 12 is aboard the leading car 6A.
- the control beacon 10 illustrated by the figure 7 differs from the control tag illustrated by the figure 4 in that it comprises an emitter of electromagnetic waves 52, also called "transmitting antenna".
- the memory 18 of the control beacon 10 stores transmission software 56, similar to the transmission software 40 described above.
- the memory 18 of the control beacon 10 does not store comparison software.
- the transmitter beacon 12 illustrated by the figure 8 differs from the transmitting beacon illustrated by the figure 5 in that it comprises an electromagnetic wave receiver 58, also called “receiving antenna", as illustrated by the figure 8 .
- the The memory 36 of the transmitting beacon 12 stores a comparison software 60, similar to the comparison software 24 described above.
- the memory 36 also stores a reception software 62, similar to the reception software 22 described above.
- the transmitting antenna 52 is able to emit an electromagnetic signal in the air.
- the transmitting antenna 52 of the control beacon 10 is able to emit an electromagnetic signal either directly towards the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitting beacon 12 or through a communication network. of type GSM-R for example.
- the receiving antenna 58 is adapted to receive an electromagnetic signal propagating in the air.
- the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitting beacon 12 is adapted to receive an electromagnetic signal either directly from the transmitting antenna of the control beacon 10, or through a communication network, from type GSM-R for example.
- the transmission software 40 of the processing unit 32 of the transmitting beacon 12 is able to generate a signal modulated by a code, also called “modulation code", for example the predetermined code or a random code.
- the third storage area 46 of the control beacon 10 and the fourth storage area 50 of the transmitting beacon 12 store a predetermined function.
- a function is suitable for associating an image code with a code provided to the function.
- the calculation software 44 of the control beacon 10 and the calculating software 48 of the transmitting beacon are each adapted to apply the predetermined function stored in the third storage area 46, respectively the fourth storage area 50, to a code.
- the transmission software 40 of the transmitting beacon 12 generates a signal modulated by the modulation code.
- the modulation code then forms the coding data.
- the transmitter 34 of the transmitting beacon 12 applies the generated signal to the communication medium 8.
- the calculation software 48 of the transmitting beacon 12 applies the predetermined function which is stored in the fourth storage area 50 to the code. modulation to obtain a reference image code.
- the receiving software 22 of the control beacon 10 processes said signal to extract a code. Then the calculation software 44 calculates the image code, by the predetermined function which is stored in the third storage area 46, of the extracted code. The transmission software 56 of the control beacon 10 then generates a response signal comprising the image code of the extracted code. Then the transmitting antenna 52 of the control beacon 10 emits the response signal in the air in the form of an electromagnetic wave.
- the transmitting beacon receiving software 62 processes said signal to extract a code from it. picture. Then the comparison software 60 compares the extracted image code and the reference image code. If the extracted image code is identical to the reference image code, then the railway train 2 is considered to be intact and the control beacon 10 transmits a signal confirming the integrity of the railway train, for example to an operator or a railway monitoring system.
- the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitting beacon 12 does not receive a signal from the transmitting antenna 52 of the control beacon 10, then the control beacon 10 does not emit a signal confirming the integrity of the railway vehicle.
- the control beacon 10 does not emit a rail vehicle integrity confirmation signal.
- control beacon 10 is aboard the car 6B, and the transmitting beacon 12 is aboard the leading car 6A.
- the control beacon 10 illustrated by the figure 11 differs from the control tag illustrated by the figure 7 in that it does not include an emitter of electromagnetic waves. This is replaced by a transmitter 64, similar to the transmitter 34 of acoustic or electrical signals illustrated by the figure 8 , connected to the communication support 8.
- the transmitter beacon 12 illustrated by the figure 12 differs from the transmitting beacon illustrated by the figure 8 in that it does not include an electromagnetic wave receiver. This is replaced by a receiver 66, similar to the receiver 16 of acoustic or electrical signals illustrated by the figure 7 , connected to the communication support 8.
- the communication medium 8 is used bidirectionally as shown in FIG. figure 13 , that is, for the transmission of signals transmitter beacon 12 to the control beacon 10, and the control beacon 10 to the transmitting beacon 12.
- the operation of the device 4 represented on the Figures 10 to 12 is similar to the operation of the device 4 illustrated by the Figures 6 to 8 .
- the device 4 is able to further transmit in the generated signal a first tag 10, 12 to a second tag 12, 10 via the communication medium 8 additional information, not related to the confirmation integrity of the convoy, this information being in addition to the coding performed on the generated signal, to confirm the integrity of the train.
- the communication medium 8 is used bidirectionally or not, thus allowing a communication, not necessarily related to the confirmation of integrity, between the first beacon 10, 12 and the second beacon 12, 10.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Biomedical Technology (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
- Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
Abstract
L'invention concerne un dispositif de confirmation d'intégrité d'un attelage d'un convoi ferroviaire comprenant au moins une première voiture et une deuxième voiture,
le dispositif comprenant un support de communication s'étendant entre la première voiture et la deuxième voiture, une première balise embarquée à bord de l'une des voitures et reliée au support de communication, une deuxième balise embarquée à bord de l'autre des voitures et reliée au support de communication,
le dispositif étant caractérisé en ce que le support de communication est propre à acheminer un signal modulé par des données de codage prédéterminée depuis la deuxième balise vers la première balise, et à se rompre en cas de rupture d'un attelage entre les deux voitures,
et en ce que le dispositif est propre à confirmer l'intégrité d'un attelage entre les voitures du convoi ferroviaire si le signal reçu par la première balise sont identiques aux données de codage prédéterminées.
The invention relates to a device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a railway train comprising at least a first car and a second car,
the device comprising a communication medium extending between the first car and the second car, a first beacon embedded in one of the cars and connected to the communication medium, a second beacon embedded on board the other car and connected to the communication medium,
the device being characterized in that the communication medium is adapted to convey a signal modulated by predetermined coding data from the second beacon to the first beacon, and to break in case of rupture of a coupling between the two cars,
and in that the device is capable of confirming the integrity of a coupling between the cars of the railway train if the signal received by the first beacon is identical to the predetermined coding data.
Description
La présente invention concerne un dispositif de confirmation d'intégrité d'un attelage d'un convoi ferroviaire comprenant au moins une première voiture et une deuxième voiture, le dispositif comprenant un support de communication s'étendant entre la première voiture et la deuxième voiture, une première balise embarquée à bord de l'une des voitures et reliée au support de communication, une deuxième balise embarquée à bord de l'autre des voitures et reliée au support de communication.The present invention relates to a device for confirming the integrity of a hitch of a railway train comprising at least a first car and a second car, the device comprising a communication medium extending between the first car and the second car, a first beacon embedded in one of the cars and connected to the communication medium, a second beacon embedded on board the other cars and connected to the communication medium.
L'invention s'applique au domaine de la sécurité ferroviaire, notamment à la confirmation d'intégrité d'un convoi ferroviaire.The invention applies to the field of railway safety, in particular to the confirmation of integrity of a railway train.
Par « confirmation d'intégrité », on entend au sens de la présente demande la détection de la non-rupture d'un attelage du convoi ferroviaire, c'est-à-dire la non-rupture de la liaison mécanique entre deux wagons ou deux voitures d'un convoi ferroviaire, que celle-ci soit « à vis », automatique ou de n'importe quel autre type d'accouplement.For the purposes of this application, the term "confirmation of integrity" means the detection of the non-rupture of a coupling of the railway train, that is to say the non-breaking of the mechanical connection between two wagons or two cars of a railway train, whether it is "screw", automatic or any other type of coupling.
Il est connu d'utiliser un émetteur pour générer un signal au niveau d'une première voiture d'un convoi ferroviaire, située en queue de convoi, et d'appliquer ce signal, successivement au cours du temps et sous la forme d'une onde acoustique, à une conduite de pression du convoi ferroviaire.It is known to use a transmitter to generate a signal at a first car of a train convoy, located at the tail of the convoy, and to apply this signal, successively over time and in the form of a signal. acoustic wave, to a pressure line of the railway convoy.
Un récepteur, disposé à bord d'une deuxième voiture du convoi ferroviaire, située en tête du convoi, est propre à recevoir l'onde acoustique générée par l'émetteur et se propageant dans la conduite de pression.A receiver, placed on board a second car of the train convoy, located at the head of the convoy, is adapted to receive the acoustic wave generated by the transmitter and propagating in the pressure line.
En cas de rupture d'attelage, l'onde acoustique ne peut pas se propager entre l'émetteur et le récepteur le long de la conduite de pression. Le récepteur, ne recevant plus l'onde acoustique générée par l'émetteur, détecte alors une rupture d'attelage au sein du convoi ferroviaire.In the event of a coupling failure, the acoustic wave can not propagate between the transmitter and the receiver along the pressure line. The receiver, no longer receiving the acoustic wave generated by the transmitter, then detects a coupling failure within the railway train.
Néanmoins, un tel dispositif ne donne pas entière satisfaction.Nevertheless, such a device does not give complete satisfaction.
En effet, l'onde acoustique émise par l'émetteur s'atténue au cours de sa propagation le long de la conduite de pression. Du fait de la longueur des convois ferroviaires, la puissance de l'onde acoustique parvenant au récepteur est susceptible d'être à un niveau similaire à celui du bruit aléatoire présent dans la conduite de pression et qui est également détecté par le détecteur. Il n'est alors pas possible d'affirmer avec un niveau de fiabilité suffisant que le signal détecté par le détecteur est l'onde acoustique qui a été émise par l'émetteur embarqué à bord de la première voiture. Ceci signifie qu'il n'est pas possible d'affirmer, avec un niveau de fiabilité suffisant, que le convoi ferroviaire est toujours intègre.Indeed, the acoustic wave emitted by the transmitter attenuates during its propagation along the pressure line. Because of the length of railway convoys, the power of the acoustic wave reaching the receiver is likely to be at a level similar to that of the random noise present in the pressure line and which is also detected by the detector. It is then not possible to state with a sufficient level of reliability that the signal detected by the detector is the acoustic wave that has been emitted by the onboard transmitter aboard the first car. This means that it is not possible to say, with a sufficient level of reliability, that the railway convoy is always intact.
Un but de l'invention est donc de proposer un dispositif qui permette de confirmer l'intégrité d'un convoi ferroviaire avec une meilleure fiabilité.An object of the invention is therefore to propose a device that makes it possible to confirm the integrity of a railway train with better reliability.
A cet effet, l'invention a pour objet un dispositif du type précité, dans lequel :
- la deuxième balise est propre à générer un signal modulé par des données de codage prédéterminées et à appliquer le signal modulé au support de communication ;
- le support de communication est propre à acheminer ledit signal vers la première balise, le support de communication étant en outre propre à se rompre en cas de rupture d'un attelage entre les deux voitures empêchant alors la propagation du signal jusqu'à la première balise ;
- la première balise est propre à recevoir un signal acheminé par le support de communication et à extraire des données de codage extraites du signal reçu ;
- the second beacon is adapted to generate a signal modulated by predetermined coding data and to apply the modulated signal to the communication medium;
- the communication medium is adapted to convey said signal to the first beacon, the communication medium being furthermore capable of breaking in the event of a breakage of a hitch between the two cars thus preventing the propagation of the signal until the first beacon ;
- the first beacon is adapted to receive a signal conveyed by the communication medium and to extract coding data extracted from the received signal;
En effet, il est possible de choisir un code de taille suffisante pour permettre au dispositif de détecter le code avec une fiabilité suffisante, c'est-à-dire discriminer le code reçu d'un code généré de façon aléatoire par le bruit, avec un taux d'erreur inférieur à un seuil souhaité.Indeed, it is possible to choose a code of sufficient size to allow the device to detect the code with sufficient reliability, that is to say, to discriminate the code received from a code randomly generated by the noise, with an error rate below a desired threshold.
Suivant d'autres aspects avantageux de l'invention, le dispositif de détection comporte une ou plusieurs des caractéristiques suivantes, prise(s) isolément ou suivant toute combinaison techniquement possible :
- la deuxième balise est propre à calculer l'image d'un code prédéterminé par une première fonction prédéterminée pour former une clé calculée, la clé calculée formant les données de codage, la deuxième balise étant en outre propre à moduler ledit signal généré par la deuxième balise par le code prédéterminé,
la première balise est propre à extraire un code extrait et une clé extraite du signal reçu via le support de communication et à appliquer la première fonction prédéterminée au code extrait pour former une clé calculée,
et le dispositif est propre à confirmer l'intégrité d'un attelage entre les voitures du convoi ferroviaire si la clé extraite par la première balise est identique à la clé calculée par la première balise ; - la première balise est propre à appliquer une deuxième fonction prédéterminée aux données de codage extraites pour former des données-images, à générer un signal de réponse modulé par les données-images et à émettre le signal de réponse à destination de la deuxième balise,
la deuxième balise est propre à appliquer la deuxième fonction prédéterminée aux données de codage pour former des données-images de référence, à recevoir le signal de réponse, à extraire des données-images extraites du signal de réponse reçu et à comparer les données-images extraites aux données-images de référence,
et le dispositif est propre à confirmer l'intégrité d'un attelage entre les voitures du convoi ferroviaire si les données-images extraites sont identiques aux données-images de référence ; - la première balise comprend un émetteur d'ondes électromagnétiques, la deuxième balise comprend un récepteur d'ondes électromagnétiques, la première balise étant propre à émettre le signal de réponse par voie aérienne via l'émetteur d'ondes électromagnétiques, la deuxième balise étant propre à recevoir le signal de réponse par voie aérienne via le récepteur d'ondes électromagnétiques ;
- le support de communication est une conduite de pression du convoi ferroviaire, et en ce que la deuxième balise est propre à appliquer un signal acoustique au support de communication ;
- le support de communication est un câble électrique du convoi ferroviaire, et en ce que la deuxième balise est propre à appliquer un signal électrique au support de communication ;
- le dispositif est propre à transmettre en outre dans le signal généré d'une première balise vers une deuxième balise via le support de communication une information supplémentaire, non liée à la confirmation d'intégrité du convoi ferroviaire.
- the second beacon is able to calculate the image of a predetermined code by a first predetermined function to form a calculated key, the calculated key forming the coding data, the second beacon being further suitable for modulating said signal generated by the second tag by the predetermined code,
the first tag is adapted to extract an extracted code and a key extracted from the signal received via the communication medium and to apply the first predetermined function to the extracted code to form a calculated key,
and the device is capable of confirming the integrity of a coupling between the cars of the railway train if the key extracted by the first beacon is identical to the key calculated by the first beacon; - the first beacon is adapted to apply a second predetermined function to the extracted coding data to form image data, to generate a response signal modulated by the image data and to transmit the response signal to the second beacon,
the second beacon is adapted to apply the second predetermined function to the coding data to form reference image data, to receive the response signal, to extract extracted image data from the received response signal and to compare the image data extracted from the reference image data,
and the device is capable of confirming the integrity of a coupling between the cars of the railway train if the extracted image data are identical to the reference image data; - the first beacon comprises an emitter of electromagnetic waves, the second beacon comprises an electromagnetic wave receiver, the first beacon being able to emit the response signal by air via the emitter of electromagnetic waves, the second beacon being clean receiving the response signal by air via the electromagnetic wave receiver;
- the communication medium is a pressure line of the railway train, and in that the second beacon is adapted to apply an acoustic signal to the communication medium;
- the communication medium is an electric cable of the railway train, and in that the second beacon is able to apply an electrical signal to the communication medium;
- the device is able to further transmit in the signal generated from a first tag to a second tag via the communication medium additional information, not related to the confirmation of integrity of the railway train.
En outre, l'invention a pour objet un convoi ferroviaire comprenant un dispositif de confirmation d'intégrité d'un attelage tel que défini ci-dessus, pour confirmer l'intégrité d'un attelage dudit convoi ferroviaire.In addition, the subject of the invention is a railway train comprising a device for confirming the integrity of a hitch as defined above, to confirm the integrity of a hitch of said railway train.
L'invention sera mieux comprise à l'aide de la description qui va suivre, donnée uniquement à titre d'exemple non limitatif et faite en se référant aux dessins annexés sur lesquels :
- la
figure 1 est une représentation schématique d'un convoi ferroviaire comprenant un dispositif de détection selon l'invention ; - la
figure 2 est une représentation schématique d'une première balise du dispositif de lafigure 1 ; - la
figure 3 est une représentation schématique d'une deuxième balise du dispositif de lafigure 1 ; - la
figure 4 est une représentation schématique d'une première balise d'un deuxième mode de réalisation d'un dispositif de détection selon l'invention ; - la
figure 5 est une représentation schématique d'une deuxième balise du deuxième mode de réalisation du dispositif de détection selon l'invention ; - la
figure 6 est une représentation schématique d'un convoi ferroviaire comprenant un troisième mode de réalisation d'un dispositif de détection selon l'invention ; - la
figure 7 est une représentation schématique d'une première balise du dispositif de lafigure 6 ; - la
figure 8 est une représentation schématique d'une deuxième balise du dispositif de lafigure 6 ; - la
figure 9 est un organigramme du fonctionnement du dispositif de détection mettant en oeuvre les balises desfigures 7 et8 ; - la
figure 10 est une représentation schématique d'un convoi ferroviaire comprenant un quatrième mode de réalisation d'un dispositif de détection selon l'invention ; - la
figure 11 est une représentation schématique d'une première balise du dispositif de lafigure 10 ; - la
figure 12 est une représentation schématique d'une deuxième balise du dispositif de lafigure 10 ; et - la
figure 13 est un organigramme du fonctionnement du dispositif de détection mettant en oeuvre les balises desfigures 11 et12 .
- the
figure 1 is a schematic representation of a railway train comprising a detection device according to the invention; - the
figure 2 is a schematic representation of a first beacon of the device of thefigure 1 ; - the
figure 3 is a schematic representation of a second beacon of the device of thefigure 1 ; - the
figure 4 is a schematic representation of a first beacon of a second embodiment of a detection device according to the invention; - the
figure 5 is a schematic representation of a second beacon of the second embodiment of the detection device according to the invention; - the
figure 6 is a schematic representation of a railway train comprising a third embodiment of a detection device according to the invention; - the
figure 7 is a schematic representation of a first beacon of the device of thefigure 6 ; - the
figure 8 is a schematic representation of a second beacon of the device of thefigure 6 ; - the
figure 9 is a flowchart of the operation of the detection device implementing the tags of thefigures 7 and8 ; - the
figure 10 is a schematic representation of a railway train comprising a fourth embodiment of a detection device according to the invention; - the
figure 11 is a schematic representation of a first beacon of the device of thefigure 10 ; - the
figure 12 is a schematic representation of a second beacon of the device of thefigure 10 ; and - the
figure 13 is a flowchart of the operation of the detection device implementing the tags of thefigures 11 and12 .
Un convoi ferroviaire 2 comprenant un dispositif 4 de confirmation d'intégrité selon l'invention est représenté sur la
Le convoi ferroviaire 2 comprend une pluralité de voitures 6, notamment une voiture de tête 6A et une voiture de queue 6B.The
Les voitures 6 sont reliées deux à deux entre elles par un attelage (non représenté).The
Le dispositif de détection 4 comprend un support de communication 8, une balise de contrôle 10 et une balise émettrice 12.The
Le support de communication 8 s'étend le long du convoi ferroviaire 2. Notamment, le support de communication 8 s'étend entre le wagon de tête 6A et le wagon de queue 6B.The
La balise de contrôle 10 est embarquée à bord de la voiture de tête 6A, et la balise émettrice 12 est embarquée à bord de la voiture de queue 6B. Chacune des balises de contrôle 10 et émettrice 12 est reliée au support de communication 8.The
Le support de communication 8 est propre à se rompre en cas de rupture de l'attelage entre les voitures 6A, 6B. Le support de communication 8 est par exemple une conduite générale de pression du convoi ferroviaire 2, destinée à commander pneumatiquement un système de freinage du convoi ferroviaire 2. En variante, le support de communication 8 est un câble électrique du convoi ferroviaire 2.The
Comme illustré par la
L'unité de traitement 14 comporte une mémoire 18 et un processeur 20.The
La mémoire 18 stocke un logiciel de réception 22 et un logiciel de comparaison 24. La mémoire 18 comporte en outre une première zone de stockage 28 d'un code prédéterminé, par exemple un code de 256 bits.The
Le processeur 20 est propre à exécuter les logiciels 22, 24 stockés dans la mémoire 18.The
Le récepteur 16 est propre à capter des signaux se propageant le long du support de communication 8. Dans le cas d'une conduite de pression formant le support de communication 8, le récepteur 16 est propre à recevoir des ondes acoustiques. Dans le cas d'un câble électrique formant le support de communication 8, le récepteur 16 est propre à recevoir des signaux électriques.The
Le logiciel de réception 22 est propre à traiter les signaux captés par le récepteur 16 pour en extraire un code. Le logiciel de comparaison 24 est propre à comparer chaque code extrait par le logiciel de réception 22 avec le code prédéterminé.The receiving
Comme illustré par la
L'unité de traitement 32 comporte une mémoire 36 et un processeur 38.The
La mémoire 36 stocke un logiciel d'émission 40. La mémoire 36 comporte en outre une deuxième zone de stockage 42 du code prédéterminé.The
L'émetteur 34 est propre à appliquer des signaux au support de communication 8. Dans le cas d'une conduite de pression formant le support de communication 8, l'émetteur 34 est propre à appliquer des ondes acoustiques. Dans le cas d'un câble électrique formant le support de communication 8, l'émetteur 34 est propre à appliquer des signaux électriques.The
Le logiciel d'émission 40 est propre à générer un signal modulé par le code prédéterminé. Le logiciel d'émission 40 est en outre propre à transmettre le signal généré à l'émetteur 34.The
En fonctionnement, le logiciel d'émission 40 de la balise émettrice 12 génère un signal modulé par le code prédéterminé qui est stocké dans la deuxième zone de stockage 42. Le code prédéterminé forme alors des données de codage. Puis l'émetteur 34 de la balise émettrice 12 applique le signal au support de communication 8.In operation, the
Avantageusement, la balise émettrice 12 émet le signal successivement au cours du temps à une cadence de répétition supérieure à 0,1 Hz, de préférence supérieure à 1 Hz, par exemple supérieure à 5 Hz.Advantageously, the transmitting
Si le récepteur 16 de la balise de contrôle 10 reçoit un signal acheminé par le support de communication 8, alors le logiciel de réception 22 de la balise de contrôle 10 traite ledit signal pour en extraire un code. Puis le logiciel de comparaison 24 compare le code reçu au code prédéterminé qui est stocké dans la première zone de stockage 28. Si le code reçu est identique au code prédéterminé, alors le convoi ferroviaire 2 est considéré comme intègre et la balise de contrôle 10 émet un signal de confirmation d'intégrité du convoi ferroviaire, par exemple à destination d'un opérateur ou d'un système de surveillance du réseau ferroviaire.If the
Si, le code reçu est différent du code prédéterminé, ou si, à l'issue d'une durée d'attente prédéterminée, la balise de contrôle 10 ne reçoit pas de signal comprenant un code identique au code prédéterminé, alors la balise de contrôle 10 n'émet pas de signal de confirmation d'intégrité du véhicule ferroviaire.If, the received code is different from the predetermined code, or if, after a predetermined waiting period, the
Selon un deuxième mode de réalisation du dispositif de détection 4 selon l'invention, la balise de contrôle 10 et la balise émettrice 12 sont en outre propres à mettre en oeuvre au moins un algorithme de détection d'erreurs de transmission.According to a second embodiment of the
Par exemple, les balises de contrôle 10 et émettrice 12 sont propres à mettre en oeuvre un algorithme de détection d'erreurs de transmission par codage CRC (pour « contrôle de redondance cyclique »), classiquement connu.For example, the control and
Dans le cas d'un codage CRC, l'algorithme met en oeuvre un polynôme générateur prédéterminé. Avantageusement, le polynôme générateur prédéterminé est adapté pour permettre une détection, avec une fiabilité supérieure à un seuil de fiabilité prédéterminé, d'éventuelles erreurs de transmission entre la balise de contrôle 10 et la balise émettrice 12.In the case of a CRC encoding, the algorithm implements a predetermined generator polynomial. Advantageously, the predetermined generator polynomial is adapted to allow detection, with a reliability greater than a predetermined reliability threshold, of possible transmission errors between the
Comme illustré par la
Comme illustré par la
Le logiciel de calcul 44, respectivement 48, est propre à appliquer l'algorithme de détection mettant en oeuvre le polynôme générateur stocké dans la troisième zone de stockage 46, respectivement la quatrième zone de stockage 50, à un code. En particulier, le logiciel de calcul 48 de la balise émettrice 12 est propre à appliquer l'algorithme de détection au code prédéterminé stocké dans la deuxième zone de stockage 42. En outre, le logiciel de calcul 44 de la balise de contrôle 10 est propre à appliquer l'algorithme de détection à un code fourni par le logiciel de réception 22.The
En fonctionnement, le logiciel de calcul 48 de la balise émettrice 12 calcule une clé de contrôle relative au code prédéterminé. Puis le logiciel d'émission 40 de la balise émettrice 12 transmet à l'émetteur 34 un signal modulé par le code prédéterminé et la clé de contrôle correspondante. La clé de contrôle forme alors les données de codage. L'émetteur 34 applique ledit signal au support de communication 8.In operation, the
Si le récepteur 16 de la balise de contrôle 10 reçoit un signal acheminé par le support de communication 8, alors le logiciel de réception 22 de la balise de contrôle 10 traite ledit signal pour en extraire un code et une clé correspondante. Puis le logiciel de calcul 44 calcule une clé de contrôle relative au code extrait par le logiciel de réception 22, au moyen du polynôme générateur stocké dans la troisième zone de stockage 46. Le logiciel de comparaison 24 compare ensuite la clé extraite par le logiciel de réception 22 et la clé calculée par le logiciel de calcul 44. Si la clé calculée est identique à la clé extraite, alors le convoi ferroviaire 2 est considéré comme intègre et la balise de contrôle 10 émet un signal de confirmation d'intégrité du convoi ferroviaire, par exemple à destination d'un opérateur ou d'un système de surveillance du réseau ferroviaire.If the
Si, la clé calculée est différente de la clé extraite, ou si, à l'issue d'une durée d'attente prédéterminée, la balise de contrôle 10 ne reçoit pas de signal comprenant un code identique au code prédéterminé, alors la balise de contrôle 10 n'émet pas de signal de confirmation d'intégrité du véhicule ferroviaire.If, the calculated key is different from the key extracted, or if, after a predetermined waiting period, the
Selon un troisième mode de réalisation du dispositif de détection 4, illustré par les
La balise de contrôle 10 illustrée par la
La balise émettrice 12 illustrée par la
L'antenne d'émission 52 est propre à émettre un signal électromagnétique dans l'air. De préférence, l'antenne d'émission 52 de la balise de contrôle 10 est propre à émettre un signal électromagnétique soit directement en direction de l'antenne de réception 58 de la balise émettrice 12, soit au travers d'un réseau de communication, de type GSM-R par exemple.The transmitting
L'antenne de réception 58 est propre à recevoir un signal électromagnétique se propageant dans l'air. De préférence, l'antenne de réception 58 de la balise émettrice 12 est propre à recevoir un signal électromagnétique soit directement en provenance de l'antenne d'émission de la balise de contrôle 10, soit au travers d'un réseau de communication, de type GSM-R par exemple.The receiving
Le logiciel d'émission 40 de l'unité de traitement 32 de la balise émettrice 12 est propre à générer un signal modulé par un code, encore appelé « code de modulation », par exemple le code prédéterminé ou un code aléatoire.The
La troisième zone de stockage 46 de la balise de contrôle 10 et la quatrième zone de stockage 50 de la balise émettrice 12 stockent une fonction prédéterminée. Une telle fonction est propre à associer un code-image à un code fourni à la fonction.The
Le logiciel de calcul 44 de la balise de contrôle 10 et le logiciel de calcul 48 de la balise émettrice sont chacun propre à appliquer la fonction prédéterminée stockée dans la troisième zone de stockage 46, respectivement la quatrième zone de stockage 50, à un code.The
Le fonctionnement du dispositif de détection 4 va être décrit au regard de la
En fonctionnement, le logiciel d'émission 40 de la balise émettrice 12 génère un signal modulé par le code de modulation. Le code de modulation forme alors les données de codage. Puis l'émetteur 34 de la balise émettrice 12 applique le signal généré au support de communication 8. En outre, le logiciel de calcul 48 de la balise émettrice 12 applique la fonction prédéterminée qui est stockée dans la quatrième zone de stockage 50 au code de modulation pour obtenir un code-image de référence.In operation, the
Si le récepteur 16 de la balise de contrôle 10 reçoit un signal acheminé par le support de communication 8, alors le logiciel de réception 22 de la balise de contrôle 10 traite ledit signal pour en extraire un code. Puis le logiciel de calcul 44 calcule le code-image, par la fonction prédéterminée qui est stockée dans la troisième zone de stockage 46, du code extrait. Le logiciel d'émission 56 de la balise de contrôle 10 génère ensuite un signal de réponse comprenant le code-image du code extrait. Puis l'antenne d'émission 52 de la balise de contrôle 10 émet dans l'air le signal de réponse sous la forme d'une onde électromagnétique.If the
Si l'antenne de réception 58 de la balise émettrice 12 capte un signal émis par l'antenne d'émission 52 de la balise de contrôle 10, alors la logiciel de réception 62 de balise émettrice 12 traite ledit signal pour en extraire un code-image. Puis le logiciel de comparaison 60 compare le code-image extrait et le code-image de référence. Si le code-image extrait est identique au code-image de référence, alors le convoi ferroviaire 2 est considéré comme intègre et la balise de contrôle 10 émet un signal de confirmation d'intégrité du convoi ferroviaire, par exemple à destination d'un opérateur ou d'un système de surveillance du réseau ferroviaire.If the receiving
Si, à l'issue d'une deuxième durée d'attente prédéterminée successive à l'émission du signal émis, l'antenne de réception 58 de la balise émettrice 12 ne reçoit pas de signal provenant de l'antenne d'émission 52 de la balise de contrôle 10, alors la balise de contrôle 10 n'émet pas de signal de confirmation d'intégrité du véhicule ferroviaire.If, at the end of a second predetermined waiting period following the transmission of the transmitted signal, the receiving
En outre, si le code-image extrait est différent du code-image de référence, et que, à l'issue d'une troisième durée d'attente prédéterminée, l'antenne de réception 58 de la balise émettrice 12 ne capte pas un nouveau signal pour lequel le code-image extrait est identique au code-image de référence, alors la balise de contrôle 10 n'émet pas de signal de confirmation d'intégrité du véhicule ferroviaire.In addition, if the extracted image code is different from the reference image code, and after a third predetermined waiting period, the receiving
Selon un quatrième mode de réalisation du dispositif de détection 4, illustré par les
La balise de contrôle 10 illustrée par la
La balise émettrice 12 illustrée par la
Dans ce mode de réalisation, le support de communication 8 est utilisé de manière bidirectionnelle tel que représenté sur la
Le fonctionnement du dispositif 4 représenté sur les
Selon un cinquième mode de réalisation, le dispositif 4 est propre à transmettre en outre dans le signal généré d'une première balise 10, 12 vers une deuxième balise 12, 10 via le support de communication 8 une information supplémentaire, non liée à la confirmation d'intégrité du convoi, cette information étant en supplément du codage réalisé sur le signal généré, permettant de confirmer l'intégrité du train.According to a fifth embodiment, the
Dans ce mode de réalisation, le support de communication 8 est utilisé de manière bidirectionnelle ou non, permettant ainsi une communication, non nécessairement liée à la confirmation d'intégrité, entre la première balise 10, 12 et la deuxième balise 12, 10.In this embodiment, the
Claims (8)
le dispositif (4) comprenant un support de communication (8) s'étendant entre la première voiture (6A ; 6B) et la deuxième voiture (6B ; 6A), une première balise (10) embarquée à bord de l'une des voitures (6A ; 6B) et reliée au support de communication (8), une deuxième balise (12) embarquée à bord de l'autre des voitures (6B ; 6A) et reliée au support de communication (8),
le dispositif (4) étant caractérisé en ce que :
the device (4) comprising a communication medium (8) extending between the first car (6A; 6B) and the second car (6B; 6A), a first beacon (10) on board one of the cars (6A; 6B) and connected to the communication medium (8), a second beacon (12) aboard the other car (6B; 6A) and connected to the communication support (8),
the device (4) being characterized in that :
en ce que la première balise (10) est propre à extraire un code extrait et une clé extraite du signal reçu via le support de communication (8) et à appliquer la première fonction prédéterminée au code extrait pour former une clé calculée,
et en ce que le dispositif (4) est propre à confirmer l'intégrité d'un attelage entre les voitures (6A, 6B) du convoi ferroviaire (2) si la clé extraite par la première balise (10) est identique à la clé calculée par la première balise (10).Device (4) according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the second beacon (12) is able to calculate the image of a predetermined code by a first predetermined function to form a calculated key, the calculated key forming the coding data, the second beacon (12) being further adapted to modulate said signal generated by the second beacon (12) by the predetermined code,
in that the first beacon (10) is adapted to extract an extracted code and a key extracted from the received signal via the communication medium (8) and to apply the first predetermined function to the extracted code to form a calculated key,
and in that the device (4) is capable of confirming the integrity of a coupling between the cars (6A, 6B) of the railway train (2) if the key extracted by the first beacon (10) is identical to the key calculated by the first tag (10).
en ce que la deuxième balise (12) est propre à appliquer la deuxième fonction prédéterminée aux données de codage pour former des données-images de référence, à recevoir le signal de réponse, à extraire des données-images extraites du signal de réponse reçu et à comparer les données-images extraites aux données-images de référence,
et en ce que le dispositif (4) est propre à confirmer l'intégrité d'un attelage entre les voitures (6A, 6B) du convoi ferroviaire (2) si les données-images extraites sont identiques aux données-images de référence.Device (4) according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the first beacon (10) is adapted to apply a second predetermined function to the extracted coding data to form image data, to generate a modulated response signal by the image data and transmitting the response signal to the second beacon (12),
in that the second beacon (12) is adapted to apply the second predetermined function to the coding data to form reference image data, to receive the response signal, to extract extracted image data from the received response signal and comparing the extracted image data with the reference image data,
and in that the device (4) is able to confirm the integrity of a coupling between the cars (6A, 6B) of the railway train (2) if the extracted image data are identical to the reference image data.
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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FR1458474A FR3025479B1 (en) | 2014-09-10 | 2014-09-10 | CONFIGURATION DEVICE FOR INTEGRITY OF A HITCHING OF A RAILWAY CONVEY AND ASSOCIATED RAILWAY CONVEYOR |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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EP2995529A1 true EP2995529A1 (en) | 2016-03-16 |
EP2995529B1 EP2995529B1 (en) | 2019-06-12 |
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EP15183690.5A Active EP2995529B1 (en) | 2014-09-10 | 2015-09-03 | Device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a rail vehicle and associated rail vehicle |
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EP (1) | EP2995529B1 (en) |
AU (1) | AU2015224435B2 (en) |
BR (1) | BR102015022101B1 (en) |
CL (1) | CL2015002549A1 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2744650T3 (en) |
FR (1) | FR3025479B1 (en) |
RU (1) | RU2697162C1 (en) |
SA (1) | SA115360748B1 (en) |
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CN112124352A (en) * | 2019-06-24 | 2020-12-25 | 上海梅山钢铁股份有限公司 | Method for preventing breakage accident of dry quenching electric locomotive |
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EP3592625B1 (en) | 2017-03-09 | 2023-06-07 | Thales Austria GmbH | Train with a system for monitoring the integrity of the train and a corresponding method |
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EP3919345A1 (en) | 2020-06-05 | 2021-12-08 | ECM S.p.A. | On-board apparatus and method for determining train integrity by length |
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CN106314481A (en) * | 2016-08-20 | 2017-01-11 | 徐州翔和高科电气有限公司 | Whole train management device and method for mine locomotive transportation monitoring system |
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CN112124352A (en) * | 2019-06-24 | 2020-12-25 | 上海梅山钢铁股份有限公司 | Method for preventing breakage accident of dry quenching electric locomotive |
CN112124352B (en) * | 2019-06-24 | 2022-01-14 | 上海梅山钢铁股份有限公司 | Method for preventing breakage accident of dry quenching electric locomotive |
CN112158230A (en) * | 2020-09-28 | 2021-01-01 | 交控科技股份有限公司 | Train integrity detection method and device and train control unit |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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RU2697162C1 (en) | 2019-08-12 |
AU2015224435A1 (en) | 2016-03-24 |
FR3025479B1 (en) | 2017-10-06 |
SA115360748B1 (en) | 2019-08-15 |
ES2744650T3 (en) | 2020-02-25 |
CL2015002549A1 (en) | 2016-05-13 |
AU2015224435B2 (en) | 2019-01-31 |
BR102015022101B1 (en) | 2022-06-21 |
FR3025479A1 (en) | 2016-03-11 |
BR102015022101A2 (en) | 2016-03-15 |
EP2995529B1 (en) | 2019-06-12 |
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