AU2015224435B2 - Device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a rail vehicle and associated rail vehicle - Google Patents

Device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a rail vehicle and associated rail vehicle Download PDF

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Publication number
AU2015224435B2
AU2015224435B2 AU2015224435A AU2015224435A AU2015224435B2 AU 2015224435 B2 AU2015224435 B2 AU 2015224435B2 AU 2015224435 A AU2015224435 A AU 2015224435A AU 2015224435 A AU2015224435 A AU 2015224435A AU 2015224435 B2 AU2015224435 B2 AU 2015224435B2
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Australia
Prior art keywords
beacon
communication medium
signal
coupling
integrity
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AU2015224435A
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AU2015224435A1 (en
Inventor
Brice Andre
Frédéric Henry
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Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
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Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
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Classifications

    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L23/00Control, warning, or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or vehicle trains
    • B61L23/34Control, warnings or like safety means indicating the distance between vehicles or vehicle trains by the transmission of signals therebetween
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61GCOUPLINGS; DRAUGHT AND BUFFING APPLIANCES
    • B61G7/00Details or accessories
    • B61G7/14Safety devices
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00Indicators provided on the vehicle or vehicle train for signalling purposes ; On-board control or communication systems
    • B61L15/0054Train integrity supervision, e.g. end-of-train [EOT] devices
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00Indicators provided on the vehicle or vehicle train for signalling purposes ; On-board control or communication systems
    • B61L15/0081On-board diagnosis or maintenance
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00Indicators provided on the vehicle or vehicle train for signalling purposes ; On-board control or communication systems
    • B61L15/0018Communication with or on the vehicle or vehicle train
    • B61L15/0027Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00Indicators provided on the vehicle or vehicle train for signalling purposes ; On-board control or communication systems
    • B61L15/0018Communication with or on the vehicle or vehicle train
    • B61L15/0036Conductor-based, e.g. using CAN-Bus, train-line or optical fibres

Abstract

The invention relates to a coupling confirmation device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a railway convoy comprising at least one first car and one second car, the device comprising a communication medium extending between the first car and the second car, a first on board beacon installed aboard one of the cars and connected to the communication medium, a second on board beacon installed aboard the other of the cars and connected to the communication medium. The communication medium is capable of routing a signal that is modulated by predetermined coding data from the second beacon to the first beacon, and of being broken in the event of breaking of a coupling between the two cars. The device is capable of confirming the integrity of a coupling between the cars of the railway convoy if the signal received by the first beacon is identical to the predetermined coding data. Figure 1 116 -' (CS (N Ks NO dl I is iv. "A

Description

ORIGINAL COMPLETE SPECIFICATION STANDARD PATENT
Invention Title
Device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a rail vehicle and associated rail vehicle
The following statement is a full description of this invention, including the best method of performing it known to me/us:1
2015224435 14 Jan 2019 la
The present invention relates to a coupling integrity confirmation device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a railway convoy comprising at least one first car and one second car, the device comprising a communication medium extending between the first car and the second car, a first on board beacon installed aboard one of the cars and connected to the communication medium, a second on board beacon installed aboard the other of the cars and connected to the communication medium.
The invention applies to the field of railway safety, in particular to the confirmation of integrity of a railway convoy.
The term confirmation of integrity, for the purposes of this patent application, is used to refer to the detection of the unbroken state of a coupling of the railway convoy, that is to say the unbroken state of the mechanical link between two wagons or two cars of a railway convoy, whether the latter be a screw coupling, automatic coupling or any other type of coupling.
It is a known practice to use a transmitter for generating a signal at the level of a first car of a railway convoy, located at the tail end of the convoy, and to apply this signal, successively over the course of time and in the form of an acoustic wave, to a pressure line of the railway convoy.
A receiver, disposed on board a second car of the railway convoy, located at the head end of the train convoy, is capable of receiving the acoustic wave generated by the transmitter and propagating in the pressure line.
In the event of breaking of the coupling, the acoustic wave is unable to propagate between the transmitter and the receiver along the pressure line. The receiver no longer receiving the acoustic wave generated by the transmitter, thus then detects a breaking of the coupling within the railway convoy.
However, such a device does not give complete satisfaction.
In fact, the acoustic wave emitted by the transmitter is attenuated over the course of its propagation along the pressure line. Due to the length of railway convoys, the force of the acoustic wave that reaches the receiver is quite likely to be at a similar level to that of the random noise present in the pressure line and which is also detected by the detector. It is therefore not possible to state affirmatively with a sufficient level of reliability that the signal detected by the detector is the acoustic wave that has been transmitted by the transmitter on board the first car. This means that it is not possible to state with a sufficient level of reliability, that the coupling integrity of the railway convoy is still uncom promised.
2015224435 14 Jan 2019
An object of embodiments of the invention is therefore to offer a device that provides the ability to confirm the integrity of a railway convoy with a greater degree of reliability.
As aspect of the invention provides a coupling integrity confirmation device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a railway convoy comprising at least one first car and one second car, the device comprising a communication medium extending between the first car and the second car, a first on board beacon installed aboard one of the cars and connected to the communication medium, a second on board beacon installed aboard the other of the cars and connected to communication medium, wherein:
- the second beacon is capable of generating a signal that is modulated by the predetermined coding data, and of applying the modulated signal to the communication medium;
- the communication medium is capable of routing the said signal to the first beacon, the communication medium being further capable of being broken in the event of breaking of a coupling between the two cars thereby preventing the propagation of the signal to the first beacon;
- the first beacon is capable of receiving a signal routed by the communication medium and of extracting the coding data extracted from the signal received;
the device being capable of confirming the integrity of the coupling between the cars of the railway convoy if the coding data extracted by the first beacon are identical to the predetermined coding data;
the second beacon being capable of calculating the image of a predetermined code by means of a first predetermined function so as to form a calculated key, the calculated key forming the coding data, the second beacon in addition being capable of modulating the said signal generated by the second beacon by means of the predetermined code;
the first beacon being capable of extracting an extracted code and an extracted key from the signal received via the communication medium, and of applying the first predetermined function to the extracted code in order to form a calculated key;
and the device being capable of confirming the integrity of a coupling between the cars of the railway convoy if the key extracted by the first beacon is identical to the key calculated by the first beacon.
Indeed, it is possible to choose a code of sufficient size in order to enable the device to detect the code with a sufficient degree of reliability, that is to say, to
2015224435 14 Jan 2019
2a differentiate the code received from a code randomly generated by the noise, with an error rate that is below a desired threshold.
According to other advantageous aspects of the invention, the detection device comprises one or more of the following characteristic features, taken into consideration in isolation or in accordance with any technically possible combination:
- the first beacon is capable of applying a second predetermined function to the coding data extracted in order to form the image data, of generating a response signal that is modulated by the image data, and of transmitting the response signal forwarded to 10 the second beacon;
2015224435 09 Sep 2015 the second beacon is capable of applying the second predetermined function to the coding data in order to form the reference image data, of receiving the response signal, of extracting the extracted image data from the received response signal, and comparing the extracted image data to the reference image data;
and the device is capable of confirming the integrity of a coupling between the cars of the railway convoy if the extracted image data are identical to the reference image data;
- the first beacon includes a transmitter of electromagnetic waves, the second beacon includes a receiver of electromagnetic waves, the first beacon being capable of transmitting the response signal over the air via the transmitter of electromagnetic waves, the second beacon being capable of receiving the response signal over the air via the receiver of electromagnetic waves;
- the communication medium is a pressure line of the railway convoy, and characterised in that the second beacon is capable of applying an acoustic signal to the communication medium;
- the communication medium is an electrical cable of the railway convoy, and characterised in that the second beacon is capable of applying an electric signal to the communication medium;
- the device is capable of transmitting in addition within the signal generated by a first beacon to a second beacon via the communication medium an additional information element, which is not related to the confirmation of integrity of the railway convoy.
Moreover, the object of the invention relates to a railway convoy including a device for confirming the integrity of a coupling as defined here above, in order to confirm the integrity of a coupling of the said railway convoy.
The invention will be better understood with the aid of the description that follows, given solely by way of non limiting example and with reference being made to the accompanying drawings in which:
- Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a railway convoy including a detection device according to the invention;
- Figure 2 is a schematic representation of a first beacon of the device shown in Figure 1;
- Figure 3 is a schematic representation of a second beacon of the device shown in Figure 1;
- Figure 4 is a schematic representation of a first beacon of a second embodiment of a detection device according to the invention;
- Figure 5 is a schematic representation of a second beacon of the second embodiment of the detection device according to the invention;
2015224435 09 Sep 2015
- Figure 6 is a schematic representation of a railway convoy including a third embodiment of a detection device according to the invention;
- Figure 7 is a schematic representation of a first beacon of the device shown in Figure 6;
- Figure 8 is a schematic representation of a second beacon of the device shown in Figure 6;
- Figure 9 is a flow chart of the operation of the detection device that operationally implements the beacons shown in the Figures 7 and 8;
- Figure 10 is a schematic representation of a railway convoy including a fourth embodiment of a detection device according to the invention;
- Figure 11 is a schematic representation of a first beacon of the device shown in Figure 10 ;
- Figure 12 is a schematic representation of a second beacon of the device shown in Figure 10; and
- Figure 13 is a flow chart of the operation of the detection device that operationally implements the beacons shown in the Figures 11 and 12.
A railway convoy 2 including a coupling integrity confirmation device 4 for confirming the integrity of a coupling according to the invention is shown in Figure 1.
The railway convoy 2 includes a plurality of cars 6, in particular a lead car 6A and a tail end car 6B or caboose.
The cars 6 are connected in pairs to one another by means of a coupling (not shown).
The detection device 4 comprises a communication medium 8, a control beacon 10 and a transmitter beacon 12.
The communication medium 8 extends along the railway convoy 2. In particular, the communication medium 8 extends between the lead car 6A and the tail end car 6B.
The control beacon 10 is installed on board in the lead car 6A, and the transmitter beacon 12 is installed on board in the tail end car 6B. Each of the control beacon 10 and transmitter beacon 12 is connected to the communication medium 8.
The communication medium 8 is capable of breaking in the event of breaking of the coupling between the cars 6A, 6B. The communication medium 8 is for example a brake pressure line of the railway convoy 2, meant for pneumatically controlling a brake system of the railway convoy 2. Alternatively, the communication medium 8 is an electrical cable of the railway convoy 2.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the control beacon 10 includes a processing unit 14 for processing information, connected to a receiver 16.
2015224435 09 Sep 2015
The processing unit 14 comprises a memory 18 and a processor 20.
The memory storage 18 stores a receiving software application 22 and a comparison software application 24. The memory storage 18 further includes a first storage zone 28 for storing a predetermined code, for example a 256 bit code.
The processor 20 is capable of executing the software applications 22, 24 stored in the memory storage 18.
The receiver 16 is capable of picking up the signals that are being propagated along the communication medium 8. In the event of a pressure line forming the communication medium 8, the receiver 16 is capable of receiving acoustic waves. In the event of an electrical cable forming the communication medium 8, the receiver 16 is capable of receiving electrical signals.
The receiving software application 22 is capable of processing the signals picked up by the receiver 16 in order to extract a code therefrom. The comparison software application 24 is capable of comparing each code extracted by the receiving software application 22 with the predetermined code.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the transmitter beacon 12 includes a processing unit 32 for processing information, connected to a transmitter 34.
The processing unit 32 comprises a memory storage 36 and a processor 38.
The memory storage 36 stores a transmission software application 40. The memory storage 36 includes in addition a second storage zone 42 for storing the predetermined code.
The transmitter 34 is capable of applying signals to the communication medium 8. In the event of a pressure line forming the communication medium 8, the transmitter 34 is capable of applying the acoustic waves. In the event of an electrical cable forming the communication medium 8, the transmitter 34 is capable of applying the electrical signals.
The transmission software application 40 is capable of generating a signal that is modulated by the predetermined code. The transmission software application 40 is further also capable of transmitting the signal generated to the transmitter 34.
In operation, the transmission software application 40 of the transmitter beacon 12 generates a signal modulated by the predetermined code that is stored in the second storage zone 42. The predetermined code thus then forms the coding data. Then the transmitter 34 of the transmitter beacon 12 applies the signal to the communication medium 8.
Advantageously, the transmitter beacon 12 transmits the signal successively over the course of time at a repetition rate that is higher than 0.1 Hz, preferably higher than 1 Hz, for example higher than 5 Hz.
2015224435 09 Sep 2015
If the receiver 16 of the control beacon 10 receives a signal routed and sent by the communication medium 8, then the receiving software application 22 of the control beacon 10 processes the said signal in order to extract a code therefrom. Then the comparison software application 24 compares the received code with the predetermined code that is stored in the first storage zone 28. If the received code is identical to the predetermined code, then the railway convoy 2 is considered to have uncompromised coupling integrity and the control beacon 10 transmits a coupling integrity confirmation signal confirming the coupling integrity of the railway convoy, for example to be forwarded to an operator or a railway network monitoring system.
If the code received is different from the predetermined code, or if, at the end of a predetermined waiting period, the control beacon 10 does not receive a signal comprising a code that is identical to the predetermined code, then the control beacon 10 does not transmit an integrity confirmation signal to confirm the integrity of the railway vehicle.
According to a second embodiment of the detection device 4 in accordance with the invention, the control beacon 10 and the transmitter beacon 12 are in addition capable of implementing at least one error detection algorithm for detecting transmission errors.
For example, the control beacon 10 and transmitter beacon 12 are capable of operationally implementing an algorithm for detecting transmission errors by CRC coding (for Cyclic Redundancy Check), which is conventionally known.
In the case of CRC coding, the algorithm implements a predetermined generator polynomial. Advantageously, the predetermined generator polynomial is capable of enabling detection, with a higher level of reliability than a predetermined threshold of reliability, of possible errors in transmission between the control beacon 10 and the transmitter beacon 12.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the memory storage 18 of the processing unit 14 of the control beacon 10 also stores a calculation software application 44. The memory storage 18 includes in addition a third storage zone 46 for storing the generator polynomial. Unlike the control beacon 10 illustrated in Figure 2, the control beacon 10 illustrated in Figure 4 does not include a first storage zone for storing the predetermined code.
As illustrated in Figure 5, the memory storage 36 of the processing unit 32 of the transmitter beacon 12 also stores a calculation software application 48. The memory storage 36 includes in addition a fourth storage zone 50 for storing the generator polynomial.
The calculation software application 44, and 48 respectively, is capable of applying the algorithm for detection implementing the generator polynomial stored in the third storage zone 46, and the fourth storage zone 50 respectively, to a code. In particular, the
2015224435 09 Sep 2015 calculation software application 48 of the transmitter beacon 12 is capable of applying the detection algorithm to the predetermined code stored in the second storage zone 42. In addition, the calculation software application 44 of the control beacon 10 is capable of applying the detection algorithm to a code provided by the receiving software application 22.
In operation, the calculation software application 48 of the transmitter beacon 12 calculates a control key relative to the predetermined code. Then the transmission software application 40 of the transmitter beacon 12 transmits to the transmitter 34 a signal that is modulated by the predetermined code and the corresponding control key. The control key then forms the coding data. The transmitter 34 applies the said signal to the communication medium 8.
If the receiver 16 of the control beacon 10 receives a signal forwarded by the communication medium 8, then the receiving software application 22 of the control beacon 10 processes the said signal in order to extract therefrom a code and a corresponding key. Then the calculation software application 44 calculates a control key relative to the code extracted by the receiving software application 22, by means of the generator polynomial stored in the third storage zone 46. The comparison software application 24 subsequently compares the key extracted by the receiving software application 22 and the key calculated by the calculation software application 44. If the calculated key is identical to the extracted key, then the railway convoy 2 is considered to have uncompromised coupling integrity and the control beacon 10 transmits a coupling integrity confirmation signal confirming the coupling integrity of the railway convoy, for example to be forwarded to an operator or a railway network monitoring system.
If the calculated key is different from the extracted key, or if, at the end of a predetermined waiting period, the control beacon 10 does not receive a signal comprising a code that is identical to the predetermined code, then the control beacon 10 does not transmit an integrity confirmation signal to confirm the integrity of the railway vehicle.
According to a third embodiment of the detection device 4, illustrated by the Figures 6 to 9, the control beacon 10 is installed on board in the tail end car 6B, and the transmitter beacon 12 is installed on board in the leading car 6A.
The control beacon 10 illustrated in Figure 7 differs from the control beacon illustrated by the Figure 4 in that it comprises an electromagnetic wave transmitter 52, also referred to as a transmission antenna. In addition, the memory storage 18 of the control beacon 10 stores a transmission software application 56, similar to the transmission software application 40 described here above. The memory storage 18 of the control beacon 10 does not store any comparison software application.
2015224435 09 Sep 2015
The transmitter beacon 12 illustrated in Figure 8 differs from the transmitter beacon illustrated in the Figure 5 in that it comprises an electromagnetic wave receiver 58, also referred to as a receiving antenna, as illustrated in Figure 8. Furthermore, the memory storage 36 of the transmitter beacon 12 stores a comparison software application 60, similar to the comparison software application 24 described here above. The memory storage 36 also stores a receiving software application 62, similar to the receiving software application 22 described here above.
The transmission antenna 52 is capable of emitting an electromagnetic signal into the air. Preferably, the transmission antenna 52 of the control beacon 10 is capable of emitting an electromagnetic signal either directly in the direction of the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitter beacon 12 or through a communication network, for example of the GSM-R (Global System for Mobile Communications - Railway) type.
The receiving antenna 58 is capable of receiving an electromagnetic signal that is propagated in the air. Preferably, the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitter beacon 12 is capable of receiving an electromagnetic signal either directly originating from the transmission antenna of the control beacon 10, or coming through a communication network, for example of the GSM-R type.
The transmission software application 40 of the processing unit 32 of the transmitter beacon 12 is capable of generating a signal that is modulated by a code, also referred to as a modulation code, for example, the predetermined code or a random code.
The third storage zone 46 of the control beacon 10 and the fourth storage zone 50 of the transmitter beacon 12 store a predetermined function. Such a function is able to associate an image code with a code supplied to the function.
The calculation software application 44 of the control beacon 10 and the calculation software application 48 of the transmitter beacon are each capable of applying the predetermined function stored in the third storage zone 46, and the fourth storage zone 50 respectively, to a code.
The operation of the detection device 4 will be described in relation to Figure 9.
In operation, the transmission software application 40 of the transmitter beacon 12 generates a signal that is modulated by the modulation code. The modulation code thus then forms the coding data. Then the transmitter 34 of the transmitter beacon 12 applies the signal generated to the communication medium 8. In addition, the calculation software application 48 of the transmitter beacon 12 applies the predetermined function that is stored in the fourth storage zone 50 to the modulation code in order to obtain a reference image code.
2015224435 09 Sep 2015
If the receiver 16 of the control beacon 10 receives a signal forwarded by the communication medium 8, then the receiving software application 22 of the control beacon 10 processes the said signal in order to extract a code therefrom. Then the calculation software application 44 calculates the image code, by means of the predetermined function that is stored in the third storage zone 46, from the extracted code. The transmission software application 56 of the control beacon 10 subsequently generates a response signal comprising of the image code from the extracted code. Then the transmission antenna 52 of the control beacon 10 emits into the air the response signal in the form of an electromagnetic wave.
If the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitter beacon 12 picks up a signal emitted by the transmission antenna 52 of the control beacon 10, then the receiving software application 62 of the transmitter beacon 12 processes the said signal in order to extract an image code therefrom. Then the comparison software application 60 compares the extracted image code and the reference image code. If the extracted image code is identical to the reference image code, then the railway convoy 2 is considered to have uncompromised coupling integrity and the control beacon 10 transmits a coupling integrity confirmation signal confirming the coupling integrity of the railway convoy, for example to be forwarded to an operator or a railway network monitoring system.
If, at the end of a successive second predetermined waiting period subsequent to the transmission of the transmitted signal, the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitter beacon 12 does not receive a signal originating from the transmission antenna 52 of the control beacon 10, then the control beacon 10 does not transmit a coupling integrity confirmation signal confirming the coupling integrity of the railway vehicle.
In addition, if the extracted image code is different from the reference image code, and if, at the end of a third predetermined waiting period, the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitter beacon 12 does not pick up a new signal for which the extracted image code is identical to the reference image code, then the control beacon 10 does not transmit a coupling integrity confirmation signal confirming the coupling integrity of the railway vehicle.
According to a fourth embodiment of the detection device 4, illustrated in the Figures 10 to 12, the control beacon 10 is installed on board in the tail end car 6B, and the transmitter beacon 12 is installed on board in the lead car 6A.
The control beacon 10 illustrated in Figure 11 differs from the control beacon illustrated in Figure 7 in that it does not include a transmitter of electromagnetic waves. The latter has been replaced by a transmitter 64, similar to the transmitter 34 of acoustic
2015224435 09 Sep 2015 or electrical signals illustrated in Figure 8, which is connected to the communication medium 8.
The transmitter beacon 12 illustrated in Figure 12 differs from the transmitter beacon illustrated in Figure 8 in that it does not include an electromagnetic wave receiver. The latter has been replaced by a receiver 66, similar to the receiver 16 for acoustic or electrical signals illustrated in Figure 7, which is connected to the communication medium 8.
In this embodiment, the communication medium 8 is used in a bidirectional manner as represented in Figure 13, that is to say for the transmission of signals from the transmitter beacon 12 to the control beacon 10, and from the control beacon 10 to the transmitter beacon 12.
The operation of the device 4 represented in the Figures 10 to 12 is similar to the operation of the device 4 illustrated in the Figures 6 to 8.
According to a fifth embodiment, the device 4 is further also capable of transmitting within the signal generated from a first beacon 10, 12 to a second beacon 12, 10 via the communication medium 8, an additional information element, which is not related to the confirmation of coupling integrity of the train convoy, this information being in addition to the coding performed on the signal generated, which makes it possible to confirm the integrity of the train.
In this embodiment, the communication medium 8 is either used in a bidirectional manner or not, thereby enabling communication, which is not necessarily related to the confirmation of integrity, between the first beacon 10, 12 and the second beacon 12, 10.
The reference in this specification to any prior publication (or information derived from it), or to any matter which is known, is not, and should not be taken as an acknowledgment or admission or any form of suggestion that that prior publication (or information derived from it) or known matter forms part of the common general knowledge in the field of endeavour to which this specification relates.
Throughout this specification and the claims which follow, unless the context requires otherwise, the word comprise, and variations such as comprises and comprising, will be understood to imply the inclusion of a stated integer or step or group of integers or steps but not the exclusion of any other integer or step or group of integers or steps.

Claims (7)

  1. THE CLAIMS DEFINING THE INVENTION ARE AS FOLLOWS
    1. - A coupling integrity confirmation device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a railway convoy comprising at least one first car and one second car, the device comprising a communication medium extending between the first car and the second car, a first on board beacon installed aboard one of the cars and connected to the communication medium, a second on board beacon installed aboard the other of the cars and connected to communication medium;
    wherein:
    - the second beacon is capable of generating a signal that is modulated by the predetermined coding data, and of applying the modulated signal to the communication medium;
    - the communication medium is capable of routing the said signal to the first beacon, the communication medium being further capable of breaking in the event of breaking of a coupling between the two cars thereby preventing the propagation of the signal to the first beacon;
    - the first beacon is capable of receiving a signal routed by the communication medium and of extracting the coding data extracted from the signal received;
    and wherein the device is capable of confirming the integrity of a coupling between the cars of the railway convoy if the coding data extracted by the first beacon are identical to the predetermined code data;
    and wherein the second beacon is capable of calculating the image of a predetermined code by means of a first predetermined function so as to form a calculated key, the calculated key forming the coding data, the second beacon in addition being capable of modulating the said signal generated by the second beacon by means of the predetermined code;
    and wherein the first beacon is capable of extracting an extracted code and an extracted key from the signal received via the communication medium, and of applying the first predetermined function to the extracted code in order to form a calculated key;
    and wherein the device is capable of confirming the integrity of a coupling between the cars of the railway convoy if the key extracted by the first beacon is identical to the key calculated by the first beacon.
  2. 2. - A device according to claim 1, wherein the first beacon is capable of applying a second predetermined function to the coding data extracted in order to form the image
    2015224435 14 Jan 2019 data, of generating a response signal that is modulated by the image data, and of transmitting the response signal forwarded to the second beacon;
    wherein the second beacon is capable of applying the second predetermined function to the coding data in order to form the reference image data, of receiving the response signal, of extracting the extracted image data from the received response signal, and comparing the extracted image data to the reference image data;
    and wherein the device is capable of confirming the integrity of a coupling between the cars of the railway convoy if the extracted image data are identical to the reference image data.
  3. 3. - A device according to claim 2, wherein the first beacon includes a transmitter of electromagnetic waves, the second beacon includes a receiver of electromagnetic waves, the first beacon being capable of transmitting the response signal over the air via the transmitter of electromagnetic waves, the second beacon being capable of receiving the response signal over the air via the receiver of electromagnetic waves.
  4. 4. - A device according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the communication medium is a pressure line of the railway convoy, and in that the second beacon is capable of applying an acoustic signal to the communication medium.
  5. 5. - A device according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the communication medium is an electrical cable of the railway convoy, and wherein the second beacon is capable of applying an electric signal to the communication medium.
  6. 6. - A device according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein it is capable of transmitting in addition within the signal generated by a first beacon to a second beacon via the communication medium an additional information element, which is not related to the confirmation of integrity of the railway convoy.
  7. 7. - A railway convoy wherein it includes a device according to any one of the preceding claims for confirming the integrity of a coupling of the said railway convoy coupling.
AU2015224435A 2014-09-10 2015-09-09 Device for confirming the integrity of a coupling of a rail vehicle and associated rail vehicle Active AU2015224435B2 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR1458474A FR3025479B1 (en) 2014-09-10 2014-09-10 CONFIGURATION DEVICE FOR INTEGRITY OF A HITCHING OF A RAILWAY CONVEY AND ASSOCIATED RAILWAY CONVEYOR
FR1458474 2014-09-10

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AU (1) AU2015224435B2 (en)
BR (1) BR102015022101B1 (en)
CL (1) CL2015002549A1 (en)
ES (1) ES2744650T3 (en)
FR (1) FR3025479B1 (en)
RU (1) RU2697162C1 (en)
SA (1) SA115360748B1 (en)

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CN112124352B (en) * 2019-06-24 2022-01-14 上海梅山钢铁股份有限公司 Method for preventing breakage accident of dry quenching electric locomotive
EP3919345A1 (en) 2020-06-05 2021-12-08 ECM S.p.A. On-board apparatus and method for determining train integrity by length
CN112158230B (en) * 2020-09-28 2022-07-19 交控科技股份有限公司 Train integrity detection method and device and train control unit

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