EP2857277B1 - Programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang mit Kommunikationsverbindung zu intelligenten externen Peripheriegeräten und Verfahren zur Steuerung der Aktivität dieser Einrichtung - Google Patents

Programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang mit Kommunikationsverbindung zu intelligenten externen Peripheriegeräten und Verfahren zur Steuerung der Aktivität dieser Einrichtung Download PDF

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EP2857277B1
EP2857277B1 EP14003294.7A EP14003294A EP2857277B1 EP 2857277 B1 EP2857277 B1 EP 2857277B1 EP 14003294 A EP14003294 A EP 14003294A EP 2857277 B1 EP2857277 B1 EP 2857277B1
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backed
level crossing
control block
safeguarding
programmable
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French (fr)
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EP2857277A1 (de
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Martin Zidek
Pavel Cermak
Vladimir Miska
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AZD Praha SRO
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AZD Praha SRO
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    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L29/00Safety means for rail/road crossing traffic
    • B61L29/08Operation of gates; Combined operation of gates and signals
    • B61L29/18Operation by approaching rail vehicle or rail vehicle train
    • B61L29/22Operation by approaching rail vehicle or rail vehicle train electrically
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61RAILWAYS
    • B61LGUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L29/00Safety means for rail/road crossing traffic
    • B61L29/24Means for warning road traffic that a gate is closed or closing, or that rail traffic is approaching, e.g. for visible or audible warning
    • B61L29/28Means for warning road traffic that a gate is closed or closing, or that rail traffic is approaching, e.g. for visible or audible warning electrically operated

Definitions

  • the invention concerns programmable railway level crossing safeguarding equipment with a communication coupling to external intelligent peripherals, where at least one level crossing is situated on the railroad lines.
  • the invention also concerns the method for controlling the activity of this programmable level crossing safeguarding equipment.
  • EP 1 187 750 B1 published on 17.9.2003 , with the owner being Siemens AG DE, priority application DE 199 28 317 A1 , concerns equipment for securing a railway level crossing.
  • the individual components of the railway level crossing, being the setting parts and the arrangement of the sensors are mutually connected by a wireless transmitter and/or receiver.
  • the setting parts for the assigned controllers the reports of the sensors are processed and transformed into the setting commands for the blocking parts.
  • the power supply for the setting parts and sensors, as well as the controllers and transmitter and/or receivers assigned to them, is primarily made using decentralised solar cells.
  • the advantage of the solution compared to conventional level crossing safeguarding equipment is the decentralisation of the control to the setting equipment.
  • the disadvantage of the solution is the absence of a control core for the central processing of functional algorithms for the level crossing safeguarding equipment, which limits the setup of the setting equipment for only one locality of crossing of a road and a railway track and does not permit the central processing of functional algorithms for the level crossing safeguarding equipment for a group of several level crossings in the given area of coverage.
  • GB 2 419 624 B published on 25.2.2009 , with the owner being Westinghouse Brake and Signal Holdings Ltd., GB, describes a railway level crossing. It describes equipment having gates or barriers, which can be opened or closed or lifted or dropped. The gates or barriers are equipped with detection equipment containing switches and relays to detect whether at least one of the gates is open or closed or at least one of the barriers is lifted or dropped. Warning equipment, such as beacons or LED displays, are connected with detection equipment providing a warning signal to users of the crossing and informing them that at least one gate is open or at least one barrier is lifted.
  • the LED display may be double-sided writing with a warning text.
  • the solution deals with categories of user-controlled level crossing safeguarding equipment, which are common in Great Britain and is not related to the solution of safeguarding level crossings with automatic control, which is common in Europe.
  • GB 2 457 276 A published on 12.8.2009 , with the owner being Westinghouse Brake and Signal Holdings Ltd.
  • GB describes a railway level crossing warning system.
  • the connection with the railway level crossing contains: a warning system on the level of the level crossing for warning of an approaching train; means for detection of approaching train used for activating the warning system; and a system for verifying the warning system.
  • the system is equipped with feedback for the train that activated the warning system.
  • the feedback makes it possible to indicate to the engine driver by starting a sound warning against the train.
  • the warning system can provide a local visual and sound warning.
  • the type of indication to the engine driver on the display changes thanks to the feedback.
  • the display can be comprised of an LED matrix.
  • the advantage of the solution compared to conventional level crossing safeguarding equipment is the possibility of connecting a warning system of signals for the control and feedback through a communication line.
  • the disadvantage of the solution is the absence of a control core for the central processing of functional algorithms for the level crossing safeguarding equipment, which limits the setup of the blocking equipment for only one locality of crossing of a road and a railway track and does not permit the central processing of functional algorithms for the level crossing safeguarding equipment for a group of several level crossings in the given area of coverage.
  • EP 2 425 414 B1 published on 30.1.2013 , with the owner being Siemens AG DE, describes the method and equipment for controlling traffic on a railway level crossing on which a road and railway track cross on the same level in a danger zone.
  • the road contains at least one crossing to the danger zone and consecutively one exit from the danger zone.
  • the crossing for vehicles before the danger zone is closed or opened using a safeguarding mechanism. If the flow of vehicles to the exit from the danger zone is measured, these measurements can be used to evaluate the traffic jam to the exit from the place where the danger zone ends and, when the approach of the end of the traffic jam to the danger zone which would close the exit from the danger zone is critical, the operational safeguarding on the level crossing can be improved.
  • the solution represents an extension to the conventional level crossing safeguarding equipment; it does not concern the essence of the solution of the actual safeguarding of the level crossing.
  • the advantage of this extension is that it decreases the risk ensuing from not respecting the freedom beyond the level crossing when a line of cars is leaving the crossing location.
  • CZ 282 966 published on 12.11.1997, with the owner being A D PRAHA s.r.o.
  • CZ describes programmable level crossing safeguarding equipment, which is meant for controlling the output peripherals, i.e. warning board signal lights, sound warnings, barrier drives and barrage signal lights.
  • This equipment cooperates with a block of input commands, with a block of outdoor elements, with a power supply block and, if necessary, with a block of indication elements.
  • the block of input commands and the power supply block are connected through the first and second input block to the control block, which is connected to the comparator block, which is connected through the block of switching circuits to the block of outdoor elements.
  • the control block is a secure programmable control unit.
  • the first input block is a secure peripheral device for the secure entry of the input commands to the data memory.
  • the second input block is a secure peripheral device for the secure entry of the input commands to the data memory, independent of the first input block.
  • the comparator block is a secure coincidence circuit of critical control block outputs for the control of the block of switching circuits.
  • the block of switching circuits is comprised of a type-N switching relay in the sense of the international codex UIC 736. The switching relay contacts are connected both in the circuits of the block of outdoor elements and as feedback to both of the input blocks.
  • the programmable level crossing safeguarding equipment according to CZ 282 966 can be programmed for various types and configurations of control track and controlled outdoor elements with varied connections according to the requirements and philosophy of the safeguarding equipment, not only from the perspective of Czech standard No. 34 2600, but also in the sense of various norms of other national railways. It enables the use of a single- or double-processor unit in place of the control block without the need for synchronisation.
  • the disadvantage of this situation is the location of the control block either on the site where the railroad and road intersect or on the site of the level crossing safeguarding equipment.
  • the equipment uses a single-processor unit or double-processor unit, which does not result in getting or achieving a high availability of functionality of the safeguarding equipment.
  • the placement of the input and output elements connected to the control block have a limited reach
  • CZ 297 617, priority 28.12.2005 CZ, with the owner being A D Praha s.r.o. CZ, is an intelligent LED light with LED diodes for outdoor light signalisation in railway safeguarding technology. This light is divided into three independent LED sections, while the shine from only two LED sections is sufficient for fulfilling the relevant standards for the optical characteristics of this light.
  • the functionality of each LED diode is controlled in three independent ways. The control of the functionality of the control and supervisory electronics of each section of the LED light is performed as is a control of the functionality of the electrical power supply. The continual and simultaneously performed control of the LED diodes ensures the secure monitoring of this LED light. The detection of a defect in one section is transferred to the parent system, where it is indicated and evaluated.
  • CZ PV 2008 - 369, priority 16.6.2008 CZ, with the applicant being A D Praha s.r.o, CZ introduces the method for the control of mechanical warnings at light safeguarding equipment through the electromechanical barrier drive.
  • the barrier lowers in a set interval after issuing a vital command signal to lower.
  • the lowering is performed simultaneously by two different mutually independent principles, passive and forced. Passive lowering is ensured by the weight of the barrier and forced lowering is performed by an electric motor.
  • the barrier is affixed in the upper terminal position using two mutually independent brake circuits with regular and automatic testing of their function and evaluation of their functionality. Secure information about the real terminal positions of the barrier is obtained simultaneously from two independent barrier position sensors with a comparison of their function.
  • the drive elements of the barrier drive being the drive shaft, electric motor, coupling and gears, are grouped into separate branches, independent of the brake circuits with the brakes and the free wheels on the brake shaft.
  • the advantage of this invention is that it ensures the safe operation and functioning of the mechanical warnings at light level crossing safeguarding equipment. This resolves the lowering of the barrier in the prescribed time interval, which is in most cases within 12 seconds from the issuing of the command to lower, as is specified in Czech Standard SN 342650 (within 10 seconds) and in other national railway specifications, i.e. 412 UPUTSTVO - the Bulgarian railway standard (within 12 seconds). Thus it achieves the high reliability of motorised and simultaneously gravitational lowering, especially in the case when there is a motor failure; or on the contrary, when adverse wind conditions, or strong winds, act against the gravitational lowering.
  • the disadvantage of this solution is the absence of a control subsystem in the barrier drive, which does not enable the distribution of the barrier drive intelligence to the remote peripheral.
  • the aforementioned disadvantages are removed or considerably limited with the programmable railway level crossing safeguarding equipment, with a communication coupling to an external intelligent peripheral, in accordance to this invention.
  • the essence of this invention consists in the level crossing safeguarding equipment containing a backed-up programmable control block, which is connected through a backed-up transfer of data to remote intelligent peripherals, that are located near the railroad lines on the site specified for the safeguarding of level crossings, and which are partially or fully backed up.
  • the backed-up programmable control block, backed-up data transfer and remote intelligent peripherals are connected to the backed-up power supply through the backed-up power line.
  • the backed-up programmable control block there are 1, 2 to M remote intelligent peripherals in one site for the safeguarding the level crossing and 1, 2 to J sites designated for the safeguarding of one level crossing.
  • the value of the number M remote intelligent peripherals in one site for the safeguarding of one level crossing and the value of the number J of sites specified for the safeguarding of one level crossing depends on the performance capacity of the backed-up programmable control block and on the transfer capacity of the backed-up data transfer.
  • the main advantage of the submitted invention is the increase in reliability, safety and functional availability of the level crossing safeguarding equipment in the sense of Czech Standard No. CSN EN 50 126 while lowering expenses, with regard to conventional level crossing safeguarding equipment in that a very high number of remote intelligent peripherals can be connected to one control system of the level crossing safeguarding equipment and one backed-up programmable control block can control several level crossings within reach of the communication equipment.
  • the conception of the system design secures this system's greater resistance against external influences, atmospheric, traction, etc.
  • a great strength is also the very high availability of the basic elements of the equipment according to this invention, specifically the backed-up programmable control block, remote intelligent peripherals and backed-up data transfer.
  • the remote intelligent peripherals can be distributed to a considerable distance from the backed-up programmable control block, and also share a joint backed-up programmable control block for a group of several level crossings in the given area of coverage.
  • the remote intelligent peripherals can be partially or fully backed up.
  • part of the intelligence of the level crossing safeguarding equipment in the form of functional algorithms is centralised into the backed-up programmable control block, part of the intelligence of the level crossing safeguarding equipment, relating to the warning signal, to the barrier drive, to the detection elements for determining the location of a train and to the feedback to the engine driver is distributed to the remote intelligent peripherals, then the functional requirements placed on the level crossing safeguarding equipment can be fully fulfilled while removing or significantly limiting the disadvantages specified in the background of the invention.
  • this solution can be applied advantageously as a remote intelligent peripheral of the level crossing safeguarding equipment.
  • the remote intelligent peripherals are situated along the railroad lines at an essentially unlimited distance, e.g. at a length on the order of kilometres, or tens or even hundreds of kilometres, from the backed-up programmable control block.
  • the backed-up programmable control block is bi-directionally connected through an interface to the station and/or track safeguarding equipment.
  • the maximum distance between the backed-up programmable control block and the remote intelligent peripherals is given by the technological level of the technical means of the backed-up transfer of data and the dimensioning of the pair of independent power sources, including the dimensioning of the power lines for covering the power performance balance of the backed-up programmable control block and all the remote intelligent peripherals.
  • Sharing the common backed-up programmable control block for a group of multiple level crossings saves some of the control technologies of the level crossings, which brings considerable savings. It is equipment that enables the control of remote intelligent peripherals at large distances, with the transfer of information from the backed-up programmable control block to the station and/or track safeguarding equipment through a specific interface.
  • Two arrangements are specified for the realisation of the isolated island variant of the level crossing safeguarding equipment.
  • Either the backed-up programmable control block is situated on the site of the level crossing in geographically remote areas for the realisation of the isolated island variant of the level crossing safeguarding equipment with a level crossing protection signal device such as a barrage signal board.
  • the backed-up programmable control block is situated in the site of the level crossing and the remote control and check block is connected to it bi-directionally over an interface for the realisation of the isolated island variant of the level crossing safeguarding equipment with the transfer of remote commands and remote indications to the site of operations.
  • the island variant enables the control of intelligent peripheries in remote areas by distant level crossings.
  • the island variant of the level crossing safeguarding equipment brings savings in the cabling for connecting the performance elements for the backed-up programmable control block.
  • the remote intelligent peripherals containing at least one block from a group of blocks, containing a warning board block, a barrier drive block, a block of on and off switching elements of automatic control and a block of a level crossing protection signal such as a barrage signal board in the function of an indication of the status of the level crossing safeguarding equipment towards the engine driver.
  • warning board blocks and/or barrier drive blocks and/or blocks of on and off switching elements of automatic control and/or blocks of a level crossing protection signal mutually integrated within one site for the safeguarding of a level crossing into at least one common remote intelligent peripheral and/or into the backed-up programmable control block.
  • This combination of various blocks of technical means in one level crossing site represents the optimisation both from the perspective of better prices and from the perspective of lowering performance losses.
  • the variability of the solution for the backed-up programmable control block presents an arrangement where conventional barrier drives and/or conventional warning boards and/or conventional track circuits and/or axle counters and/or point elements in the function of on and off switching elements of the automatic control of the level crossing and/or conventional level crossing protection signal devices such as barrage signals boards in the function of the indication of the state of the level crossing safeguarding equipment towards the engine driver are connected to the backed-up programmable control block.
  • This arrangement makes it possible to use conventional technical means since it is suitable if the user requires a connection to the aforementioned conventional technical means for the backed-up programmable control block.
  • the backed-up transfer of data can be realised using an optical communications line and/or metallic communication line and/or wirelessly, which enables the variability of the use of the available media for the transfer of data in the given locality.
  • the backed-up transfer of data and remote intelligent peripherals it is good, if the backed-up programmable control block and/or backed-up transfer of data and/or remote intelligent peripherals, are connected over more than one power line of the backed-up power line on more than one backed-up power supply, while the backed-up power supply is located in the location where the technical means of the backed-up programmable control block is located.
  • the use of the power supply that is already present in the given location enables such an arrangement of technical means of the power supply, where at least one source of power of the backed-up power supply is remote and thus decentralised from the location of the technical means of the backed-up programmable control block.
  • non-conventional power source represents at least one back-up power source comprised of a solar and/or wind generator.
  • the conventional power supply method presents at least one backed-up power supply, which uses batteries as the back-up element.
  • the optimal placement of the backed-up programmable control block ensures the use of existing and available resources, where the backed-up programmable control block is located in the technological cabinet in the interlocking room or in the mainframe in the site of the level crossing or in the technological cabinet located in the shed or cell in the site of the level crossing.
  • An interface comprised of a data output communication and/or a contact signal interface and/or a power input/output signal interface is used for the transfer of the control and indication signals between the backed-up programmable control block and the station safeguarding equipment and/or between the backed-up programmable control block and the track safeguarding equipment and/or between the backed-up programmable control block and the remote control and check block.
  • the backed-up power supply and technology necessary for the backed-up power lines including the power supply for the barrier drive motor circuits and/or the technology necessary for the backed-up date transfer are located, in the site of the level crossing, in the mainframe or in the shed or in the cell.
  • the use of these available technical resources thanks to the variability of the placement in the site of the level crossing, leads to an improvement of the lines of sight and thus to a secondary increase in traffic safety at the level crossing.
  • This arrangement is also very important because it provides considerable savings when controlling multiple level crossings. It is not necessary, for example, to build a shed or mainframe separately for each level crossing. It is not necessary to establish a backed-up power supply separately for each level crossing. Meanwhile the investment expenses work out to be far lower than in the case of building its own system with many of these technical means, required for each level crossing.
  • the method of controlling activities on this programmable level crossing safeguarding equipment with a communication coupling to external intelligent peripherals is performed according to this invention.
  • the essence of this method consists in the level crossing safeguarding equipment being controlled by a backed-up programmable control block that, through the backed-up transfer of data, communicates with the remote intelligent peripherals, and simultaneously monitors, controls and supervises these remote intelligent peripherals.
  • the remote intelligent peripherals are partially or fully backed up.
  • the backed-up programmable control block, backed-up data transfer and remote intelligent peripherals are powered through backed-up power lines from a backed-up power supply.
  • the communication coupling to the remote intelligent peripherals, where at least one level crossing is situated on the railroad lines, represents the transfer of data meant particularly for controlling the activities of the outdoor elements of the programmable level crossing safeguarding equipment, i.e. for turning the warning light, sound and mechanical signalisation and, if necessary, the positive signal on and off, for turning the signal device for the engine driver on and off and for controlling the indications for the transport signalman, for multiple peripherals and multiple safeguarded locations.
  • the optimal division of the control functions between the backed-up programmable control block and the remote intelligent peripherals is advantageously resolved in that part of the intelligence of the level crossing safeguarding equipment in the form of functional algorithms is centralised in the backed-up programmable control block and part of the intelligence of the level crossing safeguarding equipment, related to the warning signal, the barrier drive, the detection elements for determining the location of a train and with the feedback to the engine driver is distributed to the remote intelligent peripherals.
  • the remote intelligent peripherals communicate with the backed-up programmable control block through the backed-up data transfer.
  • the remote intelligent peripherals are distributed along the railroad lines to an essentially unlimited distance, e.g. on the order of kilometres, or tens or even hundreds of kilometres from the backed-up programmable control block while sharing the mutual backed-up programmable control block for a group of multiple level crossings in the given area of coverage.
  • the optimal transfer and indication method from the backed-up programmable control block to the connected station and/or track safeguarding equipment is performed in that the backed-up programmable control block receives control signals from the station safeguarding equipment and/or track safeguarding equipment and/or that the backed-up programmable control block sends indication signals to the station safeguarding equipment and/or track safeguarding equipment through a bi-directional interface.
  • the optimal transfer and distribution of the control functions of the programmable level crossing safeguarding equipment between the backed-up programmable control block and the remote intelligent peripherals, from the perspective of the requirements on the power capacity of the backed-up programmable control block and the remote intelligent peripherals, is ensured as follows.
  • the backed-up programmable control block monitors the status of the input commands transferred from the input remote intelligent peripherals through the backed-up data transfer and/or the backed-up programmable control block monitors the status of the input commands transferred from the station safeguarding equipment over the interface and/or transferred from the track safeguarding equipment and/or transferred from the remote control and check block.
  • the input commands are invoked automatically by the journey of a train, remote activities of other safeguarding equipment or manually by the operator, where each input command is processed and converted, according to functional algorithms in the backed-up programmable control block, into input information of the backed-up programmable control block, which is transferred through the backed-up data transfer as input information to the output remote intelligent peripherals.
  • the output remote intelligent peripherals process their input information in the form of their functional algorithms and mediate the control of the performance element related to the warning signal and/or the barrier drive and/or the feedback to the engine driver and also the output remote intelligent peripherals perform the supervision of their performance elements and, in the form of their functional algorithms, process the output indications, which are transferred from the backed-up data transfer from the output remote intelligent peripherals back to the backed-up programmable control block.
  • the output indications transferred from the output remote intelligent peripherals, are assigned to the proper location of the safeguarded level crossing and are converted on the interface in the direction of the station safeguarding equipment and/or track safeguarding equipment and/or in the direction of the remote control and check block, for displaying the indications related to the individual locations of the safeguarded level crossings to the transport signalman.
  • the function of the level crossing safeguarding equipment from the perspective of the remote intelligent peripherals, which control and supervise the performance function of this equipment without encumbering the backed-up programmable control block, represents a method where each remote intelligent peripheral acts, from the perspective of the backed-up programmable control block, as an input and/or output remote intelligent peripheral.
  • the output remote intelligent peripheral which represents, for example, a warning board block, processes its input information, transferred through the backed-up data transfer from the backed-up programmable control block, in the form of its functional algorithms, and mediates the control of the performance element related to the warning signal and/or with the sound signal while this warning board block also performs the supervision of its performance elements and, in the form of its functional algorithms, processes the output indications that are transferred from the warning board block through the backed-up data transfer to the backed-up programmable control block.
  • a warning board block processes its input information, transferred through the backed-up data transfer from the backed-up programmable control block, in the form of its functional algorithms, and mediates the control of the performance element related to the warning signal and/or with the sound signal while this warning board block also performs the supervision of its performance elements and, in the form of its functional algorithms, processes the output indications that are transferred from the warning board block through the backed-up data transfer to the backed-up programmable control block.
  • the output remote intelligent peripheral which represents, for example, a barrier drive block, processes its input information, transferred through the backed-up data transfer from the backed-up programmable control block, in the form of its functional algorithms, and mediates the control of the performance element related to the barrier drive.
  • the barrier drive block also performs the supervision of its performance elements and, in the form of its functional algorithms, processes the output indications that are transferred from the barrier drive block through the backed-up data transfer to the backed-up programmable control block.
  • the input remote intelligent peripheral which represents, for example, an on and off switching elements of automatic control block, processes, in the form of its functional algorithms, the input signals that cause the automatic driving of the train to the input commands and transfer the status of these input commands through the backed-up data transfer to the backed-up programmable control block.
  • the output remote intelligent peripheral which represents, for example, a level crossing protection signal block such as a barrage signal board, processes its input information, transferred through the backed-up data transfer from the backed-up programmable control block, in the form of its functional algorithms, and mediates the control of the performance element related to the relevant signal aspect.
  • the level crossing protection signal block such as a barrage signal board performs the supervision of its performance elements and, in the form of its functional algorithms, processes the output indications that are transferred from the level crossing protection signal block such as a barrage signal board through the backed-up data transfer to the backed-up programmable control block.
  • the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE contains a backed-up programmable control block CB , which is connected through the backed-up data transfer DT to remote intelligent peripherals IP , which are located near the railway lines RL in the site designated for the safeguarding of the level crossing LC , and which are partially or fully backed up.
  • the backed-up programmable control block CB , backed up data transfer DT and remote intelligent peripherals IP are connected to a backed-up power supply PS through backed-up power lines PL .
  • a backed-up programmable control block CB there are 1, 2 to M remote intelligent peripherals IP in one site for safeguarding the level crossing and 1, 2 to J sites designated for the safeguarding of one level crossing LC.
  • the number M of remote intelligent peripherals IP in one site for the safeguarding of the level crossing LC and the number J of sites designated for the safeguarding of one level crossing LC depends on the performance capacity of the backed-up programmable control block CB and on the transfer capacity of the backed-up data transfer DT.
  • the value M is commonly on the order of tens.
  • the value J is also usually on the order of tens.
  • the station variant SV and track variant TV of the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE can be covered to a practically unlimited distance, in a length on the order of kilometres or even tens or hundreds of kilometres, along the railway lines RL between the backed-up programmable control block CB and the remote intelligent peripherals IP.
  • the maximum distance between the backed-up programmable control block CB and the remote intelligent peripherals IP is given by the level of the technology of the backed-up data transfer DT and the dimensioning of the independent power supply PS including the dimensioning of the backed-up power lines PL for the coverage of the power performance balance of the or even tens or hundreds of kilometres, along the railway lines RL between the backed-up programmable control block CB and all of the remote intelligent peripherals IP .
  • the distribution of the backed-up programmable control block CB to the site of the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE can also cover the isolated island variant IV of the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE in remote areas, or implement conventional level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE.
  • the block diagram of the station variarit SV of the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE is displayed in Fig. 2 .
  • the backed-up programmable control block CB is located in the technological cabinet TC in the station's interlocking room IR and is connected through the interface I to the station safeguarding equipment SSE , which can be ESA produced by A D.
  • the interface I is used for the transfer of control and indication signals between the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE and the station safeguarding equipment SSE and it is comprised of either a data output communication adapter or alternatively a contact or power input/output interface.
  • the backed-up programmable control block CB can be part of the control technology of the station safeguarding equipment SSE.
  • the backed-up external data bus for the backed-up data transfer DT can also, if required, be conveyed to the next station or track level crossing LC .
  • Optical or magnetic cable can be used for the backed-up data transfer DT or it can be done wirelessly.
  • the remote intelligent peripherals IP can be partially or fully backed up.
  • warning board block WB One of the possibilities on the site of the warning board block WB is the use of intelligent LED lights pursuant to CZ 297 617, priority 28.12.2005 CZ, with the owner being A D Praha s.r.o.; one of the possibilities on the site of the barrier drive block BD is the use of a mechanical warning control method through the electromechanical barrier drive pursuant to CZ PV 2008 - 369, priority 16.6.2008 CZ, with the applicant being A D Praha s.r.o, with the addition of a control subsystem for the barrier drive block BD.
  • the warning board blocks WB or barrier drive blocks BD can be mutually combined in one site for the safeguarding of a level crossing LC into one joint remote intelligent peripheral IP or into multiple joint remote intelligent peripherals IP.
  • Conventional barrier drives connected to the backed-up programmable control block CB can be used instead of the barrier drive blocks BD .
  • Conventional warning boards connected to the backed-up programmable control block CB can be used instead of the warning board blocks WB.
  • a pair of independent powers supplies PS and backed-up power lines PL e.g. a backed-up AC connection directly from the station's interlocking room.
  • a back-up power supply from a neighbouring station can be used in the case of corridor track sections.
  • the need for the construction of further infrastructure (a technology shed) at the level crossing is minimised, which secondarily increases the safety of the level crossing by improving the lines of sight.
  • the technology for the backed-up data transfer DT and the technology for the backed-up power lines PL are located in the site of the level crossing LC situated in the mainframe MF .
  • the method of controlling the activities of the station variant SV of the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE is as follows:
  • the block diagram of the track variant TV of the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE is displayed in Fig. 3 .
  • the backed-up programmable control block CB is located in the technological cabinet TC in the station's interlocking room IR and is connected through the interface I to the station safeguarding equipment SSE , which can be ESA produced by AZD, or to the track safeguarding equipment TSE .
  • the interface I is used for the transfer of control and indication signals between the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE and the station safeguarding equipment SSE or the track safeguarding equipment TSE and it is comprised of either a data output communication adapter or alternatively a contact or power input/output interface.
  • the backed-up programmable control block CB can be part of the control technology of the station safeguarding equipment SSE or track safeguarding equipment TSE.
  • the required number of remote intelligent peripherals IP in the form of warning board blocks WB , barrier drive blocks BD and on and off switching elements of automatic control blocks AC , located near the railway line RL in the site of the level crossing LC , are connected to the common backed-up external data bus for the backed-up data transfer DT.
  • the backed-up external data bus for the backed-up data transfer DT can also be shared jointly with other level crossings LC .
  • Optical or magnetic cable can be used for the backed-up data transfer DT or it can be done wirelessly.
  • the remote intelligent peripherals IP can be partially or fully backed up.
  • One of the possibilities on the site of the warning board block WB is the use of intelligent LED lights pursuant to CZ 297 617, priority 28.12.2005 CZ, with the owner being A D Praha s.r.o.;
  • one of the possibilities on the site of the barrier drive block BD is the use of a mechanical warning control method through the electromechanical barrier drive pursuant to CZ PV 2008 - 369, priority 16.6.2008 CZ, with the applicant being A D Praha s.r.o, with the addition of a control subsystem for the barrier drive block BD.
  • the warning board blocks WB , barrier drive blocks BD and on and off switching elements of automatic control blocks AC can be mutually combined in one site for the safeguarding of a level crossing LC into one joint remote intelligent peripheral IP or into multiple joint remote intelligent peripherals IP.
  • Conventional barrier drives connected to the backed-up programmable control block CB can be used instead of the barrier drive blocks BD.
  • Conventional warning boards connected to the backed-up programmable control block CB can be used instead of the warning board blocks WB .
  • a pair of independent power supplies PS and backed-up power lines PL e.g. AC connections for feeding the station safeguarding equipment SSE of neighbouring stations, or various combinations of the main and back-up power supply connection from the neighbouring stations in combination with the non-conventional power supplies according to better geographic and other conditions.
  • the need for the construction of further infrastructure (a technology shed) at the level crossing is minimised, which secondarily increases the safety of the level crossing by improving the lines of sight.
  • the technology for the backed-up data transfer DT and the technology for the backed-up power lines PL are situated in the mainframe MF located in the site of the level crossing LC.
  • the method of controlling the activities of the track variant, TV of the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE is as follows:
  • the block diagram of the island variant IV of the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE is displayed in Fig. 4 and in Fig. 5 .
  • the backed-up programmable control block CB is located in the mainframe MF or in the technological cabinet TC located in the shed S , or in the cell C in the site of the level crossing LC.
  • the island level crossing LC can be implemented in two variants, specifically:
  • the required number of remote intelligent peripherals IP in the form of warning board blocks WB , barrier drive blocks BD , on and off switching elements of automatic control blocks AC and level crossing protection signal blocks LCPS i.e. barrage signal boards, located near the railway line RL in the site of the level crossing LC , are connected to the common backed-up external data bus for the backed-up data transfer DT.
  • Optical or magnetic cable can be used for the backed-up data transfer DT or it can be done wirelessly.
  • the remote intelligent peripherals IP can be partially or fully backed up.
  • One of the possibilities on the site of the warning board block WB is the use of intelligent LED lights pursuant to CZ 297 617, priority 28.12.2005 CZ, with the owner being AZD Praha s.r.o.;
  • one of the possibilities on the site of the barrier drive block BD is the use of a mechanical warning control method through the electromechanical barrier drive pursuant to CZ PV 2008 - 369, priority 16.6.2008 CZ, with the applicant being A D Praha s.r.o, with the addition of a control subsystem for the barrier drive block BD.
  • the warning board blocks WB , barrier drive blocks BD , on and off switching elements of automatic control blocks AC and level crossing protection signal blocks LCPS can be mutually integrated into the backed-up programmable control block CB or into one joint remote intelligent peripheral IP or into multiple joint remote intelligent peripherals IP .
  • Conventional barrier drives connected to the backed-up programmable control block CB can be used instead of the barrier drive blocks BD.
  • Conventional warning boards connected to the backed-up programmable control block CB can be used instead of the warning board blocks WB.
  • Conventional on and off switching elements of automatic control such as track circuits or axle counters or point elements for determining the occupancy or un-occupancy_of the tracks, connected to the backed-up programmable control block CB , either through a data output communication adapter or, alternatively, through a contact or power input/output interface I , can be used instead of the on and off switching elements of automatic control blocks AC .
  • Conventional barrage signals connected to the backed-up programmable control block CB , through a contact or power input/output interface I can be used instead of the level crossing protection signal blocks LCPS i.e. barrage signal boards.
  • the backup power supply i.e. the presence of a pair of independent power supplies PS and backed-up power lines PL , can be resolved either centrally from the local power connection with a backed-up batter or with the use of solar energy or wind energy or distributed for individual locally-situated remote intelligent peripherals IP , or groups of locally-situated remote intelligent peripherals IP in combination with non-conventional power supplies according to better geographic and other conditions.
  • the technologies for the backed-up data transmission DT and the technologies of the power supplies PS and he backed-up power lines PL including barrier drive motor power circuits are located in the site of the level crossing LC specifically in the mainframe MF or in a shed S , or in a cell C.
  • the backed-up programmable control block CB is connected to the remote control and check block RC .
  • the connection of the remote control and check block RC to the backed-up programmable control block CB is done through the interface I , which is comprised of either a data output communication adapter or, alternatively, through a contact or power input/output interface.
  • the method of controlling the activities of the island variant IV of the level crossing safeguarding equipment LCSE with the level crossing protection signal block i.e. barrage signal board, is as follows:
  • the programmable level crossing safeguarding equipment with a communication coupling to remote external intelligent peripherals resolves technology for railway traffic, its control and the assurance of its safety. It concerns, in more detail, the issue of security measures related to the operation of trains and the protection of road level crossings, especially control, warning or similar safety means along the tracks or between the vehicles or trains.

Claims (20)

  1. Programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleiche Bahnübergänge mit Kommunikationsverbindung zu externen intelligenten Peripherien, wobei an der Gleisanlage (RL) mindestens ein Bahnübergang (LC) situiert ist, wird dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß
    - die Sicherungseinrichtung des Bahnübergangs (LCSE) umfaßt einen gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB), welcher über eine gesicherte Datenübertragung (DT) an dezentrale intelligente Peripherien (IP) angeschlossen ist, die sich in der Nähe der Gleisanlage (RL) an der für die Absicherung des Bahnübergangs (LC) festgelegten Ort befinden, und die teilweise oder vollständig gesichert sind, wobei
    - der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB), die gesicherte Datenübertragung (DT) und die dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IP) an eine gesicherte Spannungsquelle (PS) über eine gesicherte Stromleitung (PL) angeschlossen sind, und
    - im gegebenen Abdeckungsbereich des gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblocks (CB) 1, 2 bis M dezentrale intelligente Peripherien (IP) im Rahmen eines Ortes für die Absicherung des Bahnübergangs (LC) vorhanden sind, und
    - 1, 2 bis J Orte, die für die Absicherung eines Bahnübergangs (LC) festgelegt wurden, wobei die Größe der Anzahl M der dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IP) im Rahmen des Ortes für die Absicherung des Bahnübergangs (LC) und die Größe der Anzahl J der Orte, die für die Absicherung eines Bahnübergangs (LC) festgelegt wurden, abhängig von der Leistungskapazität des gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblocks (CB) und der Übertragungskapazität der gesicherten Datenübertragung (DT) ist.
  2. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 1 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß
    - die dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IP) entlang der Gleisanlage (RL) auf Entfernung in einer Distanz von größenmäßig Kilometern oder Dutzenden oder Hunderten von Kilometern vom gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) zur Abdeckung wählbarer Varianten, einer Stationsvariante (SV) und/oder einer Streckenvariante (TV) der Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang (LCSE) stationiert sind und
    - der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB) ist beiderseitig über Interface (I) an die Stätionssicherungseinrichtung (SSE) und/oder die Streckensicherungseinrichtung (TSE) angeschlossen.
  3. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 1 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß
    der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB) an der Stelle des Bahnübergangs (LC) in geographisch abgelegenen Gebieten situiert ist für die Realisierung der wählbaren Variante, der isolierten Inselvariante (IV) der Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang (LCSE) mit deckender Signaleinrichtung des Bahnübergangs, wie es ein Bahnübergangssignal ist, oder
    der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB) ist an der Stelle des Bahnübergangs (LC) situiert und über Interface (I) sind an diesen beiderseitig der Block (RC) der Fernbedienung und der Kontrolle für die Realisierung der isolierten Inselvariante (IV) der Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang (LCSE) mit Übertragung von Fernkommandos und Fernanzeigen zum Bedienungsort angeschlossen.
  4. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 1 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die dezentrale intelligente Peripherie (IP) mindestens einen Block aus der Blockgruppe, die den Block (WB) des Warnsignals, den Block (BD) für den Schrankenantrieb, den Block (AC) der Ein- und Ausschaltelemente der automatischen Bedienung und den Block (LCPS) der deckenden Signaleinrichtung des Bahnübergangs, wie es ein Bahnübergangssignal ist, umfaßt in der Anzeigefunktion des Standes der Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang (LCSE) in Richtung zum Triebfahrzeugführer hin.
  5. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 4 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Blöcke (WB) des Warnsignals und/oder die Blöcke (BD) für den Schrankenantrieb und/oder die Blöcke (AC) der Ein- und Ausschaltelemente der automatischen Bedienung und/oder die Blöcke (LCPS) der deckenden Signaleinrichtung des Bahnübergangs im Rahmen einer Stelle zur Absicherung des Bahnübergangs (LC), in mindestens eine gemeinsame dezentrale intelligente Peripherie (IP) und/oder den gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) miteinander vereint sind.
  6. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 1 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß an den gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) angeschlossen sind
    - die konventionellen Schrankenantriebe und/oder
    - die konventionellen Warnsignale und/oder
    - die konventionellen Gleisschaltkreise und/oder die Achszähler und/oder die Punktelemente zur Feststellung der Streckengleisfreiheit und/oder Streckengleisbesetzung in Funktion der Ein- und Ausschaltelemente der automatischen Bedienung und/oder
    - die konventionellen deckenden Signaleinrichtungen des Bahnübergangs, wie es ein Bahnübergangssignal ist, in Anzeigefunktion des Standes der Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang (LCSE) in Richtung zum Triebfahrzeugführer hin.
  7. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 1 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die gesicherte Datenübertragung (DT) über eine optische Kommunikationsleitung und/oder metallische Kommunikationsleitung und/oder drahtlos realisiert wird.
  8. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 1 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB) und/oder die gesicherte Datenübertragung (DT) und/oder die dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IP) über mehr als nur eine Stromversorgungsleitung der gesicherten Stromversorgung (PL) zu mehr als nur einem Stromanschluß der gesicherten Spannungsquelle (PS) angeschlossen sind, wobei
    die gesicherte Spannungsquelle (PS) am Ort der Stationierung des gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) stationiert ist.
  9. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 8 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß mindestens ein Stromanschluß der gesicherten Spannungsquelle (PS) dezentral ist, also dezentralisiert vom Ort der Stationierung der technischen Einrichtungen des gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblocks (CB) liegt.
  10. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 8 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß mindestens ein Stromanschluß der gesicherten Spannungsquelle (PS) einen Solarzell- und/oder Windgenerator umfaßt.
  11. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 8 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß mindestens ein Stromanschluß der gesicherten Spannungsquelle (PS) als Sicherungselement Batterien verwendet.
  12. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 1 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB) in einem Schaltschrank (TC) im Stellwerksraum (IR), oder im Hauptgerät (MF) am Ort des Bahnübergangs (LC), oder in einem Schaltschrank (TC) in einem Stromhäuschen (S), gegebenenfalls in einer Schaltzelle (C) am Ort des Bahnübergangs (LC) stationiert ist.
  13. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 2 oder 3 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß Interface (I) von einem Kommunikationsadapter des Datenausgangs und/oder einer Kontakt-Signalschnittstelle und/oder einer Spannungseingangs/ Spannungsausgangssignalschnittstelle gebildet wird.
  14. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 2 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB) Bestandteil der Steuerungstechnologie der Stationssicherungseinrichtung (SSE) oder der Steuerungstechnologie der Streckensicherungseinrichtung (TSE) ist.
  15. Die programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang wird nach Anspruch 1 dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß
    die gesicherte Spannungsquelle (PS) und/oder
    mindestens ein Stromanschluß der gesicherten Spannungsquelle (PS) und/oder die für die gesicherte Stromleitung (PL) notwendige Technologie, einschließlich der Versorgungsstromkreise der Motoren der Schrankenantriebe und/oder die für die gesicherte Datenübertragung (DT) notwendige Technologie,
    am Ort des Bahnübergangs (LC) im Hauptgerät (MF) oder in einem Stromhäuschen (S) oder in einer Schaltzelle (C) untergebracht sind.
  16. Die Art und Weise der Steuerung der Tätigkeit der programmierbaren Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang (LCSE) mit Kommunikationsverbindung zur externen intelligenten Peripherie, wo an der Gleisanlage (RL) mindestens ein Bahnübergang (LC) situiert ist, wird dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang (LCSE) von einem gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) gesteuert wird, welcher mittels einer gesicherten Datenübertragung (DT) mit den dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IPJ.1, IPJ.2, ..., IPJ.M) kommuniziert und dabei gleichzeitig diese dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IPJ.1, IPJ.2, ..., IPJ.M) kontrolliert, bedient und überwacht, wobei M die Anzahl der dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien am Ort der Absicherung des Bahnüberganges (LC), die in der Nähe der Gleisanlage (RL) am Ort der für der Absicherung der Bahnübergänge (LC1, LC2, ... , LCJ) festgelegt wurde stationiert sind, ist und
    J die Anzahl der für die Absicherung eines Bahnübergangs festgelegten Orte ist, und wobei die dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IP) teilweise oder vollständig gesichert werden, wobei der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB), die gesicherte Datenübertragung (DT) und die dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IP) über die gesicherte Stromleitung (PL) von der gesicherten Spannungsquelle (PS) gespeist werden.
  17. Die Art und Weise der Steuerung nach Anspruch 16 wird dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß
    - ein Teil der Intelligenz der Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang (LCSE) wird in Form von Funktionsalgorithmen im gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) zentralisiert und
    - ein Teil der Intelligenz der Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang (LCSE) wird in Zusammenhang mit dem Warnsignal, mit dem Schrankenantrieb, mit den Detektorelementen zur Feststellung der Zugposition und mit Rückmeldung an den Triebfahrzeugführer an die dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IP) distribuiert, wobei
    - die dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IP) mit dem gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) über die gesicherte Datenübertragung (DT) kommunizieren,
    - die dezentralen intelligenten Peripherien (IP), die entlang der Gleisanlage (RL) in einer Distanz von größenmäßig Kilometern oder Dutzenden oder Hunderten von Kilometern vom gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) entfernt verteilt sind, teilen sich den gemeinsamen gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) für eine Gruppe von Bahnübergängen (LC) im gegebenen Abdeckungsbereich.
  18. Die Art und Weise der Steuerung nach Anspruch 16 wird dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB) die Bedienungssignale von der Stationssicherungseinrichtung (SSE) und/oder der Streckensicherungseinrichtung (TSE) empfängt und/oder der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB) sendet die Anzeigesignale zur Stationssicherungseinrichtung (SSE) und/oder zur Streckensicherungseinrichtung (TSE) über beiderseitigen Schnittstellen (I).
  19. Die Art und Weise der Steuerung nach Anspruch 16 wird dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß
    - der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB) über die gesicherte Datenübertragung (DT) den Stand der Eingangskommandos kontrolliert, die von den dezentralen intelligenten Eingangsperipherien (ID) übertragen werden, und/oder
    - der gesicherte programmierbare Steuerblock (CB) kontrolliert über die Schnittstelle (I) den Stand der Eingangskommandos, die von der Stationssicherungseinrichtung (SSE) und/oder von der Streckensicherungseinrichtung (TSE) und/oder vom Block (RC) der Fernbedienung und Kontrolle übertragen werden, wobei
    - die Eingangskommandos entstehen automatisch durch die Zugfahrt, durch die Tätigkeit einer anderen entfernten Sicherungsanlage oder durch die manuelle Tätigkeit des Bedienungspersonals wobei
    - jedes Eingangskommando nach dem Funktionsalgorithmus im gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) bearbeitet und in Ausgangsinformationen des gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) überführt wird, welche mittels der gesicherten Datenübertragung (DT) als Eingangsinformationen zu den dezentralen intelligenten Ausgangsperipherien (IP) übertragen werden, wobei
    - die dezentralen intelligenten Ausgangsperipherien (IP) ihre Eingangsinformationen in Form ihrer Funktionsalgorithmen bearbeiten und die Bedienung des ausführenden Elements vermitteln, welches in Zusammenhang steht mit dem Warnsignal und/oder mit dem Schrankenantrieb und/oder mit der Rückverbindung zum Triebfahrzeugführer, und gleichzeitig
    - kontrollieren die dezentralen intelligenten Ausgangsperipherien (IP) ihre ausführenden Elemente und in Form ihrer Funktionsalgorithmen bearbeiten sie die Ausgangsanzeigen, die von den dezentralen intelligenten Ausgangsperipherien (IP) aus mittels der gesicherten Datenübertragung (DT) zurück zum gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) übertragen werden, wobei
    - nach den Funktionsalgorithmen im gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) die Ausgangsanzeigen, die von den dezentralen intelligenten Ausgangsperipherien (IP) übertragen werden, dem entsprechenden Ort der Absicherung des Bahnübergangs (LC) und zugeordnet werden an Interface (I) in Richtung der Stationssicherungseinrichtung (SSE) und/oder der Streckensicherungseinrichtung (TSE) und/oder in Richtung des Blocks (RC) der Fernbedienung und Kontrolle, zur Anzeigendarstellung bezüglich der einzelnen festgelegten Orte der Absicherung des Bahnübergangs (LC) für das Transportbedienungspersonal.
  20. Die Art und Weise der Steuerung nach Anspruch 16 wird dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß
    - jede dezentrale intelligente Peripherie (IP) sich hinsichtlich des gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblocks (CB) wie eine dezentrale intelligente Eingangs- und/oder Ausgangsperipherie (IP) verhält, wobei
    - der Block (WB) des Warnsignals eine dezentrale intelligente Ausgangsperipherie darstellt, welche ihre Eingangsinformationen verarbeitet, die mittels der gesicherten Datenübertragung (DT) vom gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) aus übertragen werden, und in Form seiner Funktionsalgorithmen vermittelt die Bedienung des ausführenden Elements, das mit dem Warnsignal und/oder einem akkustischen Signal in Zusammenhang steht und gleichzeitig
    - der Block (WB) des Warnsignals die Kontrolle über seine ausführende Elemente ausübt und in Form seiner Funktionsalgorithmen die Ausgangsanzeigen bearbeitet, die vom Block (WB) des Warnsignals mittels der gesicherten Datenübertragung in den gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) übertragen werden und wobei
    - der Block (BD) des Schrankenantriebs eine dezentrale intelligente Peripherie (IP) darstellt, die ihre Eingangsinformationen, die mittels der gesicherten Datenübertragung (DT) vom gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) aus übertragen werden, in Form seiner Funktionsalgorithmen verarbeitet und vermittelt die Bedienung des ausführenden Elements, die in Zusammenhang mit dem Schrankenantrieb stehen, und gleichzeitig
    - der Block (BD) des Schrankenantriebs die Kontrolle seiner ausführenden Elemente ausübt und in Form seiner Funktionsalgorithmen die Eingangsangaben verarbeitet, welche vom Block (BD) des Schrankenantriebs mittels der gesicherten Datenübertragung (DT) in den gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) übertragen werden, wobei
    - der Block (AC) der Ein- und Ausschaltungselemente der automatischen Bedienung stellt eine dezentrale intelligente Peripherie (IP) dar, welche in Form ihrer Funktionsalgorithmen die Eingangssignale, die automatisch durch die Zugfahrt in Eingangsanweisungen hervorgerufen werden, und überträgt den Stand dieser Eingangsanweisungen mittels der gesicherten Datenübertragung (DT) in den gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (DT), und wobei
    - der Block (LCPS) der deckenden Signaleinrichtung des Bahnübergangs, wie es ein Bahnübergangssignal ist, stellt eine dezentrale intelligente Peripherie (IP) dar, die ihre Eingangsinformationen, die über die gesicherte Datenübertragung (DT) vom gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) in Form seiner Funktionsalgorithmen übertragen werden, verarbeitet und vermittelt die Bedienung des mit dem entsprechenden Signalzeichen, und gleichzeitig
    - der Block (LCPS) der deckenden Signaleinrichtung des Bahnübergangs, wie es ein Bahnübergangssignal ist, übt die Kontrolle seiner ausführenden Elemente in Form seiner Funktionsalgorithmen aus, verarbeitet die Ausgangsanzeigen, die der Block (LCPS) der deckenden Signaleinrichtung, wie es ein Bahnübergangssignal ist, über die gesicherte Datenübertragung (DT) in den gesicherten programmierbaren Steuerblock (CB) überträgt.
EP14003294.7A 2013-09-24 2014-09-23 Programmierbare Sicherungseinrichtung für niveaugleichen Bahnübergang mit Kommunikationsverbindung zu intelligenten externen Peripheriegeräten und Verfahren zur Steuerung der Aktivität dieser Einrichtung Active EP2857277B1 (de)

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CZ2013735A3 (cs) 2015-07-08
PL2857277T3 (pl) 2017-02-28

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