Classifications

• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
  • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
  • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
  • F02D41/30—Controlling fuel injection
  • F02D41/3005—Details not otherwise provided for
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
  • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
  • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
  • F02D41/22—Safety or indicating devices for abnormal conditions
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
  • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
  • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
  • F02D41/0025—Controlling engines characterised by use of non-liquid fuels, pluralities of fuels, or non-fuel substances added to the combustible mixtures
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
  • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
  • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
  • F02D41/0025—Controlling engines characterised by use of non-liquid fuels, pluralities of fuels, or non-fuel substances added to the combustible mixtures
  • F02D41/0027—Controlling engines characterised by use of non-liquid fuels, pluralities of fuels, or non-fuel substances added to the combustible mixtures the fuel being gaseous
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
  • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
  • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
  • F02D41/24—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means
  • F02D41/26—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means using computer, e.g. microprocessor
  • F02D41/266—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means using computer, e.g. microprocessor the computer being backed-up or assisted by another circuit, e.g. analogue
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
  • F02M—SUPPLYING COMBUSTION ENGINES IN GENERAL WITH COMBUSTIBLE MIXTURES OR CONSTITUENTS THEREOF
  • F02M43/00—Fuel-injection apparatus operating simultaneously on two or more fuels, or on a liquid fuel and another liquid, e.g. the other liquid being an anti-knock additive
  • F02M43/04—Injectors peculiar thereto
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
  • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
  • F02D19/00—Controlling engines characterised by their use of non-liquid fuels, pluralities of fuels, or non-fuel substances added to the combustible mixtures
  • F02D19/06—Controlling engines characterised by their use of non-liquid fuels, pluralities of fuels, or non-fuel substances added to the combustible mixtures peculiar to engines working with pluralities of fuels, e.g. alternatively with light and heavy fuel oil, other than engines indifferent to the fuel consumed
  • F02D19/0639—Controlling engines characterised by their use of non-liquid fuels, pluralities of fuels, or non-fuel substances added to the combustible mixtures peculiar to engines working with pluralities of fuels, e.g. alternatively with light and heavy fuel oil, other than engines indifferent to the fuel consumed characterised by the type of fuels
  • F02D19/0642—Controlling engines characterised by their use of non-liquid fuels, pluralities of fuels, or non-fuel substances added to the combustible mixtures peculiar to engines working with pluralities of fuels, e.g. alternatively with light and heavy fuel oil, other than engines indifferent to the fuel consumed characterised by the type of fuels at least one fuel being gaseous, the other fuels being gaseous or liquid at standard conditions
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
  • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
  • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
  • F02D41/22—Safety or indicating devices for abnormal conditions
  • F02D2041/224—Diagnosis of the fuel system
• • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
  • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
  • Y02T—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO TRANSPORTATION
  • Y02T10/00—Road transport of goods or passengers
  • Y02T10/10—Internal combustion engine [ICE] based vehicles
  • Y02T10/30—Use of alternative fuels, e.g. biofuels

Definitions

• the invention relates to a method for checking the operability of an internal combustion engine operated by a multi-fuel system, in which at least two control units electronically control a combustion process of the internal combustion engine with another fuel, each control unit having its own safety concept and a system functionality of the multi-fuel -System is divided on the at least two control devices, and an apparatus for performing the method.
• Bi-fuel refers to a gasoline-gas system, which is operated either with gas only or only with gasoline or mixed.
• a bi-fuel vehicle allows a mode in which either the gaseous fuel is injected into the internal combustion engine of the motor vehicle and / or the liquid fuel is injected into a cylinder of the internal combustion engine of the motor vehicle.
• a diesel-gas system is referred to as dual-fuel, which can operate in pure diesel mode or in diesel-gas mixed operation.
• the invention has for its object to provide a method for checking the operability of an internal combustion engine operated by a multi-fuel system, in which a monitoring of the overall system functionality of the multi-fuel system is performed with all control devices involved in the operation of the internal combustion engine.
• this object is achieved in that a control unit, preferably one of the at least two control units, monitors the entire system functionality of the multi-fuel system.
• a control unit preferably one of the at least two control units, monitors the entire system functionality of the multi-fuel system.
• the overall system monitoring can be carried out by different methods, e.g. by a torque, speed, acceleration or thrust monitoring.
• the overall system monitoring can take place in any control unit, such as a diesel control unit or a gas control unit, which are part of the multi-fuel system.
• the monitoring is also possible by other control units of the vehicle, which, like a vehicle management computer, are not provided directly for the operation of the internal combustion engine.
• This concept is universally suitable for both dual-fuel systems, i. Systems that can burn two fuels, such as diesel and gas, as well as multi-fuel systems that can handle more than two fuels.
• control unit monitoring the entire system functionality monitors safety-relevant desired values and / or safety-relevant actual values of the system functionality of the multi-fuel system, preferably continuously.
• control units which do not have their own security concept can be monitored by another control unit having a security concept, whereby the overall functionality of the multi-fuel system is always considered.
• a desired value, preferably a driver desired torque, of the entire multi-fuel system is compared with a total of, in particular added, actual values of the entire multi-fuel system at a
• the fault response produces a manageable state of a motor vehicle driven by the engine operated with the multi-fuel system, wherein the fault response is preferably stepped by continuing to run the engine with a first fuel while the engine is running Operation is prohibited with the second fuel.
• the method is suitable for bringing about a safe state of the internal combustion engine and thus of the vehicle in the event of a fault.
• this concept is also capable of providing a replacement operation for controlling the internal combustion engine and thus of the vehicle, since the necessary redundancy is achieved by a plurality of independently acting ones
• each control device comprises a first application-specific level, which is monitored safety-critical by a second level, while a third level carries out a monitoring of the hardware of the control unit.
• a third level carries out a monitoring of the hardware of the control unit.
• the monitoring of the entire system functionality of the multi-fuel system is performed in the second level of the corresponding control unit. Since this second level is already designed in particular for the safety-critical monitoring of the application function running in the first level of the control unit, the monitoring of the overall functionality of all the control units involved in the operation of the internal combustion engine is easy Insertion of an additional software module adapted to this second level of the security concept. A separate safety concept for monitoring the overall functionality of the multi-fuel system can be dispensed with.
• the messages exchanged between the at least two control units of the multi-fuel system are intrinsically safe.
• Intrinsic safety means that all messages received and transmitted by the control units are considered correct, since they are checked continuously for their plausibility during operation of the internal combustion engine.
• the intrinsic safety of the exchanged messages is checked for integrity and / or timeliness.
• a checksum check is performed, whereby it is determined whether the checked data are really plausible.
• the actuality check is carried out by means of a message counter, which is incremented at each message. If this counter is not further incremented, it is assumed that a software or hardware item is defective.
• a development of the invention relates to a control unit for the electronic control of an internal combustion engine operated by a multi-fuel system, which controls an operation of the internal combustion engine with a first fuel and sends signals to a second control unit, which operates the internal combustion engine with a second fuel, and / or receives signals from the latter and has a three-level security concept for checking security-relevant signals.
• a control unit whose safety relevance has been expanded, means are present which monitor an overall functionality of the multi-fuel system for operating the internal combustion engine. In this case, all signals that are processed by the control unit itself or receives this control unit from other control units, assembled into a total that allows conclusions about the safety of the entire multi-fuel system.
• Such an overall monitoring system can be implemented in any control concept having a safety concept which is used in the motor vehicle.
• the monitoring of the overall functionality of the multi-fuel system is performed in a second security-relevant level of the security concept. Since this second level of the security concept is already provided for checking security-relevant data, such additional monitoring functionality can easily be implemented in this level.
• FIG. 1 Schematic representation of a diesel-gas system for controlling an internal combustion engine
• FIG. 2 system overview of the diesel-gas control with two control devices
• FIG. 3 shows a basic illustration of the torque monitoring of the entire diesel-gas system according to FIG. 2,
• FIG. 4 shows a system overview of a gas control system with continuous torque monitoring of the entire diesel-gas system according to FIG. 2,
• FIG. 5 System overview of the diesel control with continuous
• a gas injector 3 is connected via a gas pressure regulator 4 and a Gasabsperrventil 5 with a gas tank 6 and projects into the intake 7 of the internal combustion engine, not shown, in which the gaseous fuel is injected.
• the internal combustion engine has close to the cylinder 8 a pre-chamber 9, in which the diesel fuel, which is used as a liquid fuel, is injected. This is done via a diesel injector 10, which is controlled by the diesel control unit 1.
• the Diesel control unit 1 is connected to the gas control unit 2, which regulates the supply of the gaseous fuel.
• the diesel control unit 1 is connected to the gas control unit 2 via a bidirectional interface in the form of, for example, a CAN bus 11, the two control units 1, 2 communicating via the CAN bus 1 1.
• FIG. 2 illustrates a system overview of the dual-fuel control of the internal combustion engine shown in FIG.
• Each of the listed control units 1, 2 each includes a security concept, which consists of three levels.
• the first level comprises the application software, the second level
• Level is concerned with the monitoring of safety-critical signals of the first level, while the third level monitors the hardware of the respective control unit 1, 2 in terms of their function.
• the diesel control unit 1 and the gas control unit 2 are shown in their first level I of the application soft, where, in particular, the operative connection with respect to the function of the fuel supply to the internal combustion engine is illustrated.
• the diesel control unit 1 receives an input signal 12, for example, as a result of the operation of an accelerator pedal by the driver, whereupon a desired value is calculated in the form of a total desired torque 13 in the diesel control unit 1. This total desired torque 13 is transmitted to the gas control unit 2 via the intrinsically safe CAN bus 1 1.
• a torque distribution logic 14 which determines the proportion of the liquid fuel in the form of diesel or the gaseous fuel involved in the achievement of the total desired torque 13.
• a desired gas torque 38 for the gas path is calculated from the total desired torque 13, which gas is supplied to the diesel control unit 1 via the communication line 15.
• the desired diesel torque 50 is formed as the difference between the total desired torque 13 and the desired gas torque 38. From the thus obtained diesel desired torque 50 for the diesel fuel and the gas desired torque 38 for the gas to be used, the fuel injection systems 16 and 17 are controlled.
• an injection system 17 controls the output stages 18 of the diesel injection nozzle 10, while an injection system 16 activates the output stages 19 of the gas injector 3 in order to calculate the injection quantities derived according to the desired diesel torque 50 and the desired gas torque 38. conditions to ensure liquid or gaseous fuel in the internal combustion engine.
• FIG. 3 shows a schematic diagram of the torque monitoring of such an entire diesel-gas system. It is the first
• Point 24 detects that the Intelistmoment 23 significantly exceeds the total desired torque 13, so after an appropriate delay time, an error response 25 is performed.
• This error reaction can once cause a false-save strategy by the state of the internal combustion engine and thus the motor vehicle remains manageable.
• a false-save strategy by the state of the internal combustion engine and thus the motor vehicle remains manageable.
• Fail-operation strategy be performed as a fault reaction 25, in which a replacement operation for the internal combustion engine or the motor vehicle is carried out in case of failure.
• a replacement operation for the internal combustion engine or the motor vehicle is carried out in case of failure.
• the desired gas torque 38 in the gas control unit 2 is set to zero and the total desired torque 13 is switched over to the desired diesel torque 50 by the switch 27.
• Figure 4 is a system overview of a gas control with the continuous
• the gas control unit 2 has a safety concept in three levels I, II, III.
• the diesel control unit 1 via the CAN bus 1 1 is connected to a block 29 in the plane I of the gas control unit 2, which receives messages and sends.
• This block 29 not only receives messages from the diesel Control unit 1, but also via the communication line 15 messages to the diesel control unit 1 from (block 30).
• the gas control unit 2 has the task of realizing the safety monitoring for the entire diesel-gas system.
• the transmitted and received blobs of the block 29 are forwarded to the level II, in particular to the block 31, or received by the latter.
• Block 31 has the task of securing the communication. This ensures that the communication between the participating control units 1, 2 is intrinsically safe.
• the CAN messages are monitored by the gas control unit 2 by checking the integrity of the CAN messages by means of a check sum check.
• CAN messages are performed by a message counter check.
• a checksum is also formed or a message counter is provided.
• the total desired torque 13, which is considered as the setpoint value of the entire diesel-gas system, is guided to the block 32, which monitors the torque distribution strategy 14.
• the torque distribution strategy 14 is the torque distribution strategy
• Torque distribution strategy 14 of the application software level I recalculated and determined in case of error replacement values. This procedure ensures a continuous protection of the safety-relevant setpoint values, as used in the gas control unit 2.
• the functionality of the block 33 is used to calculate the total instantaneous torque 23 of the diesel / gas system, consisting of the diesel instant 20 of the diesel control unit 1 and the gas instant 21 of the gas control unit 2.
• the Bacistmoment 23 consists of the sum of the Delistmomentes 20 and the Gasistmomentes 21, as has already been explained in connection with Figure 3. Through this functionality of the block 33, the safety-relevant actual moments are hedged.
• the gas desired torque 38 of the gas path is calculated in the gas control unit 2 and supplied by the injection system 16 of the level I functionality in block 33.
• the Examlistmoment 20 of the diesel path is transmitted from the diesel control unit 1 via the secured CAN bus 1 1 (Block 28). This transmission takes place after checking the safe communication by the block 31.
• the Examlistmoment 20 of the diesel control unit 1 and the Gasistmoment 21 of the gas control unit 2 can also be calculated in other ways. For example, a measurement of the crankshaft torque with the aid of a sensor, an estimate of the crankshaft torque by means of the evaluation of the crankshaft rotational speed oscillation or the like is possible.
• the torque comparison for the entire diesel-gas system In this case, the comparison between the total desired torque 13 of the entire diesel-gas system used as the desired value with the added diesel and gas instant 23 of the entire diesel-gas system, which is regarded as the actual value, is carried out, the safety-relevant nominal values and the safety-relevant actual values of the entire diesel-gas system are considered continuously.
• the gas path can be made plausible by comparing a comparison between the gas instant 21 and the gas desired gas torque command 38.
• level III of the safety concept of the gas control unit 2.
• This level III includes functionality for hardware monitoring 35, which is made plausible by an external monitoring unit 36.
• a question is sent to the hardware monitor 35 which the hardware monitor 35 answers. If the answer matches the expected response, the hardware is considered functional. If the answer does not correspond to the expected response, the external monitoring unit 36 switches off the output stage 19 of the gas valves 3 via a redundant shutdown path.
• FIG. 5 shows a system overview for the safety concept of the diesel control unit 1, with a diesel control with continuous torque monitoring in the control unit network of a dual-fuel system.
• the diesel control unit 1 also has three levels I, II, III of the safety concept. However, since the monitoring of the entire diesel-gas system is realized in the gas control unit 2, only the additional, not present in the gas control unit functionalities is pointed out here.
• the diesel control unit 1 communicates with the gas control unit 2, wherein also in the plane I of the diesel control unit 1, a block 29 for transmitting and receiving of messages is present, which communicates via a communication interface 28 with the gas control unit 2.
• the diesel control unit 1 contains at level II a block 31 to secure the communication to determine whether the exchanged messages are also error-free.
• the permissible desired diesel torque 37 is formed in the plane II similar to the total torque 13 of the plane I.
• the actually set at the output stages 18 of the diesel injectors 10 Motherlistmoment 20 is supplied together with the permissible diesel desired torque 37 to a block 39, in which the torque comparison between the diesel desired torque 37 and the
• multi-fuel systems are understood as systems which work with two or more fuels.
• the monitoring of the overall functionality of the multi-fuel system can be implemented in a control unit of the multi-fuel system.
• a control unit of the motor vehicle assumes this monitoring task, which is not part of the multi-fuel system.

Landscapes

• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
• Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
• Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
• Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
• Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
• Combined Controls Of Internal Combustion Engines (AREA)
• Output Control And Ontrol Of Special Type Engine (AREA)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Publications (1)

Family

ID=47257770

Family Applications (1)

Country Status (6)

Families Citing this family (6)

Family Cites Families (7)

• 2011
  • 2011-12-08 DE DE201110087988 patent/DE102011087988A1/de not_active Withdrawn
• 2012
  • 2012-11-13 WO PCT/EP2012/072499 patent/WO2013083367A1/de active Application Filing
  • 2012-11-13 BR BR112014013625A patent/BR112014013625A2/pt not_active IP Right Cessation
  • 2012-11-13 EP EP12791725.0A patent/EP2788605A1/de not_active Withdrawn
  • 2012-11-13 CN CN201280060147.9A patent/CN103958866A/zh active Pending
  • 2012-11-13 US US14/362,466 patent/US20150122238A1/en not_active Abandoned

Non-Patent Citations (2)

Also Published As

Similar Documents

Legal Events