EP2204632A1 - Procédé d'application de déploiement de neutralisation par déroutement, système de déploiement de neutralisation par déroutement et produit de programme informatique - Google Patents

Procédé d'application de déploiement de neutralisation par déroutement, système de déploiement de neutralisation par déroutement et produit de programme informatique Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2204632A1
EP2204632A1 EP08173134A EP08173134A EP2204632A1 EP 2204632 A1 EP2204632 A1 EP 2204632A1 EP 08173134 A EP08173134 A EP 08173134A EP 08173134 A EP08173134 A EP 08173134A EP 2204632 A1 EP2204632 A1 EP 2204632A1
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European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
decoy
miss
missile
launch
parameter set
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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EP08173134A
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Martin Weiss
Franciscus Aloysius Maria Dam
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Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek TNO
TNO Institute of Industrial Technology
Original Assignee
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek TNO
TNO Institute of Industrial Technology
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Application filed by Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek TNO, TNO Institute of Industrial Technology filed Critical Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek TNO
Priority to EP08173134A priority Critical patent/EP2204632A1/fr
Priority to PCT/NL2009/050837 priority patent/WO2010077142A1/fr
Priority to EP09796128A priority patent/EP2382438A1/fr
Priority to JP2011544392A priority patent/JP2012514179A/ja
Priority to US13/142,490 priority patent/US20120055990A1/en
Priority to CA2748832A priority patent/CA2748832A1/fr
Priority to AU2009333968A priority patent/AU2009333968B2/en
Publication of EP2204632A1 publication Critical patent/EP2204632A1/fr
Priority to IL213837A priority patent/IL213837A0/en
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41—WEAPONS
    • F41H—ARMOUR; ARMOURED TURRETS; ARMOURED OR ARMED VEHICLES; MEANS OF ATTACK OR DEFENCE, e.g. CAMOUFLAGE, IN GENERAL
    • F41H11/00—Defence installations; Defence devices
    • F41H11/02—Anti-aircraft or anti-guided missile or anti-torpedo defence installations or systems
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41—WEAPONS
    • F41J—TARGETS; TARGET RANGES; BULLET CATCHERS
    • F41J2/00—Reflecting targets, e.g. radar-reflector targets; Active targets transmitting electromagnetic or acoustic waves
    • F41J2/02—Active targets transmitting infrared radiation
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42B—EXPLOSIVE CHARGES, e.g. FOR BLASTING, FIREWORKS, AMMUNITION
    • F42B12/00—Projectiles, missiles or mines characterised by the warhead, the intended effect, or the material
    • F42B12/02—Projectiles, missiles or mines characterised by the warhead, the intended effect, or the material characterised by the warhead or the intended effect
    • F42B12/36—Projectiles, missiles or mines characterised by the warhead, the intended effect, or the material characterised by the warhead or the intended effect for dispensing materials; for producing chemical or physical reaction; for signalling ; for transmitting information
    • F42B12/56—Projectiles, missiles or mines characterised by the warhead, the intended effect, or the material characterised by the warhead or the intended effect for dispensing materials; for producing chemical or physical reaction; for signalling ; for transmitting information for dispensing discrete solid bodies
    • F42B12/70—Projectiles, missiles or mines characterised by the warhead, the intended effect, or the material characterised by the warhead or the intended effect for dispensing materials; for producing chemical or physical reaction; for signalling ; for transmitting information for dispensing discrete solid bodies for dispensing radar chaff or infrared material
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42B—EXPLOSIVE CHARGES, e.g. FOR BLASTING, FIREWORKS, AMMUNITION
    • F42B5/00—Cartridge ammunition, e.g. separately-loaded propellant charges
    • F42B5/02—Cartridges, i.e. cases with charge and missile
    • F42B5/145—Cartridges, i.e. cases with charge and missile for dispensing gases, vapours, powders, particles or chemically-reactive substances
    • F42B5/15—Cartridges, i.e. cases with charge and missile for dispensing gases, vapours, powders, particles or chemically-reactive substances for creating a screening or decoy effect, e.g. using radar chaff or infrared material

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method of applying soft-kill deployment to mislead an incoming missile directed to a mother platform, the method comprising the steps of evaluating a number of miss distances associated with corresponding particular decoy launch parameter sets, selecting a decoy parameter set having an optimal evaluated miss distance; and transmitting the selected decoy parameter set to a launch unit for launching the decoy.
  • soft-kill measures are an advantageous means, especially when coping with attacks that may not be fully averted by hard-kill means.
  • Soft-kill deployment systems have quicker reaction times than most hard-kill systems, are cheaper and their use is not associated with the risks of collateral damage, or friendly fire that may characterize the use of hard-kill systems.
  • Advanced computing power has been a proven recipe for solving complex problems in combat decision making. For the purpose of deciding when and how to launch a soft-kill decoy, it might be relevant to predict effects of the decoy on the attacking missile. Thereto, a number of miss distances associated with corresponding particular decoy launch parameter sets may be predicted so that an optimal decoy parameter set having an optimal evaluated miss distance can be selected. The selected decoy parameter set can then be transmitted to the launch unit for launching the decoy.
  • much data has to be processed, e.g. data concerning the threat, ship, soft-kill component and the environment.
  • the quality of the prediction will have an immediate effect on the performance of the soft-kill deployment.
  • Computational time constraints will necessarily limit the complexity of the effect prediction, so many factors that may influence the effect of the soft-kill measure will need to be approximated, thereby deteriorating the predictions and rendering the decision process less effective.
  • the predicting step in the method according to the invention includes the use of an adjoint algorithm.
  • the method further comprises the step of computing uncertainty data corresponding with a predicted miss distance, so that an estimate of the inherent uncertainty in the prediction can be taking into account in the decision process of an optimal decoy launch parameter set, thereby further improving the effect of the soft-kill deployment.
  • the method further comprises a step of validating the effect of the launched decoy, the validation step comprising the substeps of predicting a zero-effort miss distance, under platform lock on condition and/or decoy lock on condition, measuring incoming missile data, comparing the measured data with the predicted zero-effort miss distance or distances, and deducing, from the comparison results, on which entity the incoming missile is locked.
  • the deducing step includes the use of computed uncertainty data corresponding with a predicted zero-effort miss distance, thereby using the benefits of the adjoint algorithm another time.
  • the invention also relates to a soft-kill deployment system.
  • a computer program product may comprise a set of computer executable instructions stored on a data carrier, such as a CD or a DVD.
  • the set of computer executable instructions which allow a programmable computer to carry out the method as defined above, may also be available for downloading from a remote server, for example via the Internet.
  • Figure 1 shows a schematic view of a soft-kill deployment system 1 according to the invention.
  • the system 1 is provided on a mother platform, such as a ship, and comprises a launch unit 2 for launching a decoy to mislead an incoming missile directed to the ship.
  • the system 1 further comprises a computer system 3 provided with a processor 4 that is arranged for performing a number of steps thereby enabling a proper control of the launch unit 2.
  • the computer system 3 has a multiple number of input ports 5 for receiving input data and at least one output port 6 for transmitting data to the launch unit 2.
  • Figure 2 shows a schematic perspective view of the ship 10 equipped with the soft-kill deployment system 1.
  • the ship 10 is provided with multiple sensors, such as an omni-directional radar unit 11 for inputting data to the computer system 3 of the soft-kill deployment system 1.
  • Figure 2 further shows a hostile missile 12 attacking the ship 10.
  • the missile 12 remains locked on the ship 10, the missile 12 follows a path P1 and the missile 12 will hit the ship 10.
  • the soft-kill deployment system 1 works properly, the missile will lock on a launched decoy 14 to follow another pre-determined path P2 directed to the decoy 14 thereby missing the ship 10.
  • the missile then passes the ship 10 at a shortest distance, also called the miss distance M.
  • the processor 4 is arranged for performing a number of steps. First of all, the processor 4 signals an incoming missile 12. After signaling the missile 12, the processor 4 performs an identifying step of the missile 12. Such an identifying step may include determining the missile type, position, orientation, speed, path etc. In order to perform the identifying step properly, sensor data are input to the computer system 3 of the soft-kill deployment system 1.
  • FIG 3 shows a time line t.
  • Ts and T 1 denote a launch time of the missile, the signalling time instant of the missile and the identifying instant of the missile, respectively.
  • the processor 4 is further arranged for predicting a number of miss distances associated with corresponding particular decoy launch parameters sets. As an example, several tens of decoy launch parameter sets can be evaluated, each of them corresponding to a particular miss distance. In the predicting step, the use of an adjoint algorithm is included. The predicting step may be based on a large number of data, such as incoming missile parameter data, mother platform parameter data, the corresponding decoy launch parameter set and/or environmental data. Further, the processor is arranged for selecting a decoy parameter set having an optimal predicted miss distance M. The selected decoy parameter set is then transmitted to the launch unit 2 for launching the decoy. Further, control commands can be generated to modify the position and/or orientation of the ship.
  • the processor 4 is further arranged for performing the step of computing uncertainty data corresponding with a predicted miss distance, e.g. a probability area of the path that the missile is assumed to follow.
  • the processor 4 selects the decoy parameter set that corresponds to the largest predicted miss distance M, thereby providing a largest offset between the ship 10 and the missile 12.
  • the processor also takes into account an uncertainty in the predictions of the miss distance, thereby optionally selecting a decoy parameter set that corresponds to a relatively large predicted miss distance M having a relatively small uncertainty.
  • the launch unit 2 of the decoy system 1 launches a decoy 14 including e.g. flare for influencing any infra-red lock on device in the hostile missile and/or chaff for influencing any radar lock on equipment in the hostile missile.
  • the decoy 14 is intended to cause the missile to deviate from the original direction, away from the ship 10.
  • the decoy 14 is launched at a time instant T D . Then, the missile lock on the decoy at a later time instant T SD . At a further time instant Tv, it is verified or validated whether the decoy works properly and/or whether the missile 12 is now directed to the decoy 14. Thereto, the processor 4 is also arranged for performing the substeps of predicting a zero-effort miss distance, under platform lock on condition and decoy lock on condition. As a result, using the adjoint algorithm, a zero-effort miss distance is computed assuming that the missile remains locked on the ship.
  • the zero-effor miss distance is dependent on a specific time instant and is defined as the miss distance which will result when at that specific time instant the path of the ship and the missile will remained unchanged. Similarly, a zero-effor miss distance is computed assuming that the missile changes lock on to the decoy.
  • the processor further performs the substeps of measuring data related to the incoming missile and comparing the measured data with one or both predicted zero-effor miss distances. Then, the processor deduces, from the comparison results, on which entity the incoming missile is expected to be locked. Preferably, the deducing step includes the use of computed uncertainty data corresponding with a predicted zero-effort miss distance. After the validation has been performed, the missile enters the miss distance area, closest point of approach, at time instant T CPA and moves away from the ship.
  • the predicting step can be used before launch of the decoy, for finding an optimal launch parameter set. Further, after launch, the effectiveness of the soft-kill can be checked by comparing the predicted effect if the anti-ship missile has been locked on the decoy or on the ship.
  • the decision for the optimal decoy parameter set and/or the decision in the checking step can be enhanced by using uncertainty data that may be provided by the adjoint algorithm.
  • the adjoint algorithm also known as adjoint method, is based on making a single simulation of a modified model called the Adjoint Model in order to determine the effect of all the perturbation sources that affect the miss distance.
  • the adjoint model can be readily obtained from a linearization of the original model by performing some straightforward block diagram manipulations. Alternatively, the adjoint model can be obtained easily from a state-space representation of the original model. It can mathematically be proven that for deterministically analyzing guidance loops, the separate influence of the initial condition and of the input of the time-varying system on the final value of the output, it is enough to compute one initial-value solution of the adjoint system. Expressions can be derived for assessing the final value using an initial-value solution for an arbitrary initial condition and input.
  • Adjoint Method can be useful in the case of deterministic performance analysis, it can be used with far greater advantage in the case of stochastic performance analysis.
  • adjoint response can be used to compute the variance of the output without lengthy Monte Carlo simulations.
  • the adjoint method includes the steps of constructing an adjoint model and using its response for generating performance data.
  • the adjoint model simulates the dynamical system whose response includes the input sensitivities of the system to be analyzed.
  • the adjoint algorithm is thus suited for evaluating the performance of the decoy process, in particular when the process depends on many variables, is dynamic and time varying.
  • the initial configuration is represented by a guided antiship missile that heads in the general direction of the ship at low altitude, a decoy cloud that is positioned a given displacement from the ship and moves freely with the wind, and a ship that is assumed to keep a constant heading during the engagement.
  • the missile is locked with its seeker on the decoy and uses the seeker data for computing guidance commands. This assumption corresponds to the use of the decoy in distraction mode.
  • the missile is first locked on the ship itself and it changes lock to the decoy only after the decoy becomes active.
  • the missile guides towards the decoy using Proportional Navigation Guidance law until passing the decoy. Subsequently, the missile continues in unguided flight until reaching the closest point of approach with respect to the ship. During the entire engagement, the velocity vector of the wind is assumed to be constant. It is also assumed that the missile speed is constant throughout the engagement, and consequently that only the course of the missile changes as a consequence of guidance commands.
  • a non-linear model is linearized to obtain a linear model and an expression for the miss distance can be formulated depending on an adjoint response that is defined as the solution to an initial value problem. Further, the variance of the miss distance can be expressed as a function of the variances of components of the initial condition. The variances of the initial state vector coordinates in terms of original stochastic quantities can be approximated relatively easily.
  • a post-launch validation can be performed using statistical hypothesis testing algorithms.
  • n , c ⁇ N p ⁇ V c , f ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ f , V c , f > 0 , 0 , V c , f ⁇ 0 , with N p , the navigation constant of the missile, V c,f , the closing velocity between missile and decoy, and ⁇ f , the angular rate of the line-of-sight between missile and decoy.
  • the velocity of the missile along the x e -axis is approximately constant. Also the range between missile and ship, and between missile and decoy can be approximated by the difference of their x coordinates, whereas the miss distances can be approximated by the difference of their y coordinates. By neglecting the course variations of the missile, we can approximate the lateral acceleration of the missile by a nx e a ny e ⁇ a nx 0 .
  • R mf ( t ) V c,f ( t miss,f t).
  • ⁇ ⁇ f y f e - y m e + v yw e - v ym e ⁇ t miss , f - t V c , f ⁇ t miss , f - t 2 .
  • Miss y m e t miss - y s e t miss , which is a linear function of the state of the linearized model.
  • This form is particularly interesting for deterministic performance studies.
  • the Adjoint Method can be used to refine the first method of assessing the success of launching the decoy based on the closest point of approach.
  • the idea is to use the Adjoint Method to estimate the closest point of approach for both the case that the missile is locked on the decoy and the case that the missile is locked on the ship. By comparing the computed position based on track data with these estimates and taking into account the variances of these estimates that can equally be determined using the Adjoint Method, it is possible to decide whether the missile has indeed locked on the decoy or not.
  • the Adjoint Method can be applied to estimate the Zero-Effort-Miss distance at time t d in case that the missile is locked on the decoy.
  • the value of the Zero-Effort-Miss distance at time t d can also be computed based on track data, and this value is denoted ⁇ .
  • ⁇ is normally distributed around z
  • the theory of statistical hypothesis testing can be used to provide an optimal interval Z ⁇ (z s ,z f , ⁇ s , ⁇ f , ⁇ m ) such that if z ⁇ ⁇ Z ⁇ , then the best decision is that the missile is locked on the decoy, and if this condition is not satisfied then the best decision is that the missile is locked on the ship.
  • the optimal interval Z ⁇ can be obtained from the Neyman-Pearson Lemma. For convenience, we summarize here the main notions and results of statistical hypothesis testing that we use in the sequel.
  • H 1 1 - P eII .
  • the problem is to determine the decision interval Z ⁇ that maximizes the power of the test, or minimizes the probability of miss, such that the probability of false alarm takes a given value ⁇ .
  • the following classical result can be used to determine the optimal threshold.
  • H 0 ⁇ .
  • H 0 ) > ⁇ 0 is equivalent to 1 ⁇ s 2 + ⁇ m 2 - 1 ⁇ f 2 + ⁇ m 2 ⁇ z ⁇ - z s ⁇ s 2 + ⁇ m 2 - z f ⁇ f 2 + ⁇ m 2 ⁇ 1 ⁇ s 2 + ⁇ m 2 + 1 ⁇ f 2 + ⁇ m 2 ⁇ z ⁇ - z s ⁇ s 2 + ⁇ m 2 + z f ⁇ f 2 + ⁇ m 2 > ln ⁇ 0 2 ⁇ ⁇ f 2 + ⁇ m 2 ⁇ s 2 + ⁇ m 2
  • the probability that this condition is satisfied can be evaluated using the assumption about the conditional distribution of ⁇ if H 0 is true. According to the Neyman-Pearson Lemma, this probability has to be equal to ⁇ and ⁇ 0 can be computed using this
  • Source Parameter Symbol Value Target sensor Missile initial East [m] x om 6000 Missile initial North [m] y om 6000 Missile velocity [m/s] V m 300 Estimate ⁇ of missile initial East [m] ⁇ xom 46.3 ⁇ of missile initial North [m] ⁇ yom 46.3 ⁇ of missile initial course [rad] ⁇ ⁇ om 0.08 Missile time constant [s] T 0.1 Missile navigation constant.
  • the power of the criterion ⁇ F' ⁇ " H 1 "
  • the prediction using the adjoint algorithm may thus be applied in two ways. Firstly, before launch, the prediction may be used to optimize the deployment. Secondly, after launch, the prediction may be used to make an assessment on the success of deployment. The latter may be realized by comparing observations and predictions of the closest point of approach under two hypotheses: that the missile is locked on the decoy, i.e. the deployment was successful, and that the missile is locked on the ship, i.e. the deployment failed.
  • the fact that the Adjoint Method can take into account measurement and estimation uncertainties without excessive computational effort leads to advantages, especially for the success assessment.
  • the method of applying soft-kill deployment to mislead an incoming missile directed to a mother platform can be performed using dedicated hardware structures, such as FPGA and/or ASIC components. Otherwise, the method can also at least partially be performed using a computer program product comprising instructions for causing a processor of the computer system to perform the above described steps of the method according to the invention. All steps can in principle be performed on a single processor. However it is noted that at least one step can be performed on a separate processor, e.g. the step of identifying a hostile missile and/or the step of identifying the missile.
  • Figure 4 shows a flow chart of an embodiment of the method according to the invention.
  • a method is used for applying soft-kill deployment to mislead an incoming missile directed to a mother platform.
  • the method comprises the steps of predicting (100) a number of miss distances associated with corresponding particular decoy launch parameter sets, selecting (110) a decoy parameter set having an optimal evaluated miss distance; and transmitting (120) the selected decoy parameter set to a launch unit for launching the decoy.
  • the predicting step (100) includes the use of an adjoint algorithm.
  • the soft-kill deployment system according to the invention may be provided with a single launch system or with a multiple launch system. Further, a single missile or a multiple number of missiles directed to the mother platform can be coped with by the soft-kill deployment system according to the invention.
  • the method according to the invention is applied in combating an antiship missile threat
  • the method can also be applied when coping with missiles directed to other mother platforms, such as missiles threatening an airplane or a ground vehicle.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
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EP08173134A 2008-12-31 2008-12-31 Procédé d'application de déploiement de neutralisation par déroutement, système de déploiement de neutralisation par déroutement et produit de programme informatique Withdrawn EP2204632A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (8)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP08173134A EP2204632A1 (fr) 2008-12-31 2008-12-31 Procédé d'application de déploiement de neutralisation par déroutement, système de déploiement de neutralisation par déroutement et produit de programme informatique
PCT/NL2009/050837 WO2010077142A1 (fr) 2008-12-31 2009-12-30 Procédé d'application d'un déploiement de contre-mesures non destructives, système de déploiement de contre-mesures non destructives et progiciel informatique
EP09796128A EP2382438A1 (fr) 2008-12-31 2009-12-30 Procédé d'application d'un déploiement de contre-mesures non destructives, système de déploiement de contre-mesures non destructives et progiciel informatique
JP2011544392A JP2012514179A (ja) 2008-12-31 2009-12-30 誘導攪乱展開を適用する方法、誘導攪乱展開システム、およびコンピュータプログラム製品
US13/142,490 US20120055990A1 (en) 2008-12-31 2009-12-30 Method of Applying Soft-Kill Deployment, a Soft-Kill Deployment System and a Computer Program Product
CA2748832A CA2748832A1 (fr) 2008-12-31 2009-12-30 Procede d'application d'un deploiement de contre-mesures non destructives, systeme de deploiement de contre-mesures non destructives et progiciel informatique
AU2009333968A AU2009333968B2 (en) 2008-12-31 2009-12-30 A method of applying soft-kill deployment, a soft-kill deployment system and a computer program product
IL213837A IL213837A0 (en) 2008-12-31 2011-06-29 A method of applying soft-kill deployment, a soft-kill deployment system and a computer program product

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EP08173134A EP2204632A1 (fr) 2008-12-31 2008-12-31 Procédé d'application de déploiement de neutralisation par déroutement, système de déploiement de neutralisation par déroutement et produit de programme informatique

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EP09796128A Withdrawn EP2382438A1 (fr) 2008-12-31 2009-12-30 Procédé d'application d'un déploiement de contre-mesures non destructives, système de déploiement de contre-mesures non destructives et progiciel informatique

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US (1) US20120055990A1 (fr)
EP (2) EP2204632A1 (fr)
JP (1) JP2012514179A (fr)
AU (1) AU2009333968B2 (fr)
CA (1) CA2748832A1 (fr)
IL (1) IL213837A0 (fr)
WO (1) WO2010077142A1 (fr)

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US20120055990A1 (en) 2012-03-08
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AU2009333968A1 (en) 2011-07-21
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JP2012514179A (ja) 2012-06-21
CA2748832A1 (fr) 2010-07-08

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