EP1824721B1 - Method and system for verification of a data transmission unit for control of a travelling object - Google Patents
Method and system for verification of a data transmission unit for control of a travelling object Download PDFInfo
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- EP1824721B1 EP1824721B1 EP05796217A EP05796217A EP1824721B1 EP 1824721 B1 EP1824721 B1 EP 1824721B1 EP 05796217 A EP05796217 A EP 05796217A EP 05796217 A EP05796217 A EP 05796217A EP 1824721 B1 EP1824721 B1 EP 1824721B1
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- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- data transmission
- transmission unit
- information
- transmitted
- code
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L3/00—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. to release brake, to operate a warning signal
- B61L3/02—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. to release brake, to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control
- B61L3/08—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. to release brake, to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically
- B61L3/12—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. to release brake, to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves
- B61L3/121—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. to release brake, to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves using magnetic induction
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation
- B61L2027/202—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method and a system for checking a data transmission unit for controlling a moving object, in particular a rail-bound vehicle.
- punctual and / or linear data transmission units such as, for example, balises, transmission loops or leakage cables, are used to transmit information relevant to the operation of the vehicle to the vehicle.
- This information transmitted to the vehicle includes, for example, a signal term displayed on the next light signal in the direction of travel.
- a signal term displayed on the next light signal in the direction of travel may also result in compliance with predefined speed profiles, braking profiles or even emergency braking if the safety of this and / or other vehicle and the passengers and / or goods transported with it can not be guaranteed otherwise.
- the train control information in the ETCS level 1 is called via the air interface A according to punctiform fixed data and / or transparent data transmission units transmitted to the ETCS / ERTMS specification.
- the information transmitted with these balises is therefore of great importance in the As a result, module level security and data transfer procedures are generally subject to Level SIL 4 security levels (Security Integrity Level according to standards EN50159, EN50126 and EN50129 for secure connections).
- Level SIL 4 security levels Security Integrity Level according to standards EN50159, EN50126 and EN50129 for secure connections.
- the present invention is therefore based on the object, a method and a system for checking the correct function of a data transmission unit for controlling a moving object, in particular a rail vehicle, specify, with which a considerably simpler Procedure can be achieved as with the previous route inspection and the subsequent operational monitoring for the acceptance and function monitoring of (trackside) data transmission units.
- the method and system allow immediate feedback of the transmitted information to verify the information actually sent.
- the source of this readback information channel is thus generated "onboard" in the data transmission unit by a receive antenna similar to the transmit antenna.
- the transmission at the data transmission unit can be made active or passive, because, for example, a reflection modulation would be possible.
- a bitstream coder in the data transmission unit as the backward information channel (MD4 / MD5, CRC32, etc.)
- MD4 / MD5, CRC32, etc. backward information channel
- a sufficiently good security of the readback channel can be realized. This allows an automated, cost-effective acceptance of the data transmission unit taking into account the required personal safety and efficiency as well as a qualitative improvement of the system availability and error disclosure can be achieved.
- the information to be transmitted from a signal box and / or a Control center be discontinued. Accordingly, the logical control unit can be assigned to the interlocking and / or the control center.
- a complete test of the signal path can be achieved with SIL 4 level, when the received signals or the code is passed over the signal path in the opposite direction to the direction of the information to be transmitted.
- the received signals or the code can be transmitted on a different from the information to be transmitted frequency.
- the data transmission unit is controlled by a control unit, wherein by means of the control unit, a signal term is converted into a telegram for the data transmission unit and the received signals, preferably already on the data transmission unit, are converted into the code by means of a checksum method.
- FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of a system for train control by means of a balise B and a signal S. Both the balise B and the signal S represent a data signal output by a signal box STW signal concept.
- LEU track-side control unit
- a to the signal term associated Beautysentelegramm BT is transmitted to the Balise B and there transparent to the air interface (as already mentioned as interface "A" after ETCS / ERTMS defined ) transmitted to a not illustrated here rail vehicle.
- the Balise B record this issued to the air interface A Balisentegram BT and send back via a return path RP in the form of a code obtained by a checksum method to the interlocking STW.
- a T element T associated with the LEU which is designed as a bandpass filter and bandpass lock, separates the returned code from the forward-oriented balise telegram BT, so that the code can be sent, for example, directly to the T element T or after transmission via a universal process signal.
- Interface for data and diagnosis UPS in the interlocking STW can be compared by a control unit KE with the originally transmitted signal term.
- the logical control unit KE is indicated here by the stick figure and a separate data cable.
- control unit KE can be implemented fully automatically by software and automatically generate an error telegram if the retransmitted code (for example according to MD4 / MD5, CRC32) does not match the signal concept originally issued by signal box STW.
- the retransmitted code for example according to MD4 / MD5, CRC32
- the control unit KE can be implemented fully automatically by software and automatically generate an error telegram if the retransmitted code (for example according to MD4 / MD5, CRC32) does not match the signal concept originally issued by signal box STW.
- the retransmitted code for example according to MD4 / MD5, CRC32
- FIG. 2 shows the with FIG. 1 comparable case of a control of the balise B via a modular control element MSTT.
- This modular control part MSTT works in a similar way to the LEU, but unlike the LEU it is also able to process the code sent via the return path itself and send it back to the STW interlocking.
- a schematic construction of an embodiment of the invention shows the balise B and the modular actuator MSTT.
- the components used are explained on the basis of the signal path.
- the modular control part MSTT receives a signal term SB from the signal box STW via an ISDN connection.
- a processor CPU and a universal logic core ULK determines the modular control part MSTT associated with this signal term SB Beautysentelegramm BT and feeds this Balsentelegramm BT in the uplink direction via the balisen worne T-member T to a data transmitter DT, the Greysentelegramm BT by way of FSK (Frequency Shift Keying) modulation modulates to an analog amplifier AV passes.
- the analog amplifier AV then sends the modulated Beautysentegram BT 'via a loop antenna / current loop A to the air interface "A".
- This modulated Balisentegram BT is now by means of a second on the Balise B arranged antenna (loop), hereinafter called antenna sample AP, received and by means of a coder Coder in one after any Checksum method obtained code converted.
- This code is also modulated by means of the coder to an analog or digital carrier signal whose frequency differs significantly from the frequency of the data signal of the balancing telegram BT (see. Fig. 4 ), so that the T-member T precludes a retroactivity of this code on the antenna A.
- the code is then transmitted via the interface "C” and via another T-element T, which is arranged on the modular control part MSTT, back to the modular control part MSTT and transmitted from there again via the ISDN connection in the interlocking STW.
- the automatable check now takes place as to whether the returned code corresponds to the signal signal SB originally set.
- the T-gate T can also be omitted in those applications in which the received signal of the Beautyse B is known and can be recovered by a mathematical correlation function, as is known, for example, from echo cancellation in telecommunications.
- FIG. 4 now shows a schematic representation of the frequency in the above signal paths.
- the free frequency ranges are listed on which, for example, the code can be returned. Since the code, for example MD5 or CRC32, is only about 32 bits long, only low requirements are placed on the transmission rate of the return path RP, which physically corresponds to the telegram path TP (unlike the telegram path on which the 1024 bit long ETCS - balancing telegram BT has to be transmitted).
- the signal for the power supply of the Balise B transmits on a frequency of 8.826 kHz.
- the data signal of the Beautysentelegramms C transmits in a range of 232 kHz to about 1.3 MHz. For the returned code therefore remain comfortable areas free frequency spectrum FS.
- the method and the system allow an immediate return of the sent Beautysentelegramms BT for checking in the interlocking STW.
- the source of this readback information channel (return path RP) is thus generated "onboard" in the balise B by a receive antenna AP similar to the transmit antenna A.
- the security of the return path RP can be realized.
- an automatable cost-effective acceptance of the Transparent-Balise B can be achieved taking into account the required personal safety and efficiency as well as a qualitative improvement of the system availability and error disclosure in the Rolling Wheel operated network.
- any type of communication units can be checked for release and monitored for correct operation in current traffic.
- a route point for driving display cross sections on roads, in particular highways may be mentioned, in which not only the information controlling the traffic is displayed, but will also be transmitted to the vehicles in the future.
Abstract
Description
Die vorliegende Erfindung betrifft ein Verfahren und ein System zur Überprüfung einer Datenübertragungseinheit zur Steuerung eines fahrenden Objektes, insbesondere eines schienengebundenen Fahrzeugs.The present invention relates to a method and a system for checking a data transmission unit for controlling a moving object, in particular a rail-bound vehicle.
Im schienengebundenen Verkehr werden punkt- und/oder linienförmige Datenübertragungseinheiten, wie zum Beispiel Balisen, Sendeschlaufen bzw. Leckkabel eingesetzt, um für den Betrieb des Fahrzeugs relevante Informationen auf das Fahrzeug zu übertragen. Diese auf das Fahrzeug übertragenen Informationen beinhalten beispielsweise einen am in Fahrtrichtung nächsten Lichtsignal angezeigten Signalbegriff. Derartige Informationen können in Abhängigkeit vom Betriebszustand des Fahrzeugs auch das Befolgen vorgegebener Geschwindigkeitsprofile, Bremsprofile oder sogar Zwangsbremsungen zur Folge haben, wenn die Sicherheit dieses und/oder anderer Fahrzeugs und der mit diesen transportierten Fahrgäste und/oder Güter ansonsten nicht mehr gewährleistet werden kann.In rail-bound traffic, punctual and / or linear data transmission units, such as, for example, balises, transmission loops or leakage cables, are used to transmit information relevant to the operation of the vehicle to the vehicle. This information transmitted to the vehicle includes, for example, a signal term displayed on the next light signal in the direction of travel. Depending on the operating state of the vehicle, such information may also result in compliance with predefined speed profiles, braking profiles or even emergency braking if the safety of this and / or other vehicle and the passengers and / or goods transported with it can not be guaranteed otherwise.
Im besonderen im neuen zukünftig europaweit eingesetzten Zugbeeinflussungssystem ETCS/ERTMS (European Train Control System, European Railway Traffic Management System) werden im ETCS Level 1 die Zugbeeinflussungsinformationen mittels punktförmigen Festdaten- und/oder transparenten Datenübertragungseinheiten, im Fachjargon Balisen genannt, über die Luftschnittstelle A gemäss der ETCS/ERTMS Spezifikation übertragen. Den mit diesen Balisen übertragenen Informationen kommen daher eine hohe Bedeutung in der Sicherung des Zugverkehrs zu, weshalb an die Modul-Einheiten und die durchgeführten Datenübertragungsverfahren in der Regel eine Sicherheitsstufe nach Level SIL 4 gestellt wird (Security Integrity Level nach Normen EN50159, EN50126 und EN50129 für sichere Anschaltungen). Damit werden neben der im Betrieb erforderlichen hohen Sicherheit auch hohe Anforderungen an die Streckenabnahme und die Module und Systemverfügbarkeit sowie ihre Fehleroffenbarung gelegt.In particular, in the new train control system ETCS / ERTMS (European Train Traffic Management System) used in Europe in the future, the train control information in the ETCS level 1 is called via the air interface A according to punctiform fixed data and / or transparent data transmission units transmitted to the ETCS / ERTMS specification. The information transmitted with these balises is therefore of great importance in the As a result, module level security and data transfer procedures are generally subject to Level SIL 4 security levels (Security Integrity Level according to standards EN50159, EN50126 and EN50129 for secure connections). Thus, in addition to the high level of safety required during operation, high demands are placed on the track acceptance and the modules and system availability as well as their error disclosure.
Im Stand der Technik werden eine Projektierung der Orte für eine Anordnung einer transparenten Balise, also einer Balise, die verschiedene Signalbegriffe transparent durchleitet; sowie eine Projektierung der ETCS-Balisentelegramme im Labor oder Büro vorgenommen. Diese Daten werden auf eine gleisseitige Steuerungseinheit für die Balise, nachfolgend LEU (Lineside Electronic Unit) genannt, transferiert oder via modulares Stellteil, nachfolgend MSTT genannt, in den Telegrammspeicher des Logikkern des modularen Stellteils transferiert. Für die Abnahme der Streckenpunkte muss nun verifiziert werden, dass die Balise für jeden für diesen Streckenpunkt projektierten Signalbegriff auch das richtige (zugehörige) Balisentelegramm an die Luftschnittstelle (A gemäss ETCS Spezifikation) ausgibt. Hierzu ist es derzeit erforderlich, die Strecke für das Auslesen der pro Signalbegriff vorgesehenen Projektierungsdaten zu sperren und das gesendete Balisentelegramm an der Luftschnittstelle mit einem Programmier- und Auslesegerät vor Ort von Hand abzugreifen. Das abgegriffene Balisentelegramm wird dann mit einem Prüfsummenverfahren, wie z.B. MD4/MD5 oder CRC32, verarbeitet und der entsprechend ermittelte Code pro Signalbegriff abgelesen und erfasst. Dies erfordert es, dass die Signalbegriffe hintereinander einzeln und deutlich voneinander separiert vom Stellwerk oder der Leittechnikzentrale durchgestellt werden müssen, was beispielsweise über GSM-Verbindungen von den Streckenposten mit dem Stellwerkpersonal oder über sonstige Funkverbindungen gelöst werden muss. Problematisch ist dieses Verfahren vor allen Dingen in Tunneln oder solchen Abschnitten, die keine ausreichende Abdeckung mit drahtlosen Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen aufweisen. Nach dieser (wenn auch mitunter komplizierten und aufwendigen) Aufnahme der Codes für die verschiedenen möglichen Signalbegriffe pro Streckenpunkt müssen beide Codes - also der dem zugeordneten Signalbegriff entsprechende Code, der vom Stellwerk an die Steuerungseinheit ausgegeben wird, und der zu dem mit dem Programmier- und Auslesegerät aufgenommenen Balisentelegramm gehörige Code im Büro (von der bereits durchgeführten Projektierung) verglichen werden. Erst dann kann verifiziert werden, ob eine LEU oder ein MSTT möglicherweise falsch projektiert, also ob der Bitinhalt und die Zuordung des richtigen ETCS Telegrames für jeden Signalbegriff stimmen, wurden und ob die Balise funktechnisch überhaupt korrekt funktioniert.In the prior art, a configuration of the locations for an arrangement of a transparent balise, ie a balise, which transparently passes through different signal terms; as well as a project planning of the ETCS-Balisentegrams in the laboratory or office. These data are transferred to a trackside control unit for the balise, hereinafter referred to as LEU (Lineside Electronic Unit), or transferred to the message memory of the logic core of the modular control unit via a modular control section, hereinafter referred to as MCP. For the acceptance of the route points, it must now be verified that the beacon also outputs the correct (associated) balise telegram to the air interface (A according to ETCS specification) for each signal concept configured for this route point. For this purpose, it is currently necessary to block the route for reading out the configuration data provided for each signal concept and to manually pick up the transmitted balise telegram at the air interface with a programming and readout device on site. The tapped Balisentelegramm is then processed with a checksum method, such as MD4 / MD5 or CRC32, and the corresponding determined code per signal concept read and recorded. This requires that the signal terms behind each other individually and clearly separated from each other by the signal box or the control center must be put through what must be solved for example via GSM connections from the marshals with the interphone personnel or other wireless connections. This process is problematic all things in tunnels or sections that do not have sufficient coverage with wireless telecommunications services. After this (although sometimes complicated and expensive) recording the codes for the different possible signal terms per waypoint both codes - ie the corresponding signal signal corresponding code output from the interlocking to the control unit, and to the with the programming and Readout code recorded in the office (from the project already carried out). Only then can it be verified whether a LEU or a MSTT may be projecting incorrectly, ie whether the bit content and the assignment of the correct ETCS telegram are correct for each signal concept, and whether the balise functions properly in terms of radio technology.
Auch im Betrieb wird die Fehlerhaftigkeit dieser Signalkette zur Abstrahlung des ETCS-Telegramms erst dann bemerkt, wenn das Telegramm entweder nicht vollständig oder sonst wie fehlerhaft übertragen wird oder wenn der Führer des Fahrzeugs von sich aus merkt, dass die übertragene Information nicht mit dem tatsächlich am Signal angezeigten Signalbegriff plausibel ist. Es kann daher eine erhebliche Zeitdauer verstreichen, bis sich ein diesbezüglicher Fehler also offenbart. Dieser Fehler kann dann erhebliche Rückwirkungen auf die Verfügbarkeit dieses Streckenabschnitts haben, was einen nicht tolierbaren Sicherheitsverlust und einen gehörigen Ausfall von Personen- und/oder Tonnenkilometern nach sich ziehen kann, da die Strecke ja bis zur Behebung dieses Fehler ausser Betrieb genommen werden muss.Also in operation, the defectiveness of this signal chain for the emission of the ETCS telegram is not noticed until the telegram is either not complete or otherwise transmitted as faulty or if the driver of the vehicle notes of itself that the transmitted information does not match the actual am Signal displayed signal concept is plausible. It can therefore take a considerable amount of time until an error of this kind is revealed. This error can then have significant repercussions on the availability of this section of the route, which can result in a non-fatal loss of security and a substantial loss of passenger and / or tonne-kilometers, since the route must indeed be taken out of service until this fault is rectified.
Der vorliegenden Erfindung liegt daher die Aufgabe zugrunde, ein Verfahren und ein System zur Überprüfung der korrekten Funktion einer Datenübertragungseinheit zur Steuerung eines fahrenden Objektes, insbesondere eines schienengebundenen Fahrzeugs, anzugeben, mit denen eine erheblich einfachere Vorgehensweise als mit der bisherigen Streckenbegehung und der nachfolgenden betrieblichen Überwachung für die Abnahme und Funktionsüberwachung von (gleisseitigen) Datenübertragungseinheiten erreicht werden können.The present invention is therefore based on the object, a method and a system for checking the correct function of a data transmission unit for controlling a moving object, in particular a rail vehicle, specify, with which a considerably simpler Procedure can be achieved as with the previous route inspection and the subsequent operational monitoring for the acceptance and function monitoring of (trackside) data transmission units.
Diese Aufgabe wird bezüglich des Verfahrens erfindungsgemäss dadurch gelöst, dass ein Verfahren zur Überprüfung der Funktion einer Datenübertragungseinheit, die zur drahtlosen Steuerung eines fahrenden Objektes, insbesondere eines schienengebundenen Fahrzeugs, dient, vorgesehen ist, bei dem
- a) eine auf das Fahrzeug zu übertragende und über einen Signalweg herangeführte Information mit der Datenübertragungseinheit abgestrahlt wird;
- b) eine in der Datenübertragungseinheit angeordnete Empfangseinrichtung zum Empfang der zu übertragenden Information vorgesehen wird;
- c) die mittels der Empfangseinrichtung empfangenen Signale unverändert oder mittels einer Analyseeinrichtung bewertet in Form eines Codes an eine logische Kontrolleinheit übertragen werden;
- d) die logische Kontrolleinheit die mit der Datenübertragungseinheit abzustrahlende Information und die empfangenen Signale bzw. den Code vergleicht; und
- e) anhand des Vergleichs der Betriebszustand der Datenübertragungseinheit und/oder des Signalwegs bestimmt wird.
- a) an information to be transmitted to the vehicle and brought up via a signal path is radiated with the data transmission unit;
- b) a receiving device arranged in the data transmission unit is provided for receiving the information to be transmitted;
- c) the signals received by the receiving device are transmitted unchanged or evaluated by means of an analysis device in the form of a code to a logical control unit;
- d) the logical control unit compares the information to be radiated with the data transmission unit and the received signals or the code; and
- e) is determined based on the comparison of the operating state of the data transmission unit and / or the signal path.
Bezüglich des Systems wird diese Aufgabe erfindungsgemäss durch ein System zur Überprüfung der Funktion einer Datenübertragungseinheit zur Steuerung eines fahrenden Objektes, insbesondere eines schienengebundenen Fahrzeugs, gelöst, umfassend:
- a) eine der Datenübertragungseinheit zugeordnete Antenne, mit der eine auf das Fahrzeug zu übertragende und über einen Signalweg herangeführte Information abstrahlbar ist;
- b) eine der Datenübertragungseinheit zugeordnete Empfangseinrichtung zum Empfang der zu übertragenden Information;
- c) Datenübertragungsmittel, mit denen die mittels der Empfangseinrichtung empfangenen Signale unverändert oder mittels einer Analyseeinrichtung, insbesondere ein Codierer bzw. Decodierer, bewertet in Form eines Codes an eine logische Kontrolleinheit übertragbar sind;
- d) die logische Kontrolleinheit so ausgestaltet ist, dass die mit der Datenübertragungseinheit abzustrahlende Information und die empfangenen Signale bzw. den Code vergleichbar sind; und
- e) dass anhand des Vergleichs der Betriebszustand der Datenübertragungseinheit und/oder des Signalwegs bestimmbar ist.
- a) an antenna assigned to the data transmission unit, with which an information to be transmitted to the vehicle and brought up via a signal path can be emitted;
- b) a receiving unit associated with the data transmission unit for receiving the information to be transmitted;
- c) data transmission means with which the signals received by means of the receiving device can be transmitted unchanged or by means of an analysis device, in particular an encoder or decoder, evaluated in the form of a code to a logical control unit;
- d) the logical control unit is designed such that the information to be radiated with the data transmission unit and the received signals or the code are comparable; and
- e) that based on the comparison of the operating state of the data transmission unit and / or the signal path can be determined.
Auf diese Weise gestatten das verfahren und das System eine unmittelbare Rückführung der ausgesendeten Information zum Überprüfen der tatsächlich gesendeten Information. Die Quelle dieses Rückleseinformationskanals wird somit "onboard" in der Datenübertragungseinheit durch eine der Sendeantenne ähnliche Empfangsantenne erzeugt. Es sein angemerkt, dass die Übertragung an der Datenübertragungseinheit aktiv oder passiv vorgenommen werden kann, weil beispielsweise auch eine Reflexionsmodulation möglich wäre. Durch die Implementierung eines Bitstrom Coders (Balisentelegramm-Codierers) in der Datenübertragungseinheit als Rückwärtsinformationskanal (MD4/MD5, CRC32 etc.) kann eine genügend gute Sicherheit des Rücklesekanals realisiert werden. Damit können eine automatisierte kostengünstigere Abnahme der Datenübertragungseinheit unter Berücksichtigung der geforderten Personensicherheit und Effizienz sowie eine qualitative Verbesserung der Systemverfügbarkeit und Fehleroffenbarung erreicht werden.In this way, the method and system allow immediate feedback of the transmitted information to verify the information actually sent. The source of this readback information channel is thus generated "onboard" in the data transmission unit by a receive antenna similar to the transmit antenna. It should be noted that the transmission at the data transmission unit can be made active or passive, because, for example, a reflection modulation would be possible. By implementing a bitstream coder in the data transmission unit as the backward information channel (MD4 / MD5, CRC32, etc.), a sufficiently good security of the readback channel can be realized. This allows an automated, cost-effective acceptance of the data transmission unit taking into account the required personal safety and efficiency as well as a qualitative improvement of the system availability and error disclosure can be achieved.
In zweckmässiger Ausgestaltung der Erfindung kann die zu übertragende Information aus einem Stellwerk und/oder einer Leittechnikzentrale abgesetzt werden. Entsprechend kann die logische Kontrolleinheit dem Stellwerk und/oder der Leittechnikzentrale zugeordnet werden.In an expedient embodiment of the invention, the information to be transmitted from a signal box and / or a Control center be discontinued. Accordingly, the logical control unit can be assigned to the interlocking and / or the control center.
Ein vollständiger Test des Signalwegs kann mit SIL 4 Level erreicht werden, wenn die empfangenen Signale bzw. der Code über den Signalweg in Gegenrichtung zur Richtung der zu übertragenden Information geleitet wird. Zur einfachen Entkopplung von uplink und downlink-Signal können die empfangenen Signale bzw. der Code auf einer von der zu übertragenden Information abweichenden Frequenz übertragen werden.A complete test of the signal path can be achieved with SIL 4 level, when the received signals or the code is passed over the signal path in the opposite direction to the direction of the information to be transmitted. For simple decoupling of uplink and downlink signals, the received signals or the code can be transmitted on a different from the information to be transmitted frequency.
In einfacher Umsetzung einer Ausgestaltung der Erfindung kann die Datenübertragungseinheit mittels einer Steuerungseinheit gesteuert wird, wobei mittels der Steuerungseinheit ein Signalbegriff in ein Telegramm für die Datenübertragungseinheit umgewandelt wird und die empfangenen Signale, vorzugsweise bereits auf der Datenübertragungseinheit, mittels eines Prüfsummenverfahrens in den Code umgewandelt werden.In a simple implementation of an embodiment of the invention, the data transmission unit is controlled by a control unit, wherein by means of the control unit, a signal term is converted into a telegram for the data transmission unit and the received signals, preferably already on the data transmission unit, are converted into the code by means of a checksum method.
Vorteilhafte Ausgestaltungen der Erfindung sind in weiteren Unteransprüchen angegeben.Advantageous embodiments of the invention are specified in further subclaims.
Die Erfindung wird nachfolgend anhand der Zeichnung beispielsweise näher erläutert. Dabei zeigen:
- Figur 1
- eine schematische Darstellung eines ersten Systems mit einem Rückpfad für das von einer Balise ausgestrahlte Balisentelegramm;
- Figur 2
- eine schematische Darstellung eines zweiten Systems mit einem Rückpfad.für das von einer Balise ausgestrahlte Balisentelegramm;
- Figur 3
- eine schematische Darstellung eines Layouts für die Balise und ein die Balise steuerndes MSTT; und
- Figur 4
- eine schematische Darstellung der Frequenznutzung für das Balisentelegramm und die Coderücksendung.
- FIG. 1
- a schematic representation of a first system with a return path for the radiated from a balise Balisentelegramm;
- FIG. 2
- a schematic representation of a second system with a Rückpfad.für the radiated from a balise Balisentelegramm;
- FIG. 3
- a schematic representation of a layout for the Balise and a balise controlling MSTT; and
- FIG. 4
- a schematic representation of the frequency usage for the Balisentelegramm and the code return.
Selbstverständlich kann die Kontrolleinheit KE vollautomatisch arbeitend softwaremässig realisiert sein und automatisch ein Fehlertelegramm generieren, wenn der rückübertragene Code (z.B. nach MD4/MD5, CRC32) nicht mit dem ursprünglich von Stellwerk STW abgesetzten Signalbegriff übereinstimmt. In einem solchen Störungsfall arbeitet mindestens ein Element in der Signalkette vom Stellwerk STW zu der Balise B nicht ordnungsgemäss und muss wegen der möglichen Sicherheitsgefährdung sofort ausgetauscht werden.Of course, the control unit KE can be implemented fully automatically by software and automatically generate an error telegram if the retransmitted code (for example according to MD4 / MD5, CRC32) does not match the signal concept originally issued by signal box STW. In such a fault case, at least one element in the signal chain from the STW interlocking to the Balise B is not working properly and must be replaced immediately because of the possible safety hazard.
Ein schematischer Aufbau einer Ausführungsform der Erfindung zeigt die Balise B und das modulare Stellteil MSTT. Die eingesetzten Komponenten werden anhand des Signalweges erläutert. Das modulare Stellteil MSTT erhält über eine ISDN-Verbindung einen Signalbegriff SB von dem Stellwerk STW. Mittels eines Prozessors CPU und eines universellen Logikkerns ULK ermittelt das modulare Stellteil MSTT das zu diesem Signalbegriff SB zugehörige Balisentelegramm BT und speist dieses Balisentelegramm BT in Uplink-Richtung über das balisenseitige T-Glied T an einen Datentransmitter DT, der das Balisentelegramm BT im Wege einer FSK (Frequency Shift Keying)-Modulation moduliert an einen analogen Verstärker AV übergibt. Der analoge Verstärker AV sendet dann das modulierte Balisentelegramm BT' über eine Rahmenantenne/Stromschlaufe A an die Luftschnittstelle "A".A schematic construction of an embodiment of the invention shows the balise B and the modular actuator MSTT. The components used are explained on the basis of the signal path. The modular control part MSTT receives a signal term SB from the signal box STW via an ISDN connection. By means of a processor CPU and a universal logic core ULK determines the modular control part MSTT associated with this signal term SB Balisentelegramm BT and feeds this Balisentelegramm BT in the uplink direction via the balisenseitige T-member T to a data transmitter DT, the Balisentelegramm BT by way of FSK (Frequency Shift Keying) modulation modulates to an analog amplifier AV passes. The analog amplifier AV then sends the modulated Balisentegram BT 'via a loop antenna / current loop A to the air interface "A".
Dieses modulierte Balisentelegramm BT' wird nun mittels einer zweiten auf der Balise B angeordneten Antenne (Schlaufe), nachfolgend Antennenprobe AP genannt, empfangen und mittels eines Codierers Coder in einen nach einem beliebigen Prüfsummenverfahren gewonnenen Code umgewandelt. Dieser Code wird mittels des Coders zudem auf ein analoges oder digitales Trägersignal moduliert, dessen Frequenz von der Frequenz des Datensignals des Balisentelegramms BT deutlich abweicht (vgl.
Auf diese Weise gestatten das Verfahren und das System eine unmittelbare Rückführung des ausgesendeten Balisentelegramms BT zum Überprüfen im Stellwerk STW. Die Quelle dieses Rückleseinformationskanals (Rückpfad RP) wird somit "onboard" in der Balise B durch eine der Sendeantenne A ähnliche Empfangsantenne AP erzeugt. Durch die Implementierung eines Bitstrom Coders (Balisentelegramm-Codierers) in der Balise B als Rückwärtsinformationskanal (MD4/MD5, CRC32 etc.) kann die Sicherheit des Rückpfades RP realisiert werden. Damit können eine automatisierbare kostengünstige Abnahme der Transparent-Balise B unter Berücksichtigung der geforderten Personensicherheit und Effizienz sowie eine qualitative Verbesserung der Systemverfügbarkeit und Fehleroffenbarung im unter dem Rollenden Rad betriebenene Netzwerk erreicht werden.In this way, the method and the system allow an immediate return of the sent Balisentelegramms BT for checking in the interlocking STW. The source of this readback information channel (return path RP) is thus generated "onboard" in the balise B by a receive antenna AP similar to the transmit antenna A. By implementing a bitstream coder in the balise B as the backward information channel (MD4 / MD5, CRC32, etc.), the security of the return path RP can be realized. Thus, an automatable cost-effective acceptance of the Transparent-Balise B can be achieved taking into account the required personal safety and efficiency as well as a qualitative improvement of the system availability and error disclosure in the Rolling Wheel operated network.
Auch wenn das vorliegende Ausführungsbeispiel in Bereich des schienengebundenen Verkehrs angesiedelt ist, können mit dem vorliegenden System und dem vorliegenden Verfahren im Grunde genommen jede Art von Datenübertragungseinheiten hinsichtlich der Freigabe überprüft und auf korrekte Funktion im laufenden Verkehr überwacht werden kann. Beispielhaft kann hier ein Streckenpunkt zur Ansteuerung von Anzeigequerschnitten auf Strassen, insbesondere Autobahnen, genannt werden, bei dem nicht nur die den Verkehr steuernde Information angezeigt wird, sondern zukünftig auch auf die Fahrzeuge übertragen werden wird.Although the present embodiment resides in the field of rail transport, with the present system and method, basically, any type of communication units can be checked for release and monitored for correct operation in current traffic. By way of example, a route point for driving display cross sections on roads, in particular highways, may be mentioned, in which not only the information controlling the traffic is displayed, but will also be transmitted to the vehicles in the future.
Claims (12)
- Method for verification of the function of a data transmission unit (B) for control of a travelling object, especially a track-bound vehicle, in whicha) information (BT) to be transmitted to the vehicle and provided via a signal path (TP) is broadcast using the data transmission unit (B);b) a receiver device (AP) disposed in the data transmission unit (B) for receiving the information (BT) to be transmitted is provided;c) the signals received by means of the receiver device (AP) are transmitted to a logical control unit (KE) unchanged or in the form of a code after evaluation by an analytical device (Coder);d) the logical control unit (KE) compares the information (BT) to be broadcast by the data transmission unit (B) with the received signals or the code; ande) on the basis of the comparison the operating state of the data transmission unit (B) and/or of the signal path (TP) is determined.
- Method according to claim 1,
characterised in that
the information (BT) to be transmitted is dispatched from an interlocking (STW) and/or a control centre. - Method according to claim 1 or 2,
characterised in that
the logical control unit (KE) is provided for the interlocking (STW) and/or the control centre. - Method according to one of claims 1 to 3,
characterised in that
the received signals or the code are routed via the signal path (TP) in the opposite direction to the direction of the information (BT) to be transmitted. - Method according to one of claims 1 to 4,
characterised in that
the received signals or the code are transmitted on a frequency differing from the information (BT) to be transmitted. - Method according to one of claims 1 to 5,
characterised in that
the data transmission unit (B) is controlled by means of a control unit (LEU, MSTT), a signal aspect (SB) being converted into a telegram (BT) for the data transmission unit (B) by means of the control unit (LEU, MSTT) and the received signals being converted into the code by means of a check sum method. - System for verification of the function of a data transmission unit (B) for control of a travelling object, especially a track-bound vehicle, comprising:a) an antenna (A) provided for the data transmission unit (B), by means of which information (BT) for transmission to the vehicle provided via a signal path (TP) can be broadcast;b) a receiver device (AP) provided for the data transmission unit (B) for receiving the information (BT) to be transmitted;c) data transmission means (Coder, T), by means of which the signals received by means of the receiver device (AP) can be transmitted to a logical control unit (KE) unchanged or in the form of a code after evaluation by an analytical device;d) the logical control unit (KE) is configured such that the information (BT) to be broadcast by the data transmission unit (B) can be compared with the received signals or the code; ande) that on the basis of the comparison the operating state of the data transmission unit (B) and/or of the signal path (TP) can be determined.
- System according to claim 7,
characterised in that
an interlocking (STW) and/or a control centre are provided, which send the information (SB) to be transmitted to a control unit (LEU, MSTT) controlling the data transmission unit (B). - System according to claim 7 or 8,
characterised in that
the logical control unit (KE) is provided for the interlocking (STW) and/or the control centre. - System according to one of claims 7 to 9,
characterised in that
transmission means (Coder, T) are provided which route the received signals or the code via the signal path (TP) in the opposite direction to the direction of the information (BT) to be transmitted. - System according to one of claims 7 to 10,
characterised in that
the transmission means transmit the received signals or the code on a frequency differing from the information to be transmitted. - System according to one of claims 7 to 11,
characterised in that
the data transmission unit (B) is controlled by means of a control unit (LEU, MSTT), a signal aspect (SB) being converted into a telegram (BT) for the data transmission unit (B) by means of the control unit (LEU, MSTT) and the received signals being converted into the code by means of a coder (Coder) disposed in the data transmission unit, preferably in accordance with a check sum method.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP05796217A EP1824721B1 (en) | 2004-11-25 | 2005-10-25 | Method and system for verification of a data transmission unit for control of a travelling object |
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP04027960A EP1661784A1 (en) | 2004-11-25 | 2004-11-25 | Method and system for checking the function of a data transmission unit for controlling a moving object |
PCT/EP2005/011407 WO2006056284A1 (en) | 2004-11-25 | 2005-10-25 | Method and system for verification of a data transmission unit for control of a travelling object |
EP05796217A EP1824721B1 (en) | 2004-11-25 | 2005-10-25 | Method and system for verification of a data transmission unit for control of a travelling object |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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EP1824721A1 EP1824721A1 (en) | 2007-08-29 |
EP1824721B1 true EP1824721B1 (en) | 2008-03-05 |
Family
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Family Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP04027960A Withdrawn EP1661784A1 (en) | 2004-11-25 | 2004-11-25 | Method and system for checking the function of a data transmission unit for controlling a moving object |
EP05796217A Not-in-force EP1824721B1 (en) | 2004-11-25 | 2005-10-25 | Method and system for verification of a data transmission unit for control of a travelling object |
Family Applications Before (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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EP04027960A Withdrawn EP1661784A1 (en) | 2004-11-25 | 2004-11-25 | Method and system for checking the function of a data transmission unit for controlling a moving object |
Country Status (8)
Country | Link |
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EP (2) | EP1661784A1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN101065283B (en) |
AT (1) | ATE388072T1 (en) |
AU (1) | AU2005309079B2 (en) |
DE (1) | DE502005003148D1 (en) |
DK (1) | DK1824721T3 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2301065T3 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2006056284A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (13)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102007006130A1 (en) * | 2007-02-02 | 2008-08-07 | Siemens Ag | Method, mobile operating device and arrangement for transmitting data to a route element of the track-bound traffic |
DE102007019035A1 (en) * | 2007-04-18 | 2008-10-23 | Siemens Ag | Method and test device for checking the functionality of a route point of the track-bound traffic as well as route point and arrangement |
FR2916719B1 (en) * | 2007-05-31 | 2009-08-21 | Alstom Transport Sa | COMMUNICATION BEACON AND ASSOCIATED CONFIGURATION DEVICE |
FR2938229B1 (en) * | 2008-11-12 | 2010-12-24 | Alstom Transport Sa | ANOMALY DETECTION DEVICE FOR A SUPERVISION INSTALLATION OF A RAIL VEHICLE, ASSOCIATED INSTALLATION AND METHOD |
EP2450253A1 (en) * | 2010-11-08 | 2012-05-09 | Siemens Schweiz AG | Method for qualifying a data cable for ETCS signalling data |
CN102307148B (en) * | 2011-09-22 | 2014-04-02 | 北京铁路信号有限公司 | Method for determining bit error rate of transponder message |
CN102857366B (en) * | 2012-06-08 | 2015-02-18 | 北京和利时系统工程有限公司 | Trackside electronic device for transparent transmission of information of high-speed railway responder |
CN102984054B (en) * | 2012-11-19 | 2015-06-24 | 北京交大思诺科技有限公司 | Special message sending device and message sending method for balise transmission module (BTM) |
DE102013209307A1 (en) * | 2013-05-21 | 2014-11-27 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method for operating an automatic train control system and automatic train control system |
ES2750278T3 (en) * | 2015-03-09 | 2020-03-25 | Bombardier Transp Gmbh | A device and a procedure to monitor the operability of a signal connection |
ES2898658T3 (en) * | 2016-04-04 | 2022-03-08 | Thales Man & Services Deutschland Gmbh | Method for safe train integrity monitoring and the use of on-board units of an automatic train protection system for train integrity monitoring |
DE102016108446A1 (en) * | 2016-05-06 | 2017-11-09 | Terex Mhps Gmbh | System and method for determining the position of a transport vehicle and transport vehicle |
DE102019214637A1 (en) * | 2019-09-25 | 2021-03-25 | Siemens Mobility GmbH | Method for monitoring functions of a balise and a reading device suitable for this purpose |
Family Cites Families (8)
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DE3674205D1 (en) * | 1986-06-24 | 1990-10-18 | Acec Transport Sa | DEVICE FOR DOT-SIGNAL TRANSFER OF DATA BETWEEN THE TRACK AND A TRAIN. |
CN1051045C (en) * | 1994-03-04 | 2000-04-05 | 黄金富 | Real-time continuous detecting method and system for train runing parameters |
ATE211826T1 (en) * | 1995-03-29 | 2002-01-15 | Siemens Schweiz Ag | METHOD AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM FOR DATA TRANSMISSION BETWEEN TWO STATIONS |
DE59607113D1 (en) * | 1995-04-13 | 2001-07-26 | Siemens Schweiz Ag Zuerich | Data transmission method and device |
PT894061E (en) * | 1996-04-19 | 2002-07-31 | Siemens Schweiz Ag | PROCESS AND SELECTIVE DATA TRANSMISSION DEVICE IN TRAFFIC ENGINEERING COMICS SYSTEMS |
DE19647744A1 (en) * | 1996-11-06 | 1998-05-07 | Siemens Ag | Test for reception channel of contactless transmission system |
WO1998041435A1 (en) * | 1997-03-19 | 1998-09-24 | Hitachi, Ltd. | Method and system for controlling train by radio |
DE59913216D1 (en) * | 1998-05-25 | 2006-05-11 | Siemens Schweiz Ag | Transmission system, especially for traffic systems |
-
2004
- 2004-11-25 EP EP04027960A patent/EP1661784A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2005
- 2005-10-25 DK DK05796217T patent/DK1824721T3/en active
- 2005-10-25 EP EP05796217A patent/EP1824721B1/en not_active Not-in-force
- 2005-10-25 AT AT05796217T patent/ATE388072T1/en active
- 2005-10-25 CN CN2005800404606A patent/CN101065283B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2005-10-25 WO PCT/EP2005/011407 patent/WO2006056284A1/en active IP Right Grant
- 2005-10-25 DE DE502005003148T patent/DE502005003148D1/en active Active
- 2005-10-25 AU AU2005309079A patent/AU2005309079B2/en not_active Ceased
- 2005-10-25 ES ES05796217T patent/ES2301065T3/en active Active
Also Published As
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WO2006056284A1 (en) | 2006-06-01 |
ES2301065T3 (en) | 2008-06-16 |
CN101065283A (en) | 2007-10-31 |
CN101065283B (en) | 2011-01-12 |
DE502005003148D1 (en) | 2008-04-17 |
AU2005309079A1 (en) | 2006-06-01 |
EP1824721A1 (en) | 2007-08-29 |
ATE388072T1 (en) | 2008-03-15 |
EP1661784A1 (en) | 2006-05-31 |
DK1824721T3 (en) | 2008-06-30 |
AU2005309079B2 (en) | 2009-04-23 |
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