EP1646988A2 - Portail de protection de produits et procede de controle de l'authenticite de produits - Google Patents

Portail de protection de produits et procede de controle de l'authenticite de produits

Info

Publication number
EP1646988A2
EP1646988A2 EP04739329A EP04739329A EP1646988A2 EP 1646988 A2 EP1646988 A2 EP 1646988A2 EP 04739329 A EP04739329 A EP 04739329A EP 04739329 A EP04739329 A EP 04739329A EP 1646988 A2 EP1646988 A2 EP 1646988A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
sequence
product
encryption
control
piece
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP04739329A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Ralf Wilde
Sebastian Doose
Kurt Heinz
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
TUEV Rheinland Holding AG
Original Assignee
TUEV Rheinland Holding AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by TUEV Rheinland Holding AG filed Critical TUEV Rheinland Holding AG
Publication of EP1646988A2 publication Critical patent/EP1646988A2/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/02—Marketing; Price estimation or determination; Fundraising
    • G06Q30/0283—Price estimation or determination
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a system for securing products against counterfeiting and for checking the authenticity of products or for detecting product counterfeiting.
  • the security features used only make sense for a limited range of products. Technologically complex measures may require special sensors and measuring devices to check counterfeit products that are not generally available. Conversely, the technical advantage over the counterfeiter on which the security of the feature is based disappears, the faster, the cheaper and simpler the production of the security feature, the faster.
  • the so-called unique card method is known from the German published patent application DE-OS 27 34 456, in which encrypted information is formed from an open information, for example an account number and / or personalization information, and a unique number, this information be recorded on a record carrier.
  • an open information for example an account number and / or personalization information
  • a unique number this information be recorded on a record carrier.
  • the encrypted information and the uniqueness number are used to generate the open information. This is then compared with the open information entered on the record carrier. This procedure is used to secure ID cards and documents.
  • the invention is based on the object of proposing a general product protection method which can in principle be used for all products, as little additional demands verifiability and is inexpensive.
  • the object of the invention is achieved by a method for generating a product protection identifier according to claim 1, by a counterfeit-proof product item according to claim 12, by a method for checking the authenticity of a product item according to claim 23 and by a product protection server structure according to claim 37.
  • Advantageous further developments of the invention result from the subclaims.
  • Computer program products for implementing the method according to the invention result from claims 44, 45.
  • a product-specific identification sequence is first determined for each product piece.
  • the product-specific identification sequence or a sequence derived therefrom is encrypted using an encryption method (F1) using a secret encryption sequence (B), a coded test sequence being generated.
  • a product control sequence comprising the coded test sequence or a sequence derived therefrom is attached to or on the product piece.
  • the producer of a product is provided with a secret encryption sequence (B) and an encryption method (Fl), with which he can convert the respective product-specific identification sequence into a coded test sequence, which is then attached to or on the product piece becomes.
  • a secret encryption sequence B
  • an encryption method Fl
  • counterfeits are identified with the help of the cryptographically generated product control sequence.
  • This can be a security feature be made available that can be used for all product groups due to its independence from physical or chemical product properties. No sensors or measuring devices are required to check the authenticity of a product, only the authenticity of the product control sequence has to be checked. Since an encryption method is used instead of complicated security features (such as, for example, microtext, guilloche printing, kinegrams, transponders, etc.), the method according to the invention is also considerably less expensive than the security features used hitherto.
  • the coded test sequence (C) cannot be generated from the product-specific identification sequence (K) without knowledge of the secret encryption sequence (B). Only producers who have the secret encryption sequence can create product control sequences for the product pieces they produce. The secret encryption sequence (B) cannot be derived from the product control sequences of products on the market.
  • the product control sequence in addition to the coded test sequence (C) or the sequence derived therefrom, also includes the product-specific identification sequence (K).
  • the product control sequence contains both the unencrypted identification sequence (K) and the coded test sequence (C). The authenticity of the product control sequence can thus be checked by checking that the two episode sections of the product control sequence belong together.
  • the coded test sequence (C) or the product-specific identification sequence (K) can be decrypted, for example.
  • the serial number of the product piece is used as the product-specific identification sequence (K) is used.
  • the serial number is generated during product manufacture and allows a product to be assigned to a specific batch. It is common practice to place a serial number, especially on higher quality products.
  • the encrypted test sequence can be added to the serial number without much additional effort.
  • the secret encryption sequence (B) is the secret key of a symmetrical encryption method.
  • Symmetrical encryption methods are also referred to as single-key systems or secret-key systems.
  • a secret key that is to say a secret encryption bit sequence, is used to encrypt the product-specific identification sequence or a sequence derived therefrom.
  • the encrypted sequence generated in this way can only be decrypted with knowledge of this secret key, even if the encryption and decryption method is generally known.
  • this sequence can only have been encrypted with knowledge of this secret key.
  • symmetrical methods can be implemented very quickly and with little effort, both in hardware and in software.
  • Another advantage of using symmetrical encryption methods is that they are used
  • test sequences and product control sequences generated are relatively short, so that they can be conveniently attached to the product pieces.
  • the symmetrical encryption method is one of the encryption Triple-DES, IDEA, CAST-128, Blowfish, RC5, f ⁇ , Rijndael.
  • the secret encryption sequence (B) is the secret key of an asymmetrical encryption method.
  • asymmetrical processes which are also referred to as two-key or public-key processes
  • key pairs are used which comprise a private key and a public key. Since the private key with the computing capacity available today cannot be calculated from the public key, the publication of the public key is possible.
  • the product protection method according to the invention it makes sense to use the secret key on the part of the producer to encrypt the identification sequence or a sequence derived from it.
  • the public key can then be used to check the product authenticity and can be made freely accessible to all communication participants without any confidentiality requirements. In particular, this enables decentralized verification, which can be carried out by the participating dealers and buyers in many different locations.
  • the public key required for decryption can be made available to all of these dealers.
  • the asymmetrical encryption method is one of the RSA, ElGamal, DSA, ECC encryption methods.
  • the product-specific identification sequence (K) is converted into a first hash sequence (h x (K)) before encryption using a first hash method (h x ), the coded test sequence (C) being converted by Ver - code the first hash sequence (h ⁇ K)) with the secret one
  • Encryption sequence (B) is generated. A hash is therefore first placed on the product-specific identification sequence. Method (h is applied, and the hash sequence thus generated is then encrypted. Using a hash method in addition to the encryption can increase the security of the encoding carried out overall. For a counterfeiter, it is therefore virtually impossible to use the coded test sequence (C) to determine the underlying encryption method (Fl) and the underlying secret encryption sequence (B).
  • the coded test sequence (C) is converted into a second hash sequence (h 2 (C)) using a second hash method (h 2 ), which is part of the product control sequence on or on is attached to the product piece.
  • a second hash method (h 2 ) used after the encryption it is in particular possible to shorten very long coded test sequences (C) before they are attached to or on the product piece as part of the product control sequence.
  • long coded test sequences are created which make the use of a second hash method seem expedient.
  • the security of the coding is increased overall by the second hash method.
  • the first or the second hash method is one of the hash methods MD 5, SHA-1, RIPE-MD 160, MDC-2.
  • the counterfeit-proof product piece according to the invention comprises a product control sequence attached to or on the product piece, which comprises a coded test sequence (C) or a sequence derived therefrom.
  • the coded test sequence (C) is generated individually for the product piece in that a product-individual identification sequence (K) or a sequence derived therefrom by means of an encryption method (F1) using a secret encryption sequence (B) is encrypted.
  • an encryption method (F1) using a secret encryption sequence (B) is encrypted.
  • the product control sequence is attached to the product piece as an alphanumeric character string.
  • the coded test sequence and the product control sequence can be generated as bit sequences, whereby the product control sequence can then be represented either as a sequence of digits with numbers from 0 to 9, or as a sequence of ASCII characters, or as any other alphanumeric character string and attached to the product piece.
  • the product control sequence is attached to the product piece in a machine-readable form.
  • the product control sequence could be attached to the product piece as a barcode or as a machine-readable font.
  • the product control sequence could also be stored on a magnetic strip, memory chip or other electronic medium that is connected to the product, the product packaging or the accompanying documents. Since typing in is omitted in this embodiment of the invention, longer product control sequences can also be processed.
  • the product control sequence is attached to the product piece in a legible font.
  • the product control sequence can be checked by typing in the product control sequence using a keyboard.
  • the product control sequence is attached to a document enclosed with the product piece or on the packaging. In this way, a long product control sequence can be added to a product without the product piece being adversely affected.
  • the authenticity of the product piece is checked via the Internet by means of a product control sequence attached to or on the product piece.
  • the product control sequence is recorded by the control interrogator and transmitted to a product protection server structure via the Internet.
  • an encoded test sequence (C) derived from the product control sequence is decrypted using a decryption method (F2) using a decryption sequence (A) and a decrypted test sequence is generated, the decryption sequence (A) with the encryption sequence used for the encryption (B) forms a complementary key pair.
  • the authenticity of the decrypted test sequence or a sequence derived therefrom is checked and the result of the authenticity test is transmitted to the control interrogator via the Internet.
  • a dealer who wants to check the authenticity of product pieces can transmit the corresponding product control sequences to the product protection server structure, for example, using his Internet browser.
  • the decoding of the coded test sequence (C) and the authenticity test are then carried out there.
  • This has the advantage that no devices for checking the product authenticity are required locally at the dealer. Sensors and measuring devices, such as were provided in the methods of the prior art for checking physical and chemical security features, are not necessary in the method according to the invention. Therefore, the overall implementation of the investment protection required minimal investment. Since the decryption is not carried out locally, but centrally on the part of the product protection server structure, a secret or a public key can optionally be used as the decryption sequence (A).
  • the decryption sequence (A) is the secret key of a symmetrical encryption method.
  • the use of a symmetrical encryption method has the advantage that both the key length and the block length are relatively short. Since the decryption for all control queries is carried out centrally by the product protection server structure, the secrecy of the decryption sequence (A) can be ensured by suitable measures, for example by using firewalls, separate crypto servers etc.
  • Another advantage of the use A symmetrical method is that the time required for decryption is very low.
  • the decryption sequence (A) is the public key of an asymmetrical encryption method.
  • the secret encryption sequence (B) can neither be derived from the decryption method (F2), nor from the decryption sequence (A), nor from different samples of pairs of unencrypted and encrypted information. Even if a forger had both the public key, the decryption process and various valid product control sequences available, the forger could not derive the secret encryption sequence (B) from this. It is therefore not possible for him to generate valid product control sequences himself.
  • the coded test sequence (C) is contained as a sequence section in the product control sequence or can be derived from a sequence section of the product control sequence by using a hash inverse function (h 2 _1 ). If the coded test sequence (C) was additionally converted into a second hash sequence (h 2 (C)) by means of a second hash method (h 2 ) when generating the product control sequence, then a hash must first be present on the part of the product protection server structure -Inverse function (h 2 -1 ) are applied to the relevant sequence section of the product control sequence in order to obtain the coded test sequence (C). The encoded test sequence (C) is then decrypted.
  • the decrypted test sequence represents a product-specific identification sequence (K) or can be converted into a product-specific identification sequence (K) by using a hash inversion function (I 1 ).
  • the product-specific identification sequence (K) prior to encryption means of a first hash method (h x) was converted into a first hash result (h ⁇ K)) for the production of the product control sequence
  • the product protection server structure must pages by performing a decryption function (h ⁇ 1 ) can be applied to the decrypted test sequence in order to obtain the product-specific identification sequence (K).
  • the authenticity of the decrypted test sequence or a sequence derived therefrom is checked in that the decrypted test sequence or the sequence derived therefrom with a product-specific identification sequence (K) contained as a sequence section in the product control sequence or a hash derived therefrom Sequence (h ⁇ K)) is compared.
  • the product control sequence contains all of the information required to determine its authenticity. The authenticity of the product control sequence can therefore only be determined on the basis of the product control sequence itself. be judged without the need for external information.
  • the authenticity of the decrypted test sequence or a sequence derived therefrom is checked by checking the belonging of the decrypted test sequence or the sequence derived therefrom to predetermined quotas.
  • producers are allocated contingents of sequences in advance. In order to check the authenticity of a decrypted test sequence or a sequence derived therefrom, it is determined whether this sequence lies within a quota of one of the producers or not. This has the advantage that the unencrypted information does not have to be contained in the product control sequence in this embodiment of the invention. The product control sequence only has to contain the encrypted information. Therefore, this embodiment of the invention manages with relatively short product control sequences.
  • control interrogator It is advantageous if the legitimacy of the control interrogator is checked as part of a review of a product control sequence. Only authorized dealers should be allowed to query product control sequences. By querying the legitimacy of the control interrogator, the path of the checked product pieces can also be traced.
  • a database entry is created in a logging database as part of a control query for a product control sequence.
  • a logging database can be set up, which includes database entries for all previously checked product control sequences. Assume that a counterfeiter acquires a series of product control sequences from original products and attaches these product control sequences to his counterfeit goods. In this case, the cryptographic process would give the result that the respective product control sequence is real. However, there are now several product items with identical product control sequences on the market. Such multiple use of product control sequences can be detected with the help of the logging database.
  • a database query is carried out in a logging database in order to determine previous control queries relating to the product control sequence of the product piece.
  • a first dealer carries out a control query for the first product pieces available to him and checks the product control sequences attached to the product pieces.
  • the cryptographic process delivers the result that the product control sequences are genuine, and database entries for these product control sequences are also created in the logging database. If, at a later point in time, a second dealer carries out control queries for second product pieces which are provided with identical product control sequences, then it can be determined with the aid of the logging database that control queries for these product control sequences have already been carried out earlier by another dealer.
  • the goods of the first dealer were the original goods and the goods of the second dealer were a counterfeit product, or vice versa. If multiple use is found, the goods available to the querying trader can therefore either be counterfeit or serve as a template for a counterfeit.
  • At least one of: product control sequence, product-specific identification sequence (K), coded test sequence (C), decrypted test sequence, or a corresponding the derived sequence is compared with database entries in the logging database, the product piece, if at least one match is found, being identified as a forgery or as a template for a forgery.
  • a specific product piece can be identified with each of the mentioned sequences, because each of these sequences is individual for the respective product piece. If multiple uses are identified with regard to the sequence used in each case, then there is either a counterfeit or there is an original product that served as a template for a counterfeit.
  • a database entry for a control query includes the date of the control query.
  • a database entry includes the identity of the control interrogator. If multiple use of a product-individualizing sequence is determined, this information can be used to trace the path of the counterfeit products to the retailers involved and the times at which the retailers carried out the control queries.
  • the product protection server structure makes it possible to implement a product protection portal for checking the authenticity of product pieces on the basis of a product control sequence attached to or on the product piece.
  • the product protection server structure comprises a web server module, which makes web pages of the product protection portal available over the Internet.
  • a product protection portal and method for verifying the authenticity of product and product control sequence recorded on the part of a control interrogator is transmitted to the web server module via the Internet, and the result of the authenticity test is transmitted to the control interrogator via the Internet.
  • the product protection server structure includes a cryptographic module, which uses a coded test sequence (C) derived from the product control sequence by means of a decryption method (F2) using decryption sequence (A) is decrypted and a decrypted test sequence is generated.
  • the decryption sequence (A) forms a complementary key pair with the encryption sequence (B) used for the encryption. The authenticity of the decrypted test sequence or a sequence derived therefrom is checked by the cryptographic module.
  • the product protection server structure comprises a logging database which contains at least one database entry for each product control sequence, the authenticity of which has been established.
  • a logging database which contains at least one database entry for each product control sequence, the authenticity of which has been established.
  • the method for generating a product protection identifier can be carried out with the aid of a computer program product which has means for carrying out the corresponding method steps on a computer, a digital signal processor or the like.
  • the method for checking the authenticity of a product piece can also be carried out with the aid of a computer program product which has means for executing the corresponding method steps on a computer, a digital signal processor or the like.
  • 2 shows a schematic illustration of the encryption and decryption of a product-specific identification sequence K
  • 3 shows a representation of the encryption and decryption of a product-specific identification sequence K, a first hash function h ⁇ being applied to the identification sequence K before the encryption;
  • FIG. 5 shows an implementation of a product protection portal accessible via the Internet.
  • a producer 1 of the products, a dealer 2 and the provider of the product protection portal 3 are involved in the product protection system.
  • the producer 1 assigns an individual identification sequence to each of the products manufactured by him. Any bit sequence, number sequence or an alphanumeric character string can be used as the identification sequence. It is advisable to use the serial number of the respective product as a product-specific identification sequence, which is available as part of the production data 5.
  • a coded test sequence 7 must be generated on the basis of the product-specific identification sequence 4 using a secret encryption method.
  • This coded test sequence 7 can again be represented as a bit sequence, as a test number, or as an alphanumeric character string.
  • Encryption methods are used in which a secret encryption sequence is used for encryption. Otherwise, a counterfeiter, who would fall into the hands of the encryption sequence, could himself create any product control sequences.
  • Symmetrical encryption methods which are also referred to as single-key systems or as secret-key systems, can be used as the encryption method. In these methods, a secret key is used both for encryption and for decryption. A sequence encrypted with the secret key can only be decrypted using this secret key, even if the encryption and decryption method is generally known.
  • asymmetrical encryption methods can also be used to encrypt the product-specific identification sequence.
  • the asymmetrical encryption methods are also referred to as two-key methods or as public key methods. Such methods work with
  • Key pairs which each include a secret key and an associated public key.
  • the private key cannot be calculated from the public key with the computing capacity available today.
  • the public key can therefore be made freely accessible. While the private key to be kept secret is only known to its owner and can only be used by it, the public key of a user is freely accessible to all communication participants.
  • the private key of the producer 1 is used to encrypt the product-specific identification sequence 4. This key is only available on the computer system 6 of the producer 1 and may not be published.
  • the associated public key of the key pair is used, which can be transmitted to all dealers and customers without special security measures. In particular, this public key can also be made accessible via the Internet.
  • both sequences can be applied to the product together as a product control sequence 8.
  • the product control sequence 8 can be attached to or on the product piece as a bit sequence, as a sequence of digits, or as an alphanumeric character string.
  • the product control sequence could be, for example, a sequence of digits which has an unencrypted serial number as the first part and an encoded test number as the second part.
  • the product control sequence 8 could also consist exclusively of the coded test sequence 7, in which case the product-specific identification sequence 4 would only be obtained when the product control sequence 8 was decrypted.
  • the product control sequence 8 can be applied in any form on or on the product, for example by printing, embossing, punching, by printing on the packaging, etc.
  • the product control sequence 8 could also be printed on a package insert which is in the packaging of the
  • the product control sequence 8 can be attached to the product in a visually readable form or in a machine-readable form.
  • machine-readable codes for example, bar codes could be considered, but magnetic strips or other magnetizable media could also be used to store the product control sequence 8.
  • the product with the product control sequence 8 attached to it or thereon arrives in a wide variety of distribution channels at a dealer 2 who wants to check the authenticity of the product obtained.
  • the dealer 2 wants to ensure that he has acquired the original product of the producer 1 and not a copy of the product made by a counterfeiter. If the retailer distributes 2 counterfeit product copies, then he risks not being able to continue selling if the counterfeit becomes known. Often the counterfeit products are of poorer quality than the original products, and this would also damage the retailer's reputation 2.
  • the dealer 2 accesses the server structure 11 of the product protection portal 3 via the Internet 10.
  • the dealer 2 must register with the product protection portal with his identifier 12.
  • a login ID and a password are usually used to legitimize user access.
  • the dealer 2 After the dealer 2 has successfully legitimized himself, he can access the websites of the product protection portal which are transmitted from the server structure 11 to his browser via the Internet 10 and displayed there.
  • the dealer On one of the pages, the dealer can enter the product control sequence 8 of the goods available to him in an input window provided for this purpose, whereupon the product control sequence 8 is transmitted to the server structure 11 via the Internet 10.
  • the received product control sequence 8 is checked by means of a first test 13 and a second test 14.
  • the product control sequence 8 contains the coded test sequence 7, and this coded test sequence is decrypted in the first test 13 by means of a decryption method using a decryption sequence.
  • a decrypted test sequence is generated.
  • the decryption process is complementary to the encryption process used by producer 1. If a symmetrical method is used, then the decryption sequence used in the decryption must match the encryption sequence used by the producer 1. With symmetrical methods it is necessary to keep both the encryption sequence and the decryption sequence secret. Since the decryption is carried out centrally in the server structure 11, the secrecy of the decryption sequence can be guaranteed.
  • the coded test sequence can be decrypted using a public decryption sequence, a so-called "public key".
  • a public decryption sequence a so-called "public key”.
  • the decoding sequence does not have to be kept secret on the recipient side. This could be significant for further stages of the project, in which product control is no longer carried out using the central server structure, but rather using a large number of decentralized test devices.
  • the decryption sequence could then be stored as a public key on all test devices.
  • the decrypted test sequence is next compared with the unencrypted identification sequence. If the decrypted test sequence matches the product-specific identification sequence, which was used as the starting point for the calculation of the coded test sequence, the tested product control sequence is inherently consistent.
  • the first test 13 then delivers the result that the product control sequence of the product piece checked by the dealer 2 is authentic. If the decrypted test sequence does not match the product-specific identification sequence, then the product control sequence is incorrect. If other sources of error can be excluded, it is therefore a product falsification. This test result is transmitted from the server structure 11 via the Internet 10 to the web browser of the dealer 2 and displayed there.
  • the product control sequence consists only of the coded test sequence, and the product-specific identification sequence is not part of the product control sequence.
  • the coded test sequence is first decoded using the decryption method in order to generate a decrypted test sequence.
  • the decrypted test sequence obtained in this way can be checked if the test sequence quotas assigned to the individual producers are known on the server structure 11 side. It is checked whether the decoded check sequence is contained in one of these quotas.
  • the product control sequence does not necessarily have to contain the identification number as a component.
  • counterfeit products are conceivable in which the counterfeiter obtains one or more product control sequences from original products and applies these product control sequences to the counterfeit product pieces.
  • the counterfeit product then has an error-free product control sequence and therefore cannot be identified as a counterfeit by the first test 13.
  • a second test 14 is provided, in which the currently queried product control sequence is compared with all previously queried product control sequences. If a product control sequence is copied and applied to a counterfeit product, then in the course of time control queries could be carried out by the retailers involved for both the original product and the counterfeit product. This can lead to multiple queries over the course of the same product control sequence. Such multiple queries are identified in the second test 14 using a logging database 15.
  • a corresponding database entry is created in the logging database 15 for each control query processed by the server structure 11.
  • a database entry contains at least one of the following sequences: the product control sequence, the product-specific identification sequence, the coded test sequence, or the decrypted test sequence.
  • the database entry contains the ID of the dealer who carried out the control query, as well as the date and possibly the time of the control query. As the system is intended for worldwide use, the time zone of the dealer performing the query must be taken into account when logging the date and time. The date and time format must enable the date and time of the various inquiries to be compared internationally.
  • the logging database 15 is searched for entries relating to the product control sequence entered by the dealer for each dealer request. If the product control sequence transmitted by the retailer has been queried earlier, there are two options: the product item could be a counterfeit, but it could also be an original product, the product control sequence of which is used as a template for the production of a counterfeit product Product has been used. Based on the IDs of the participating retailers involved in the entries and the dates and times, further steps can now be taken to check the goods.
  • the dealer 2 receives a message from the server structure 11 via the Internet 10 that the product item is not likely to be is a fake.
  • the encryption and decryption of the product-specific identification sequence K is shown schematically in FIG. On the manufacturer's side, the product-specific identification sequence K is encrypted using the encryption method F1 using the key B, a coded test sequence C being obtained.
  • the coded test sequence C is decrypted using the decryption method F2 using the key A, the product-specific identification sequence K again being obtained. If, in addition to the coded test sequence C, the product-specific identification sequence K is also included as part of the product control sequence, then the identification sequence obtained by decoding can be compared with the identification sequence transmitted as part of the product control sequence. If there is a match, the product control sequence is valid, whereas if there is a mismatch, there may be a fake product control sequence.
  • So-called symmetrical methods which are also referred to as single-key systems or secret-key systems, can be used for encryption and decryption.
  • the encryption method F1 used for security or the corresponding secret key B matches the decryption method F2 used in the control or the corresponding secret key A.
  • both the key B used by the producer for security and the key A used by the product protection portal must therefore be kept secret.
  • the secret key B is only used by the manufacturer, and the necessary measures for keeping the key secret can be taken there.
  • the product control sequences can be generated on computers that are not connected to the Internet.
  • the secret key A is only required for decryption centrally on the server structure side of the product protection portal.
  • the secret key B cannot be derived from different samples of pairs of unencrypted and encrypted information.
  • Another essential feature of symmetrical encryption methods is that the encrypted information (C) cannot be generated from the unencrypted information (K) without the secret key B.
  • One example is the Triple DES method, in which the encryption according to the DES method is used three times in succession, using two or three different keys.
  • DES provides for the encryption of plain text blocks of 8 bytes in length using a 56-bit key to 8-byte ciphertext blocks.
  • Another symmetrical lock The IDEA procedure is based on modulo arithmetic and can be easily implemented in hardware and software.
  • the symmetric encryption methods CAST-128, RC5, or f8 can be used.
  • the procedure was developed f8 in charge of ETSI under the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
  • Method f8 is a stream cipher, and the data block to be encrypted can have a length of 1 to 20,000 bits. It is based on the KASUMI block cipher (block length 64 bits).
  • KASUMI is a derivative of the MISTY algorithm developed by Mitsubishi.
  • Another symmetrical encryption method is the Rijndal algorithm, which uses S-Boxes as non-linear components and can be implemented in both software and hardware.
  • a so-called key management can additionally be provided when using a symmetrical encryption method.
  • different secret keys can be used in chronological order so that the validity of each individual key is limited in time.
  • shell models for key management in which different key components of the inner and outer shell are used together for encryption. For example, different validity periods can be defined for the key components of the inner or outer shells.
  • asymmetrical encryption methods can also be used to encrypt and decrypt the product-specific identification sequence.
  • the identification sequence K is encrypted using an encryption method F1 using a key B.
  • a secret key B must be used, because if to If a public key were to be encrypted, then it would be possible for everyone to generate an associated coded test sequence C for an identification sequence K.
  • the coded test sequence C is decrypted using a decryption method F2 using the key A.
  • asymmetrical method which is also referred to as a two-key or public-key system
  • a public key can be used for decryption, which can be made freely accessible to everyone.
  • the secret key B and the public key A form a complementary key pair.
  • the secret key B used in the encryption cannot be determined either from the decryption method F2 used during the control or from the public key A used for the decryption, at least not with the computer capacities available today.
  • the secret key B can also not be derived from different samples of pairs of unencrypted and encrypted information.
  • the secret key B is therefore only available to the producer and cannot be derived from the information available to the public.
  • Another important feature of asymmetrical encryption methods is that the encrypted information (C) cannot be derived from the unencrypted information (K) without the secret key (B).
  • the RSA method can be used as an asymmetrical encryption method.
  • security is based on factoring large numbers, with the public and private keys depending on a pair of large prime numbers (p, q).
  • the asymmetric encryption method ElGamal is also suitable, in which the security is based on the difficulty of calculating discrete logarithms over a finite field.
  • DSA can also be used, which is also based on the discrete logarithm problem.
  • the asymmetrical fastener uses several parameters, including a prime number p, the bit length of which is synonymously referred to as the key length, a 160-bit prime factor of p-1, and the hash function SHA.
  • the ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
  • hash procedures can be used in addition to the actual encryption procedure.
  • 3 shows how a hash method h is applied to the product-specific identification sequence K before the actual encryption, the hashed identification sequence h x (K) being generated. This hashed identification sequence h ⁇ K) is then encrypted using the encryption method F1 using the key B in order to obtain the encoded test sequence C.
  • the coded test sequence C is first decrypted using the decryption method F2 using the key A, the hashed identification sequence h ⁇ K) being obtained.
  • the inverse function h, -1 of the hash function h ⁇ is applied to this hashed identification sequence hi (K) in order to obtain the product-specific identification sequence K.
  • This identification sequence obtained by decryption can then be compared with the identification sequence transmitted as part of the product control sequence.
  • the coded test sequence C is also first of all by means of the decryption function F2 using the Key A is decrypted, the hashed identification sequence h x (K) being obtained.
  • the hash function h ⁇ is applied to the identification sequence K transmitted as part of the product control sequence, and the hashed identification sequence h ⁇ K) is also generated in the process.
  • the authenticity of the product control sequence can be checked by comparing the hashed identification sequences obtained by decrypting C and the hashed identification sequences obtained by applying h x to K.
  • the security of the encryption can be improved by means of a hash method used before the encryption.
  • the identification sequence K is first encrypted by means of the encryption method F1 using the key B, the coded test sequence C being obtained.
  • the hash function h 2 is then applied to the coded test sequence C in order to obtain the hashed sequence h 2 (C).
  • the inverse function h 2 -1 of the hash function h 2 must first be applied to the hashed sequence h 2 (C) in order to obtain the coded test sequence C.
  • the coded test sequence C can then be converted into the identification sequence K using the decryption method F2 using the key A.
  • a hash procedure used after encryption is particularly suitable for shortening long test sequences. This also shortens the product control sequence, which includes the coded test sequence.
  • the hash method h ⁇ shown in FIG. 3 before encryption can also be used together with a hash method h 2 used after encryption.
  • the decryption function h 2 -1 would have to be used for the decryption, then the received sequence decrypted, and finally the inverse function h ⁇ 1 would have to be used.
  • the hash functions MD 5, SHA-1, RIPE-MD 160, which each deliver a 160-bit hash value, can be used as hash functions h lf h 2 .
  • the hash function MDC-2 can be used, in which the length of the hash value corresponds to twice the block length.
  • FIG. 5 shows how a product protection portal accessible via the Internet can be implemented.
  • the dealer uses his web browser 16 to establish an internet connection 17 with the web server 18 of the product protection portal.
  • a secure Internet connection is preferably established, for example an Internet connection secured by means of the SSL (Secure Socket Layer) protocol, via which the retailer can access the websites of the product protection portal.
  • the web server 18 is designed in such a way that several traders can access it simultaneously. While the internet connection 17 to the first dealer exists, a second dealer can establish an internet connection 20 to the web server 18 via his web browser 19.
  • the web server 18 is responsible for the preparation and transmission of the websites of the product protection portal, the pages, for example, according to the standard
  • HTML Hyper Text Mark-up Language
  • the web server 18 communicates via an interface 21 with the application server 22, on which the applications for processing the dealer inquiries are executed.
  • the web server 18 and the application server 22 can be two separate computers, the communication between these computers being handled via an internal protocol such as SSL.
  • the web server 18 and the application server 22 can also be software modules that can be installed on one and the same server computer. In this case, the interface 21 between the Both modules can be implemented as a common process interface.
  • a product control sequence entered by the dealer also passes via the interface 21 to the application server 22, on which a process 24 responsible for checking the product control sequence is carried out.
  • the process 24 transmits the product control sequence 25 to the crypto server 26.
  • the crypto server 26 can be a separate computer that can be separated from the application server 22 by means of a firewall.
  • the crypto server 26 can also be installed as a cryptography module on the server computer on which the other software modules are also installed.
  • the crypto server 26 decrypts the encoded test sequence contained in the product control sequence 25.
  • the crypto server 26 After the crypto server 26 has carried out the decryption shown in FIGS. 2 to 4, it compares the decrypted test sequence with the unencrypted identification sequence K, which may be contained in the product control sequence 25. In an alternative embodiment of the invention, the crypto server 26 compares the decrypted test sequence with a quota assigned to the respective trader. If a match is found, it is an authentic product control sequence.
  • a second test is also carried out to determine whether this product control sequence has already been queried at an earlier point in time.
  • a process 28 for querying the database is carried out on the application server 22.
  • Process 28 transmits a request ge 29 to a logging database 30.
  • the logging database contains data records on previous queries and is preferably implemented as a relational database which can be queried using the query language SQL (Structured Query Language).
  • Inquiry 29 contains either the product control sequence, the identification sequence, the coded test sequence, the decrypted test sequence, or several of these sequences.
  • the result 31 is transmitted from the logging database 30 to the process 28. If multiple queries have taken place, there is a suspicion of a counterfeit product. If, on the other hand, no previous queries relating to this product control sequence were found in the logging database 30 and the queried product control sequence was identified as genuine by the crypto server 26, then it is highly likely that the product is an original product.
  • a new database entry is created in the logging database 30, which comprises either the product control sequence, or the identification sequence, or the coded test sequence, or the decrypted test sequence (or more of these sequences).
  • the database entry can also contain the ID of the querying dealer and possibly the time and date of the query. Should further queries take place in the future in relation to the queried product control sequence, then such multiple queries can be identified with the help of this database entry.

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un système de protection de produits selon lequel une séquence d'identification (K) est associée individuellement à un produit, cette séquence étant transformée en une séquence de vérification codée (C) par un procédé de codage (F1) au moyen d'une séquence de codage secrète (B). Une séquence de contrôle de produit (8) est appliquée sur le produit, cette séquence comprenant la séquence de vérification codée (C) ou une séquence dérivée de celle-ci. Pour vérifier l'authenticité du produit, la séquence de contrôle de produit est enregistrée au niveau d'un interrogateur de contrôle et transmise par l'intermédiaire d'Internet (10) à un serveur de protection de produits (11), dans lequel une séquence de vérification décodée est dérivée de ladite séquence de contrôle de produit (8) par un procédé de décodage (F2) au moyen d'une séquence de décodage (A). L'authenticité de la séquence de vérification décodée ou d'une séquence dérivée de celle-ci est contrôlée et le résultat de ce contrôle d'authenticité est transmis à l'interrogateur de contrôle par l'intermédiaire d'Internet (10).
EP04739329A 2003-06-25 2004-05-25 Portail de protection de produits et procede de controle de l'authenticite de produits Ceased EP1646988A2 (fr)

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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10328328.5A DE10328328B4 (de) 2003-06-25 2003-06-25 Produktschutz-Portal und Verfahren zur Echtheitsprüfung von Produkten
PCT/EP2004/005581 WO2004114173A2 (fr) 2003-06-25 2004-05-25 Portail de protection de produits et procede de controle de l'authenticite de produits

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EP (1) EP1646988A2 (fr)
JP (1) JP2007507120A (fr)
CN (1) CN100583170C (fr)
DE (1) DE10328328B4 (fr)
WO (1) WO2004114173A2 (fr)

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US8606716B2 (en) 2013-12-10
CN100583170C (zh) 2010-01-20
JP2007507120A (ja) 2007-03-22
US20110082795A1 (en) 2011-04-07
WO2004114173A8 (fr) 2005-09-15
US7580895B2 (en) 2009-08-25
CN1813272A (zh) 2006-08-02
US20090276360A1 (en) 2009-11-05
WO2004114173A3 (fr) 2005-05-26
WO2004114173A2 (fr) 2004-12-29
DE10328328B4 (de) 2015-06-03
DE10328328A1 (de) 2005-01-20
US20060100964A1 (en) 2006-05-11

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