EP1513107A2 - Prévention de la fraude sur un taximètre - Google Patents

Prévention de la fraude sur un taximètre Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1513107A2
EP1513107A2 EP04396054A EP04396054A EP1513107A2 EP 1513107 A2 EP1513107 A2 EP 1513107A2 EP 04396054 A EP04396054 A EP 04396054A EP 04396054 A EP04396054 A EP 04396054A EP 1513107 A2 EP1513107 A2 EP 1513107A2
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
pulse
taximeter
signal
key numbers
key
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EP04396054A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP1513107A3 (fr
EP1513107B1 (fr
Inventor
Veli-Seppo Mäkinen
Keijo Länsikunnas
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Semel Oy
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Semel Oy
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B13/00—Taximeters
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C7/00—Details or accessories common to the registering or indicating apparatus of groups G07C3/00 and G07C5/00

Definitions

  • the invention relates to preventing the misuse of a taximeter. More precisely, the invention relates to a method according to the preamble of claim 1, by which method it is possible to detect and prevent falsifications and frauds made by a taximeter, where the transport data fed in the taximeter is manipulated. The invention also relates to an arrangement for preventing the misuse of a taximeter according claim 10.
  • a taximeter is a measurement device installed in a vehicle, by which the fare of the transport is calculated, and the accumulated fare is shown to the customer.
  • the development of the fare in the course of the trip must be permanently visible for the customer.
  • the fare is calculated on the basis of several different variables, among them the traveled distance, the time used in the trip and possible waiting periods.
  • a taximeter is provided with a printer or a printer interface, a real-time clock, information input means and information exchange means for maintaining a connection to the central system. Taximeters must fulfil the qualification approvals required by the authorities, and the regulations vary according to the country in question.
  • taximeters are generally measurement devices that must be calibrated distinctly for each vehicle and sealed for preventing manipulation and for avoiding misuse.
  • the present application mainly concentrates on detecting possible manipulation of information connected to the traveled distance and on preventing the use of the manipulated information. It can be maintained that in average, the fare displayed by a taximeter is more dependent on the traveled distance than on the time passed in the trip, which time is measured by a clock.
  • a taximeter receives information of the distance traveled by the vehicle for example from a vehicle-specific sensor connected to an odometer provided in connection with the dash speedometer, which sensor sends a number of pulses that is proportional to the traveled distance. The taximeter converts the received pulses to distance on the basis of a given kilometer coefficient (pulses/kilometer).
  • the distance traveled by a vehicle is measured by an electronic or electromagnetic sensor that detects the speed of rotation of the vehicle wheels, and sends an electronic signal that is proportional to the speed of rotation of the wheels from the output interface through a wire to stationary devices of the vehicle that need said information and are provided with an input interface, for example to an electronic odometer and speedometer, as well as to devices that are later installed in the vehicle and provided with an input interface, for example to an electronic taximeter.
  • sensors used in vehicles produce a pulse signal, i.e. a pulse sequence, where the pulse width is directly proportional to the pulse frequency, which again is proportional to the vehicle speed.
  • One way to fraudulently raise the transport fare calculated by the taximeter is to feed extra pulses to the taximeter by a pulse generator. This is carried out by discreetly connecting a pulse generator to the wires by which the taximeter is connected to the vehicle, for example to the wires located between the sensor and the taximeter.
  • the driver can, for instance by means of a separate, suitably concealed switching device, feed extra pulses to the signal wires, and thus fraudulently raise the basis for the fare accumulated in the taximeter.
  • the taximeter receives pulses where the frequency is proportional to the vehicle speed, i.e. to the speed of rotation of the wheel caused by the moving vehicle.
  • the anti-fraud function can only be triggered in cases where a sudden change in the frequency of the received pulse takes place in proportion to a sudden deviation of the average speed between two successive measurement points. If an evenly growing or stabile-frequency deceit pulse is fed by a pulse generator fraudulently in the wires between the sensor and the taximeter, the anti-fraud function is not triggered in the prior art methods, and the fare displayed in the taximeter can be fraudulently raised to the disadvantage of the customer.
  • the object of the invention is to realize a method and arrangement by which the above described drawbacks are avoided, and by which an attempt at a falsification of the pulse signal fed in the taximeter is detected, and the fraud is prevented.
  • Another object of the invention is to trigger a procedure where at least the accumulation of a fare based on the falsified signal is prevented, and advantageously also the distance-based accumulation of the fare in the taximeter is interrupted, and likewise an alarm signal of a falsified signal is advantageously given.
  • a method for detecting and preventing the falsification of a signal fed in a vehicle taximeter is applied in a taximeter provided with a sensor measuring the distance traveled by the vehicle, which sensor is arranged to feed a pulse signal in the taximeter.
  • the pulse widths of the pulse signal received in the taximeter are measured, a key number, such as an average, of the pulse widths of a predetermined pulse set is defined, the relative changes in the key numbers of successive pulse sets are calculated, and the changes are compared with predetermined limit values for detecting a deceit pulse signal; as a result of said comparison, a deviation from the allowed limit values is interpreted as the presence of a deceit pulse signal, and on the basis of this, the falsification of the pulse signal and further a fraud based thereon it is prevented, and an alarm signal indicating a falsification is advantageously given.
  • signal pulses that are fed in a taximeter in the purpose of a falsification i.e. deceit pulses
  • deceit pulses are detected reliably with respect to the prior art, and the development of a fare based on said deceit pulses is prevented, because the method is capable of detecting also such falsified signal pulses where the frequency is not suddenly raised, but the frequency changes evenly or remains constant.
  • an attempt at a fraud is detected more extensively, i.e. more securely than in the prior art.
  • the comparison in the first comparison step is realized between the key numbers of the pulse widths of two such successive pulse sets where at least one pulse set and the respective key number is left between said pulse sets.
  • the comparison is realized between the key numbers of the pulse widths of two immediately successive pulse sets.
  • the second comparison step there is calculated the total number of those pulse sets where the changes in the key numbers of the pulse widths are found to be included in the second fluctuation interval in the key numbers, and the obtained total sum is always compared as it grows to a predetermined limit value, i.e. an integer value; the detection of the reaching of said value is interpreted as the presence of deceit pulses, and at least fraud prevention measures are started.
  • a predetermined limit value i.e. an integer value
  • the arrangement according to the invention for detecting and preventing the falsification of a signal fed in the taximeter of a vehicle is applied in a taximeter provided with a sensor measuring the distance traveled by the vehicle, said sensor being arranged to feed a pulse signal in the taximeter.
  • the arrangement according to the invention includes:
  • An advantage of the method and arrangement according to the invention is that a taximeter can neither be deceived when the pulse frequency of the received pulse is raised evenly, nor when the pulse frequency of the received pulse is raised suddenly. In both cases it is required that there is detected a predefined change in the pulse width, and that thereafter the pulse width remains stabile.
  • An additional advantage of the invention is that the changed pulse width of the received pulse (the frequency remains the same, but the pulse width at the same frequency is different) is detected, which provides a more extensive and more secure protection against fraud attempts than the prior art.
  • Yet another advantage is that the higher the frequency of the input deceit pulse signal (i.e. the bigger the fraud), the faster the deceit is detected. This is based on the fact that as the frequency is raised, the prerequisite for verifying the fraud is realized faster, because the verification is bound to the number of pulses.
  • the fraud system includes a pulse generator 6 connected to the taximeter 1.
  • the vehicle sensor 2 generates an information pulse signal relating to the traveled distance, which signal is transmitted along the wires 4 in electronic form to the devices needing said information and installed in the vehicle as standard equipment, such as an odometer and speedometer 3, as well as to auxiliary equipment, for instance to the taximeter 1.
  • the feeding of deceit pulses to the wires 4, 5 arranged between the sensor 2 and the taximeter 1 is usually carried out by a pulse generator 6 that is switched on and off typically replacing the sensor 2, for example by a two-way switch 7 hidden in the vehicle dashboard.
  • a pulse signal generated by the vehicle is created in a sensor 2 placed in the vehicle gearbox or somewhere else in the power transmission system, which sensor converts the wheel rotation speed to a pulse sequence that is proportional to the speed of rotation.
  • a pulse signal generated by the vehicle means a pulse signal generated by a sensor that is specially and distinctively installed in the vehicle.
  • a vehicle pulse signal P and respectively a deceit pulse signal P h are illustrated in figure 2. Both signals are composed of single pulses p that are timewise in succession and of the intervals of said pulses, which together constitute a pulse signal cycle.
  • the pulse width a means that a lengthwise measure of a signal pulse which, when expressed as timewise duration, starts at the rising edge of the pulse and ends with the falling edge.
  • the pulse signal P generated by the vehicle is represented by a pulse set PJ(X-2), and the pulse width of said pulse signal is a sensor specific feature, for which there can be defined, at certain conditions, an allowed fluctuation range, i.e. limit values, wherebetween the pulse width can vary.
  • the deceit pulse signal P h it is represented by a pulse set PJ(X).
  • the pulse quantity means a predefined number of single pulses p and respectively pulse widths a in a pulse set PJ.
  • the key number KA of the pulse widths of each pulse set PJ means a number defined on the basis of the measured pulse widths of a predetermined pulse set, which key number reflects the pulse widths of the pulse set and correlates with them.
  • the key number KA is the average of the pulse widths a of the pulse set PJ, but as an alternative, it can be the sum of these, the sum as multiplied by a suitable predetermined number, or a predetermined part of the sum, such as said average.
  • the key number KA is a calculatory quantity that is proportional to, preferably directly proportional to the pulse widths a of the pulse set PJ.
  • the chosen number of pulses in the pulse set PJ is four, and respective pulses p and their measured pulse widths a are defined as p1, p2, p3, p4; a1, a2, a3, a4.
  • the number of pulses in a pulse set PJ can be other than four; this is a matter that can be agreed and defined separately in each case.
  • each pulse set PJ always includes an equal amount of pulses p.
  • the pulse width a of a pulse signal P generated by a vehicle can change, or it can remain near to a constant value.
  • the created pulse width is affected by the structure of the sensor. Mechanical arrangements in vehicles are such that in one way or other, the wheel speed of rotation is proportional to the speed of rotation of that mechanical part of the wheel where the detection mechanism of the sensor is located. It is, however, also possible to realize a sensor that generates a pulse signal that is essentially constant irrespective of the speed of rotation. In normal transport service, the changes in the pulse width of the pulse signal are not very drastic, because the acceleration and deceleration of a vehicle are fairly limited.
  • the pulse widths of the pulse signals generated by a vehicle are specific to vehicle sensors and dependent on the structure and construction of the sensors. Consequently the pulse width of the sensor pulse signal is designed to be sufficiently narrow in order to make the information carried by the pulses to be transmitted without errors even at high vehicle speeds, without the pulses being glued to each other. In other words, the pulse width is designed, by calculatory means, according to the highest possible driving speed of the vehicle.
  • the method according to the invention observes the changes taking place in the pulse width of a the pulse signal fed in a taximeter, but it does not estimate the type nor size of the pulse width in various situations.
  • Falsified pulses i.e. deceit pulses P h are detected by suitably comparing the key numbers KA of the pulse widths of test sequences according to the pulse sets PJ.
  • the pulse widths a of successive pulses p in a pulse signal are measured, and in the test sequence, on the basis of the measured pulse width values, i.e. measurement results, there is defined the key number KA, such as an average, of the pulse widths a; a1, a2, a3, a4 of a predetermined pulse quantity, i.e. a pulse set PJ.
  • the result from the test sequence i.e. the key number
  • the pulse width key number obtained from a respective earlier test sequence is compared with the pulse width key number obtained from a respective earlier test sequence, and differences in the key numbers are observed, i.e. the system observes the changes with respect to the allowed fluctuation interval.
  • the comparison is realized between the key number KA(X) of the latest test sequence PJ(X) and the key number KA(X-2) of a test sequence PJ(X-2) that falls two test sequences behind with respect to the former.
  • the key numbers of the pulse widths of two such pulse sets PJ(X), PJ(X-2) where one pulse set PJ(X-1) and the respective test sequence as well as the obtained key number KA(X-1) are skipped in between.
  • deceit pulses P h from a signal source is started at the point of time T that is marked by an arrow in figure 2, in the middle of a pulse set PJ, i.e. in this example a test sequence of four pulses, and simultaneously the feeding of the pulse signal P of the sensor 2 is interrupted.
  • the pulse width a of the pulse signal is changed when the deceit pulse signal P h replaces the sensor pulse signal P, but in this example, it is assumed that the pulse signal frequency remains the same.
  • the pulse frequency of the pulse signal is attempted to be raised in order to gain economic advantage as a result from the falsification, but the change in frequency does not as such affect the detection of deceit pulses in the method and arrangement according to the invention.
  • the key number KA of the pulse width of the pulse set and the corresponding test sequence is not set within the predetermined fluctuation interval, i.e. within the first fluctuation interval, it is probable that a taximeter fraud is taking place, and fraud prevention can in principle be triggered already on these grounds. However, it is advantageous that the fraud prevention function is not yet started in this step, but certain predetermined verification measures are taken.
  • the changes in the key numbers KA of successive pulse widths are surveyed as a continuum in order to be able to make sure that a fraud attempt is going on with the taximeter. In this way, there is eliminated a possible asymmetricality, caused by the measured successive single pulses, that is a typical feature of many sensors. If a change surpassing the predetermined first fluctuation sequence is detected in the key numbers of the test sequences, as was already explained above, and after detecting said change, particularly during the next few test sequences, the pulse width is set at stabile, i.e. constant value, the fraud prevention function is triggered. The stability of the pulse width is also transmitted to the key numbers defined on the basis of the pulse widths of the pulse set, which key numbers also are stabilized and set at an essentially constant value.
  • the staying of the key numbers at said constant value is checked by comparing the change between successive key numbers with a predetermined second fluctuation interval, which is a relatively narrow fluctuation interval. In case the change in the key numbers remains within this fluctuation interval, the last defined key number is interpreted to have stayed, with respect to the latter one, as stabile and at an essentially constant value.
  • the staying constant of the key number must start immediately from the next test sequence after the surpassing of the first fluctuation interval and the respective test sequence.
  • step 101 the vehicle specific sensor 2 (cf. figure 3) sends a pulse signal P proportional to the speed of rotation of the wheels to the taximeter 1 that receives the signal one pulse at a time.
  • the pulse signal transmitted to normal fare calculation, such as to the fare calculation unit 11, is according to the invention started to be observed along with this step, preferably in a special fraud prevention unit 12.
  • the pulse widths a are measured in step 103 from the pulses p received in the taximeter 1. After each measuring step 103, it is checked whether the pulse sequence PJ and simultaneously the test sequence is complete, i.e. whether all pulses belonging to the pulse sequence are already measured.
  • step 105 it is checked that the pulse sequence includes a quantity of pulses that corresponds to the first number A given in step 106.
  • the number A can be any number of pulses indicated by the selected number, for example the pulse quantity can be the kilometer coefficient divided by n, where n is a suitably chosen constant.
  • the kilometer coefficient indicates the signal pulse quantity per kilometer generated by the sensor.
  • the pulse sequence PJ is not yet complete, the system proceeds to the next new pulse and back to step 101.
  • the pulse sequence PJ is found to have the correct measure in pulse quantity, such as four (cf.
  • the key number KA such as the average
  • the key number KA of the pulse widths of said pulse sequence is saved, provided with the respective growing index X, i.e. the value KA(X), in the memory unit 15, in which case X describes the index of the last saved key number.
  • step 109 the above described key number KA(X) of the pulse widths of the pulse sequence is compared with the respective key number KA(X-2) of the earlier pulse sequence that preceded the former behind two pulse sequences.
  • step 109 there is calculated the difference between said key numbers KA(X), KA(X-2) i.e. the change in the key number describing the pulse widths, and in step 111 the change is compared with the first given limit values, i.e. with the first fluctuation interval B defined thereby.
  • step 117 If the change in the key number of the pulse set has remained within the first fluctuation interval B (preferably including the set limit values) and it has not changed over the allowed fluctuation interval, i.e. the key number change at most is equal to the first fluctuation interval B given in step 112, we next proceed to step 117, where it is checked whether the fraud investigation function is switched on. In other words, in step 117 it is checked whether a falsified pulse, i.e. a deceit pulse, is already detected and registered in an earlier step. If the fraud investigation function is not switched on, we proceed from step 117 to the next pulse to be received in step 101.
  • a falsified pulse i.e. a deceit pulse
  • step 113 If the change in the key number KA of the pulse set has not remained within the first fluctuation interval B, but it has surpassed the allowed first fluctuation interval B, we proceed to step 113, where the fraud investigation function is switched on, i.e. activated. Thereafter we proceed to process the next received pulse in step 101.
  • the accumulated total of possible "used" pulses that has been summed up in the sum calculator (cf. step 121) and is not needed anymore is reset at the same time according to step 114.
  • step 117 of the method If in step 117 of the method it is found that the fraud investigation function is switched on, i.e. a deceit pulse signal has been detected earlier, we proceed to step 119. Now it is investigated whether the key number KA(X) of the pulse widths of said pulse set has changed in comparison with the key number KA(X-1) of the pulse widths of the preceding pulse set. Now the difference, i.e. the change in the key numbers is in step 118 compared with the given second limit values, i.e. the second fluctuation interval C.
  • step 118 If the detected change in the key number KA in step 118 surpasses the second fluctuation interval C, i.e. is bigger than the set fluctuation interval C, we next proceed to step 127, where the fraud investigation function is switched off, i.e. it is canceled, and we proceed to step 101 and to the reception of a new pulse.
  • the result means that the key number KA fluctuates from one pulse sequence to another in a normal way, and there is no reason to suspect a fraud.
  • step 119 If the detected change in the key number KA in step 119 remains within the second fluctuation interval C, i.e. is equal or smaller than the set fluctuation interval C, this means that the key number KA does not fluctuate from one pulse sequence to another in way typical for a normal sensor signal P, but is set at an essentially constant value, which means that there is reason to suspect a fraud.
  • step 121 the pulse quantity, such as 4, of said pulse sequence, having the key number KA(X), is added to the accumulated sum, i.e. to the sum calculator 174 (cf. figure 5).
  • step 123 the contents of the sum calculator are compared with a third limit value D, which is a pulse quantity that is set in advance in step 124.
  • step 101 If the number of pulses required by the third limit value D is not yet accumulated in the sum calculator, we proceed to step 101.
  • the pulses of the pulse sets PJ remain essentially unchanged as regards their pulse width and at the same time their key number KA for the duration of a predetermined number D of pulses, it is considered to prove that there is reason to suspect a fraud. Consequently, when the limit value D is at least reached (or even surpassed), and this has been detected in step 123, a fraud is detected and this is indicated, step 125, further by sending an operation command signal further for starting fraud prevention functions, step 129.
  • step 123 when it is detected in step 123 that a deceit pulse has been fed in the sensor wires and further in the taximeter 1, the distance measurement of the taximeter 1 is interrupted in step 129, or some other fraud prevention function is activated, and an alarm is preferably given.
  • the arrangement according to the invention for preventing the falsification of a signal fed in the taximeter of a vehicle is illustrated as a block diagram in figures 3 and 5.
  • the taximeter 1 comprises a control unit 10 for controlling its operation, such as a microprocessor provided with a memory unit and other auxiliary circuits, as well as a display, a keypad and other suitable auxiliary devices for ensuring an appropriate use and function of the taximeter; said auxiliary devices are not illustrated in the drawings.
  • the control unit 10 includes, among others, a fare calculation unit 11 and a device according to the invention, which device is simply called a fraud prevention unit 12 in the description below.
  • Preferably said fraud prevention unit 12 is realized as a unit composed of one or more computer programs inside the control unit 10.
  • the fraud prevention unit 12 comprises a pulse width measuring unit 13, a key number calculation unit 14, a memory unit 15, a key number change calculation unit 16 and a comparison unit 17 proper, as illustrated in figure 5.
  • the pulse width measuring unit 13 receives the pulse signal P, P h and measures the pulse widths a of the pulse signal.
  • the key number KA of each pulse sequence PJ is defined on the basis of the pulse widths a of the pulse sequence in the key number calculation unit 14.
  • the key numbers of the pulse sequences are recorded in the memory unit 15 provided by a suitable index X describing their chronological order, for instance a running number growing by incrementals of one.
  • the differences in the key numbers of the pulse sets PJ i.e. the changes that indicate changes in the pulse widths of the pulse sets, are calculated in a change calculation unit 16 and advantageously recorded in the memory unit 15.
  • the changes in the key numbers KA are compared in a comparison unit 17 with suitable predetermined limit values B, C, D. When the results depart from the limit values in a predetermined way, it means that an attempt at deceiving the taximeter 1 is going on at the moment in question.
  • a taximeter in addition to functions connected to detecting a fraud, also comprises one or several fraud prevention functions proper, which likewise are preferably realized by means of a computer program, such as a fraud prevention unit 18.
  • a fraud prevention unit 18 The accumulation of extra payment on the basis of falsified pulses, i.e. deceit pulses in the odometer and display of the taximeter is prevented by a fraud prevention unit 18.
  • Said fraud prevention unit 18 is realized according to regulations stipulated separately in each country, and the activation of the prevention function results in that for example the accumulation of distance-based fare is interrupted in the taximeter, an indication of a falsified distance pulse appears on the display, the taximeter is switched to a mode that can only be exited by opening the sealing, or some other corresponding function is performed.
  • the comparison measures proper such as steps 111, 119 and 123, their follow-up functions, such as steps 113, 114, 117, 121, 125 and the setting of the limit values B, C and D are advantageously realized in the comparison unit 17.
  • the measures proper for preventing a fraud, when a deceit is detected, is realized in the fraud prevention unit 18, and the alarm indicating the detection of a fraud is realized in the alarm unit 19.
  • the comparison unit 17 comprises a first comparator 171, a mode indicator 172 and a second comparator 173.
  • the first comparator 171 the relative change in the key numbers KA of the pulse widths of two successive pulse sets PJ is compared with a predetermined fluctuation interval B of the first key numbers.
  • the first comparator 17 there is formed the absolute value, i.e. change value, of the difference of the key numbers KA, such as averages, of the pulse widths of the two pulse sets, and said change value is compared with predetermined maximum and minimum limit values, i.e. the fluctuation interval B.
  • the mode indicator 172 has two modes: the first mode is a standby mode, and the second mode is a operation mode indicating the fraud investigation function.
  • the mode indicator 172 is switched from the standby mode to the operation mode, in case the result obtained on the basis of the comparison realized by the first comparator 171 falls outside the fluctuation interval B.
  • the relative change in the key numbers KA of the pulse widths of two successive pulse sets PJ is compared with a predetermined second fluctuation interval C of the key numbers in a case where the mode indicator 172 is switched to the operation mode.
  • the second comparator 173 there is formed the absolute value, i.e. the change value, of the key numbers KA, such as averages, of the pulse widths of two successive pulse sets, and said change value is compared with second predetermined maximum and minimum limit values, i.e. with the second fluctuation interval C.
  • the output signal of the second comparator 173 is an operation command signal, when the changes in the key numbers KA of the pulse widths of two successive pulse sets fall within the fluctuation interval C and the key numbers are essentially unchanged constant values.
  • the output signal of the second comparator 173 is a cancel signal, when the changes in the key numbers of the pulse widths of successive pulse sets fall outside the fluctuation interval.
  • the operation mode of the mode indicator 172 is canceled by a cancel signal, and the mode indicator is returned to the standby mode.
  • the first comparator 171 is arranged to perform a comparison between the key numbers KA(X), KA(X-2) of the pulse widths of two such successive pulse sets, where at least one pulse set and the respective key number KA(X-1) are skipped over in between.
  • the second comparator 173 is arranged to perform a comparison between the key numbers KA(X), KA(X-1) of the pulse widths of successive pulse sets.
  • the comparison unit 17 also includes a sum calculator 174 and a third comparator 175.
  • the sum calculator 174 is connected to a second comparator 173.
  • the sum calculator 174 there is arranged to be fed an integer, advantageously one, from the second comparator 173, always when the key numbers of the pulse widths of successive pulse fall within the second fluctuation interval C.
  • the third comparator 175 the integer sum of the sum calculator 174 is compared with a predetermined limit value, i.e. a second integer value D; the detection of the reaching of said value is arranged to trigger the sending of an operation command signal as the output signal of the comparison unit 17.
  • the first limit values and the first fluctuation interval B defined thereby is a change of no more than 25 percent in the key number, preferably an average
  • the second limit values and the second fluctuation interval C defined thereby is a change of no more than 5 percent in the key number, preferably an average
  • the third limit value i.e. the integer value D
  • is preferably a kilometer coefficient divided by a suitable integer n, advantageously n 2.
  • the fraud prevention function interrupts the accumulation of a fare based on a falsified signal in the taximeter.
  • the fraud prevention function interrupts the accumulation of a distance-based fare in the taximeter.
  • the fraud prevention function also sends an alarm signal of a detected falsified signal to the alarm means.
  • the fraud prevention function switches the taximeter to an operation mode that requires the sealing to be broken, until the taximeter can be restarted.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
EP04396054A 2003-09-05 2004-08-20 Prévention de la fraude sur un taximètre Expired - Lifetime EP1513107B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FI20031264A FI20031264A (fi) 2003-09-05 2003-09-05 Taksamittarin väärinkäytön estäminen
FI20031264 2003-09-05

Publications (3)

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EP1513107A2 true EP1513107A2 (fr) 2005-03-09
EP1513107A3 EP1513107A3 (fr) 2006-06-07
EP1513107B1 EP1513107B1 (fr) 2009-04-15

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EP04396054A Expired - Lifetime EP1513107B1 (fr) 2003-09-05 2004-08-20 Prévention de la fraude sur un taximètre

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EP (1) EP1513107B1 (fr)
AT (1) ATE428998T1 (fr)
DE (1) DE602004020562D1 (fr)
DK (1) DK1513107T3 (fr)
FI (1) FI20031264A (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN112074882A (zh) * 2018-05-11 2020-12-11 开利公司 用于对联网的警报单元进行测试的系统和方法

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5155747A (en) * 1991-03-20 1992-10-13 Huang Chung Hwa Anti-fraud means for digital measuring instrument
FR2703493A1 (fr) * 1993-04-01 1994-10-07 Ricard Claude Procédé et dispositif électronique, d'adaptation entre un capteur électronique de distance parcourue par un taxi ou par un camion, et le taximètre ou le chronotachygraphe associé à ce capteur.
EP0664528A1 (fr) * 1994-01-25 1995-07-26 Claude Ricard Procédé et dispositif pour éviter les fraudes sur un taxi équipé d'un taximètre ou sur un camion équipé d'un chronotachygraphe
EP0750178A2 (fr) * 1995-06-20 1996-12-27 VDO Adolf Schindling AG Méthode de détection de manipulations à la mesure de la distance parcourue par un véhicule et mesurées par un générateur d'impulsions
FR2792093A1 (fr) * 1999-04-06 2000-10-13 Claude Ricard Procede pour eviter les fraudes sur un taximetre ou chronotachygraphe

Patent Citations (5)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5155747A (en) * 1991-03-20 1992-10-13 Huang Chung Hwa Anti-fraud means for digital measuring instrument
FR2703493A1 (fr) * 1993-04-01 1994-10-07 Ricard Claude Procédé et dispositif électronique, d'adaptation entre un capteur électronique de distance parcourue par un taxi ou par un camion, et le taximètre ou le chronotachygraphe associé à ce capteur.
EP0664528A1 (fr) * 1994-01-25 1995-07-26 Claude Ricard Procédé et dispositif pour éviter les fraudes sur un taxi équipé d'un taximètre ou sur un camion équipé d'un chronotachygraphe
EP0750178A2 (fr) * 1995-06-20 1996-12-27 VDO Adolf Schindling AG Méthode de détection de manipulations à la mesure de la distance parcourue par un véhicule et mesurées par un générateur d'impulsions
FR2792093A1 (fr) * 1999-04-06 2000-10-13 Claude Ricard Procede pour eviter les fraudes sur un taximetre ou chronotachygraphe

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN112074882A (zh) * 2018-05-11 2020-12-11 开利公司 用于对联网的警报单元进行测试的系统和方法

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ATE428998T1 (de) 2009-05-15
EP1513107A3 (fr) 2006-06-07
DK1513107T3 (da) 2009-06-02
DE602004020562D1 (de) 2009-05-28
FI20031264A (fi) 2005-03-06
FI20031264A0 (fi) 2003-09-05
EP1513107B1 (fr) 2009-04-15

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