EP1472690A1 - Module cryptographique destine a l'enregistrement et a la reproduction de supports audio et video electroniques proteges en matiere de copie et d'utilisation - Google Patents

Module cryptographique destine a l'enregistrement et a la reproduction de supports audio et video electroniques proteges en matiere de copie et d'utilisation

Info

Publication number
EP1472690A1
EP1472690A1 EP02792632A EP02792632A EP1472690A1 EP 1472690 A1 EP1472690 A1 EP 1472690A1 EP 02792632 A EP02792632 A EP 02792632A EP 02792632 A EP02792632 A EP 02792632A EP 1472690 A1 EP1472690 A1 EP 1472690A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
cryptographic module
key
sound
module
media
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP02792632A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Juergen K. Lang
Ursula Maria Bing
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of EP1472690A1 publication Critical patent/EP1472690A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/441—Acquiring end-user identification, e.g. using personal code sent by the remote control or by inserting a card
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G06F21/109—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM] by using specially-adapted hardware at the client
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00137—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving measures which result in a restriction to contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier to authorised users
    • G11B20/00159—Parental control systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0071—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a purchase action
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00731—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction
    • G11B20/00746—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction can be expressed as a specific number
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00731—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction
    • G11B20/00746—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction can be expressed as a specific number
    • G11B20/00797—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction can be expressed as a specific number wherein the usage restriction limits the number of times a content can be reproduced, e.g. using playback counters
    • G—PHYSICS
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    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00731—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction
    • G11B20/00818—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction limits the signal quality, e.g. by low-pass filtering of audio signals or by reducing the resolution of video signals
    • G—PHYSICS
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    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00855—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a step of exchanging information with a remote server
    • G—PHYSICS
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    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00884—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a watermark, i.e. a barely perceptible transformation of the original data which can nevertheless be recognised by an algorithm
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04N21/20—Servers specifically adapted for the distribution of content, e.g. VOD servers; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/23—Processing of content or additional data; Elementary server operations; Server middleware
    • H04N21/234—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing of video streams or manipulating encoded video stream scene graphs
    • H04N21/2347—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing of video streams or manipulating encoded video stream scene graphs involving video stream encryption
    • H04N21/23476—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing of video streams or manipulating encoded video stream scene graphs involving video stream encryption by partially encrypting, e.g. encrypting the ending portion of a movie
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04N21/25—Management operations performed by the server for facilitating the content distribution or administrating data related to end-users or client devices, e.g. end-user or client device authentication, learning user preferences for recommending movies
    • H04N21/254—Management at additional data server, e.g. shopping server, rights management server
    • H04N21/2543—Billing, e.g. for subscription services
    • H04N21/25435—Billing, e.g. for subscription services involving characteristics of content or additional data, e.g. video resolution or the amount of advertising
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/418—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
    • H04N21/4181—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access for conditional access
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
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    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/44—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream or rendering scenes according to encoded video stream scene graphs
    • H04N21/4405—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream or rendering scenes according to encoded video stream scene graphs involving video stream decryption
    • H04N21/44055—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream or rendering scenes according to encoded video stream scene graphs involving video stream decryption by partially decrypting, e.g. decrypting a video stream that has been partially encrypted
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
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    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/45—Management operations performed by the client for facilitating the reception of or the interaction with the content or administrating data related to the end-user or to the client device itself, e.g. learning user preferences for recommending movies, resolving scheduling conflicts
    • H04N21/462—Content or additional data management, e.g. creating a master electronic program guide from data received from the Internet and a Head-end, controlling the complexity of a video stream by scaling the resolution or bit-rate based on the client capabilities
    • H04N21/4627—Rights management associated to the content
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/60—Network structure or processes for video distribution between server and client or between remote clients; Control signalling between clients, server and network components; Transmission of management data between server and client, e.g. sending from server to client commands for recording incoming content stream; Communication details between server and client 
    • H04N21/63—Control signaling related to video distribution between client, server and network components; Network processes for video distribution between server and clients or between remote clients, e.g. transmitting basic layer and enhancement layers over different transmission paths, setting up a peer-to-peer communication via Internet between remote STB's; Communication protocols; Addressing
    • H04N21/633—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client
    • H04N21/6332—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client
    • H04N21/6334—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client for authorisation, e.g. by transmitting a key
    • H04N21/63345—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client for authorisation, e.g. by transmitting a key by transmitting keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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    • H04N21/80—Generation or processing of content or additional data by content creator independently of the distribution process; Content per se
    • H04N21/81—Monomedia components thereof
    • H04N21/8106—Monomedia components thereof involving special audio data, e.g. different tracks for different languages
    • H04N21/8113—Monomedia components thereof involving special audio data, e.g. different tracks for different languages comprising music, e.g. song in MP3 format
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04N21/80—Generation or processing of content or additional data by content creator independently of the distribution process; Content per se
    • H04N21/83—Generation or processing of protective or descriptive data associated with content; Content structuring
    • H04N21/835—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates
    • H04N21/8355—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates involving usage data, e.g. number of copies or viewings allowed
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
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    • H04N21/80—Generation or processing of content or additional data by content creator independently of the distribution process; Content per se
    • H04N21/83—Generation or processing of protective or descriptive data associated with content; Content structuring
    • H04N21/835—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates
    • H04N21/8358—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates involving watermark
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N5/00—Details of television systems
    • H04N5/76—Television signal recording
    • H04N5/91—Television signal processing therefor
    • H04N5/913—Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/162—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing
    • H04N7/163—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing by receiver means only
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/167—Systems rendering the television signal unintelligible and subsequently intelligible
    • H04N7/1675—Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2135—Metering
    • G—PHYSICS
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    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00007—Time or data compression or expansion
    • G11B2020/00014—Time or data compression or expansion the compressed signal being an audio signal
    • G11B2020/00057—MPEG-1 or MPEG-2 audio layer III [MP3]
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    • G11B20/10—Digital recording or reproducing
    • G11B20/10527—Audio or video recording; Data buffering arrangements
    • G11B2020/10537—Audio or video recording
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    • H04N5/913—Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection
    • H04N2005/91307—Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection by adding a copy protection signal to the video signal
    • H04N2005/91328—Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection by adding a copy protection signal to the video signal the copy protection signal being a copy management signal, e.g. a copy generation management signal [CGMS]
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    • H04N2005/91357—Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection by modifying the video signal
    • H04N2005/91364—Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection by modifying the video signal the video signal being scrambled

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a cryptographic module for storing and playing back copy and usage-protected electronic sound and image media in a recipient, the scope of use lawful for the recipient being regulated and observed by the module.
  • cryptographic modules are used in many areas of data processing exactly where data content or electronic processes are to be protected separately against unauthorized manipulation.
  • Cryptographic modules must therefore be able to ward off attempts at manipulation or temporarily interrupt or end their own functionality when a manipulation is discovered.
  • level 1 level 1
  • the FIPS PUB 140 standard specifies level 1 ("security level 1") as the lowest security level for a cryptographic module.
  • level 1 is the complete absence of "physical security” (e.g. through external sealing, etc.). Rather, a normal PC can be used to carry out cryptographic processes at a low security level while observing the requirements specified in the standard.
  • level 2 level 2
  • level 2 level 2
  • a physical seal or closure of the module is now provided ("tamper evident coating or seals, or pick.” -resistant lock ").
  • this seal only serves to prove whether an unauthorized physical access to the module or an opening of the module has taken place.
  • Another important difference to level 1 is that role-based authentication of the user must take place. This level of security is popular in practice because of the balance between security requirements and security costs, but for highly secure applications such as digital signature creation and the secure use of sensitive cryptographic information, security is considered insufficient by professionals.
  • level 3 level 3
  • level 3 level 3
  • numerous security measures are required from level 3 onwards.
  • An important measure concerns physical security. Seals are included in this To attach the level in such a way that its manipulation or opening leads to the deletion of the information contained in the cryptographic module. Attempting to unauthorized access to a cryptographic module of level 3 leads to the destruction or deletion of the module. fe 3 requires authentication of the user on an individual basis. Security-relevant interfaces of the module must still be physically separated. Parameters of the cryptographic module must usually be transferred to the module in encrypted form or removed from the module in encrypted form, etc. All of these measures lead to that a level 3 cryptographic module is considered very secure in the professional world.
  • level 4 level 4
  • level 4 level 4
  • a maximum level of security measures that can currently be achieved is required from level 4. This is achieved with a second protective wall around the actual cryptographic module, the so-called “envelope”. Even if the outer wrapper is breached (eg physical cutting), this attempt to attack should be actively discovered and lead to an automatic deletion of the data content.
  • the level 4 cryptographic module observes itself and, in the event of an attack, automatically decides to delete its security-related content.
  • the level 4 module is protected against non-contact environmental attacks, for example due to temperature fluctuations and electromagnetic interference.
  • cryptographic modules used for the secure storage of information are the electronic ID card and cards for storing
  • the main task of solder cryptographic modules is to store certain information within a secure area (the cryptographic module) in such a way that unauthorized manipulation of this information is not possible without destroying the cryptographic module and thus the information it contains.
  • cryptographic processes would not be required with this application, since it is not the main purpose of the cryptographic module to encrypt or decrypt data.
  • data import and data export processes are generally secured by secure authentication, ie by using encryption and signatures.
  • Cryptographic modules for the implementation of cryptographic processes of encryption and signature Probably the most widespread high-quality cryptographic modules in the future will be the so-called signature cards.
  • Cryptographic modules for special purposes. Cryptographic modules can be further developed for special purposes. An important example is the patent for a "security module and method for creating counterfeit-proof documents", which also went back to the applicant of the present cryptographic module. With the German patent
  • DE 100 20 561 C2 provides a cryptographic module which is a central component of the so-called "PC franking" of Deutsche Post for the creation of electronic "Intemef stamps.
  • a random number was formed in this security module which was based on secure is transferred electronically to a central office of Deutsche Post and is retransmitted with an encryption known only by Deutsche Post
  • a weakened variant of a cryptographic module which can at least be broadly understood under this term, is that of the so-called decoder for encrypted television broadcasts ("pay TV").
  • these decoders are generally completely identical (i.e. not customer-specific) and are not based on cryptographic-analytical encryption, but on an element of obfuscation (such "security by obscurity" is rejected by experts in the case of high security requirements, since there are secure methods without obfuscation).
  • security is also ensured via the
  • the problem with the known cryptographic modules is that they are not suitable for decrypting and encrypting copy- and usage-protected audio and video media and their data content with the aim of collecting license fees in accordance with usage.
  • the cryptographic modules used to date either serve to securely store information (e.g. ID card, money card), for encryption / decryption and signature of dedicated user data (signature card, usually for text data), for the generation of forgery-proof documents (e.g. electronic stamps) or for decoding encrypted television signals ("Pay-TV").
  • Cryptographic modules for however, the intended purpose is not known!
  • the invention is based on the object of further developing generic systems and methods in such a way that the required combination of secure storage, cryptographic processing of flowing information with individual keys is performed in real time (in contrast to batch processing) by a cryptographic module.
  • the object is achieved in that the cryptographic module is completely or partially encrypted or encrypted in the recipient's encrypted or encrypted data content of electronic audio and video media or keys for decrypting this data content while preserving usage rights and conditions of use and then decrypting it and then for the purpose of storage or Replay, in turn, is encrypted or encrypted so that license fees can be charged based on usage.
  • An advantageous embodiment of the cryptographic module is characterized in that the authorization of the use of the cryptographic module for the reproduction and storage of sound and image media, for viewing and changing the terms of use and for billing license fees is checked by authenticating the authorized user prior to the corresponding implementation ,
  • the reliability of the sound and image media within the cryptographic module is based on the validity of the certificate issued by a credible certification body of a key of the publisher of the sound and image media by means of a cryptographic see module stored test key of the certification body is carried out.
  • the reliability of the playback device within the cryptographic module is based on the validity of the certificate issued by a credible certification body for the playback device by means of a test key of the certification body stored in the cryptographic module.
  • the reliability of electronic communication partners within the cryptographic module is carried out on the basis of the validity of the communication partner's certificate issued by a credible certification body by means of a test key of the certification body stored in the cryptographic module.
  • An expedient version of the cryptographic module consists in that, while avoiding the processing of extensive sound and image data within the cryptographic module, only key data for decrypting this sound and image data are processed.
  • usage rights and terms of use are stored temporarily or permanently within the cryptographic module in order to serve as a basis for decision on playback, storage or license billing during further use.
  • An advantageous embodiment of the cryptographic module is that the license fee billing within the module is carried out in such a way that the license fee billing can only be continued in accordance with the terms of use in the course of lawful use when carrying out conversion processes.
  • the license-compliant use of a user-specific key for the conversion of keys for the reproduction of audio and image information outside of the cryptographic module is stored with a digital signature by the cryptographic module with a note of the specific section of the specific sound and image information with the identification of the activation in accordance with the license provided.
  • the cryptographic module is operated together with a PC-based application program which supports the transactions for license-appropriate use by providing a graphical user interface.
  • the present method and system is to be introduced by several companies in the media industry under the project name "m.sec". Special features of m.sec are described below.
  • MP3 received special support from the "Napster" internet exchange, which, partly on the verge of legality and partly outside of legality, apparently offered private exchange campaigns between Internet users in general in a public setting and thus encouraged the illegal transfer of music tracks to third parties.
  • M.sec meets this need by offering the following advantages:
  • the encrypted sound and image data can be provided with certain usage rights (eg number of reproductions and copying processes) and additional information.
  • m.sec provides the following architecture:
  • the recipient has an individual, personalized chip card (the so-called “m.card”), which is used as a cryptographic
  • Corresponding playback and display devices e.g. personal computers, CD players, Walkman, TV etc.
  • the plug-in chip card m.card
  • FIG. 1 The three possible transmission paths, identified as A, B and C, are shown in FIG. 1:
  • transmission path A e.g. television, TV
  • transmission path A there is a continuous, direct reception of sound and image data, in extreme cases in an uninterrupted data stream with no beginning and end. (so-called "streaming")
  • transmission path B there is a remote transmission of audio and video media (e.g. as an Internet download). as dedicated, closed files.
  • audio and video media e.g. as an Internet download
  • the picture and sound information is available to the recipient on physically provided sound and picture media (e.g. CDs or DVDs).
  • sound and picture media e.g. CDs or DVDs.
  • the m.card serves as a key to encoding between the encryption of the
  • the m.card serves as a conversion tool between the encryption of the publisher and the personal encryption of the m.card. This conversion is usually associated with costs, for example in cryptographic
  • the encryption is canceled by the publisher within the m.card by decryption, the right to create a local copy is checked, the encryption is carried out with the m.card's own key and the creation of a copy is initiated.
  • the m.card serves as a conversion tool between the encryption of the Publisher and the playback unit.
  • the encryption by the publisher is reversed within the m.card by decryption, the right to playback is checked and playback is initiated.
  • This conversion is usually associated with costs that can be tracked, for example, in the cryptographic module. In FIG. 1, this corresponds to the transmission path C in connection with the measure for the recipient, identified by the number 1), namely immediate playback. If the audio and video information is not in an encrypted state according to Number 2 temporarily stored in FIG.
  • the information about the first-time decryption of precisely defined audio signals can be reproduced for the repeated reproduction of the unencrypted data.
  • image data are stored either in the cryptographic module itself or outside the cryptographic module, provided with a digital signature of the cryptographic module.
  • the m.card's own encryption within the m.card is undone by decryption and playback is initiated.
  • content from audio and video media (e.g. for a separate fee) is activated as "re-publishable" and encrypted again with the m.card's own key, it can be passed on to third parties.
  • third parties have the option of
  • Decryption (e.g. for a fee) as well as this for sound and image data that comes directly from publishers.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates the use of keys in the overall system.
  • the certification body (“Certification Authority”, CA) is now added as a new party, who acts as a neutral, trustworthy party Instance or "trust center” guarantees the issuance of keys.
  • the certification body has a so-called "main” key maini. Encryption with this first "master key” can be decrypted with the counterpart to this "master key, which is in every m.card.
  • the "master key” is, for example, a symmetrical key according to TDES with at least 168 bit key length.
  • keys according to other encryption methods and with different key lengths for example asymmetrical keys with a length of 1024 bits, can be used, with asymmetrical methods for example keeping the private key in the certification body and the public key in the cryptographic modules m.cards.
  • asymmetric keys would not really publish the "public" key component in the cryptographic module m.card, but also in a secure manner in the cryptographic module Module introduced and would not be known to the recipient.
  • the "main key is at least duplicated, so that in an emergency there is the possibility, both in the certification body and in the m.cards, to switch to a second or even further" main key n main 2 , main n .
  • the symmetrical variant is shown and explained, regardless of whether symmetrical or asymmetrical keys are used as the “main key”.
  • the maini key in the certification body would correspond to the private key and the main x key in the cryptographic module would correspond to the associated public key.
  • the individual publishers receive a new "media” key medx (see step 1 in Fig. 2) from the certification body, for example annually.
  • this generally symmetrical key indirect, namely via changing "melody” - Keys ", which are referred to in their sequence as” key melody "that encrypts the data contents (for an explanation, see below).
  • Other encryption methods e.g. asymmetrical or according to elliptic curves
  • the key med ⁇ for decryption is not available in the m.card, it is supplied in a further encrypted form together with the data content of the audio and video media.
  • the publisher "media" key is encrypted at the certification body using the "main key mainx".
  • the publisher "media” key encrypted with the "master key” is also digitally signed by the certification body
  • the certification authority creates a so-called digital fingerprint from the encrypted publisher "media” key, which is then encrypted with the private signature key of the certification authority priv CA (cf. steps 2 and 3 in FIG. 2).
  • the publisher of the "media” key is only available in a cryptographic module Make sure that the “media key cannot be read out, but can only be used according to the intended purpose.
  • This signature of the certification body is checked later in the cryptographic module m.card by the self-certificate of the certification body stored there, which contains the public counterpart pub CA of the signing key of the certification body as well as its signature with the signing key.
  • the public counterpart pub CA of the signing key of the certification body as well as its signature with the signing key.
  • only the public key of the certification body can be stored there.
  • the publisher now encrypts data content with so-called “melody” keys that change in chronological order (e.g. every minute or every second), which in their sequence form the so-called “key melody”. It makes sense for the changing "melody" keys to be random keys using any, e.g. symmetrical, methods such as TDES with 128 bits. Alternatively, other keys can also be used as random keys (cf. step 4 in FIG. 2).
  • the key melody is encrypted with the "media” key from the publisher med: and transmitted to the recipient along with the encrypted audio and video information on the transmission path or medium (see step 5 in Fig. 2).
  • the key melody encrypted with the "media” key is referred to as "crypto melody”.
  • At least the following four pieces of information are transferred to the recipient along with the actual audio and video information on the transmission path or on the medium (further information may include authorizations and usage information such as prices):
  • the "media” key medx is now learned in advance of decrypting the data content in the m.card. Since this is still enclosed in encrypted and signed form with the audio and visual media, the public key in the m.card is used first Key of the certification authority pub CA the certificate or signature of the certification authority is checked (cf. step 8 in FIG. 2). The “media” key is then decrypted using the “main key ainx” contained in the m.card and used for decryption (see step 9 in Fig. 2). Regardless of whether the sound and image media are to be played back immediately or temporarily stored, the crypto melody is now decrypted to the key melody using the previously decrypted “media” key (cf. step 10 in FIG. 2).
  • the certificate sig CA ⁇ pub re ⁇ created by the certification body for the playback unit (or the design of the playback unit) is first transferred from the playback unit to the cryptographic module and there using the deposited public key of the certification body pub CA checked (see step 11 in Fig. 2).
  • the asymmetrical keys of the pub re and priv re playback unit are usually not individually different key pairs, but keys that are changed with each new design of the playback unit and are identical within one construction type.
  • REPLACEMENT LEAF TIRE 26 checked certificate taken public key of the playback unit encrypted (rdm) pubre and transferred to the playback unit (cf. step 12 in Fig. 2).
  • the key melody is then encrypted in the cryptographic module with the playback key rdm (cf. step 13 in FIG. 2) and forwarded to the playback unit together with the still encrypted media data (cf. step 14 in FIG. 2).
  • the playback key thus takes on the function of a temporary "media” key. "Recording" the data exchanged between the cryptographic module and the playback unit cannot be used for unauthorized pirated copies, since the encrypted key melody cannot be decrypted.
  • the playback key is decrypted in the playback unit, with which the key melody can be decrypted, with which the media data can finally be decrypted for final playback.
  • the unencrypted key melody present in the cryptographic module with an individually assigned and securely stored "card” key med car d encrypted (cf. step 15 in FIG. 2)
  • the key melody thus newly encrypted to form a card-specific crypto melody is stored together with the still encrypted media data on any data carrier, for example on the hard disk of the PC (cf. step 16 in Fig. 2.
  • This card key acts like a publisher "media” key, but, in contrast to this, is usually not added to the sound and image media for security reasons.
  • special card keys as well as the publisher "media” key can be added to the audio and video media in encrypted form.
  • the encryption of the card key takes place, similar to the publisher "media” key, with another "main key” that is present in each card. It is also sensible with this alternative to add the encrypted card key together with a signature of a certification body to the audio and video media. This alternative makes it possible to have the sound and image media encrypted with one card reproduced on another card. This may make audio and video media "re-publishable", subject to a charge.
  • master media and signature keys reduces the overall risk of corruption of the entire system: By using relatively fewer “media” keys (eg one per publisher per year), the sensitive "master key” is used as little as possible , which makes it difficult to uncover the key in the course of cryptanalysis, but even the actually serious uncovering of the "main key” (which is still present in every m.card) does not yet lead to failure of the overall system, because this also uncovered the well secured signing key from the certification body would be required. Only through the interaction of "main key,” media "key and signing key is a simple and secure copy and usage protection guaranteed.
  • the card can contain one or more keys that are used to secure the communication.
  • an asymmetrical pair of keys pub cara and priv card with min. 1024 bit key length is also possible.
  • other key methods eg symmetrical or based on elliptic curves
  • With enough space on the possible If there is sufficient storage space on the card or in the cryptographic module, duplication to two asymmetric key pairs is possible, with one of the key pairs exclusively for decryption and one of the key pairs exclusively for creating digital signatures based on a recommendation from the Federal Office for Information Security BSI is used.
  • the public key of the pub card card is certified by the issuing body or directly by the certification authority (in the latter case: sig CA ⁇ card identity + pub card ⁇ .) for third parties, the assignment of card number and public key can be ensured with confidence. Subsequently, secure communication regarding confidentiality, integrity and liability is possible with any third party.
  • the m.sec cryptographic module fulfills several functions that can be listed as follows:
  • Secure electronic communication also primarily relates to the implementation of sales and decryption as well as the generation and verification of digital signatures for communication with communication partners, eg internet-based servers.
  • Communication does not refer to sound and image data, but to the exchange of usage and license fee information, the secure exchange of keys and the change of personal and usage-related data. In this way, all data exchanged between the communication partner and the cryptographic module can be secured by encryption and digital signature.
  • keys see the last paragraph in the previous section on the use of keys in the overall system.
  • the task of the cryptographic module is to collect, manage and adhere to the securely transmitted usage information.
  • the cryptographic module must store or prevent copies or playback processes intended by the user of the cryptographic module in accordance with the usage information. Usage information and terms of use can be stored temporarily or permanently in the cryptographic module in order to serve as a basis for decision-making for playback, storage or license billing. Management of existing activations
  • Sound and image media that are saved for later playback in accordance with the m.sec procedure explained above can then be played back without further payment of license fees.
  • the re-encoded audio and video medium itself provides information about the activation carried out.
  • the situation is different with broadcast programs or unchangeable sound and video carriers such as CDs or DVDs, for which it is not possible to convert them.
  • the cryptographic module takes over the task of storing this activation information. Two types of storage are possible. On the one hand, the "inbound" storage, in which information about the activation of a specific section of a specific medium is stored securely within the cryptographic module and cannot be manipulated without authorization by the user.
  • the information about the activation of a specific one is stored Sections of a certain medium outside the cryptographic module, for example in the CD player, on a PC hard drive or in a central database in such a way that an unauthorized manipulation of this information can not take place. This is achieved through the digital signature or encryption of this information by the cryptographic module. In return, media that have already been released may only be reproduced after checking the information stored within the cryptographic module. Particularly in the case of the “out-bound” method, the verification of one's own digital signature or the decryption with a key contained only within the cryptographic module is required within the cryptographic module before playback.
  • the cryptographic module is used by the individual recipient, ie the authorized owner of the m.card. To prevent unauthorized use of the m.card, authentication of the authorized user is provided by entering a password or a “PIN” code. All actions provided with the cryptographic module, in particular those that are relevant in terms of license fees, may be performed by the cryptographic Module can only be carried out after secure authentication of the legitimate user.
  • An important task of the cryptographic module is to charge for the individual use of
  • the m.card cryptographic module In addition to the described processes for decrypting and encrypting media data, the m.card cryptographic module also takes on the task of billing license fees. For this purpose, the asymmetrical key pair or the key pair doubled with regard to its intended use is used.
  • the m.card basically supports two types of billing:
  • the certified public key of the m.card pub oard (including the certificate) is used to set up the communication, which enables the billing or charging point to check the authenticity of the identity of the card (via the certificate) and for subsequent communication to use the m.card public key to encrypt messages to the m.card.
  • the billing or loading point transmits its public key certified by the certification body to m.card, the authenticity of which can be checked using the public key of the pub CA certification body already stored in the card. Subsequently, messages from the m.card to the billing or loading point are encrypted using the public key of the billing or loading point. If two key pairs are used for separate encryption and signature, both certified public keys must be transmitted to the communication partner.
  • the exchange of messages between the m.card and the billing or loading point can involve the following information:
  • Cryptographic modules that correspond to the m.sec method can be implemented as microprocessor-based systems, for example as integrated circuits.
  • a preferred option in the implementation is a personal cryptographic module, which is designed as a microprocessor chip card or as a dongle.
  • the m.card cryptographic module is mainly used for the purpose of playing and storing released audio and video media. Accordingly, the cryptographic module within or in the periphery of potential playback and storage devices such as in TV sets, radios, CD players, DVD players, video recorders, video cameras, projection systems and PCs is useful.
  • a corresponding attachment of a chip card reader in or on the playback or storage device or a plug for inserting the dongle is advantageous.
  • the cryptographic module can be used network-based. It is possible, for example, to use the cryptographic module at a central point (e.g. on the Internet) with which playback and storage devices can communicate via electronic networks.
  • a central point e.g. on the Internet

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un module cryptographique destiné à l'enregistrement et à la reproduction de supports audio et vidéo électroniques protégés en matière de copie et d'utilisation, au niveau d'un destinataire, le domaine d'utilisation légal accordé au destinataire étant régulé et respecté par le module. Selon l'invention, le module cryptographique décode ou décrypte, au niveau du destinataire, des contenus de données entièrement ou partiellement codés ou cryptés de supports audio et vidéo électroniques ou des clés de décodage de ces contenus de données, avec respect des droits d'utilisation, puis les code ou crypte à nouveau pour l'enregistrement ou la reproduction, de manière que les taxes de licence puissent être prélevées en fonction de l'utilisation.
EP02792632A 2001-12-30 2002-12-04 Module cryptographique destine a l'enregistrement et a la reproduction de supports audio et video electroniques proteges en matiere de copie et d'utilisation Withdrawn EP1472690A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10164131A DE10164131A1 (de) 2001-12-30 2001-12-30 Kryptographisches Modul zur Speicherung und Wiedergabe kopier-und nutzungsgeschützter elektronischer Ton- und Bildmedien
DE10164131 2001-12-30
PCT/DE2002/004435 WO2003058618A1 (fr) 2001-12-30 2002-12-04 Module cryptographique destine a l'enregistrement et a la reproduction de supports audio et video electroniques proteges en matiere de copie et d'utilisation

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