EP1891638A1 - Systeme et procede de restitution de supports-son et de supports-image proteges contre le piratage et l'utilisation non autorisee - Google Patents

Systeme et procede de restitution de supports-son et de supports-image proteges contre le piratage et l'utilisation non autorisee

Info

Publication number
EP1891638A1
EP1891638A1 EP02794968A EP02794968A EP1891638A1 EP 1891638 A1 EP1891638 A1 EP 1891638A1 EP 02794968 A EP02794968 A EP 02794968A EP 02794968 A EP02794968 A EP 02794968A EP 1891638 A1 EP1891638 A1 EP 1891638A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
key
playback
media
sound
encryption
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP02794968A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Juergen K. Lang
Ursula Maria Bing
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of EP1891638A1 publication Critical patent/EP1891638A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/418—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
    • H04N21/4182—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access for identification purposes, e.g. storing user identification data, preferences, personal settings or data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00137—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving measures which result in a restriction to contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier to authorised users
    • G11B20/00159—Parental control systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00731—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction
    • G11B20/00746—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction can be expressed as a specific number
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00731—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction
    • G11B20/00818—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction limits the signal quality, e.g. by low-pass filtering of audio signals or by reducing the resolution of video signals
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00855—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a step of exchanging information with a remote server
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00884—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a watermark, i.e. a barely perceptible transformation of the original data which can nevertheless be recognised by an algorithm
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/418—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
    • H04N21/4181—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access for conditional access
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/436—Interfacing a local distribution network, e.g. communicating with another STB or one or more peripheral devices inside the home
    • H04N21/4367—Establishing a secure communication between the client and a peripheral device or smart card
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/80—Generation or processing of content or additional data by content creator independently of the distribution process; Content per se
    • H04N21/83—Generation or processing of protective or descriptive data associated with content; Content structuring
    • H04N21/835—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates
    • H04N21/8355—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates involving usage data, e.g. number of copies or viewings allowed
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N5/00—Details of television systems
    • H04N5/76—Television signal recording
    • H04N5/91—Television signal processing therefor
    • H04N5/913—Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/162—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing
    • H04N7/163—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing by receiver means only
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/167—Systems rendering the television signal unintelligible and subsequently intelligible
    • H04N7/1675—Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00007—Time or data compression or expansion
    • G11B2020/00014—Time or data compression or expansion the compressed signal being an audio signal
    • G11B2020/00057—MPEG-1 or MPEG-2 audio layer III [MP3]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/10—Digital recording or reproducing
    • G11B20/10527—Audio or video recording; Data buffering arrangements
    • G11B2020/10537—Audio or video recording
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N5/00—Details of television systems
    • H04N5/76—Television signal recording
    • H04N5/91—Television signal processing therefor
    • H04N5/913—Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection
    • H04N2005/91357—Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection by modifying the video signal
    • H04N2005/91364—Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection by modifying the video signal the video signal being scrambled

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a system and method for the reproduction of copy-protected and usage-protected electronic sound and image media and their data contents, the data contents of the electronic media being encrypted in such a way that their complete reproduction or display cannot take place without the implementation of cryptographic processes.
  • D / A converters are used to reproduce digital electronic media, for example to convert a digital data stream that represents sound information into analog vibrations or signals that are sent in an amplified form to a loudspeaker with the aim the transformation into acoustic (air) vibrations can be transferred.
  • digital VA-analog converters or D / A converters for short, are used to reproduce digital electronic media, for example to convert a digital data stream that represents sound information into analog vibrations or signals that are sent in an amplified form to a loudspeaker with the aim the transformation into acoustic (air) vibrations can be transferred.
  • analog image signals for display e.g. by means of a television tube.
  • the aim of a D / A converter is to convert the data stream representing the sound and image information as accurately as possible, without errors and with avoidance of self-generated distortions into analog signals.
  • PCM pulse code modulation
  • the digital data stream consists of individual, absolutely quantified amplitude values which are known for each individual Sampling time exist.
  • the compact disc this means that 44100 amplitude values per second with a range of values of 16 bits (value range 0 to 65535 or -32767 to +32767) are present in the data stream.
  • D / A converters are characteristic of all previously known converters that digital data are supplied to the input of the D / A converter, which represent an analog signal and from which algorithm amplitude values can be calculated or generated during the conversion.
  • the invention is based on the object of further developing existing systems and methods for reproducing electronic sound and image media and their data contents in such a way that the data contents of the electronic media are encrypted in such a way that their complete reproduction or display is not possible without the implementation of cryptographic processes can take place.
  • the object is achieved in that a playback unit transmits the data contents of electronic audio and video media, which are delivered for playback in fully or partially encrypted or encrypted form, by means of one or more “melody” keys for decrypting the data contents was transmitted from an authentic source to the playback unit, decrypted for playback and transferred from the digital to the analog domain in such a way that the data content of the electronic audio and video media is never available in unencrypted form as a copyable digital data stream.
  • An advantageous embodiment of the method and a preferred embodiment of the system are characterized in that the transmission of the “melody” key or keys is securely ensured by means of cryptographic encryption or encryption.
  • the encryption or encryption for the secure transmission of the "melody” key or for the decryption or decryption of the data content takes place by means of a "media” key, which is taken over by the secure, authentic source.
  • the “media key for decrypting or decrypting the“ melody ”key for decrypting or decrypting the data content or data is a“ playback ”key that is not regularly used for playing back the corresponding Data content is used.
  • a practical embodiment of the method and a preferred embodiment of the system are distinguished furthermore from the fact that a cryptographic module serves as the authentic source of the key, which, after decoding or decrypting the electronic sound and image information or its key, originating from the author, creator, processor or distributor, again encrypts or encrypts it in such a way that only a playback unit can decrypt or decrypt it.
  • the "playback" key which is used in the cryptographic module as a result of an encapsulation process for the encryption or encryption of the electronic audio and video media, or the key for
  • Decryption or decryption of the electronic sound and image media is used, is transferred securely and authentically from the cryptographic module in advance to the playback unit.
  • the "playback" key used in the cryptographic module for encryption or encryption of the "melody” key is generated in advance by the cryptographic module according to the random principle or according to algorithms that make it difficult to predict.
  • the keys of the playback unit which are used in the cryptographic module to encrypt or encrypt the "playback" key for transmission to the playback unit, differ in different playback units.
  • the two data streams of the encrypted audio and video media on the one hand and the "melody" key to be decrypted initially with the decrypted "playback” key on the other hand only meet in the course of the actual digital-to-analog conversion, so that there is no decrypted digital data stream of sound and image data.
  • the shift registers used in the digital-to-analog conversion are constructed in such a way that they require calibration information, which is formed by the decrypted “melody” key, to convert their content representing the sound and image signals.
  • MP3 received special support from the "Napster" internet exchange, which, partly on the verge of legality and partly outside of legality, apparently offered private exchange campaigns between Internet users in general in a public setting and thus encouraged the illegal transfer of music tracks to third parties.
  • M.sec meets this need by offering the following advantages:
  • the encrypted sound and image data can be provided with certain usage rights (eg number of reproductions and copying processes) and other additional information. • When the sound and image data are played back, the data are also not transmitted unencrypted. Decryption takes place only with the so-called digital-to-analog conversion (D / A conversion).
  • m.sec provides the following architecture:
  • the recipient has an individual, personalized chip card (the so-called “m.card”) which, as a cryptographic module, provides functionalities that cannot be manipulated by him. (Cf. "Cryptographic module for the recipient, m.card” in Fig. 1)
  • Corresponding playback and display devices e.g. personal computer, CD player, Walkman, TV etc.
  • the plug-in chip card m.card
  • transmission path A e.g. television, TV
  • streaming the three possible transmission paths
  • transmission path B there is a remote transmission of audio and video media (e.g. as an Internet download). as dedicated, closed files.
  • audio and video media e.g. as an Internet download
  • the picture and sound information is available to the recipient on physically provided sound and picture media (e.g. CDs or DVDs).
  • sound and picture media e.g. CDs or DVDs.
  • the m.card serves as a key to encoding between the encryption of the publisher and the playback unit.
  • the encryption is canceled by the publisher within the m.card by decryption, the right to playback is checked and playback is initiated.
  • This conversion is usually associated with costs, e.g. can be tracked in the cryptographic module. In FIG. 1, this corresponds to the transmission path A in connection with the measure for the recipient, identified by the number 1), namely immediate playback.
  • the m.card serves as a conversion tool between the encryption of the publisher and the personal encryption of the m.card.
  • This conversion is Usually associated with costs that can be tracked, for example, in the cryptographic module. In FIG. 1, this corresponds to the transmission path B in connection with the measure at the recipient, identified by the number 2), namely the local storage of the
  • the encryption is canceled by the publisher within the m.card by decryption, the right to create a local copy is checked, the encryption is carried out with the m.card's own key and the creation of a copy is initiated.
  • the m.card serves as a conversion key between the encryption of the publisher and the playback unit.
  • the encryption by the publisher is reversed within the m.card by decryption, the right to playback is checked and playback is initiated.
  • This conversion is usually associated with costs that can be tracked, for example, in the cryptographic module. In FIG. 1, this corresponds to the transmission path C in connection with the measure for the recipient, identified by the number 1), namely immediate playback. If the audio and video information is not in the decrypted state according to Number 2 temporarily stored in FIG. 1, the information about the first decryption of precisely defined sound and image data can be stored either in the cryptographic module itself or outside the cryptographic module, provided with a digital signature of the cryptographic module, for the repeated reproduction of the unencrypted data be deposited. 4.
  • the m.card serves as a conversion tool. This conversion is usually free of charge, since one-time costs for the activation were raised when it was originally saved. In FIG. 1, this corresponds to the measure at the recipient marked with the number 3), namely the later reproduction.
  • the m.card's own encryption within the m.card is undone by decryption and playback is initiated.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates the use of keys in the overall system.
  • the certification authority (“Certification Authority”, CA) is now added as a new party, acting as a neutral, trustworthy entity or "Trust Center” guarantees the issuance of keys.
  • the certification body has a so-called "main” key maini. Encryption with this first "main” key can be decrypted with the counterpart to this "main” key, which is in every m.card.
  • the "main” key is, for example, a symmetrical key according to TDES with at least 168 bit key length.
  • keys can also be used using other encryption methods and with other key lengths, for example asymmetrical keys with a length of 1024 bits, with asymmetrical methods for example keeping the private key in the certification authority and the public key in the cryptographic modules m.cards.
  • the individual publishers receive a new "media” key ms ⁇ (see step 1 in Fig. 2) from the certification body, for example, each year to encrypt their audio and video media.
  • This generally symmetrical key indirect, namely via changing "melody” - Keys ", which are referred to in their sequence as” key melody ", which encrypts the data contents (for an explanation, see below).
  • Other encryption methods eg asymmetrical or according to elliptic curves
  • the medi key for decryption is not available in the m.card, it is supplied in a further encrypted form together with the data content of the audio and video media.
  • the publisher "media” key is encrypted at the certification body using the "main” key aini.
  • the publisher "media” key (medi) main encrypted with the "Haupf” key is also digitally signed by the certification body sigc A ⁇ (med I ) main ⁇ .
  • the certification authority creates a so-called digital fingerprint from the encrypted publisher "media” key, which is then encrypted with the private signing key of the certification authority priv CA (see steps 2 and 3 in FIG. 2).
  • the publisher does not have the possibility of calculating the "main” key by means of cryptanalysis or by trial and error
  • the publisher of the "media” key is only available in a cryptographic module in such a way that he can not read the "media key, but can only use it according to the intended purpose.
  • This signature of the certification body is checked later in the cryptographic module m.card by the self-certificate of the certification body stored there, which contains the public counterpart pub CA of the signing key of the certification body as well as its signature with the signing key.
  • the publisher now encrypts data content with so-called “melody” keys that change in chronological order (e.g. every minute or every second), which in their sequence form the so-called “key melody”. It makes sense for the changing "melody" keys to be random keys using any, e.g. symmetrical, methods such as TDES with 128 bits. Alternatively, other keys can also be used as random keys (cf. step 4 in FIG. 2).
  • the key melody is encrypted with the "media” key from the publisher med ;: and transmitted to the recipient along with the encrypted audio and video information on the transmission path or medium (cf. Step 5 in Fig. 2.
  • the key melody encrypted with the "media” key is referred to as "crypto melody”.
  • the encrypted "media” key originally provided to the publisher by the certification body is also transferred to the recipient (cf. step 6 in FIG. 2) as well as the certificate or the digital signature also provided by the certification body the encrypted "media” key (see step 7 in Fig. 2).
  • At least the following four pieces of information are transferred to the recipient along with the actual sound and image information on the transmission path or on the medium (further information may include authorizations and usage information such as prices):
  • Form is included with the audio and visual media, is first used with the public key in the m.card
  • Certification body pub CA checked the certificate or signature of the certification body (cf. step 8 in FIG. 2).
  • the “media” key is then decrypted with the “main” key maini present in the m.card and used for decryption (cf. step 9 in FIG. 2).
  • the crypto melody is now decrypted to the key melody using the previously decrypted “media” key (cf. step 10 in FIG. 2).
  • This reveals itself here now the advantage of changing melody keys that make up the key melody composed.
  • the cryptographic module taking into account the computing capacity of the cryptographic module, only one media key that is valid for a certain time has to be processed in this module. Even if a single melody key were to be found out publicly, for example by cryptanalysis or trying it out, this would only have an effect on a short sequence of sound and image data that are no longer protected.
  • the key melody must not be read out. This is guaranteed by using the cryptographic module.
  • the certificate sig CA ⁇ pub r ⁇ ⁇ issued by the certification body for the playback unit (or the design of the playback unit) is first transferred from the playback unit to the cryptographic module and there using the deposited public Key of the certification authority pub CA checked (see step 11 in Fig. 2).
  • the asymmetrical keys of the pub re and priv re playback unit are usually not individually different key pairs, but keys that are changed with each new design of the playback unit and are identical within one design.
  • a random or unpredictable temporary "playback" key rdm is generated in the cryptographic module, encrypted (rdm) pubre with the public key taken from the previously checked certificate and transferred to the playback unit (see step 12 in FIG . 2).
  • the key melody is then encrypted in the cryptographic module with the playback key rdm (cf. step 13 in FIG. 2) and, together with the still encrypted media data, sent to the playback input. passed on (see step 14 in Fig. 2).
  • the playback key thus takes on the function of a temporary "media” key. "Recording" the data exchanged between the cryptographic module and the playback unit cannot be used for unauthorized pirated copies, since the encrypted key melody cannot be decrypted.
  • the playback key is decrypted in the playback unit, with which the key melody can be decrypted, with which the media data can finally be decrypted for final playback.
  • the unencrypted key melody present in the cryptographic module with an individually assigned and securely stored "card" key card - Key encrypted med card (cf. step 15 in FIG. 2)
  • the key melody newly encrypted in this way to form a card-specific crypto melody is stored together with the still encrypted media data on any data carrier, for example on the hard disk of the PC (cf. step 16 2)
  • This card key acts like a publisher "media” key, but, in contrast to this, is usually not added to the audio and video media for security reasons.
  • special card keys as well as the publisher "media” key can be added to the audio and video media in encrypted form.
  • the card key is encrypted, similar to the publisher "media” key, with another "main” key that is present in each card. It also makes sense with this alternative to encrypt the card key together with a signature of a card. Certification body to attach to the sound and image media.
  • This alternative makes it possible to have the sound and image media encrypted with one card reproduced on another card. As a result, sound and image media may become “re-publishable” for a fee.
  • the main media and signature key By using the main media and signature key, the risk of corruption of the entire system is reduced overall: By using relatively fewer “media” keys (eg one per publisher per year), the sensitive "main” key is used as little as possible, which makes it difficult to uncover the key in the course of the cryptanalysis, but even the actually serious uncovering of the "main” key (which is present in every m.card) does not lead to a failure of the overall system, because this also uncovered the well-secured one Signing key of the certification body would be necessary. Only through the interaction of "main” key, "media” key and signing key is a simple and secure copy and usage protection guaranteed.
  • Playback units that correspond to the m.sec process can be implemented as integrated circuits and used as a replacement or as an alternative to existing digital-to-analog converters, e.g. in televisions, radios, CD players, DVD players, video recorders, video cameras, projection systems, PC sound cards and PC graphics cards.
  • the above devices offer a corresponding communication interface.
  • the preferred alternative during implementation is local communication with the cryptographic module, which is designed as a microprocessor chip card or as a dongle. Accordingly, the attachment of a chip card reader in or on the playback device or a plug for inserting the dongle is advantageous.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Reverberation, Karaoke And Other Acoustics (AREA)
  • Signal Processing For Digital Recording And Reproducing (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système et un procédé permettant de restituer des supports-son et des supports-image électroniques protégés contre le piratage et l'utilisation non autorisée, ainsi que leurs contenus de données. Lesdits contenus de données des supports électroniques sont codés de sorte que leur restitution ou leur représentation complète ne puisse intervenir sans le déroulement de processus cryptographiques. A cet effet, il est prévu selon l'invention, qu'une unité de restitution décode, à des fins de restitution, les contenus de données des supports-son et des supports-image électroniques, fournis codés ou chiffrés, en partie ou en totalité, pour la restitution, au moyen d'une ou de plusieurs clés « mélodie », ladite clé ayant été transmise dans l'unité de restitution à partir d'une source authentique, et que ladite unité de restitution transfère lesdits contenus de données des domaines numériques dans les domaines analogiques, de sorte que lesdits contenus de données des supports-son et des supports-image ne soient à aucun moment décodés, sous forme de flux de données numérique pouvant être copié.
EP02794968A 2001-12-30 2002-12-04 Systeme et procede de restitution de supports-son et de supports-image proteges contre le piratage et l'utilisation non autorisee Withdrawn EP1891638A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10164133A DE10164133A1 (de) 2001-12-30 2001-12-30 System und Verfahren zur Wiedergabe kopier- und nutzungsgeschützter Ton- und Bildmedien
PCT/DE2002/004434 WO2003060907A1 (fr) 2001-12-30 2002-12-04 Systeme et procede de restitution de supports-son et de supports-image proteges contre le piratage et l'utilisation non autorisee

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
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US (1) US7334134B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP1891638A1 (fr)
AU (1) AU2002360887A1 (fr)
DE (1) DE10164133A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2003060907A1 (fr)

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JP4888057B2 (ja) * 2006-11-01 2012-02-29 富士通セミコンダクター株式会社 情報処理装置
JP2011225949A (ja) * 2010-04-21 2011-11-10 Ibiden Co Ltd 炭素部品および炭素部品の製造方法

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Publication number Publication date
US20050010791A1 (en) 2005-01-13
WO2003060907A1 (fr) 2003-07-24
US7334134B2 (en) 2008-02-19
AU2002360887A1 (en) 2003-07-30
DE10164133A1 (de) 2003-07-17

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